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V9.14.028.2026.06.18 
Signed-off-by: Marc S. Weidner <msw@coresecret.dev>
2026-06-18 10:49:41 +01:00

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---
gitea: none
include_toc: true
---
# 1. CISS.debian.live.builder
**Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard**<br>
*Debian Live Build Generator for hardened live environment and CISS Debian Installer*<br>
**Master Version**: 9.14<br>
**Build**: V9.14.028.2026.06.18<br>
# 2. CISS.debian.live.builder – Boot & Trust Chain (Technical Documentation)
**Status:** 2026-06-18<br>
**Audience:** CICA CISO, CISS staff, technically proficient administrators<br>
**Summary:** The **CISS.debian.live.builder** Live-ISO establishes a two-stage verification chain around the live root: after the CISS LUKS/dm-integrity container has been opened, and the live medium context has been exposed, `0030-ciss-verify-checksums` verifies the mounted live-medium checksum manifest, detached signature, and signer fingerprint; `0024-ciss-crypt-squash` preserves the rootfs attestation artifacts from the real ISO medium into a stable initramfs runtime cache; later, `0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest` verifies the signed rootfs attestation manifest, and the exact final SquashFS payload bytes copied into the decrypted LUKS mapper. UEFI Secure Boot can use either the default Microsoft/Debian shim chain, or a CISS-signed UKI chain for systems that trust the CISS Secure Boot key material.<br>
# 3. Overview
* **Trust anchor:** Pinned fingerprint (FPR) of the signing key embedded at build time in initramfs hooks.
* **Integrity and authenticity verification:**
1. **Mounted live medium:** After `0024-ciss-crypt-squash` has opened the encrypted container and exposed `/run/live/medium`, verify `sha512sum.txt` using `gpgv`, FPR pinning, and checksum execution.
2. **Decrypted rootfs payload:** Preserve the external rootfs attestation manifest and detached signature before live-boot may replace or unmount the medium view, verify the cached manifest using `gpgv` and FPR pinning, then verify the exact SquashFS payload bytes from the decrypted mapper with `sha512sum -c`.
* **Storage-level confidentiality and keyed sector integrity:** `dm-crypt` (AES-XTS-512) and `dm-integrity` (HMAC-SHA-512, 4 KiB).
* **Remotely unlock:** CISS hardened and build dropbear, modern primitives only, no passwords, no agent/forwarding.
# 3.1. Secure Boot Profiles
The builder supports two built-time Secure Boot profiles:
* `debian-shim` (default): keeps the broadly portable live-build path. The ISO is built as `iso-hybrid` with BIOS and UEFI
bootloaders, and UEFI Secure Boot loads the Microsoft-signed Debian shim before Debian-signed GRUB.
* `ciss-uki`: intended for amd64 systems whose firmware trusts the CISS Secure Boot public key through db, or a custom
PK/KEK/db model. A late binary hook builds and signs a UKI from the final `binary/live/vmlinuz-*` and
`binary/live/initrd.img-*` artifacts, then installs it as `EFI/BOOT/BOOTX64.EFI` inside `binary/boot/grub/efi.img` and
mirrors it into the ISO EFI tree when live-build created one.
The `ciss-uki` path is:
```text
UEFI firmware -> EFI/BOOT/BOOTX64.EFI (CISS-signed UKI) -> Linux
```
The private EFI signing key remains outside `binary/`, `chroot/` and `config/includes.*`; the binary hooks fail if the CISS
private Secure Boot key names are detected in those paths before live-build checksum generation.
# 4. Primitives & Parameters
| Component | Primitive / Parameter | Purpose |
|--------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| LUKS2 | `aes-xts-plain64`, `--key-size 512`, `--sector-size 4096` | Confidentiality (2×256-bit XTS) |
| dm-integrity | `hmac-sha512` (keyed), journal | Keyed per-sector integrity for the opened mapping; not origin authenticity |
| PBKDF | `argon2id`, `--iter-time 1000` ms, `--pbkdf-memory 262144`, `--pbkdf-parallel 1` | Bounded key derivation cost for initramfs unlock |
| Signatures | Ed25519 or RSA-4096 (FPR pinned) | Public verifiability, non-repudiation |
| Verification | `gpgv --keyring <pinned-keyring>` | Explicit keyring selection and no agent dependency in initramfs |
| Hash lists | `sha512sum` format | Deterministic content verification |
| Dropbear | Modern KEX/AEAD (per `localoptions.h`) | Minimal attack surface, remote unlock |
# 5. Diagram: CISS Live ISO Boot Flow
```mermaid
flowchart TD
subgraph Trusted HW Manufacturer
0000["System Power On"] e00@--> 0010["CPU reset 0xFFFFFFF0, POST"];
0010 e01@--> 0020["UEFI DXE Phase enumerates devices"];
0020 e02@--> 0030["Secure Boot (if enabled): db, dbx, KEK, PK loaded from NVRAM"];
e00@{ animation: fast }
e01@{ animation: fast }
e02@{ animation: fast }
end
subgraph Trusted Secure Boot
0030 e03@--> |debian-shim| 0040["Secure Boot: load & verify \EFI\BOOT\BOOTX64.EFI (shim)"];
0040 e04@--> |SUCCESSFUL| 0050["shim: load & verify \EFI\BOOT\GRUBX64.EFI"];
0050 e05@--> 0060["GRUB: load vmlinuz + initrd.img, set cmdline"];
0030 e06a@--> |ciss-uki| 0045["Secure Boot: load & verify \EFI\BOOT\BOOTX64.EFI (CISS UKI)"];
0045 e06b@--> 0060;
e03@{ animation: fast }
e04@{ animation: fast }
e05@{ animation: fast }
e06a@{ animation: fast }
e06b@{ animation: fast }
end
subgraph Trusted Live ISO
0060 e06@--> 0070["Transfer Control to Kernel Entry Point"];
0070 e07@--> 0080["Decompress Kernel"];
0080 e08@--> 0090["/init Phase"];
0090 e09@--> 0100["Starting CISS.hardened dropbear"];
0100 e10@--> 0110["Executing live-boot, mounting ISO FS"];
0110 e11@--> 0122["Executing 0022-ciss: Hardening tmpfs for OverlayFS upper/work"];
0122 e12@--> 0124["Executing 0024-ciss: Mount ISO medium and locate /live/ciss_rootfs.crypt"];
0124 e13@--> CACHE["0024-ciss: Preserve rootfs attestation artifacts in /run/ciss-rootfs-attestation"];
CACHE e13b@--> LUKSOPEN["0024-ciss: LUKS open (dm-crypt & integrity)"];
LUKSOPEN e13c@--> |SUCCESSFUL| LUKS["Decrypted mapper exposed; livefs_root=/run/live/medium set"];
LUKS e14@--> 0126["Executing 0026-ciss: Hardening early sysctls"];
0126 e15@--> 0130["Executing 0030-ciss: Mounted live-medium checksum and signature verification"];
0130 e16@--> |SUCCESSFUL| ROOT["9990-overlay: Mount SquashFS / OverlayFS"];
ROOT e17@--> 0142["Executing 0042-ciss: Attestation of RootFS SquashFS payload"];
0142 e18@--> 0145["init-bottom: stop CISS.hardened dropbear, tear down initramfs net"];
0145 e19@--> 9050["Switching root (run-init / pivot_root)"];
9050 e20@--> 9010["Starting /sbin/init -> systemd"];
9010 e21@--> 9020["Starting Target Units"];
0100 -.-> 0145;
e06@{ animation: fast }
e07@{ animation: fast }
e08@{ animation: fast }
e09@{ animation: fast }
e10@{ animation: fast }
e11@{ animation: fast }
e12@{ animation: fast }
e13@{ animation: fast }
e13b@{ animation: fast }
e13c@{ animation: fast }
e14@{ animation: fast }
e15@{ animation: fast }
e16@{ animation: fast }
e17@{ animation: fast }
e18@{ animation: fast }
e19@{ animation: fast }
e20@{ animation: fast }
e21@{ animation: fast }
end
subgraph Finale State
9020 e24@--> 9030{{"CISS.debian.live.builder Waiting for Login"}};
X{{"CISS.debian.live.builder Boot process halted"}};
e24@{ animation: fast }
end
0030 -- FAIL --> X;
0040 -- FAIL --> X;
0124 -- FAIL --> X;
CACHE -- FAIL --> X;
LUKSOPEN -- FAIL --> X;
0130 -- FAIL --> X;
0142 -- FAIL --> X;
```
# 6. Diagram: CISS Live ISO LUKS and dm-integrity layering
```text
ISO medium
└── /live/ciss_rootfs.crypt
└── LUKS2 / dm-crypt / dm-integrity
└── /dev/mapper/crypt_liveiso
└── SquashFS rootfs [SHA-512 over exact SquashFS byte stream]
└── OverlayFS / running root filesystem
```
Rootfs attestation evidence follows a separate side path:
```text
ISO medium
├── /live/filesystem.squashfs.sha512sum.txt
└── /live/filesystem.squashfs.sha512sum.txt.sig
└── copied by 0024-ciss-crypt-squash to:
├── /run/ciss-rootfs-attestation/filesystem.squashfs.sha512sum.txt
└── /run/ciss-rootfs-attestation/filesystem.squashfs.sha512sum.txt.sig
```
The `/run/ciss-rootfs-attestation/` cache is only a stable initramfs runtime location. It is not a trust anchor. `0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest` still requires the cached manifest to verify against the detached signature, the pinned GPG fingerprint, and the actual decrypted mapper bytes.
```mermaid
---
config:
theme: forest
---
flowchart TD
0{{"Plain device: CD-ROM / USB"}} --> 1["ISO medium (ISO9660 + ESP)"];
1 --> 2["/live/ciss_rootfs.crypt"];
2 --> 3["LUKS2 / dm-crypt / dm-integrity"];
3 --> 4["/dev/mapper/crypt_liveiso"];
4 --> 5["SquashFS rootfs byte stream"];
5 --> 6["OverlayFS / running root filesystem"];
```
**Note:** `dm-integrity` provides keyed sector integrity for the opened LUKS mapping. It is not treated as origin authenticity; origin authenticity is provided by the signed checksum and rootfs attestation manifests plus pinned signer fingerprints.
# 7. CISS Live ISO LUKS Build-Time Core Steps
```sh
cryptsetup luksFormat \
--batch-mode \
--cipher aes-xts-plain64 \
--integrity hmac-sha512 \
--iter-time 1000 \
--key-file "/proc/$$/fd/${KEYFD}" \
--key-size 512 \
--label crypt_liveiso \
--luks2-keyslots-size 16777216 \
--luks2-metadata-size 4194304 \
--pbkdf argon2id \
--pbkdf-memory 262144 \
--pbkdf-parallel 1 \
--sector-size 4096 \
--type luks2 \
--use-random \
--verbose \
"${LUKSFS}"
```
**Signing keys:** Ed25519 and RSA-4096; **FPR pinned at build time** in hooks. Signing keys are **additionally** signed by an offline GPG Root-CA (out-of-band trust chain).
## 7.1. Rootfs Attestation Artifacts Created at Build Time
`config/hooks/live/zzzz_ciss_crypt_squash.hook.binary` runs in the live-build binary phase after `binary/live/filesystem.squashfs` exists and before the final ISO image is emitted.
The hook expects:
| Artifact | Build-time path | Purpose |
|-----------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Final plaintext SquashFS | `${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}/binary/live/filesystem.squashfs` | Source byte stream that will be attested and copied into the encrypted mapper. |
| Signing key passphrase file | `${VAR_SIGNING_KEY_PASSFILE}` | Unlocks the configured signing key without exposing the passphrase on the command line. |
| Verification keyring | `${VAR_VERIFY_KEYRING}` | Build-time self-check for the detached signature before the ISO is accepted. |
The hook creates:
| Artifact | Build-time path | ISO path |
|---------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| Encrypted live root container | `${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}/binary/live/ciss_rootfs.crypt` | `/live/ciss_rootfs.crypt` |
| Rootfs attestation manifest | `${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}/binary/live/filesystem.squashfs.sha512sum.txt` | `/live/filesystem.squashfs.sha512sum.txt` |
| Rootfs attestation detached signature | `${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}/binary/live/filesystem.squashfs.sha512sum.txt.sig` | `/live/filesystem.squashfs.sha512sum.txt.sig` |
The manifest format is intentionally small and deterministic:
```text
# CISS.debian.live.builder Master <version>
# Attestation file for filesystem.squashfs Version 1.0.0
# Boundary : Final filesystem.squashfs byte stream copied into /dev/mapper/crypt_liveiso
# Bytes : Final filesystem.squashfs <exact-byte-count>
<sha512-of-final-filesystem.squashfs> filesystem.squashfs
```
The signed boundary is the final SquashFS byte stream before LUKS wrapping. The hook writes that byte stream into `/dev/mapper/crypt_liveiso`, closes the mapper, shreds the transient LUKS key file, removes `binary/live/filesystem.squashfs`, and keeps only `/live/ciss_rootfs.crypt` plus the manifest/signature pair in the final ISO payload tree.
# 8. Mounted Live-Medium Checksum Verification (CISS modified hook 0030-ciss-verify-checksums, live-bottom)
**Goal:** After `0024-ciss-crypt-squash` has opened the encrypted container and exposed the live medium context, but before the final live root is accepted, verify:
1. **Detached signature of `sha512sum.txt`** using `gpgv` against the embedded public key.
2. **FPR pinning:** Parse `VALIDSIG` and require exact match with the build-time pinned FPR.
3. **Optional:** *Script self-IA* – hash the executed hook and compare against the signed list (drift/bitrot detector).
**Core call (initramfs):**
```sh
/usr/bin/gpgv --keyring "$KEYFILE" --status-fd 1 sha512sum.txt.sig sha512sum.txt
# parse [GNUPG:] VALIDSIG ... <FPR> ...
```
# 9. Late Root-FS Attestation and dmsetup Health (CISS hook 0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest, called by 9990-overlay.sh)
**Goal:** After LUKS unlocked, and the live root has been mounted by `9990-overlay.sh`, validate the **decrypted** rootfs payload selected at build time and the **actual** mapping topology.
* **Attested boundary:** the final `binary/live/filesystem.squashfs` byte stream, immediately before it is copied into `/dev/mapper/crypt_liveiso` by `zzzz_ciss_crypt_squash.hook.binary`.
* **Runtime verification boundary:** the first byte count declared by `# Bytes : Final filesystem.squashfs <bytes>` in the signed manifest, read from the decrypted mapper. Any LUKS allocation slack after the SquashFS payload is intentionally excluded.
* **ISO attestation files:** `/run/live/medium/live/filesystem.squashfs.sha512sum.txt[.sig]` while the original ISO medium is mounted by `0024-ciss-crypt-squash`.
* **Runtime attestation cache:** `/run/ciss-rootfs-attestation/filesystem.squashfs.sha512sum.txt[.sig]`, copied by `0024-ciss-crypt-squash` before live-boot may replace or unmount the medium view during `toram` handling.
* **Key source:** `/etc/ciss/keys/*.gpg` (accepted only if FPR == build-pin)
## 9.1. Runtime Artifact Custody and Expectations
| Step | Actor | Requires | Copies / writes | Later consumer |
|------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1 | `0024-ciss-crypt-squash` | Mounted ISO medium at `/run/live/medium`; `/run/live/medium/live/ciss_rootfs.crypt`; `/run/live/medium/live/filesystem.squashfs.sha512sum.txt`; `/run/live/medium/live/filesystem.squashfs.sha512sum.txt.sig` | Copies the manifest to `/run/ciss-rootfs-attestation/filesystem.squashfs.sha512sum.txt` and the detached signature to `/run/ciss-rootfs-attestation/filesystem.squashfs.sha512sum.txt.sig`; sets the cache directory to `0755` before copy, cached files to `0444`, and best-effort final directory mode to `0555` | `0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest` |
| 2 | `0024-ciss-crypt-squash` | `/run/live/medium/live/ciss_rootfs.crypt`; unlock passphrase from console or Dropbear path | Opens the encrypted container as `/dev/mapper/crypt_liveiso`; writes `/run/ciss-rootdev` with mapper, medium, and attestation-cache paths | `9990-overlay.sh` |
| 3 | `9990-main.sh` | `/conf/param.conf` with `PLAIN_ROOT=1` and `livefs_root=/run/live/medium`; optional `toram` boot parameter | May copy live media to RAM and may leave `/run/live/medium` busy, replaced, or otherwise unsuitable as the only attestation source | `9990-overlay.sh` and `0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest` |
| 4 | `9990-overlay.sh` | `/run/ciss-rootdev`; `/dev/mapper/crypt_liveiso` | Sources `/run/ciss-rootdev`, overrides the image directory to `/dev/mapper/crypt_liveiso`, mounts the decrypted SquashFS read-only, and invokes `/usr/lib/live/boot/0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest` | `0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest` |
| 5 | `0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest` | `/etc/ciss/keys/<pinned-FPR>.gpg`; `/run/ciss-rootfs-attestation/filesystem.squashfs.sha512sum.txt`; `/run/ciss-rootfs-attestation/filesystem.squashfs.sha512sum.txt.sig`; `/dev/mapper/crypt_liveiso` | Creates transient `/run/ciss-rootfs-attestation.sha512sum` for `sha512sum -c`; does not create trusted evidence | Boot continues only after signature, FPR, and exact payload bytes all verify |
`0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest` resolves artifacts in this order:
1. The explicit manifest/signature paths exported through `/run/ciss-rootdev`.
2. The default runtime cache under `/run/ciss-rootfs-attestation/`.
3. Compatibility fallback mountpoints: `${CDLB_MNT_MEDIUM}`, `/run/live/medium`, `/lib/live/mount/medium`, and `/cdrom`.
The fallback mountpoints are diagnostic and compatibility paths. The intended normal path for current CISS ISOs is the runtime cache copied by `0024-ciss-crypt-squash`.
**Core calls (initramfs):**
```sh
# 1) Signature and FPR pin (no agent)
DATA="/run/ciss-rootfs-attestation/filesystem.squashfs.sha512sum.txt"
SIG="${DATA}.sig"
KEYFILE="/etc/ciss/keys/<pinned-FPR>.gpg"
/usr/bin/gpgv --keyring "${KEYFILE}" --status-fd 1 "${SIG}" "${DATA}"
# 2) Mandatory content hash verification
dd if="${CDLB_MAPPER_DEV}" ... | /usr/bin/sha512sum -c /run/ciss-rootfs-attestation.sha512sum
```
# 10. Failure Policy (fail-closed, deterministic)
* **Abort** on: missing checksum manifest, unsupported checksum manifest/tool state, failed checksum, empty checksum manifest, missing rootfs attestation artifacts on the real ISO medium during `0024`, failed preservation of the runtime attestation cache, missing cached rootfs manifest/signature during `0042`, missing `VALIDSIG`, FPR mismatch, missing key/signature, malformed rootfs attestation manifest, or rootfs payload hash mismatch.
* A signed rootfs manifest alone is not sufficient. Boot continues only after the manifest signature/FPR, and the decrypted SquashFS payload bytes both verify successfully.
* `dm-integrity` protects the opened LUKS mapping against sector corruption or tampering under the LUKS key, but it is not treated as origin authenticity. Origin authenticity is provided by the signed rootfs attestation manifest and pinned signer fingerprint.
# 11. CISS hardened and built dropbear
```text
• Public-key auth only, no passwords
• Modern KEX / AEAD (e.g., curve25519, sntrup761x25519-sha512, mlkem768x25519-sha256; AES-GCM)
• No agent / X11 / TCP forwarding, no SFTP
• Strict timeouts / keep-alives, restricted cipher / KEX set
• Port 44137 (per CISS convention)
```
*Concrete selection compiled via [localoptions.h](../upgrades/dropbear/localoptions.h) at ISO build time.*
# 12. Integration Points & Paths
* **Hooks (build view):**
* [0022-ciss-overlay-tmpfs](../config/includes.chroot/usr/lib/live/boot/0022-ciss-overlay-tmpfs),
* [0024-ciss-crypt-squash](../config/includes.chroot/usr/lib/live/boot/0024-ciss-crypt-squash),
* [0026-ciss-early-sysctl](../config/includes.chroot/usr/lib/live/boot/0026-ciss-early-sysctl),
* [0030-ciss-verify-checksums](../config/includes.chroot/usr/lib/live/boot/0030-ciss-verify-checksums),
* [0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest](../config/includes.chroot/usr/lib/live/boot/0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest),
* [9990-main.sh](../config/includes.chroot/usr/lib/live/boot/9990-main.sh),
* [9990-networking.sh](../config/includes.chroot/usr/lib/live/boot/9990-networking.sh),
* [9990-overlay.sh](../config/includes.chroot/usr/lib/live/boot/9990-overlay.sh).
* **Hooks (initramfs boot view):**
* `/usr/lib/live/boot/0022-ciss-overlay-tmpfs`,
* `/usr/lib/live/boot/0024-ciss-crypt-squash`,
* `/usr/lib/live/boot/0026-ciss-early-sysctl`,
* `/usr/lib/live/boot/0030-ciss-verify-checksums`,
* `/usr/lib/live/boot/0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest`,
* `/usr/lib/live/boot/9990-main.sh`,
* `/usr/lib/live/boot/9990-overlay.sh`
* **Key files:**
* Mounted live medium (for 0030): embedded public key blob (project-specific FPR)
* Root FS (for 0042): `/etc/ciss/keys/<FPR>.gpg`
* **Rootfs attestation artifacts:**
* ISO payload paths: `/live/filesystem.squashfs.sha512sum.txt`, `/live/filesystem.squashfs.sha512sum.txt.sig`
* Runtime cache paths: `/run/ciss-rootfs-attestation/filesystem.squashfs.sha512sum.txt`, `/run/ciss-rootfs-attestation/filesystem.squashfs.sha512sum.txt.sig`
* Transient checksum file for exact mapper-byte verification: `/run/ciss-rootfs-attestation.sha512sum`
* **Runtime handoff state:** `/run/ciss-rootdev`
* **Mounts (typical):** `/run/live/medium`, `/run/live/rootfs`, `/run/live/overlay`
# 13. Diagram: CISS Live ISO Build, Boot, and Run Time Trust Chain & Verification Paths
```mermaid
flowchart TD
subgraph ISO Build Time
A["Embed and pin GPG FPR (into ISO & RootFS as needed)"] e00@--> B["Generate mounted-medium sha512sum.txt and .sig"];
B e01@--> C["Build filesystem.squashfs"];
C e01b@--> C2["Generate rootfs attestation manifest and detached signature in binary/live"];
C2 e01c@--> C3["Copy filesystem.squashfs into ciss_rootfs.crypt and remove plaintext filesystem.squashfs"];
e00@{ animation: fast }
e01@{ animation: fast }
e01b@{ animation: fast }
e01c@{ animation: fast }
end
subgraph ISO Boot Time
C3 e02@--> D["0024 mounts real ISO medium and expects ciss_rootfs.crypt plus rootfs attestation files under /live"];
D e02b@--> DCACHE["0024 copies rootfs attestation files to /run/ciss-rootfs-attestation"];
DCACHE e03@--> E["0024 opens ciss_rootfs.crypt with LUKS2/dm-integrity and exposes /dev/mapper/crypt_liveiso"];
E e04@--> F["0030 verifies mounted live-medium manifest, signature, FPR, and checksums"];
F e05@-->|SUCCESSFUL| G["Mounted live medium verified"];
G e06@--> H["9990-overlay mounts SquashFS / OverlayFS"];
H e07@--> I["0042 verifies cached rootfs attestation manifest and FPR"];
I e08@--> J["0042 verifies exact SquashFS bytes from /dev/mapper/crypt_liveiso"];
J e09@-->|SUCCESSFUL| K["RootFS SquashFS payload attestation successful"];
e02@{ animation: fast }
e02b@{ animation: fast }
e03@{ animation: fast }
e04@{ animation: fast }
e05@{ animation: fast }
e06@{ animation: fast }
e07@{ animation: fast }
e08@{ animation: fast }
e09@{ animation: fast }
end
subgraph ISO Run Time
K e10@--> L{{"CISS.debian.live.builder ISO running"}};
X{{"CISS.debian.live.builder Boot process halted"}};
e10@{ animation: fast }
end
D -- FAIL --> X;
DCACHE -- FAIL --> X;
E -- FAIL --> X;
F -- FAIL --> X;
I -- FAIL --> X;
J -- FAIL --> X;
```
# 14. Closing Remarks
This achieves a portable, self-contained trust chain without a Microsoft-db, providing strong protection at the mounted-medium and decrypted-rootfs-payload boundaries. The dual-verification phases make the state transparent and deterministic without treating `dm-integrity`, LUKS, or private infrastructure as substitutes for origin authenticity.
---
**[no tracking | no logging | no advertising | no profiling | no bullshit](https://coresecret.eu/)**
<!-- vim: set number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=markdown -->
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