**Summary:** The CISS.debian.live.builder Live-ISO establishes a two-stage verification chain without Microsoft-db: an early ISO-edge check (signature and FPR pin) *before* LUKS unlock, and a late root-FS attestation *after* unlock, reinforced by `dm-crypt (AES-XTS)` and `dm-integrity (HMAC-SHA-512)`.<br>
**Summary:** The **CISS.debian.live.builder** Live-ISO establishes a two-stage verification chain without Microsoft-db: an early ISO-edge check (signature and FPR pin) *before* LUKS unlock, and a late root-FS attestation *after* unlock, reinforced by `dm-crypt (AES-XTS)` and `dm-integrity (HMAC-SHA-512)`.<br>
# 3. Overview
@@ -23,8 +23,9 @@ include_toc: true
1.**Early:** Verify `sha512sum.txt` at the ISO edge using `gpgv` and FPR pin.
2.**Late:** Verify an attestation hash list inside the decrypted root FS using `gpgv` and FPR pin.
# 6. Diagram: CISS Live ISO LUKS and dm-integrity layering, complete
# 6. Diagram: CISS Live ISO LUKS and dm-integrity layering
```mermaid
---
config:
@@ -127,7 +128,7 @@ flowchart TD
**Note:** Encrypt-then-MAC at the block layer (functionally AEAD-equivalent). Any manipulation ⇒ hard I/O error.
# 7. CISS Live ISO LUKS Build-Time Core Steps, complete
# 7. CISS Live ISO LUKS Build-Time Core Steps
```sh
cryptsetup luksFormat \
--batch-mode \
@@ -149,7 +150,7 @@ cryptsetup luksFormat \
**Signing keys:** Ed25519 and RSA-4096; **FPR pinned at build time** in hooks. Signing keys are **additionally** signed by an offline GPG Root-CA (out-of-band trust chain).
# 8. Early ISO-Edge Verification (CISS modified hook 0030, live-bottom)
# 8. Early ISO-Edge Verification (CISS modified hook 0030-ciss-verify-checksums, live-bottom)
**Goal:** Before consuming any medium content, verify:
@@ -164,13 +165,12 @@ cryptsetup luksFormat \
# parse [GNUPG:] VALIDSIG ... <FPR> ...
```
# 9. Late Root-FS Attestation and dmsetup Health (CISS hook 0045, live-bottom)
# 9. Late Root-FS Attestation and dmsetup Health (CISS hook 0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest, called by 9990-overlay.sh)
**Goal:** After LUKS unlock, validate the **decrypted** contents and the **actual** mapping topology.
This achieves a portable, self-contained trust chain without a Microsoft-db, providing strong protection against medium tampering, bitrot and active attacks **both before and after decryption**. The dual verification phases plus `dmsetup` health make the state transparent and deterministic.
This achieves a portable, self-contained trust chain without a Microsoft-db, providing strong protection against medium tampering, bitrot and active attacks **both before and after decryption**. The dual verification phases make the state transparent and deterministic.
---
**[no tracking | no logging | no advertising | no profiling | no bullshit](https://coresecret.eu/)**
# Cleanup wrapper on the traps on 'ERR' and 'EXIT'.
# Globals:
# VAR_CDLB_INSIDE_RUNNER
# GNUPGHOME
# LOG_ERROR
# VAR_CDLB_INSIDE_RUNNER
# VAR_EARLY_DEBUG
# VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR
# VAR_KERNEL_INF
# VAR_KERNEL_SRT
# VAR_KERNEL_TMP
# VAR_NOTES
# VAR_TMP_SECRET
# VAR_WORKDIR
# Arguments:
# 1 : ${trap_on_exit_code} of trap_on_exit()
Reference in New Issue
Block a user
Blocking a user prevents them from interacting with repositories, such as opening or commenting on pull requests or issues. Learn more about blocking a user.