Marc S. Weidner
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🛡️ Shell Script Linting / 🛡️ Shell Script Linting (push) Successful in 1m0s
Signed-off-by: Marc S. Weidner <msw@coresecret.dev>
53 lines
2.5 KiB
Markdown
53 lines
2.5 KiB
Markdown
---
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gitea: none
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include_toc: true
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---
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# 1. CISS.debian.installer
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**Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard**<br>
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*The CISS Debian Installer provides a fully automated and hardened installation process.*<br>
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**Master Version**: 8.00<br>
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**Build**: V8.00.000.2025.06.17<br>
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# 2. Git Workflow Linter — Character Set Policy Enforcement
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## 2.1. Overview
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The **[linter_char_scripts.yaml](../../.gitea/workflows/linter_char_scripts.yaml)** defines a declarative policy framework for
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sanitizing and validating character scripts within a Git repository. It enforces linguistic and typographic constraints at the
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commit level, preventing the introduction of ambiguous, non-printable, homoglyphic, or non-standard Unicode character classes.
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This mechanism enhances both the integrity and auditability of the codebase, particularly in contexts where multilingual input,
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identity obfuscation, or supply-chain risk (e.g., Trojan Source attacks) must be mitigated.
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## 2.2. Purpose
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The core intent of this linter is to:
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- **Detect forbidden Unicode scripts or codepoints** within staged files.
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- **Ensure locale-hygienic commits** by permitting only explicitly whitelisted language/script groups.
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- **Enforce character uniformity** across source files, configuration, and metadata.
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- **Block malicious or ambiguous glyph injection**, including bidirectional override, homoglyph attacks, or zero-width characters.
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## 2.3. Security Considerations
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This linter serves as a preventive supply-chain control by reducing exposure to:
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- Invisible character injection (e.g. \u200e, \u202e)
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- Homoglyphic substitution (e.g. Cyrillic а vs. Latin a)
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- Bidirectional override attacks (Trojan Source)
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- Untraceable backdoors hidden in user comments or unused string literals
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It complements traditional static analysis and code review processes by operating at a syntactic level of representation,
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thus neutralizing attacks that bypass semantic inspection.
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## 2.4. Conclusion
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The ``linter_char_scripts.yaml`` is a vital component of the **CISS.debian.installer** secure development lifecycle. It defines
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a robust, extensible, and policy-driven control layer against linguistic abuse and typographic ambiguity in version-controlled
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assets. Its utility is especially salient in multi-language environments, cryptographic infrastructure code, and supply-chain
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sensitive repositories.
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---
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**[no tracking | no logging | no advertising | no profiling | no bullshit](https://coresecret.eu/)**
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