DEPLOY BOT : 🛡️ Shell Script Linting [skip ci]

X-CI-Metadata: master@aef00ec at 2025-10-26T18:19:48Z on 6f8f9a786bfa

Generated at : 2025-10-26T18:19:48Z
Runner Host  : 6f8f9a786bfa
Workflow ID  : 🛡️ Shell Script Linting
Git Commit   : aef00ec HEAD -> master

.archive/4620_installation_verification.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,410 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# SPDX-Version: 3.0
+# SPDX-CreationInfo: 2025-06-17; WEIDNER, Marc S.; <msw@coresecret.dev>
+# SPDX-ExternalRef: GIT https://git.coresecret.dev/msw/CISS.debian.installer.git
+# SPDX-FileContributor: WEIDNER, Marc S.; Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency
+# SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2024-2025; WEIDNER, Marc S.; <msw@coresecret.dev>
+# SPDX-FileType: SOURCE
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: EUPL-1.2 OR LicenseRef-CCLA-1.0
+# SPDX-LicenseComment: This file is part of the CISS.debian.installer.secure framework.
+# SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
+# SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
+
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
+
+### https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/tree/master/rules
+
+#######################################
+# Installs 'aide', 'audit', and 'debsums' audit and logging packages.
+# Finalizes 'rkhunter' baseline.
+# Globals:
+#   TARGET
+#   VAR_SEC_FW
+# Arguments:
+#   None
+# Returns:
+#   0: on success
+#######################################
+install_verification() {
+  ### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
+  declare -r  var_logfile="/root/.ciss/cdi/log/4620_installation_verification.log"
+
+  chroot_logger "${TARGET}${var_logfile}"
+
+  chroot_script "${TARGET}" "
+    export INITRD=No
+    [[ -r /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh ]] && . /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh
+    apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends --no-install-suggests acct 2>&1 | tee -a ${var_logfile}
+
+    mkdir -p /etc/systemd/system/multi-user.target.wants
+
+    if ln -s /lib/systemd/system/acct.service /etc/systemd/system/multi-user.target.wants/acct.service; then
+      printf 'Process Accounting enabled successfully.'
+    else
+      printf 'Process Accounting already enabled.'
+    fi
+  "
+
+  chroot_script "${TARGET}" "
+    export INITRD=No
+    [[ -r /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh ]] && . /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh
+    apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends --no-install-suggests auditd 2>&1 | tee -a ${var_logfile}
+  "
+
+  rm -f "${TARGET}/etc/audit/rules.d/audit.rules"
+
+  ############################################################### /etc/audit/rules.d/10-base-config.rules
+  cat << EOF >| "${TARGET}/etc/audit/rules.d/10-base-config.rules"
+## First rule - delete all
+-D
+
+## Increase the buffers to survive stress events.
+## Make this bigger for busy systems
+-b 16384
+
+## This determine how long to wait in burst of events
+--backlog_wait_time 1024
+
+## Set failure mode to syslog
+-f 1
+EOF
+
+  ############################################################### /etc/audit/rules.d/11-loginuid.rules
+  cat << EOF >| "${TARGET}/etc/audit/rules.d/11-loginuid.rules"
+--loginuid-immutable
+EOF
+
+  ############################################################### /etc/audit/rules.d/20-dont-audit.rules
+  cat << EOF >| "${TARGET}/etc/audit/rules.d/20-dont-audit.rules"
+## This is for don't audit rules. We put these early because audit
+## is a first match wins system. Uncomment the rules you want.
+
+## Cron jobs fill the logs with stuff we normally don't want
+-a never,user
+
+## This prevents chrony from overwhelming the logs
+-a never,exit -F arch=b64 -S adjtimex -F exe=/usr/sbin/chronyd
+-a never,exit -F arch=b32 -S adjtimex -F exe=/usr/sbin/chronyd
+
+## Human-attributable time changes
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S adjtimex -S settimeofday -S clock_settime -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k time-change
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S adjtimex -S settimeofday -S clock_settime -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k time-change
+
+### This is not very interesting and wastes a lot of space if
+### the server is public facing
+-a always,exclude -F msgtype=CRYPTO_KEY_USER
+EOF
+
+  ############################################################### /etc/audit/rules.d/21-no32bit.rules
+  cat << EOF >| "${TARGET}/etc/audit/rules.d/21-no32bit.rules"
+## If you are on a 64 bit platform, everything _should_ be running
+## in 64 bit mode. This rule will detect any use of the 32 bit syscalls
+## because this might be a sign of someone exploiting a hole in the 32
+## bit ABI.
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S all -F key=32bit-abi
+EOF
+
+  ############################################################### /etc/audit/rules.d/22-ignore-chrony.rules
+  cat << EOF >| "${TARGET}/etc/audit/rules.d/22-ignore-chrony.rules"
+## This rule suppresses the time-change event when chrony does time updates
+-a never,exit -F arch=b64 -S adjtimex -F auid=unset -F uid=_chrony
+-a never,exit -F arch=b32 -S adjtimex -F auid=unset -F uid=_chrony
+EOF
+
+  ############################################################### /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-1-create-failed.rules
+  cat << EOF >| "${TARGET}/etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-1-create-failed.rules"
+## Unsuccessful file creation (open with O_CREAT)
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create
+EOF
+
+  ############################################################### /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-1-create-success.rules
+  cat << EOF >| "${TARGET}/etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-1-create-success.rules"
+## Successful file creation (open with O_CREAT)
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create
+EOF
+
+  ############################################################### /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-2-modify-failed.rules
+  cat << EOF >| "${TARGET}/etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-2-modify-failed.rules"
+## Unsuccessful file modifications (open for write or truncate)
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification
+EOF
+
+  ############################################################### /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-2-modify-success.rules
+  cat << EOF >| "${TARGET}/etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-2-modify-success.rules"
+## Successful file modifications (open for write or truncate)
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification
+EOF
+
+  ############################################################### /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-3-access-failed.rules
+  cat << EOF >| "${TARGET}/etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-3-access-failed.rules"
+## Unsuccessful file access (any other opens) This has to go last.
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-access
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-access
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-access
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-access
+EOF
+
+  ############################################################### /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-3-access-success.rules
+  cat << EOF >| "${TARGET}/etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-3-access-success.rules"
+## Successful file access (any other opens) This has to go last.
+## These next two are likely to result in a whole lot of events
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-access
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-access
+EOF
+
+  ############################################################### /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-4-delete-failed.rules
+  cat << EOF >| "${TARGET}/etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-4-delete-failed.rules"
+## Unsuccessful file delete
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete
+EOF
+
+  ############################################################### /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-4-delete-success.rules
+  cat << EOF >| "${TARGET}/etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-4-delete-success.rules"
+## Successful file delete
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-delete
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-delete
+EOF
+
+  ############################################################### /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-failed.rules
+  cat << EOF >| "${TARGET}/etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-failed.rules"
+## Unsuccessful permission change
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-perm-change
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-perm-change
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-perm-change
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-perm-change
+EOF
+
+  ############################################################### /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-success.rules
+  cat << EOF >| "${TARGET}/etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-success.rules"
+## Successful permission change
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change
+EOF
+
+  ############################################################### /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-failed.rules
+  cat << EOF >| "${TARGET}/etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-failed.rules"
+## Unsuccessful ownership change
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-owner-change
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-owner-change
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-owner-change
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-owner-change
+EOF
+
+  ############################################################### /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-success.rules
+  cat << EOF >| "${TARGET}/etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-success.rules"
+## Successful ownership change
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-owner-change
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-owner-change
+EOF
+
+  ############################################################### /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42.rules
+  cat << EOF >| "${TARGET}/etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42.rules"
+## The purpose of these rules is to meet the requirements for Operating
+## System Protection Profile (OSPP)v4.2. These rules depends on having
+## the following rule files copied to /etc/audit/rules.d:
+##
+## 10-base-config.rules, 11-loginuid.rules,
+## 30-ospp-v42-1-create-failed.rules, 30-ospp-v42-1-create-success.rules,
+## 30-ospp-v42-2-modify-failed.rules, 30-ospp-v42-2-modify-success.rules,
+## 30-ospp-v42-3-access-failed.rules, 30-ospp-v42-3-access-success.rules,
+## 30-ospp-v42-4-delete-failed.rules, 30-ospp-v42-4-delete-success.rules,
+## 30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-failed.rules,
+## 30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-success.rules,
+## 30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-failed.rules,
+## 30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-success.rules
+##
+## original copies may be found in /usr/share/audit-rules
+
+## User add delete modify. This is covered by pam. However, someone could
+## open a file and directly create or modify a user, so we'll watch passwd and
+## shadow for writes
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify
+
+## User enable and disable. This is entirely handled by pam.
+
+## Group add delete modify. This is covered by pam. However, someone could
+## open a file and directly create or modify a user, so we'll watch group and
+## gshadow for writes
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -F path=/etc/passwd -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -F path=/etc/passwd -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -F path=/etc/shadow -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -F path=/etc/shadow -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -F path=/etc/group -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=group-modify
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -F path=/etc/group -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=group-modify
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=group-modify
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=group-modify
+
+
+## Use of special rights for config changes. This would be use of setuid
+## programs that relate to user accts. This is not all setuid apps because
+## requirements are only for ones that affect system configuration.
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -F path=/usr/sbin/unix_chkpwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -F path=/usr/sbin/unix_chkpwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -F path=/usr/sbin/usernetctl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -F path=/usr/sbin/usernetctl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -F path=/usr/sbin/userhelper -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -F path=/usr/sbin/userhelper -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -F path=/usr/sbin/seunshare -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -F path=/usr/sbin/seunshare -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -F path=/usr/bin/mount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -F path=/usr/bin/mount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -F path=/usr/bin/newgrp -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -F path=/usr/bin/newgrp -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -F path=/usr/bin/newuidmap -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -F path=/usr/bin/newuidmap -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -F path=/usr/bin/gpasswd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -F path=/usr/bin/gpasswd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -F path=/usr/bin/newgidmap -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -F path=/usr/bin/newgidmap -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -F path=/usr/bin/umount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -F path=/usr/bin/umount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -F path=/usr/bin/passwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -F path=/usr/bin/passwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -F path=/usr/bin/crontab -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -F path=/usr/bin/crontab -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -F path=/usr/bin/at -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -F path=/usr/bin/at -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -F path=/usr/sbin/grub2-set-bootflag -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -F path=/usr/sbin/grub2-set-bootflag -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes
+
+## Privilege escalation via su or sudo. This is entirely handled by pam.
+## Special case for systemd-run. It is not audit aware, specifically watch it
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -F path=/usr/bin/systemd-run -F perm=x -F auid!=unset -F key=maybe-escalation
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -F path=/usr/bin/systemd-run -F perm=x -F auid!=unset -F key=maybe-escalation
+
+## Special case for pkexec. It is not audit aware, specifically watch it
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -F path=/usr/bin/pkexec -F perm=x -F key=maybe-escalation
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -F path=/usr/bin/pkexec -F perm=x -F key=maybe-escalation
+
+## Watch for configuration changes to privilege escalation.
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -F path=/etc/sudoers -F perm=wa -F key=special-config-changes
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -F path=/etc/sudoers -F perm=wa -F key=special-config-changes
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -F dir=/etc/sudoers.d/ -F perm=wa -F key=special-config-changes
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -F dir=/etc/sudoers.d/ -F perm=wa -F key=special-config-changes
+
+## Audit log access
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -F dir=/var/log/audit/ -F perm=r -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access-audit-trail
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -F dir=/var/log/audit/ -F perm=r -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access-audit-trail
+
+## Attempts to Alter Process and Session Initiation Information
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -F path=/var/run/utmp -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=session
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -F path=/var/run/utmp -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=session
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -F path=/var/log/btmp -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=session
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -F path=/var/log/btmp -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=session
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -F path=/var/log/wtmp -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=session
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -F path=/var/log/wtmp -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=session
+
+## Attempts to modify MAC controls
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -F dir=/etc/selinux/ -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=MAC-policy
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -F dir=/etc/selinux/ -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=MAC-policy
+
+## Application invocation. The requirements list an optional requirement
+## FPT_SRP_EXT.1 Software Restriction Policies. This event is intended to
+## state results from that policy. This would be handled entirely by
+## that daemon.
+EOF
+
+  ############################################################### /etc/audit/rules.d/99-finalize.rules
+  cat << EOF >| "${TARGET}/etc/audit/rules.d/99-finalize.rules"
+-e 2
+EOF
+
+  chroot_script "${TARGET}" "
+    systemctl enable auditd.service 2>&1 | tee -a ${var_logfile}
+  "
+
+  ### Validate and build audit rules now; fail early if syntax is wrong.
+  chroot_script "${TARGET}" "
+    if command -v augenrules >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+
+      augenrules --load 2>&1 | tee -a ${var_logfile}
+
+    else
+
+      ### Fallback: build consolidated rules file without loading into the kernel.
+      if command -v bash >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+
+        bash -lc 'cat /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules > /etc/audit/audit.rules'
+
+      fi
+
+    fi
+  "
+
+  chroot_script "${TARGET}" "
+    export INITRD=No
+    [[ -r /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh ]] && . /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh
+    apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends --no-install-suggests aide aide-common 2>&1 | tee -a ${var_logfile}
+
+    sed -i 's/Checksums = H/Checksums = sha512/' /etc/aide/aide.conf
+    aideinit > /dev/null 2>> ${var_logfile}
+  "
+
+  chroot_script "${TARGET}" "
+    export INITRD=No
+    [[ -r /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh ]] && . /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh
+    apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends --no-install-suggests debsums 2>&1 | tee -a ${var_logfile}
+
+    if ! debsums -g >> ${var_logfile} 2>> ${var_logfile}; then
+      printf 'Running debsums -g - encountered errors.' >> ${var_logfile}
+    fi
+
+    mkdir -p /root/.ciss/cdi/backup/etc/default
+    cp -a /etc/default/debsums /root/.ciss/cdi/backup/etc/default/debsums.bak
+    sed -i 's/CRON_CHECK=never/CRON_CHECK=monthly/' /etc/default/debsums
+  "
+
+  chroot_script "${TARGET}" "
+    rkhunter --propupd 2>&1 | tee -a ${var_logfile}
+  "
+
+  chroot_exec "${TARGET}" sed -i 's#^\(ENABLED=\).*#\1"true"#' /etc/default/sysstat
+
+  guard_dir; return 0
+}
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f install_verification
+# vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

.gitea/workflows/linter_char_scripts.yaml

@@ -41,6 +41,10 @@ jobs:
         shell: bash
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
+          var_wait=$(( RANDOM % 33 ))
+          printf "⏳ Waiting %s seconds to desynchronize parallel workflows...\n" "${var_wait}"
+          sleep "${var_wait}"
+
           rm -rf ~/.ssh && mkdir -m700 ~/.ssh
 
           ### Private Key
@@ -202,11 +206,12 @@ jobs:
             echo -e "⚠️ Linting issues detected:\n"
             echo -e "${findings}"
             timestamp=$(date -u +"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ")
+            VAR_DATE="$(date +%F)"
             PRIVATE_FILE="LINTER_RESULTS.txt"
             touch "${PRIVATE_FILE}"
             cat << EOF >| "${PRIVATE_FILE}"
           # SPDX-Version: 3.0
-          # SPDX-CreationInfo: 2025-06-17; WEIDNER, Marc S.; <msw@coresecret.dev>
+          # SPDX-CreationInfo: ${VAR_DATE}; WEIDNER, Marc S.; <msw@coresecret.dev>
           # SPDX-ExternalRef: GIT https://git.coresecret.dev/msw/CISS.debian.installer.git
           # SPDX-FileContributor: WEIDNER, Marc S.; Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency
           # SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2024-2025; WEIDNER, Marc S.; <msw@coresecret.dev>
@@ -225,11 +230,12 @@ jobs:
           else
             echo "✅ No issues found in shell scripts."
             timestamp=$(date -u +"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ")
+            VAR_DATE="$(date +%F)"
             PRIVATE_FILE="LINTER_RESULTS.txt"
             touch "${PRIVATE_FILE}"
             cat << EOF >| "${PRIVATE_FILE}"
           # SPDX-Version: 3.0
-          # SPDX-CreationInfo: 2025-06-17; WEIDNER, Marc S.; <msw@coresecret.dev>
+          # SPDX-CreationInfo: ${VAR_DATE}; WEIDNER, Marc S.; <msw@coresecret.dev>
           # SPDX-ExternalRef: GIT https://git.coresecret.dev/msw/CISS.debian.installer.git
           # SPDX-FileContributor: WEIDNER, Marc S.; Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency
           # SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2024-2025; WEIDNER, Marc S.; <msw@coresecret.dev>

.gitea/workflows/render-dnssec-status.yaml

@@ -33,6 +33,10 @@ jobs:
         shell: bash
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
+          var_wait=$(( RANDOM % 33 ))
+          printf "⏳ Waiting %s seconds to desynchronize parallel workflows...\n" "${var_wait}"
+          sleep "${var_wait}"
+
           rm -rf ~/.ssh && mkdir -m700 ~/.ssh
 
           ### Private Key

.gitea/workflows/render-dot-to-png.yaml

@@ -34,6 +34,10 @@ jobs:
         shell: bash
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
+          var_wait=$(( RANDOM % 33 ))
+          printf "⏳ Waiting %s seconds to desynchronize parallel workflows...\n" "${var_wait}"
+          sleep "${var_wait}"
+
           rm -rf ~/.ssh && mkdir -m700 ~/.ssh
 
           ### Private Key

.gitignore

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 .checklist/
 .idea/
+.todo/
 out/
 *.DS_Store
 *.log

.preseed/SECRETS.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+# SPDX-Version: 3.0
+# SPDX-CreationInfo: 2025-06-17; WEIDNER, Marc S.; <msw@coresecret.dev>
+# SPDX-ExternalRef: GIT https://git.coresecret.dev/msw/CISS.debian.installer.git
+# SPDX-FileContributor: WEIDNER, Marc S.; Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency
+# SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2024-2025; WEIDNER, Marc S.; <msw@coresecret.dev>
+# SPDX-FileType: SOURCE
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: EUPL-1.2 OR LicenseRef-CCLA-1.0
+# SPDX-LicenseComment: This file is part of the CISS.debian.installer.secure framework.
+# SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
+# SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
+#
+#
+# This file contains all required Secrets, Tokens and Public and Private Keys for the CISS.debian.installer
+# Master V8.00.000.2025.06.17
+# YAML specification: 1.2
+#
+secrets:
+  description: "Secrets for automated installation of encrypted systems on this host via primordial-workflow™."
+  created_at: "2025-10-23"
+  created_for: "host_domain_tld"
+  name: "CISS.debian.installer"
+  version: "V8.00.000.2025.06.17"
+  x_files: "false"
+  ################################################################################################################################
+  # Grub bootloader passphrase
+  ################################################################################################################################
+  grub:
+    note: "Password used to unlock the GRUB bootloader before system initialization."
+    scope: "grub"
+    type: "plain"
+    value: "PleASE_CHan3e_M!"
+  ################################################################################################################################
+  # LUKS and LUKS Nuke passphrase
+  ################################################################################################################################
+  luks:
+    backup:
+      note: "The value is [<share-identifier>:<password>] (colon-separated). Use the same dedicated destination and credentials across servers."
+      scope: "offsite-backup"
+      type: "plain"
+      value: "NextcloudFolderNameOrShareID:SuperSecurePassword123!"
+    boot:
+      note: "Dedicated passphrase for the [/boot] partition; chosen for easy manual input via the VPS web console."
+      scope: "luks"
+      type: "plain"
+      value: "Ceterum_censeo_Bruxellam_et_Berolinum_delenda_esse!"
+    common:
+      note: "Main LUKS passphrase baked into the installer for automated setup. For dropbear SSH input method only."
+      scope: "luks"
+      type: "plain"
+      value: "Ceterum_censeo_Bruxellam_et_Berolinum_delenda_esse!"
+    nuke:
+      note: "Special LUKS passphrase that triggers secure wipe of all volumes when entered."
+      scope: "luks"
+      type: "plain"
+      value: "THIS_IS_THE_NUKE_PASSWORD!"
+  ################################################################################################################################
+  # TOTP MFA seed and salt and other seed variables
+  ################################################################################################################################
+  seeds:
+    mfa:
+      info:
+        note: "MFA version identifier, e.g., [totp:v1] for seamless mfa secrets rollover."
+        scope: "mfa"
+        type: "plain"
+        value: "totp:v1"
+      salt:
+        note: "Used to add a salt to the MFA seed to derive per-host MFA secrets for remote unlock authentication."
+        scope: "mfa"
+        type: "plain"
+        value: "CISS:CDI:OTP"
+      secret:
+        note: "Master seed (hex) used to derive per-machine MFA secrets for remote unlock authentication."
+        scope: "mfa"
+        type: "plain"
+        value: "7cad63da408c27b5121c89cdd0cf878b8f8df1f34bcc0a944152261ee1481fda"
+  ################################################################################################################################
+  # User passwords and SSH keys
+  ################################################################################################################################
+  user:
+    root:
+      password:
+        note: "Password-hash, YESCRYPT only, for the root user. Leave value empty if disabled password authentication."
+        scope: "auth"
+        type: "hash"
+        value: "$y$jFT$7pQlcZrgTEGrzkEm7UQW/.$QoCamalYEAV5mN4QWIE.xpHo8kvXa9sym2Uz.9oELwA"
+      sshpubkey:
+        note: "SSH public key for the root user. This key is also used for dropbear SSH authentication."
+        scope: "auth"
+        type: "sshpubkey"
+        value: "ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAINAYZDAqVZUk3LwJsqeVHKvLn8UKkFx642VBbiSS8uSY 2025_ciss.debian.live.ISO_PUBLIC_ONLY"
+    user0:
+      name: "user"
+      password:
+        note: "Password-hash, YESCRYPT only, for the specified user. Leave value empty if disabled password authentication."
+        scope: "auth"
+        type: "hash"
+        value: "$y$jFT$OGeZONH5ho2JSXvAbyIBQ1$5OhyHqOaMZ9BZcfMOYEwF.nMLFKd9ceiW2oNksPCHVB"
+      sshpubkey:
+        note: "SSH public key for the specified user."
+        scope: "auth"
+        type: "sshpubkey"
+        value: "ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAINAYZDAqVZUk3LwJsqeVHKvLn8UKkFx642VBbiSS8uSY 2025_ciss.debian.live.ISO_PUBLIC_ONLY"
+    user1:
+      name: "ansible"
+      password:
+        note: "Password-hash, YESCRYPT only, for the specified user. Leave value empty if disabled password authentication."
+        scope: "auth"
+        type: "hash"
+        value: ""
+      sshpubkey:
+        note: "SSH public key for the specified user."
+        scope: "auth"
+        type: "sshpubkey"
+        value: "ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAINAYZDAqVZUk3LwJsqeVHKvLn8UKkFx642VBbiSS8uSY 2025_ciss.debian.live.ISO_PUBLIC_ONLY"
+# vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=yaml

.preseed/mfa_master.txt

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-7cad63da408c27b5121c89cdd0cf878b8f8df1f34bcc0a944152261ee1481fda

.preseed/partitioning.yaml

@@ -32,6 +32,14 @@ recipe:
       kdf:
         threads: 1             # Set the parallel cost for PBKDF (number of threads, up to 4).
         time: 256              # The number of milliseconds to spend with PBKDF passphrase processing.
+      luks_backup: true        # Specify if LUKS Header backups should be created. If so, provide an external backup URL:
+                               # luks_backup_url: "https://cloud.e2ee.li/" or leave empty for local backup.
+                               # Also provide the cloud access token and access passwords via
+                               # ./.preseed/SECRETS.yaml. Yet Nextcloud only is supported.
+      luks_backup_url: "https://cloud.e2ee.li/"
+      luks_backup_pgp: "ciss"  # Specify the trigger for use of the LUKS Header backup encryption key.
+                               # Allowed values are: 'ciss', and 'physnet'. MUST be provided.
+                               # Otherwise, the backup is NOT created.
       name: "ciss.2025.gpt.btrfs.ephemeral.non-raid.256GiB.rescue"
       nuke: true               # Activates Nuke-Mechanism in '/etc/crypttab' keyscript and via dropbear SSH forced command.
       nuke_rounds: 16384       # SHA512 KDF Rounds for Nuke Passphrase. If omitted, the default value is '8,388,608'.
@@ -46,7 +54,7 @@ recipe:
       table: "gpt"             # MUST be "gpt" for "UEFI" || "msdos":
       syntax: true             # This is set to "false" by default, otherwise if the recipe is tested by the authors to "true".
       ### Version of the specific recipe.
-      version: "1.2.0"
+      version: "1.3.2"
     dev:
       sda:
         1:                     # MUST be always 'ESP' for [UEFI|GPT] or 'BIOS' for [BIOS|GPT].
@@ -76,7 +84,7 @@ recipe:
             version: "fat32"
           mount:
             enable: true       # MUST be "true" for "/boot/efi"
-            options: "noauto,umask=0077,uid=0,gid=0,nofail"
+            options: "umask=0077,uid=0,gid=0"
             optsnap: ""
             path: "/boot/efi"
           primary: primary
@@ -107,7 +115,7 @@ recipe:
             options: ""
           mount:
             enable: true
-            options: "noauto,nodev,nosuid,noexec,noatime,compress=no,discard=async"
+            options: "nodev,nosuid,noexec,noatime,compress=no,discard=async"
             optsnap: ""
             path: "/boot"
           primary: primary
@@ -166,12 +174,12 @@ recipe:
               mdup: ""
               snapshot: false
             format: true
-            label: "host_swap" # MUST be "host_swap" for ephemeral "SWAP"
+            label: "host_swap"
             options: ""
-            version: "ext4"    # MUST be "ext4" for ephemeral "SWAP"
+            version: "ext4"
           mount:
             enable: true
-            options: "defaults,discard"
+            options: "defaults"
             optsnap: ""
             path: "SWAP"
           primary: primary
@@ -199,10 +207,10 @@ recipe:
               snapshot: false
             format: true
             options: ""
-            version: "ext4"    # MUST be "ext4" for ephemeral "/tmp"
+            version: "ext4"
           mount:
             enable: true
-            options: "defaults,rw,nodev,noexec,nosuid,noatime,discard,mode=1777"
+            options: "defaults,rw,nodev,noexec,nosuid,noatime,discard"
             optsnap: ""
             path: "/tmp"
           primary: primary

.preseed/password_grub.txt

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-PleASE_CHan3e_M!

.preseed/password_luks_boot.txt

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-Ceterum_censeo_Bruxellam_et_Berolinum_delenda_esse!

.preseed/password_luks_common.txt

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-Ceterum_censeo_Bruxellam_et_Berolinum_delenda_esse!

.preseed/password_luks_nuke.txt

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-THIS_IS_THE_NUKE_PASSWORD!

.preseed/preseed.yaml

@@ -10,14 +10,17 @@
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 %YAML 1.2
 ---
-### This file contains configurations for the CISS.debian.installer
-### Master V8.00.000.2025.06.17
-### YAML specification: 1.2
-
-installer:
+# This file contains configurations for the CISS.debian.installer
+# Master V8.00.000.2025.06.17
+# YAML specification: 1.2
+#
+preseed:
+  description: "Configuration values for automated installation of encrypted systems on this host via primordial-workflow™."
+  created_at: "2025-10-23"
+  created_for: "host_domain_tld"
   name: "CISS.debian.installer"
   version: "V8.00.000.2025.06.17"
-
+#
 ################################################################################################################################
 # APT settings
 ################################################################################################################################
@@ -84,7 +87,7 @@ debootstrap:                   # Provide a mirror for downloading the Debian pac
                                # list of official Debian packages.
   mirror: "https://deb.debian.org/debian"
                                # The following packages MUST be included in the debootstrap.
-  includes: "busybox,ca-certificates,git,locales,openssl,python3,python3-apt,zstd"
+  includes: "busybox,ca-certificates,git,locales,openssl,python3,python3-apt,systemd-cryptsetup,zstd"
 distribution: "trixie"         # MUST be "trixie".
 debian_suite: "stable"         # MUST be "stable". Not supported yet: "testing", "experimental".
 exit:
@@ -104,7 +107,7 @@ image: "linux-image-6.16.3+deb13-amd64"
                                # "linux-image-6.16.3+deb13-amd64"
 needrun: false                 # Static linking to "${TARGET}/run" can cause problems if this data is "burned" into the target.
 provider: "netcup"             # MUST be one of "contabo", "hetzner", "netcup" or leave empty.
-security_ext: "selinux"        # MUST be one of "apparmor" or "selinux".
+security_ext: "apparmor"        # MUST be one of "apparmor" or "selinux".
 
 ################################################################################################################################
 # Dropbear settings
@@ -115,7 +118,7 @@ dropbear:
   firewall: false              # Yet not implemented. MUST be "false".
                                # Additional ultra hardening of the dropbear initramfs environment via firewall.
                                # The "bastion_ipv4" MUST be provided.
-  port: 42137                  # SSH Port dropbear initramfs should listen.
+  port: 44137                  # SSH Port dropbear initramfs should listen.
   pub_key:  "/.preseed/unlock_wrapper_pubring.gpg"
                                # './path/to/unlock_wrapper_pubring.pgp' to check the signature of: 'unlock-wrapper.sh.sha512.sig'
   sha_file: "/.preseed/unlock_wrapper.sh.sha512"
@@ -128,56 +131,56 @@ dropbear:
 # https://docs.kernel.org/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.html
 ################################################################################################################################
 grub_parameter:
-  ##############################################################################################################################
-  # [ USB ] Default USB device authorization:
-  # default -1 = authorized (same as 1)
-  # 0 = not authorized, 1 = authorized, 2 = authorized if a device connected to an internal port.
-  ##############################################################################################################################
-  - "usbcore.authorized_default=0"
-
   ##############################################################################################################################
   # Audit events need to be captured on processes that start up prior to auditd, so that potential malicious activity cannot go
   # undetected. During boot if audit=1, then the backlog will hold 64 records. If more than 64 records are created during boot,
   # auditd records will be lost, and potential malicious activity could go undetected.
   ##############################################################################################################################
+  - "audit_backlog_limit=262144"
   - "audit=1"
-  - "audit_backlog_limit=8192"
 
   ##############################################################################################################################
-  # Distrusts CPU bootloader for initial entropy at boot. Distrusts the CPU for initial entropy at boot, as it is not possible
-  # to audit, may contain weaknesses or a backdoor.
-  # https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RDRAND#Reception
-  # https://twitter.com/pid_eins/status/1149649806056280069
-  # https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/09/05/us/documents-reveal-nsa-campaign-against-encryption.html
-  # https://forums.whonix.org/t/entropy-config-random-trust-cpu-yes-or-no-rng-core-default-quality/8566
-  # https://lkml.org/lkml/2022/6/5/271
+  # CFI Ensures that only controlled, predefined transitions are possible in the programs' control flow.
+  # kcfi (Kernel Control Flow Integrity): Specific implementation of CFI for the Linux kernel that is particularly robust and
+  # provides accurate control flow validation. kcfi relies on compiler-based technologies (e.g., LLVM) that insert special
+  # checks and instrumentation into the kernel code.
+  # https://kspp.github.io/Recommended_Settings#kernel-command-line-options
   ##############################################################################################################################
-  - "random.trust_cpu=off"
+  - "cfi=kcfi"
 
   ##############################################################################################################################
-  # Distrusts the bootloader for initial entropy at boot.
-  # https://lkml.org/lkml/2022/6/5/271
+  # Prevents the debugfsfile system from being made available at boot time. This is a useful hardening measure because debugfs
+  # reveals a lot of potentially security-relevant kernel information by default, which can be misused by normal users and by
+  # exploits.
   ##############################################################################################################################
-  - "random.trust_bootloader=off"
+  - "debugfs=off"
 
   ##############################################################################################################################
-  # ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization) causes central areas of memory to be assigned random addresses each time a program
-  # is started. These include: Stack, Heap, Shared libraries (e.g., libc), mmap regions, VDSO/VSyscall. The executable itself
-  # (only with PIE binaries). The aim is to make it more difficult for attackers to predict memory addresses, thereby preventing
-  # classic exploits that rely on known addresses from succeeding.
-  # 0: disabled Fixed memory addresses – insecure, testable.
-  # 1: Partial ASLR Heap, mmap are randomized, stack only partially randomized.
-  # 2: Full ASLR (default) Stack, mmap, heap, VDSO, shared libraries all randomized.
+  # Disable the busmaster bit on all PCI bridges during very early boot to avoid holes in IOMMU.
+  # https://mjg59.dreamwidth.org/54433.html
+  # https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=4444f8541dad16fefd9b8807ad1451e806ef1d94
   ##############################################################################################################################
-  - "randomize_va_space=2"
+  - "efi=disable_early_pci_dma"
 
   ##############################################################################################################################
-  # Enables IOMMU to prevent DMA attacks. intel_iommu=on amd_iommu=force_isolation iommu=force
-  # Multiple IOMMU switches are redundant; iommu=force is usually sufficient. Forces an IOMMU to be initialized and used
-  # completely, even if the BIOS or ACPI wanted to disable it. It activates the basic DMA remapping function. However, it does
-  # not say anything about how restrictive the mapping strategy is, 'passthrough', 'strict', see below.
+  # Checks every copy_to_user() / copy_from_user()operation. Prevents kernels from accidentally copying unallocated memory to
+  # userspace. Stop exploits that trigger buffer overflows or use-after-free via copy_*_user(), for example. Effect: Detects
+  # heap/SLOB abuse, overwrites. Leads to BUG() & stack trace if suspicious access is detected.
   ##############################################################################################################################
-  - "iommu=force"
+  - "hardened_usercopy=1"
+
+  ##############################################################################################################################
+  # Remove additional (32-bit) attack surface, unless you really need them.
+  # https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v6.10/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.html
+  # https://kspp.github.io/Recommended_Settings#kernel-command-line-options
+  ##############################################################################################################################
+  - "ia32_emulation=0"
+
+  ##############################################################################################################################
+  # Zero memory at allocation and free time.
+  ##############################################################################################################################
+  - "init_on_alloc=1"
+  - "init_on_free=1"
 
   ##############################################################################################################################
   # Enables strict enforcement of IOMMU TLB invalidation, so devices will never be able to access stale data contents.
@@ -196,122 +199,23 @@ grub_parameter:
   - "iommu.strict=1"
 
   ##############################################################################################################################
-  # Disable the busmaster bit on all PCI bridges during very early boot to avoid holes in IOMMU.
-  # https://mjg59.dreamwidth.org/54433.html
-  # https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=4444f8541dad16fefd9b8807ad1451e806ef1d94
+  # Enables IOMMU to prevent DMA attacks. intel_iommu=on amd_iommu=force_isolation iommu=force
+  # Multiple IOMMU switches are redundant; iommu=force is usually sufficient. Forces an IOMMU to be initialized and used
+  # completely, even if the BIOS or ACPI wanted to disable it. It activates the basic DMA remapping function. However, it does
+  # not say anything about how restrictive the mapping strategy is, 'passthrough', 'strict', see below.
   ##############################################################################################################################
-  - "efi=disable_early_pci_dma"
+  - "iommu=force"
 
   ##############################################################################################################################
-  # Disables the merging of slabs of similar sizes. Sometimes a slab can be used vulnerably, which an attacker can exploit.
+  # Kernel Electric-Fence (KFENCE) is a low-overhead sampling-based memory safety error detector. KFENCE detects a heap of
+  # out-of-bounds access, use-after-free, and invalid-free errors. KFENCE is designed to be enabled in production kernels and
+  # has near zero performance overhead. Compared to KASAN, KFENCE trades performance for precision. The main motivation behind
+  # KFENCE design is that with enough total uptime, KFENCE will detect bugs in code paths not typically exercised by
+  # non-production test workloads. One way to quickly achieve a large enough total uptime is when the tool is deployed across a
+  # large fleet of machines.
+  # https://docs.kernel.org/dev-tools/kfence.html
   ##############################################################################################################################
-  - "slab_nomerge"
-
-  ##############################################################################################################################
-  # Zero memory at allocation and free time.
-  ##############################################################################################################################
-  - "init_on_alloc=1"
-  - "init_on_free=1"
-
-  ##############################################################################################################################
-  # This option randomizes page allocator freelists, improving security by making page allocations less predictable. This also
-  # improves performance.
-  ##############################################################################################################################
-  - "page_alloc.shuffle=1"
-
-  ##############################################################################################################################
-  # When releasing (i.e., free_pages()), all bytes with a marker value (e.g., 0xAA) are overwritten. If later code
-  # (accidentally or maliciously) accesses this page, it will most likely crash or produce recognizable artifacts. Only
-  # supported if the kernel was built with CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING=y (default on Debian: enabled since Bookworm).
-  ##############################################################################################################################
-  - "page_poison=1"
-
-  ##############################################################################################################################
-  # Enables Kernel Page Table Isolation, which mitigates Meltdown, improves KASLR.
-  ##############################################################################################################################
-  - "pti=on"
-
-  ##############################################################################################################################
-  # The setting 'vsyscall' is obsolete, are at fixed addresses and are a target for ROP.
-  ##############################################################################################################################
-  - "vsyscall=none"
-
-  ##############################################################################################################################
-  # The kernel adds a small random padding offset to the stack pointer with every system call or kernel entry. The starting
-  # point for local variables is at a different position within the stack with every call. This makes ROP chains
-  # (return-oriented programming) or stack pivoting attacks significantly more difficult.
-  ##############################################################################################################################
-  - "randomize_kstack_offset=on"
-
-  ##############################################################################################################################
-  # Prevents the debugfsfile system from being made available at boot time. This is a useful hardening measure because debugfs
-  # reveals a lot of potentially security-relevant kernel information by default, which can be misused by normal users and by
-  # exploits.
-  ##############################################################################################################################
-  - "debugfs=off"
-
-  ##############################################################################################################################
-  # Force the kernel to panic on "oopses" (which may be due to false positives).
-  # - 'panic=N'  (e.g., 'panic=60'): Wait N seconds and then reboot.
-  # - 'panic=0'  No automatic action (System remains stuck in panic state).
-  # - 'panic=-1' Also explicitly prevents any automatic reboot.
-  ##############################################################################################################################
-  - "oops=panic"
-  - "panic=-1"
-
-  ##############################################################################################################################
-  # Enable a subset of known mitigations for CPU vulnerabilities and disable SMT.
-  # - 'mitigations=auto' Enables all available CPU-specific security measures based on the detected CPU, microcode version, and
-  # kernel build configuration, if applicable.
-  # - 'nosmt' Disables Simultaneous Multithreading (SMT) (e.g., Hyper-Threading on Intel) system-wide to prevent shared cache
-  # attacks (SMoTHER, MDS, L1TF, TAA, Snoop-assisted).
-  # Why is 'mitigations=auto,nosmt' better than setting everything manually?
-  # Automatically adjusted: Depending on CPU family, stepping, microcode.
-  # Consistency guaranteed: No contradictions between flags are possible
-  # (e.g., spec_store_bypass_disable=on vs. nospec_store_bypass_disable=off).
-  # Future-proof: Even new features (e.g., bhi=flush or srbds) are automatically activated without having to know about them.
-  ##############################################################################################################################
-  - "mitigations=auto,nosmt"
-
-  ##############################################################################################################################
-  # If mitigations=auto,nosmt is set, see before, then these flags should not be set individually because they are redundant.
-  # Enable mitigations for both 'Spectre Variant 2' (indirect branch speculation) and Intel branch history injection (BHI)
-  # vulnerabilities.
-  # https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.html
-  ##############################################################################################################################
-  #- "spectre_v2=on"
-  #- "spectre_v2_user=on"
-  #- "spectre_bhi=on"
-
-  ##############################################################################################################################
-  # If mitigations=auto,nosmt is set, see before, then these flags should not be set individually because they are redundant.
-  # Disable Speculative Store Bypass (Spectre Variant 4).
-  # https://www.suse.com/support/kb/doc/?id=000019189
-  ##############################################################################################################################
-  #- "spec_store_bypass_disable=on"
-  #- "nospec_store_bypass_disable=off"
-
-  ##############################################################################################################################
-  # If mitigations=auto,nosmt is set, see before, then these flags should not be set individually because they are redundant.
-  # Enable mitigations for the L1TF vulnerability through disabling SMT and L1D flush runtime control.
-  # https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.html
-  ##############################################################################################################################
-  #- "l1tf=full,force"
-
-  ##############################################################################################################################
-  # If mitigations=auto,nosmt is set, see before, then these flags should not be set individually because they are redundant.
-  # Enable mitigations for the MDS vulnerability through clearing the buffer cache and disabling SMT.
-  # https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.html
-  ##############################################################################################################################
-  #- "mds=full,nosmt"
-
-  ##############################################################################################################################
-  # If mitigations=auto,nosmt is set, see before, then these flags should not be set individually because they are redundant.
-  # Patches the TAA vulnerability by disabling TSX and enables mitigations using TSX Async Abort along with disabling SMT.
-  # https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.html
-  ##############################################################################################################################
-  #- "tsx=off"
-  #- "tsx_async_abort=full,nosmt"
+  - "kfence.sample_interval=100"
 
   ##############################################################################################################################
   # Mark all huge pages in the EPT as non-executable to mitigate iTLB multihit.
@@ -319,12 +223,6 @@ grub_parameter:
   ##############################################################################################################################
   - "kvm.nx_huge_pages=force"
 
-  ##############################################################################################################################
-  # Force disable SMT as it has caused numerous CPU vulnerabilities. The only full mitigation of cross-HT attacks is disabling.
-  # https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.html
-  ##############################################################################################################################
-  - "nosmt=force"
-
   ##############################################################################################################################
   # Enables the prctl interface to prevent leaks from L1D on context switches.
   # https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1d_flush.html
@@ -332,25 +230,11 @@ grub_parameter:
   - "l1d_flush=on"
 
   ##############################################################################################################################
-  # Mitigates numerous MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities and disables SMT.
-  # mmio_stale_data=off        No mitigation (unsafe)
-  # mmio_stale_data=full       All known measures active
-  # mmio_stale_data=full,nosmt Full mitigation + SMT disabling
-  # mmio_stale_data=auto       Activated depending on CPU/microcode
-  # mmio_stale_data=full,force Forces mitigation even on CPUs that are supposedly not affected.
-  # https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.html
+  # If mitigations=auto,nosmt is set, see before, then these flags should not be set individually because they are redundant.
+  # Enable mitigations for the L1TF vulnerability through disabling SMT and L1D flush runtime control.
+  # https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.html
   ##############################################################################################################################
-  - "mmio_stale_data=full,force"
-
-  ##############################################################################################################################
-  # Enable mitigations for RETBleed (Arbitrary Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions) vulnerability and disable
-  # SMT. If 'mitigations=auto,nosmt' is set, the kernel already activates all retbleed-relevant mitigations, provided the CPU
-  # is affected; 'retbleed=auto,nosmt' explicitly overrides the internal assessment and forces full protection. If maximum
-  # hardening is required, and one does not want to rely on "auto-detection", then it is recommended to additionally set
-  # 'retbleed=auto,nosmt' otherwise, 'mitigations=auto,nosmt' is sufficient.
-  # https://www.suse.com/support/kb/doc/?id=000020693
-  ##############################################################################################################################
-  - "retbleed=auto,nosmt"
+  #- "l1tf=full,force"
 
   ##############################################################################################################################
   # Enables kernel lockdown mode with a focus on confidentiality. The kernel is configured in such a way that even privileged
@@ -375,6 +259,119 @@ grub_parameter:
   ##############################################################################################################################
   - "lockdown=integrity"
 
+  ##############################################################################################################################
+  # All Kernel Messages with a loglevel smaller than the console loglevel will be printed to the console. It can also be
+  # changed with 'klogd' or other programs. The log levels are defined as follows:
+  # 0 (KERN_EMERG)          system is unusable
+  # 1 (KERN_ALERT)          action must be taken immediately
+  # 2 (KERN_CRIT)           critical conditions
+  # 3 (KERN_ERR)            error conditions
+  # 4 (KERN_WARNING)        warning conditions
+  # 5 (KERN_NOTICE)         normal but significant condition
+  # 6 (KERN_INFO)           informational
+  # 7 (KERN_DEBUG)          debug-level messages
+  ##############################################################################################################################
+  - "loglevel=0"
+
+  ##############################################################################################################################
+  # If mitigations=auto,nosmt is set, see before, then these flags should not be set individually because they are redundant.
+  # Enable mitigations for the MDS vulnerability through clearing the buffer cache and disabling SMT.
+  # https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.html
+  ##############################################################################################################################
+  #- "mds=full,nosmt"
+
+  ##############################################################################################################################
+  # Enable a subset of known mitigations for CPU vulnerabilities and disable SMT.
+  # - 'mitigations=auto' Enables all available CPU-specific security measures based on the detected CPU, microcode version, and
+  # kernel build configuration, if applicable.
+  # - 'nosmt' Disables Simultaneous Multithreading (SMT) (e.g., Hyper-Threading on Intel) system-wide to prevent shared cache
+  # attacks (SMoTHER, MDS, L1TF, TAA, Snoop-assisted).
+  # Why is 'mitigations=auto,nosmt' better than setting everything manually?
+  # Automatically adjusted: Depending on CPU family, stepping, microcode.
+  # Consistency guaranteed: No contradictions between flags are possible
+  # (e.g., spec_store_bypass_disable=on vs. nospec_store_bypass_disable=off).
+  # Future-proof: Even new features (e.g., bhi=flush or srbds) are automatically activated without having to know about them.
+  ##############################################################################################################################
+  - "mitigations=auto,nosmt"
+
+  ##############################################################################################################################
+  # Mitigates numerous MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities and disables SMT.
+  # mmio_stale_data=off        No mitigation (unsafe)
+  # mmio_stale_data=full       All known measures active
+  # mmio_stale_data=full,nosmt Full mitigation + SMT disabling
+  # mmio_stale_data=auto       Activated depending on CPU/microcode
+  # mmio_stale_data=full,force Forces mitigation even on CPUs that are supposedly not affected.
+  # https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.html
+  ##############################################################################################################################
+  - "mmio_stale_data=full,force"
+
+  ##############################################################################################################################
+  # Force disable SMT as it has caused numerous CPU vulnerabilities. The only full mitigation of cross-HT attacks is disabling.
+  # https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.html
+  ##############################################################################################################################
+  - "nosmt=force"
+
+  ##############################################################################################################################
+  # Force the kernel to panic on "oopses" (which may be due to false positives).
+  # - 'panic=N'  (e.g., 'panic=60'): Wait N seconds and then reboot.
+  # - 'panic=0'  No automatic action (System remains stuck in panic state).
+  # - 'panic=-1' Also explicitly prevents any automatic reboot.
+  ##############################################################################################################################
+  - "oops=panic"
+  - "panic=0"
+
+  ##############################################################################################################################
+  # This option randomizes page allocator freelists, improving security by making page allocations less predictable. This also
+  # improves performance.
+  ##############################################################################################################################
+  - "page_alloc.shuffle=1"
+
+  ##############################################################################################################################
+  # When releasing (i.e., free_pages()), all bytes with a marker value (e.g., 0xAA) are overwritten. If later code
+  # (accidentally or maliciously) accesses this page, it will most likely crash or produce recognizable artifacts. Only
+  # supported if the kernel was built with CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING=y (default on Debian: enabled since Bookworm).
+  ##############################################################################################################################
+  - "page_poison=1"
+
+  ##############################################################################################################################
+  # Enables Kernel Page Table Isolation, which mitigates Meltdown, improves KASLR.
+  ##############################################################################################################################
+  - "pti=on"
+
+  ##############################################################################################################################
+  # Distrusts the bootloader for initial entropy at boot.
+  # https://lkml.org/lkml/2022/6/5/271
+  ##############################################################################################################################
+  - "random.trust_bootloader=off"
+
+  ##############################################################################################################################
+  # Distrusts CPU bootloader for initial entropy at boot. Distrusts the CPU for initial entropy at boot, as it is not possible
+  # to audit, may contain weaknesses or a backdoor.
+  # https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RDRAND#Reception
+  # https://twitter.com/pid_eins/status/1149649806056280069
+  # https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/09/05/us/documents-reveal-nsa-campaign-against-encryption.html
+  # https://forums.whonix.org/t/entropy-config-random-trust-cpu-yes-or-no-rng-core-default-quality/8566
+  # https://lkml.org/lkml/2022/6/5/271
+  ##############################################################################################################################
+  - "random.trust_cpu=off"
+
+  ##############################################################################################################################
+  # The kernel adds a small random padding offset to the stack pointer with every system call or kernel entry. The starting
+  # point for local variables is at a different position within the stack with every call. This makes ROP chains
+  # (return-oriented programming) or stack pivoting attacks significantly more difficult.
+  ##############################################################################################################################
+  - "randomize_kstack_offset=on"
+
+  ##############################################################################################################################
+  # Enable mitigations for RETBleed (Arbitrary Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions) vulnerability and disable
+  # SMT. If 'mitigations=auto,nosmt' is set, the kernel already activates all retbleed-relevant mitigations, provided the CPU
+  # is affected; 'retbleed=auto,nosmt' explicitly overrides the internal assessment and forces full protection. If maximum
+  # hardening is required, and one does not want to rely on "auto-detection", then it is recommended to additionally set
+  # 'retbleed=auto,nosmt' otherwise, 'mitigations=auto,nosmt' is sufficient.
+  # https://www.suse.com/support/kb/doc/?id=000020693
+  ##############################################################################################################################
+  - "retbleed=auto,nosmt"
+
   ##############################################################################################################################
   # Enables 'Read-Only Data Protection', which implements read-only memory areas for kernel data structures. This protects the
   # kernel from certain types of exploit (e.g., buffer overflows). 'on': Forces the corresponding areas to remain read-only.
@@ -383,31 +380,42 @@ grub_parameter:
   - "rodata=on"
 
   ##############################################################################################################################
-  # Kernel Electric-Fence (KFENCE) is a low-overhead sampling-based memory safety error detector. KFENCE detects a heap of
-  # out-of-bounds access, use-after-free, and invalid-free errors. KFENCE is designed to be enabled in production kernels and
-  # has near zero performance overhead. Compared to KASAN, KFENCE trades performance for precision. The main motivation behind
-  # KFENCE design is that with enough total uptime, KFENCE will detect bugs in code paths not typically exercised by
-  # non-production test workloads. One way to quickly achieve a large enough total uptime is when the tool is deployed across a
-  # large fleet of machines.
-  # https://docs.kernel.org/dev-tools/kfence.html
+  # Disables the merging of slabs of similar sizes. Sometimes a slab can be used vulnerably, which an attacker can exploit.
   ##############################################################################################################################
-  - "kfence.sample_interval=100"
+  - "slab_nomerge"
 
   ##############################################################################################################################
-  # CFI Ensures that only controlled, predefined transitions are possible in the programs' control flow.
-  # kcfi (Kernel Control Flow Integrity): Specific implementation of CFI for the Linux kernel that is particularly robust and
-  # provides accurate control flow validation. kcfi relies on compiler-based technologies (e.g., LLVM) that insert special
-  # checks and instrumentation into the kernel code.
-  # https://kspp.github.io/Recommended_Settings#kernel-command-line-options
+  # If mitigations=auto,nosmt is set, see before, then these flags should not be set individually because they are redundant.
+  # Disable Speculative Store Bypass (Spectre Variant 4).
+  # https://www.suse.com/support/kb/doc/?id=000019189
   ##############################################################################################################################
-  - "cfi=kcfi"
+  #- "spec_store_bypass_disable=on"
+  #- "nospec_store_bypass_disable=off"
 
   ##############################################################################################################################
-  # Remove additional (32-bit) attack surface, unless you really need them.
-  # https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v6.10/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.html
-  # https://kspp.github.io/Recommended_Settings#kernel-command-line-options
+  # If mitigations=auto,nosmt is set, see before, then these flags should not be set individually because they are redundant.
+  # Enable mitigations for both 'Spectre Variant 2' (indirect branch speculation) and Intel branch history injection (BHI)
+  # vulnerabilities.
+  # https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.html
   ##############################################################################################################################
-  - "ia32_emulation=0"
+  #- "spectre_v2=on"
+  #- "spectre_v2_user=on"
+  #- "spectre_bhi=on"
+
+  ##############################################################################################################################
+  # If mitigations=auto,nosmt is set, see before, then these flags should not be set individually because they are redundant.
+  # Patches the TAA vulnerability by disabling TSX and enables mitigations using TSX Async Abort along with disabling SMT.
+  # https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.html
+  ##############################################################################################################################
+  #- "tsx=off"
+  #- "tsx_async_abort=full,nosmt"
+
+  ##############################################################################################################################
+  # [ USB ] Default USB device authorization:
+  # default -1 = authorized (same as 1)
+  # 0 = not authorized, 1 = authorized, 2 = authorized if a device connected to an internal port.
+  ##############################################################################################################################
+  - "usbcore.authorized_default=0"
 
   ##############################################################################################################################
   # Removes mapping for 32-bit VDSO (for ia32binaries). On 32-bit processes that rely on VDSO, this causes a fallback to classic
@@ -417,16 +425,9 @@ grub_parameter:
   - "vdso32=0"
 
   ##############################################################################################################################
-  # Checks every copy_to_user() / copy_from_user()operation. Prevents kernels from accidentally copying unallocated memory to
-  # userspace. Stop exploits that trigger buffer overflows or use-after-free via copy_*_user(), for example. Effect: Detects
-  # heap/SLOB abuse, overwrites. Leads to BUG() & stack trace if suspicious access is detected.
+  # The setting 'vsyscall' is obsolete, are at fixed addresses and are a target for ROP.
   ##############################################################################################################################
-  - "hardened_usercopy=1"
-
-  ##############################################################################################################################
-  # Sets the minimum log output of the kernel at boot time to level 0 (= KERN_EMERG).
-  ##############################################################################################################################
-  - "loglevel=0"
+  - "vsyscall=none"
 
 ################################################################################################################################
 # Grub settings
@@ -434,7 +435,7 @@ grub_parameter:
 grub:
   background:                  # RECOMMENDED settings: JPG 1280 x 1024 px or JPG 1920 x 1080 px
     enable: true               # If you want to add a GRUB background.
-    path: "/includes/target/etc/default/grub.d/club_1280_720.png"
+    path: "/includes/target/etc/default/grub.d/hexagon_1280_720.png"
   bootdev: "/dev/sda"          # Due notably to potential USB sticks, the location of the primary drive cannot be determined
                                # safely in general, so this needs to be specified.
   force_efi: true              # Force GRUB installation to the EFI removable media path?
@@ -453,7 +454,7 @@ grub:
   other-os: true               # This one makes grub-installer install to the UEFI partition '/boot' record if it also finds
                                # some other OS, which is less safe as it might not be able to boot that other OS.
   password: true               # If you want to set a password for GRUB. The password MUST be set at:
-                               # '/.preseed/password_grub.txt'.
+                               # '/.preseed/SECRETS.yaml'.
   prober: false                # OS-prober did not detect any other operating systems on your computer at this time, but you
                                # may still wish to enable it in case you install more in the future.
   skip: false                  # Skip installing grub.
@@ -511,6 +512,7 @@ network:
     dhcp: 60                   # If the dhcp server is slow, and the installer times out waiting for it, this might be useful.
     linkwait: 3                # To set a different link detection timeout (default is 3 seconds).
   static:
+    dns_dhcp_override: true    # If you want to override the DNS settings of the DHCP server.
     enable: true               # If you want the preconfiguration file to work on systems both with and without a dhcp
                                # server, change 'network.static.enable' from "false" to "true" and configure the static
                                # configuration below.
@@ -525,7 +527,7 @@ network:
       #- "176.9.93.198"        # dnsforge.de
       #- "176.9.1.117"         # dnsforge.de
     ipv6address: "2a03:4000:10:d43:188:68:34:243"
-    ipv6netmask: "128"
+    ipv6netmask: "64"
     ipv6gateway: "fe80::1"
     ipv6nameserver:
       - "2a01:4f9:c012:a813:135:181:207:105"
@@ -622,8 +624,8 @@ software:
   # gawk
   # gdisk
   # gnupg
-  # haveged
   # initramfs-tools
+  # jitterentropy-rngd
   # jq
   # kbd
   # keyutils
@@ -632,6 +634,7 @@ software:
   # parted
   # pciutils
   # pwgen
+  # rsyslog
   # sudo
   # tree
   # unzip
@@ -683,7 +686,9 @@ software:
   ##############################################################################################################################
   ### Installed by 4310_dropbear_build.sh
   ##############################################################################################################################
+  # dropbear-bin
   # dropbear-initramfs
+  # gpgv
   #
   ##############################################################################################################################
   ### Installed by 4330_installation_ssh.sh
@@ -719,32 +724,28 @@ software:
   # Installed by 4600_installation_packages.sh
   ##############################################################################################################################
   - bat
-  - borgbackup
-  - borgbackup-doc
-  - dhcpdump
-  - dhcping
   - dialog
   - expect
   - htop
   - iftop
   - locate
   - man-db
-  - manpages
-  - manpages-dev
-  - mdadm
-  - mtr
+  - mtr-tiny
   - ncat
-  - rsnapshot
   - rsync
   - sysstat
-  - unzip
   - zip
   ##############################################################################################################################
-  # diagnostics
+  # backup and diagnostics
   ##############################################################################################################################
+  #- borgbackup
+  #- borgbackup-doc
+  #- dhcpdump
+  #- dhcping
   #- knot-dnssecutils
   #- knot-dnsutils
   #- nmap
+  #- rsnapshot
   #- spectre-meltdown-checker
   #- tshark
   ##############################################################################################################################
@@ -758,6 +759,8 @@ software:
   #- debootstrap
   #- linux-source
   #- lld
+  #- manpages
+  #- manpages-dev
   #- shellcheck
   #- ssl-cert
   ##############################################################################################################################
@@ -767,6 +770,7 @@ software:
   # apparmor-profiles
   # apparmor-profiles-extra
   # apparmor-utils
+  # OR #
   # selinux-basics
   # selinux-policy-default
   # selinux-utils
@@ -780,6 +784,7 @@ software:
   ##############################################################################################################################
   # Installed by 4620_installation_verification.sh
   ##############################################################################################################################
+  # acct
   # aide
   # aide-common
   # audit
@@ -802,13 +807,13 @@ software:
 # USA         : time-a-g.nist.gov time-c-b.nist.gov utcnist3.colorado.edu
 ntp:
   server:
-    - "ntp.ripe.net"
+    #- "ntp.ripe.net"          # Time out as of 2025-10-16
     - "ptbtime3.ptb.de"
     - "ptbtime2.ptb.de"
     - "ptbtime1.ptb.de"
-    - "ntp13.metas.ch"
-    - "time-c-b.nist.gov"
-    - "sth1.ntp.se"
+    #- "ntp13.metas.ch"        # Time out as of 2025-10-16
+    #- "time-c-b.nist.gov"     # Time out as of 2025-10-16
+    #- "sth1.ntp.se"           # Time out as of 2025-10-16
     - "ntp0.fau.de"
   timezone: "Europe/Lisbon"    # Any valid setting for $TZ; see the contents of '/usr/share/zoneinfo' for valid values.
   utc: true                    # Controls whether the hardware clock is set to UTC.
@@ -820,6 +825,10 @@ ssh:
   allow_hardening: true        # For additional hardening of SSH connections via TCP wrapper: '/etc/hosts.allow'.
                                # If "allow_hardening" = "true", at least one 'allow_ipv4' MUST be provided.
   allow_ipv4:                  # Provide Bastion / Jump-Server / static VPN-Exit-Nodes IPv4: will be added: 'f2ban-ignoreip'.
+                               # Also, ufw will be configured to ufw aggressive approach:
+                               # Any valid client communicating with the server should be going directly to the service ports
+                               # opened in ufw (ssh, 80, ...). Any client touching other ports is treated as malicious and
+                               # therefore is blocked access to ALL ports after 1 attempt.
     - 202.61.246.50
   allow_ipv6:                  # Provide Bastion / Jump-Server / static VPN-Exit-Nodes IPv6: will be added: 'f2ban-ignoreip'.
     - 2a03:4000:53:f:abcd:9494:0:2
@@ -830,23 +839,22 @@ ssh:
 # User settings
 ################################################################################################################################
 user:
-  mfa:
-    info: "totp:v1"
-    salt: "CISS:CDI:OTP"       # + (Server_FQDN/Username)
   ##############################################################################################################################
-  # root – Superuser account (normally disabled for direct login)
+  # Root: The superuser account (normally disabled for direct login).
+  #       Key 'user.root.password' MUST contain a valid yescrypt hashed password string.
+  #       Key 'user.root.sshpubkey' MUST be set in case dropbear is used.
   ##############################################################################################################################
   root:
     ensure: present            # Must always be 'present'. (Not in use in this version of the installer.)
     protected: true            # Prevent unintentional edits or deletions. (Not in use in this version of the installer.)
     shell: /bin/zsh            # Login shell (e.g., '/bin/bash', '/bin/zsh'); use '/usr/sbin/nologin' for non-interactive users.
-    password: "47110815"
+    password: "$y$jFT$7pQlcZrgTEGrzkEm7UQW/.$QoCamalYEAV5mN4QWIE.xpHo8kvXa9sym2Uz.9oELwA"
     sshpubkey: "ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAINAYZDAqVZUk3LwJsqeVHKvLn8UKkFx642VBbiSS8uSY 2025_ciss.debian.live.ISO_PUBLIC_ONLY"
     authentication:
       access:
         ssh: false             # Allow SSH access.
         tty: false             # Allow TTY (local console) login.
-      password: false          # Allow password login. SSH password login is always disabled.
+      password: true           # Allow password login. SSH password login is always disabled.
       2fa:
         ssh: true              # Require 2FA for SSH access.
         tty: true              # Require 2FA for TTY (local console) login.
@@ -856,6 +864,8 @@ user:
       shell: true              # MUST be "true" if the shell is not '/usr/sbin/nologin' or '/bin/false'.
       sudo: false              # Whether the user can escalate to root using sudo.
       system: true             # Whether this is a low-UID system user (e.g., for automation).
+    specific: "ciss"           # Adjust the settings for the user account as required. Allowed values are 'none', 'ciss', and
+                               # 'physnet'.
 
   ##############################################################################################################################
   # Primary administrative user with full sudo access
@@ -863,12 +873,12 @@ user:
   user0:
     ensure: present            # Must always be 'present'. (Not in use in this version of the installer.)
     protected: true            # Prevent unintentional edits or deletions. (Not in use in this version of the installer.)
-    name: "msw"                # The name of the user account.
+    name: "msw"                # The name of the user account. No ":" allowed.
     fullname: "msw"            # The full name of the user account holder.
     uid: 1000                  # Ensures that the same user has the same UID on all systems.
     gid: 1000                  # Ensures that the same user has the same GID on all systems.
     shell: /bin/zsh            # Login shell (e.g., '/bin/bash', '/bin/zsh'); use '/usr/sbin/nologin' for non-interactive users.
-    password: "47110815"
+    password: "$y$jFT$OGeZONH5ho2JSXvAbyIBQ1$5OhyHqOaMZ9BZcfMOYEwF.nMLFKd9ceiW2oNksPCHVB"
     sshpubkey: "ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAINAYZDAqVZUk3LwJsqeVHKvLn8UKkFx642VBbiSS8uSY 2025_ciss.debian.live.ISO_PUBLIC_ONLY"
     authentication:
       access:
@@ -884,6 +894,8 @@ user:
       system: false            # Whether this is a low-UID system user (e.g., for automation).
       restricted: false        # If true, the user is limited in scope (e.g., no login, no file access, --no-create-home)
       shell: true              # MUST be "true" if the shell is not '/usr/sbin/nologin' or '/bin/false'.
+    specific: "ciss"           # Adjust the settings for the user account as required. Allowed values are 'none', 'ciss', and
+                               # 'physnet'.
 
   ##############################################################################################################################
   # ansible – System user for automation, no interactive shell
@@ -891,7 +903,7 @@ user:
   user1:
     ensure: present            # "present" = create user; "absent" = remove user
     protected: true            # Prevent unintentional edits or deletions.
-    name: "ansible"            # The name of the user account.
+    name: "ansible"            # The name of the user account. No ":" allowed.
     fullname: "ansible"        # The full name of the user account holder.
     uid: 137                   # Ensures that the same user has the same UID on all systems.
     gid: 137                   # Ensures that the same user has the same GID on all systems.
@@ -912,5 +924,7 @@ user:
       system: true             # Whether this is a low-UID system user (e.g., for automation).
       restricted: false        # If true, the user is limited in scope (e.g., no login, no file access, --no-create-home)
       shell: true              # MUST be "true" if the shell is not '/usr/sbin/nologin' or '/bin/false'.
+    specific: "none"           # Adjust the settings for the user account as required. Allowed values are 'none', 'ciss', and
+                               # 'physnet'.
 
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=yaml

.preseed/unlock_wrapper.sh.sha512

@@ -1 +1 @@
-a21c7ab831616a8f880a5fb528d4eea3e0095da956ed5665255f9845a7dadf43020dd794c19deeb7b98ca8a3836e46c35c214a5da4f5a5b2ae63ebf10c9c67f1
+2d90783e0ffba3c6972b3a0d5335cca4a37c03b417f43b62b082a83734d4e4148390ac22509e68d63aaca11baf4fb081747f83347eab08176fb647e5445372f6

.pubkey/marc_s_weidner_msw+bot@coresecret.dev_AGE_pubkey

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+# created: 2025-10-11T17:22:22Z
+# public key: age1l3pm5sjg0lj5l5jlh2azllccmzflpend9hpgcg7zvsk2mr4hvpqscdwm8f

.pubkey/marc_s_weidner_msw@coresecret.dev_AGE_pubkey

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+# created: 2025-10-11T17:20:35Z
+# public key: age1chzjfu3f5nxnh5yz2l6n43l6gs07qyqcfzekdfhr5gezqvemcq7qjn23kv

.shellcheckrc

@@ -9,6 +9,9 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
+# https://github.com/koalaman/shellcheck/wiki/directive
+# https://github.com/koalaman/shellcheck/wiki/Optional
+
 encoding=utf-8
 external-sources=true
 shell=bash
@@ -16,6 +19,8 @@ source-path=~/func
 source-path=~/lib
 source-path=~/var
 
+enable=add-default-case
+enable=avoid-negated-conditions
 enable=avoid-nullary-conditions
 enable=check-extra-masked-returns
 enable=check-set-e-suppressed
@@ -24,5 +29,6 @@ enable=deprecate-which
 enable=quote-safe-variables
 enable=require-double-brackets
 enable=require-variable-braces
+enable=useless-use-of-cat
 
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=conf

.sops.yaml

@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
-#!/bin/bash
 # SPDX-Version: 3.0
 # SPDX-CreationInfo: 2025-06-17; WEIDNER, Marc S.; <msw@coresecret.dev>
 # SPDX-ExternalRef: GIT https://git.coresecret.dev/msw/CISS.debian.installer.git
@@ -9,19 +8,10 @@
 # SPDX-LicenseComment: This file is part of the CISS.debian.installer.secure framework.
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
-
-guard_sourcing
-
-#######################################
-# Finalize the system.
-# Globals:
-#   TARGET
-# Arguments:
-#   None
-# Returns:
-#   0: on success
-#######################################
-finalize_system() {
-  guard_dir && return 0
-}
-# vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh
+creation_rules:
+  - path_regex: '(^|.*/)\.preseed/SECRETS\.yaml$'
+    encrypted_regex: '^value$'
+stores:
+  yaml:
+    indent: 2
+# vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=yaml

LINTER_RESULTS.txt

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # SPDX-Version: 3.0
-# SPDX-CreationInfo: 2025-06-17; WEIDNER, Marc S.; <msw@coresecret.dev>
+# SPDX-CreationInfo: 2025-10-26; WEIDNER, Marc S.; <msw@coresecret.dev>
 # SPDX-ExternalRef: GIT https://git.coresecret.dev/msw/CISS.debian.installer.git
 # SPDX-FileContributor: WEIDNER, Marc S.; Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency
 # SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2024-2025; WEIDNER, Marc S.; <msw@coresecret.dev>
@@ -9,8 +9,8 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-This file was automatically generated by the DEPLOY BOT on: "2025-09-17T07:43:27Z".
+This file was automatically generated by the DEPLOY BOT on: "2025-10-26T18:19:45Z".
 
-✅ The last linter check was successful. ✅
+⚠️ The last linter check was NOT successful. ⚠️
 
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=text

README.md

@@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ include_toc: true
  
 [![Static Badge](https://badges.coresecret.dev/badge/Licence-EUPL1.2-white?style=plastic&logo=europeanunion&logoColor=white&logoSize=auto&label=Licence&color=%23003399)](https://eupl.eu/1.2/en/)  
 [![Static Badge](https://badges.coresecret.dev/badge/opensourceinitiative-Compliant-white?style=plastic&logo=opensourceinitiative&logoColor=white&logoSize=auto&label=OSI&color=%233DA639)](https://opensource.org/license/eupl-1-2)  
-[![Static Badge](https://badges.coresecret.dev/badge/Bash-V5.2.15-white?style=plastic&logo=gnubash&logoColor=white&logoSize=auto&label=Bash&color=%234EAA25)](https://www.gnu.org/software/bash/)  
+[![Static Badge](https://badges.coresecret.dev/badge/Bash-V5.2.37-white?style=plastic&logo=gnubash&logoColor=white&logoSize=auto&label=Bash&color=%234EAA25)](https://www.gnu.org/software/bash/)  
 [![Static Badge](https://badges.coresecret.dev/badge/shellcheck-passed-white?style=plastic&logo=gnubash&logoColor=white&logoSize=auto&label=shellcheck&color=%234EAA25)](https://shellcheck.net/)  
 [![Static Badge](https://badges.coresecret.dev/badge/shellformat-passed-white?style=plastic&logo=google&logoColor=white&logoSize=auto&label=shellformat&color=%234285F4)](https://github.com/mvdan/sh)  
 [![Static Badge](https://badges.coresecret.dev/badge/Shellstyle-Google-white?style=plastic&logo=google&logoColor=white&logoSize=auto&label=Shellstyle&color=%234285F4)](https://google.github.io/styleguide/shellguide.html)
  
-[![Static Badge](https://badges.coresecret.dev/badge/Gitea-1.24.5-white?style=plastic&logo=gitea&logoColor=white&logoSize=auto&label=gitea&color=%23609926)](https://docs.gitea.com/)  
-[![Static Badge](https://badges.coresecret.dev/badge/IntelliJ-2025.2-white?style=plastic&logo=intellijidea&logoColor=white&logoSize=auto&label=IntelliJ&color=%23000000)](https://www.jetbrains.com/store/?section=personal&billing=yearly)  
+[![Static Badge](https://badges.coresecret.dev/badge/Gitea-1.24.7-white?style=plastic&logo=gitea&logoColor=white&logoSize=auto&label=gitea&color=%23609926)](https://docs.gitea.com/)  
+[![Static Badge](https://badges.coresecret.dev/badge/IntelliJ-2025.2.4-white?style=plastic&logo=intellijidea&logoColor=white&logoSize=auto&label=IntelliJ&color=%23000000)](https://www.jetbrains.com/store/?section=personal&billing=yearly)  
 [![Static Badge](https://badges.coresecret.dev/badge/keepassxc-2.7.10-white?style=plastic&logo=keepassxc&logoColor=white&logoSize=auto&label=KeePassXC&color=%236CAC4D)](https://keepassxc.org/)  
 [![Static Badge](https://badges.coresecret.dev/badge/netcup-Netcup-white?style=plastic&logo=netcup&logoColor=white&logoSize=auto&label=powered&color=%23056473)](https://www.netcup.com/de)  
 [![Static Badge](https://badges.coresecret.dev/badge/powered-Centurion-white?style=plastic&logo=europeanunion&logoColor=white&logoSize=auto&label=powered&color=%230F243E)](https://coresecret.eu/)  

ciss_debian_installer.sh

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 
 ### Contributions so far see ./docs/CREDITS.md
 
+# TODO: Final warnings if interactive.
 # TODO: Update .dot files.
 # TODO: Update README.md for each lib and func dir.
 # TODO: Update MANPAGE.md for each func.
@@ -23,7 +24,7 @@
 # TODO: Copying Log Files to final System
 # TODO: Integrate CISS.debian.installer calling arguments and preseed.yaml into CISS.debian.live.builder build chain?
 # TODO: Reboot function for Autoinstall, Clean Exit, Flush Logs, luksClose, umount
-# TODO: Implement loop_pass() for other passwords 0105_arg_nuke_converter.sh
+# TODO: Implement loop_pass() for other passwords 1257_yaml_xnuke.sh
 # TODO: Implement / Integrate IP, Port validation CDI_1200
 
 ### WHY BASH?
@@ -104,12 +105,15 @@ declare -grx  VAR_SETUP_FULL="$(cd "$(dirname "${0}")" && pwd)/${0##*/}" # '/opt
 }
 
 ### CHECK FOR CONTACT, HELP, AND VERSION STRING.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2249
 for arg in "$@"; do case "${arg,,}" in -c|--contact) . ./meta_loader_cuv.sh; contact; exit 0;; esac; done
+# shellcheck disable=SC2249
 for arg in "$@"; do case "${arg,,}" in -h|--help)    . ./meta_loader_cuv.sh; usage  ; exit 0;; esac; done
+# shellcheck disable=SC2249
 for arg in "$@"; do case "${arg,,}" in -v|--version) . ./meta_loader_cuv.sh; version; exit 0;; esac; done
 
-### SOURCING MUST SET EARLY VARIABLES. SOURCING COLOR_ECHO(), GUARD_SOURCING(), AND SOURCE_GUARD().
-. ./lib/cdi_0005_guard/0005_guard_sourcing.sh # The function guard_sourcing MUST be present in each file to source.
+### SOURCING MUST SET EARLY VARIABLES. SOURCING COLOR_ECHO(), guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"(), AND SOURCE_GUARD().
+. ./lib/cdi_0005_guard/0005_guard_sourcing.sh # The function guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}" MUST be present in each file to source.
 . ./lib/cdi_0005_guard/0006_source_guard.sh   # Wrapper for sourcing modules, libraries, variables.
 source_guard "./var/color.var.sh"
 source_guard "./var/early.var.sh"
@@ -163,6 +167,7 @@ pre_scan_debug "$@"
 
 ### CHECK FOR AUTO INSTALL MODE.
 color_echo "${GRE}" "CISS.DEBIAN.INSTALLER PREPARATION: CHECK FOR AUTO INSTALL MODE"
+# shellcheck disable=SC2249
 for arg in "$@"; do case "${arg,,}" in -a|--autoinstall) declare -gx VAR_AUTO_INSTALL="true";; esac; done; unset arg
 
 ### ACTIVATING TRAPS.
@@ -193,178 +198,312 @@ arg_parser "$@"
 info_echo "0103_arg_priority_check.sh"
 arg_priority_check
 
-### HASHING PASSWORDS.
-info_echo "0105_arg_nuke_converter.sh"
-nuke_passphrase
-
-### CDI_1200
 
 ### CDI_1250
 info_echo "1250_yaml_parser.sh"
 yaml_parser
+
 info_echo "1251_yaml_reader.sh"
 yaml_reader
+
 info_echo "1252_yaml_validator.sh"
 yaml_validator
 
+info_echo "1256_yaml_xfiles.sh"
+yaml_secret
+
+info_echo "1257_yaml_xnuke.sh"
+nuke_passphrase
+
+
 ### CDI_3200
 info_echo "3200_partitioning.sh"
 partitioning
+
 info_echo "3210_benchmarking_encryption.sh"
 benchmarking_encryption
+
 info_echo "3220_partition_encryption.sh"
 partition_encryption
+
 info_echo "3240_partition_formatting.sh"
 partition_formatting
+
 info_echo "3280_mount_partition.sh"
 mount_partition
+
 info_echo "3290_uuid_logger.sh"
 uuid_logger
 
+
 ### CDI_4000
-info_echo "4000_debootstrap.sh"
+info_echo "4000_debootstrap.sh [${TARGET}]"
 func_debootstrap
-info_echo "4005_debootstrap_checks.sh"
+
+info_echo "4005_debootstrap_checks.sh [${TARGET}]"
 check_debootstrap
-info_echo "4010_prepare_mounts.sh"
+
+info_echo "4010_prepare_mounts.sh [${TARGET}]"
 prepare_mounts
-info_echo "4015_check_usr_merge.sh"
+
+info_echo "4011_prepare_xdg_root.sh [${TARGET}]"
+prepare_xdg_root
+
+info_echo "4015_check_usr_merge.sh [${TARGET}]"
 check_usr_merge
-info_echo "4020_remove_x509.sh"
+
+info_echo "4020_remove_x509.sh [${TARGET}]"
 remove_x509
-info_echo "4030_setup_hostname.sh"
+
+info_echo "4030_setup_hostname.sh [${TARGET}]"
 setup_hostname
-info_echo "4035_setup_resolv.sh"
+
+info_echo "4035_setup_resolv.sh [${TARGET}]"
 setup_resolv
-info_echo "4040_setup_timezone.sh"
+
+info_echo "4040_setup_timezone.sh [${TARGET}]"
 setup_timezone
-info_echo "4050_setup_locales.sh"
+
+info_echo "4050_setup_locales.sh [${TARGET}]"
 setup_locales
 
+
 ### CDI_4100
 if [[ "${VAR_DEB822}" == "true" ]]; then
-  info_echo "4105_generate_sources822.sh"
+
+  info_echo "4105_generate_sources822.sh [${TARGET}]"
   generate_sources822
+
 else
-  info_echo "4100_generate_sources.sh"
+
+  info_echo "4100_generate_sources.sh [${TARGET}]"
   generate_sources
+
 fi
-info_echo "4110_update_sources.sh"
+
+info_echo "4110_update_sources.sh [${TARGET}]"
 update_sources
-info_echo "4120_installation_kernel.sh"
+
+info_echo "4120_installation_kernel.sh [${TARGET}]"
 installation_kernel
-info_echo "4121_installation_initramfs.sh"
+
+info_echo "4121_installation_initramfs.sh [${TARGET}]"
 installation_initramfs
-info_echo "4130_installation_toolset.sh"
+
+info_echo "4130_installation_toolset.sh [${TARGET}]"
 installation_toolset
-info_echo "4131_installation_systemd.sh"
+
+info_echo "4131_installation_systemd.sh [${TARGET}]"
 installation_systemd
-info_echo "4132_installation_machineid.sh"
+
+info_echo "4132_installation_machineid.sh [${TARGET}]"
 installation_machineid
-info_echo "4133_installation_masking.sh"
+
+info_echo "4133_installation_masking.sh [${TARGET}]"
 installation_masking
-info_echo "4140_installation_microcode.sh"
+
+info_echo "4140_installation_microcode.sh [${TARGET}]"
 installation_microcode
-info_echo "4145_installation_firmware.sh"
+
+info_echo "4145_installation_firmware.sh [${TARGET}]"
 installation_firmware
-info_echo "4150_installation_chrony.sh"
+
+info_echo "4150_installation_chrony.sh [${TARGET}]"
 installation_chrony
-info_echo "4160_installation_eza.sh"
+
+info_echo "4160_installation_eza.sh [${TARGET}]"
 installation_eza
-info_echo "4170_installation_lynis.sh"
+
+info_echo "4170_installation_lynis.sh [${TARGET}]"
 installation_lynis
 
+
 ### CDI_4200
-info_echo "4200_generate_fstab.sh"
+info_echo "4200_generate_fstab.sh [${TARGET}]"
 generate_fstab
-info_echo "4205_check_fstab.sh"
+
+info_echo "4205_check_fstab.sh [${TARGET}]"
 check_fstab
-info_echo "4210_generate_crypttab.sh"
+
+info_echo "4210_generate_crypttab.sh [${TARGET}]"
 generate_crypttab
-info_echo "4215_check_crypttab.sh"
-check_crypttab
-info_echo "4220_installation_cryptsetup.sh"
+
+info_echo "4220_installation_cryptsetup.sh [${TARGET}]"
 installation_cryptsetup
-info_echo "4230_installation_grub.sh"
+
+info_echo "4230_installation_grub.sh [${TARGET}]"
 installation_grub
+
 if [[ "${VAR_GRUB_PASSWORD}" == "true" ]]; then
-  info_echo "4240_update_grub_password.sh"
+
+  info_echo "4240_update_grub_password.sh [${TARGET}]"
   update_grub_password
+
 fi
-info_echo "4250_update_grub_bootparameter.sh"
+
+info_echo "4250_update_grub_bootparameter.sh [${TARGET}]"
 update_grub_bootparameter
 
+
 ### CDI_4300
-info_echo "4300_installation_network.sh"
+info_echo "4300_installation_network.sh [${TARGET}]"
 installation_network
-info_echo "4305_installation_netsec.sh"
+
+info_echo "4305_installation_netsec.sh [${TARGET}]"
 installation_netsec
+
 if [[ "${VAR_DROPBEAR}" == "true" ]]; then
-  info_echo "4310_dropbear_build.sh"
+
+  info_echo "4310_dropbear_build.sh [${TARGET}]"
   dropbear_build
-  info_echo "4311_dropbear_initramfs.sh"
+
+  info_echo "4311_dropbear_initramfs.sh [${TARGET}]"
   dropbear_initramfs
-  info_echo "4312_dropbear_setup.sh"
+
+  info_echo "4312_dropbear_setup.sh [${TARGET}]"
   dropbear_setup
+
 fi
-info_echo "4320_update_initramfs.sh"
+
+info_echo "4320_update_initramfs.sh [${TARGET}]"
 update_initramfs
-info_echo "4330_installation_ssh.sh"
+
+info_echo "4330_installation_ssh.sh [${TARGET}]"
 installation_ssh
 
+
 ### CDI_4400
-info_echo "4400_kernel_modules.sh"
+info_echo "4400_kernel_modules.sh [${TARGET}]"
 kernel_modules && kernel_modprobe
-info_echo "4410_kernel_sysctl.sh"
+
+info_echo "4410_kernel_sysctl.sh [${TARGET}]"
 kernel_sysctl
-info_echo "4420_hardening_fail2ban.sh"
+
+info_echo "4420_hardening_fail2ban.sh [${TARGET}]"
 hardening_fail2ban
-info_echo "4430_hardening_files.sh"
+
+info_echo "4430_hardening_files.sh [${TARGET}]"
 hardening_files
-info_echo "4440_hardening_haveged.sh"
-hardening_haveged
-info_echo "4450_hardening_memory.sh"
+
+info_echo "4442_hardening_jitterentropy.sh [${TARGET}]"
+hardening_jitterentropy
+
+info_echo "4450_hardening_memory.sh [${TARGET}]"
 hardening_memory
-info_echo "4460_hardening_openssl.sh"
+
+info_echo "4460_hardening_openssl.sh [${TARGET}]"
 hardening_openssl
-info_echo "4470_hardening_ufw.sh"
+
+info_echo "4470_hardening_ufw.sh [${TARGET}]"
 hardening_ufw
-info_echo "4480_hardening_usb.sh"
+
+info_echo "4480_hardening_usb.sh [${TARGET}]"
 hardening_usb
-info_echo "4490_hardening_virus.sh"
+
+info_echo "4490_hardening_virus.sh [${TARGET}]"
 hardening_virus
 
+info_echo "4445_hardening_logrotate.sh [${TARGET}]"
+hardening_logrotate
+
+
 ### CDI_4500
-info_echo "4500_accounts_preparation.sh"
+info_echo "4500_accounts_preparation.sh [${TARGET}]"
 accounts_preparation
-info_echo "4510_accounts_hardening.sh"
+
+info_echo "4510_accounts_hardening.sh [${TARGET}]"
 accounts_hardening
-info_echo "4520_accounts_setup.sh"
+
+info_echo "4520_accounts_setup.sh [${TARGET}]"
 accounts_setup
 
+info_echo "4530_accounts_timings.sh [${TARGET}]"
+update_shadow
+
+
 ### CDI_4600
-info_echo "4600_installation_packages.sh"
+info_echo "4600_installation_packages.sh [${TARGET}]"
 installation_packages
-info_echo "4610_installation_security.sh"
+
+info_echo "4610_installation_security.sh [${TARGET}]"
 installation_security
-info_echo "4620_installation_verification.sh"
+
+info_echo "4620_installation_verification.sh [${TARGET}]"
 install_verification
 
-#info_echo "4610_finalize_system.sh"
+info_echo "4630_auditing_packages.sh [${TARGET}]"
+auditing_packages
 
-#info_echo "4670_verify_system.sh"
+### CDI_4900
+info_echo "4900_final_command.sh [${TARGET}]"
+final_commands
 
-#info_echo "4680_check_sshd_config_integrity.sh"
+info_echo "4950_final_logrotate.sh [${TARGET}]"
+final_logrotate
 
-#info_echo "4690_check_grub_cmdline.sh"
-
-### CDI_4700
-info_echo "4799_exiting_chroot_system.sh"
+info_echo "4999_exiting_chroot_system.sh [${TARGET}]"
 exiting_chroot_system
 
 ### CDI_5000
 if [[ "${VAR_RECOVERY}" == "true" ]]; then
-  wrapper_recovery
+
+  declare -gx VAR_RUN_RECOVERY="true"
+
+  info_echo "4000_debootstrap.sh [${RECOVERY}]"
+  func_debootstrap
+
+  info_echo "4005_debootstrap_checks.sh [${RECOVERY}]"
+  check_debootstrap
+
+  info_echo "4010_prepare_mounts.sh [${RECOVERY}]"
+  prepare_mounts
+
+  info_echo "4015_check_usr_merge.sh [${RECOVERY}]"
+  check_usr_merge
+
+  info_echo "4020_remove_x509.sh [${RECOVERY}]"
+  remove_x509
+
+  info_echo "4030_setup_hostname.sh [${RECOVERY}]"
+  setup_hostname
+
+  info_echo "4035_setup_resolv.sh [${RECOVERY}]"
+  setup_resolv
+
+  info_echo "4040_setup_timezone.sh [${RECOVERY}]"
+  setup_timezone
+
+  info_echo "4050_setup_locales.sh [${RECOVERY}]"
+  setup_locales
+
+  info_echo "4105_generate_sources_822.sh [${RECOVERY}]"
+  generate_sources822
+
+  info_echo "4110_update_sources.sh [${RECOVERY}]"
+  update_sources
+
+  info_echo "5120_installation_kernel.sh [${RECOVERY}]"
+  installation_kernel_reco
+
+  info_echo "5121_installation_initramfs.sh"
+  installation_initramfs_reco
+
+  info_echo "5130_installation_toolset.sh"
+  installation_toolset_reco
+
+  info_echo "5131_installation_systemd.sh"
+  installation_systemd_reco
+
+  info_echo "5132_installation_machineid.sh"
+  installation_machineid_reco
+
+  info_echo "5133_installation_masking.sh"
+  installation_masking_reco
+
+  info_echo "5999_exiting_chroot_recovery.sh"
+  exiting_chroot_recovery
+
+  declare -gx VAR_RUN_RECOVERY="false"
 fi
 
 ### Dialog Output for Initialization END

func/cdi_1000_helper/1030_check_nic.sh

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Specify the network interface card (NIC) interactively for setup.
@@ -39,6 +39,9 @@ check_nic() {
   clear
 
   do_log "info" "file_only" "1030() You have selected: '${var_nic}' - proceeding with setup."
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f check_nic
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_1000_helper/1080_helper_chroot.sh

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Use chroot_exec() for:
@@ -81,6 +81,9 @@ chroot_exec() {
 
   fi
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f chroot_exec
 
 #######################################
 # Run a complete shell script line inside the chroot using the command 'bash -c'.
@@ -133,12 +136,17 @@ chroot_script() {
 
     if [[ "${VAR_CHROOT_DEBUG}" == "true" ]]; then
 
-      if [[ "${VAR_DEBUG_TRACE}" == "true" || "${VAR_DEBUG_TRAP}" == "true" ]]; then dump_vars_exiting; fi
+      if [[ "${VAR_DEBUG_TRACE}" == "true" || "${VAR_DEBUG_TRAP}" == "true" ]]; then\
+
+        dump_vars_exiting
+
+      fi
 
       case "${VAR_IN_DIALOG_WR}" in
         box   ) dialog_box_cleaner   ;;
         gauge ) dialog_gauge_cleaner ;;
         text  ) dialog_text_cleaner  ;;
+        *     ) : ;;
       esac
 
       do_log "emergency" "tty" "1080() Launching interactive debug shell in chroot: '${var_chroot_target}'."
@@ -158,6 +166,9 @@ chroot_script() {
 
   fi
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f chroot_script
 
 #######################################
 # Run the installer-desired code incl. positional arguments via stdin (HEREDOC) inside the chroot with bash -s.
@@ -178,9 +189,9 @@ chroot_script() {
 #######################################
 chroot_stdin() {
   ### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
-  declare     var_chroot_target="$1"; shift      ### consume TARGET
-  declare     payload_marker="$1"; shift         ### consume marker (e.g. "__payload__")
-  declare     var_log_level_on_error="emergency" ### default
+  declare     var_chroot_target="$1"; shift      ### Consume 'TARGET'.
+  declare     payload_marker="$1"; shift         ### Consume marker (e.g. "__payload__").
+  declare     var_log_level_on_error="emergency" ### Default.
   declare     var_default_path="/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin"
   declare     var_mod="${BASH_SOURCE[1]##*/}"; var_mod="${var_mod%%_*}()"
 
@@ -223,12 +234,17 @@ chroot_stdin() {
 
     if [[ "${VAR_CHROOT_DEBUG}" == "true" ]]; then
 
-      if [[ "${VAR_DEBUG_TRACE}" == "true" || "${VAR_DEBUG_TRAP}" == "true" ]]; then dump_vars_exiting; fi
+      if [[ "${VAR_DEBUG_TRACE}" == "true" || "${VAR_DEBUG_TRAP}" == "true" ]]; then
+
+        dump_vars_exiting
+
+      fi
 
       case "${VAR_IN_DIALOG_WR}" in
         box   ) dialog_box_cleaner   ;;
         gauge ) dialog_gauge_cleaner ;;
         text  ) dialog_text_cleaner  ;;
+        *     ) : ;;
       esac
 
       do_log "emergency" "tty" "1080() Launching interactive debug shell in chroot: '${var_chroot_target}'."
@@ -248,4 +264,7 @@ chroot_stdin() {
 
   fi
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f chroot_stdin
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_1000_helper/1081_helper_grub.sh

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
 ### Options in "GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX" are always effective.
 ### Options in "GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT" are effective ONLY during normal boot (NOT during recovery mode).
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Helper module to extract the current GRUB CMDLINE strings.
@@ -98,6 +98,9 @@ grub_extract_current_string() {
 
   return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f grub_extract_current_string
 
 #######################################
 # Helper module to finish the modified GRUB CMDLINE strings.
@@ -146,4 +149,7 @@ EOF
 
   return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f grub_finalize_string
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_1000_helper/1082_helper_modules.sh

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Wrapper for preparing logfile inside chroot.
@@ -28,6 +28,9 @@ chroot_logger() {
   chmod 0600 "${var_logfile}" || "${ERR_CHROOT_LOGGER}"
   return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f chroot_logger
 
 #######################################
 # Helper Module to generate a Subnet Mask out of an IP in CCDIR Notation.
@@ -50,6 +53,9 @@ generate_subnetmask() {
   printf '%s' "${var_has_ipv4_subnet}"
   return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f generate_subnetmask
 
 #######################################
 # Collect NIC driver modules for initramfs installation (no lspci required).
@@ -92,7 +98,9 @@ grep_nic_driver_modules() {
 
   return 0
 }
-
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f grep_nic_driver_modules
 
 #######################################
 # Wrapper to insert the metadata field into the specified file.
@@ -128,6 +136,9 @@ insert_comments() {
 
   return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f insert_comments
 
 #######################################
 # Wrapper to insert the SPDX Header into the specified file.
@@ -160,11 +171,18 @@ EOF
 
   return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f insert_header
 
 #######################################
 # Helper module for update, full dist-upgrade, autoclean, autopurge and autoremove.
+# Globals:
+#   None
 # Arguments:
 #   None
+# Returns:
+#   0: on success
 #######################################
 update_upgrade() {
   apt-get update
@@ -172,5 +190,9 @@ update_upgrade() {
   apt-get autoclean -y
   apt-get autopurge -y
   apt-get autoremove -y
+  return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f update_upgrade
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_1000_helper/1084_helper_sanitizer.sh

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Remove any leading or trailing whitespace.
@@ -22,6 +22,9 @@ remove_whitespace() {
   declare var_out=$(printf "%s" "$1" | xargs)
   printf '%s' "${var_out}"
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f remove_whitespace
 
 #######################################
 # Function to escape all shell metacharacters
@@ -33,6 +36,9 @@ sanitize_input() {
   ### %q quotes the string so that the shell re-reads it as the original literal
   printf '%q' "${input}"
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f sanitize_input
 
 #######################################
 # Function to remove any character not in the allowed set
@@ -46,4 +52,7 @@ sanitize_string() {
   declare allowed='a-zA-Z0-9._/=\[\]:"\-+ '
   printf '%s' "${input}" | tr -cd "${allowed}"
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f sanitize_string
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_1000_helper/1085_helper_secure_dl.sh

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Wrapper for secure curl.
@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ scurl() {
     return "${ERR_DOWNLOAD_FAILED}"
   fi
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f scurl
 
 #######################################
 # Wrapper for secure wget.
@@ -73,4 +76,7 @@ swget() {
     return "${ERR_DOWNLOAD_FAILED}"
   fi
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f swget
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_1000_helper/1086_helper_yaml.sh

@@ -10,10 +10,12 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
-# yq_val <YQ expression> <file> - Returns value, converts null to ""
+# yq_val <YQ expression> <file> - Returns value, converts null to "".
+# Globals:
+#   None
 # Arguments:
 #   1: Key String to evaluate
 #   2: YAML File
@@ -23,4 +25,7 @@ yq_val() {
   [[ "${var_h}" == null ]] && var_h=""
   printf '%s' "${var_h}"
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f yq_val
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_1000_helper/README/README_1080.md

@@ -10,15 +10,13 @@ include_toc: true
 **Master Version**: 8.00<br>
 **Build**: V8.00.000.2025.06.17<br>
 
-# 2. [1080_helper_chroot.sh](1080_helper_chroot.sh)
+# 2. [1080_helper_chroot.sh](../1080_helper_chroot.sh)
 **Scope:** This note explains *what to use when* among
 * `chroot_exec()`, 
 * `chroot_script()`, and 
 * `chroot_stdin()`.
 
-
 ## 2.1. When to use what
-
 - **`chroot_exec (target, argv...)`** — *Simple, argv-style commands.*  
   Use it whenever you type a short command with discrete arguments (no shell features).  
   Examples from the updated user provisioning flow: `getent`, `groupadd`, `useradd`, `usermod`, `chsh`.
@@ -79,7 +77,6 @@ and are harder to lint. Prefer `chroot_stdin` for larger edits.
   surprises and keep editors/IDEs happy.
 
 ## 2.3. Common foundation across all helpers
-
 - **Minimal, controlled environment via `env -i`**, whitelisting only the necessities (`HOME`, `PATH`, `TERM`, `LANG/LC_ALL`, 
   noninteractive APT vars). This blocks noisy caller environments from leaking into the chroot and keeps behavior reproducible 
   across systems. 
@@ -88,7 +85,6 @@ and are harder to lint. Prefer `chroot_stdin` for larger edits.
 - **Structured logging** for both success and failure paths, and an **interactive debug shell** when requested by the debug flags.
 
 ## 2.4. Decision guide
-
 - **Is it a single command with clean argv?** → `chroot_exec`.
 - **Is it a short shell line with redirection/pipe/env assignment?** → `chroot_script`.
 - **Is it long, quote-heavy, or multi-line logic?** → `chroot_stdin` with a single-quoted heredoc.
@@ -97,7 +93,6 @@ If in doubt, start with `chroot_exec`. The moment you need a shell feature, jump
 past comfort (readability, quoting, or length), upgrade to `chroot_stdin`.
 
 ## 2.5. Subtleties and gotchas (and how the helpers address them)
-
 - **ARG_MAX and long `-c` strings:** `bash -c` places the entire script in `argv`. On typical Linux systems you effectively have
   ≈2 MiB for argv+env; very long strings or large environments hit `E2BIG`. `bash -s` (stdin) avoids this entirely.
 
@@ -114,14 +109,12 @@ past comfort (readability, quoting, or length), upgrade to `chroot_stdin`.
   is enabled, enabling immediate forensics inside the target environment.
 
 ## 2.6. Antipatterns (what to avoid)
-
 - **Using `chroot_exec` for anything involving the shell.** That defeats the argv-only contract and will either fail or behave unexpectedly.
 - **Packing large scripts into `-c` strings.** Hard to quote, hits argv limits, and clutters process lists. Prefer stdin.
 - **Relying on the caller’s ambient environment.** The helpers intentionally use `env -i` to avoid such a leakage; do not
   reintroduce it unless you must.
 
 # 3. Appendix — Helper signatures & guarantees
-
 - **`chroot_exec(target, argv...)`**
   - Preflights the binary using `which` inside the chroot; fails early if missing.
   - Runs with a minimal, deterministic environment.

func/cdi_1200_validation/1220_validation_element.sh

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Checks if a search pattern / string / value is present in an array.
@@ -31,4 +31,7 @@ validation_array() {
   done
   return 1
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f validation_array
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_1200_validation/1221_validation_ip.sh

@@ -10,12 +10,12 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # IPv4 validation.
 # Globals:
-#   ERR_INVALID_IPV4
+#   None
 # Arguments:
 #   1: IPv4 to validate.
 # Returns:
@@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ validation_ipv4() {
     return "${ERR_INVALID_IPV4}"
   fi
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f validation_ipv4
 
 #######################################
 # IPv6 validation, including
@@ -38,7 +41,7 @@ validation_ipv4() {
 #   - Addresses with embedded IPv4 addresses like ::ffff:192.0.2.128
 #   - Link-local addresses like fe80::1%eth0
 # Globals:
-#   ERR_INVALID_IPV6
+#   None
 # Arguments:
 #   1: IPv6 address
 # Returns:
@@ -88,11 +91,14 @@ validation_ipv6() {
   ### Success
   do_log "info" "file_only" "'${var_ip}' seems to be a valid IPv6."
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f validation_ipv6
 
 #######################################
 # Port validation.
 # Globals:
-#   ERR_INVALID_PORT
+#   None
 # Arguments:
 #   1: Port number
 # Returns:
@@ -107,4 +113,7 @@ validation_port() {
     return "${ERR_INVALID_PORT}"
   fi
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f validation_port
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_1200_validation/1222_validation_preseed.sh

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Validate all preseed network variables (IPv4 & IPv6)
@@ -60,4 +60,7 @@ validation_preseed() {
 
   return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f validation_preseed
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_1250_yaml/1250_yaml_parser.sh

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Parsing './.preseed/preseed.yaml' and './.preseed/partitioning.yaml'.
@@ -44,28 +44,36 @@ yaml_parser() {
 
   ### Generate Arrays for [Grub Parameter], [Locales], [NTPSec Server FQDN], [Software Packages].
   while IFS='=' read -r var_key var_value; do
+
     var_value=${var_value#\'}
     var_value=${var_value%\'}
-    # shellcheck disable=SC2034
+
+    # shellcheck disable=SC2034,SC2249
     case "${var_key}" in
+
       grub_parameter_[0-9]*) ARY_BOOTPARAM+=("${var_value}")  ;;
       locale_locale_[0-9]*)  ARY_LOCALE+=("${var_value}")     ;;
       ntp_server_[0-9]*)     ARY_NTPSRVR+=("${var_value}")    ;;
       ssh_allow_ipv4_[0-9]*) ARY_ALLOW_IPV4+=("${var_value}") ;;
       ssh_allow_ipv6_[0-9]*) ARY_ALLOW_IPV6+=("${var_value}") ;;
       software_[0-9]*)       ARY_PACKAGES+=("${var_value}")   ;;
+
     esac
+
   done < "${VAR_PRESEED}"
+
   var_key=""
 
   ### Search all set variables for user_userN_name patterns.
   # shellcheck disable=SC2312
   while IFS='=' read -r var_key _; do
+
     ### Accept any of these keys: name, fullname, uid, gid, shell, password, sshpubkey, authentication_* and privileges_*
     if [[ "${var_key}" =~ ^user_user([0-9]+)_(name|fullname|uid|gid|shell|password|sshpubkey|authentication_[A-Za-z0-9_]+|privileges_[A-Za-z0-9_]+)$ ]]; then
       var_index=${BASH_REMATCH[1]}
       (( var_index > VAR_USER_MAX )) && VAR_USER_MAX=var_index
     fi
+
   done < "${VAR_PRESEED}"
 
   ### If nothing matched, default to 0 (only user 0).
@@ -87,11 +95,14 @@ yaml_parser() {
 
     # --- Quote unquoted values -------------------------------------------
     s/^(.*)=([^'\''"]+)/\1='\''\2'\''/ # wrap value in single quotes
-' "${VAR_PRESEED}"
+  ' "${VAR_PRESEED}"
 
   # shellcheck disable=SC1090
   . "${VAR_PRESEED}"
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f yaml_parser
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_1250_yaml/1251_yaml_reader.sh

@@ -10,31 +10,38 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Reading and extracting variables from "${PRESEED}".
 # Globals:
 #   BASH_REMATCH
 #   HMP_RECIPE_DEV_PARTITIONS
-#   VAR_ARCHITECTURE
-#   VAR_CODENAME
-#   VAR_NEED_RUN_IN_TARGET
-#   VAR_NUKE
-#   VAR_PRESEED
-#   VAR_RECIPE_FIRMWARE
-#   VAR_RECIPE_HIGHEST_DEVICE
-#   VAR_RECIPE_STRING
-#   VAR_RECIPE_TABLE
-#   VAR_RECOVERY
-#   architecture
-#   distribution
-#   needrun
+#   VAR_APT_FULL_UPGRADE       VAR_ARCHITECTURE
+#   VAR_CHROOT_DEBUG           VAR_CODENAME
+#   VAR_DEB822                 VAR_DROPBEAR
+#   VAR_GRUB_PASSWORD          VAR_LUKS_BACKUP
+#   VAR_LUKS_PGP               VAR_LUKS_URL
+#   VAR_NEED_RUN_IN_TARGET     VAR_NUKE
+#   VAR_NUKE_ROUNDS            VAR_PRESEED
+#   VAR_PROVIDER               VAR_RECIPE_FIRMWARE
+#   VAR_RECIPE_HIGHEST_DEVICE  VAR_RECIPE_STRING
+#   VAR_RECIPE_TABLE           VAR_RECOVERY
+#   VAR_SEC_FW                 VAR_SSH_CA
+#   VAR_SSH_PORT               VAR_UFW_OUT
+#   VAR_USER_ROOT_SPECIFIC
+#   apt_default_deb822         apt_full_upgrade
+#   architecture               chroot_debug
+#   distribution               dropbear_boot
+#   grub_password              needrun
+#   provider                   security_ext
+#   security_ufw_out           ssh_port
+#   ssh_root_ca                user_root_specific
 # Arguments:
 #   None
 # Returns:
 #   0: on success
-#   ERR_NO_VALID_RECIPE
+#   ERR_NO_VALID_RECIPE: on failure
 #######################################
 yaml_reader() {
   ### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
@@ -43,11 +50,13 @@ yaml_reader() {
   declare -gx VAR_RECIPE_STRING="" VAR_RECIPE_HIGHEST_DEVICE="" VAR_ARCHITECTURE="" VAR_RECIPE_FIRMWARE="" VAR_NUKE="" \
               VAR_RECIPE_TABLE="" VAR_NEED_RUN_IN_TARGET="false" VAR_CODENAME="" VAR_DROPBEAR="" VAR_RECOVERY="" \
               VAR_GRUB_PASSWORD="false" VAR_SSH_PORT="22" VAR_DEB822="true" VAR_PROVIDER="" VAR_SSH_CA="" VAR_UFW_OUT="deny" \
-              VAR_CHROOT_DEBUG="false" VAR_SEC_FW="selinux" VAR_APT_FULL_UPGRADE="true"
+              VAR_CHROOT_DEBUG="false" VAR_SEC_FW="selinux" VAR_APT_FULL_UPGRADE="true" VAR_LUKS_BACKUP="false" \
+              VAR_LUKS_URL="" VAR_LUKS_PGP="" VAR_USER_ROOT_SPECIFIC=""
   ### Declare and substitute input files.
   declare -r  var_if="${VAR_PRESEED}"
   declare     var_line="" var_middle_part="" var_highest_dev="" var_device="" var_fields="" var_partition="" \
-              recipe_firmware_var="" recipe_nuke_var="" recipe_nuke_rounds_var="" recipe_table_var="" recipe_recovery_var=""
+              recipe_firmware_var="" recipe_nuke_var="" recipe_nuke_rounds_var="" recipe_table_var="" recipe_recovery_var="" \
+              recipe_luks_var="" recipe_luks_url="" recipe_luks_pgp=""
 
   ### Read "${var_if}" line by line.
   while IFS= read -r var_line; do
@@ -183,6 +192,19 @@ END { print max }
   recipe_firmware_var="recipe_${VAR_RECIPE_STRING}_control_firmware"
   VAR_RECIPE_FIRMWARE="${!recipe_firmware_var,,}"
 
+  ### Extract the chosen LUKS Backup strategy.
+    recipe_luks_var="recipe_${VAR_RECIPE_STRING}_control_luks_backup"
+    # shellcheck disable=SC2034
+    VAR_LUKS_BACKUP="${!recipe_luks_var,,}"
+
+    recipe_luks_pgp="recipe_${VAR_RECIPE_STRING}_control_luks_backup_pgp"
+    # shellcheck disable=SC2034
+    VAR_LUKS_PGP="${!recipe_luks_pgp,,}"
+
+    recipe_luks_url="recipe_${VAR_RECIPE_STRING}_control_luks_backup_url"
+    # shellcheck disable=SC2034
+    VAR_LUKS_URL="${!recipe_luks_url,,}"
+
   ### Extract the chosen Nuke mechanism.
   recipe_nuke_var="recipe_${VAR_RECIPE_STRING}_control_nuke"
   # shellcheck disable=SC2034
@@ -232,6 +254,13 @@ END { print max }
   # shellcheck disable=SC2034
   VAR_UFW_OUT="${security_ufw_out,,}"
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  ### Extract User Root Specific Branch.
+  # shellcheck disable=SC2034
+  VAR_USER_ROOT_SPECIFIC="${user_root_specific,,}"
+
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f yaml_reader
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_1250_yaml/1252_yaml_validator.sh

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Extended dynamic network variable checks and declarations depending on preseed.yaml.
@@ -219,11 +219,16 @@ yaml_validator() {
 
   fi
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f yaml_validator
 
 #######################################
 # Network connectivity prober.
+# Globals:
+#   network_timeout_linkwait
 # Arguments:
 #   1: IP-Family
 #   2: TLD to probe
@@ -237,21 +242,33 @@ probe_link() {
 
   ### 1) Try ping (quiet, 1 probe, 3s deadline)
   if ping -q -c 1 -W "${network_timeout_linkwait:-3}" "-${var_fam}" "${var_target}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+
     var_ok="true"
+
   else
+
     ### 2) Fallback: mtr in report mode (non-interactive), no DNS to avoid TUI/delays.
     if command -v mtr >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+
       ### Treat as success if ANY hop resolves to something other than "???".
       ### '-r = report', '-c 2 = two cycles', -n = no DNS, -4/-6 = address family
+
       # shellcheck disable=SC2312
       if mtr "-${var_fam}" -r -c 3 -n "${var_target}" 2>/dev/null \
         | awk 'NR>2 && $2!="???"{ok=1} END{exit ok?0:1}'; then
+
         var_ok="true"
+
       fi
+
     fi
+
   fi
 
   printf '%s' "${var_ok}"
   return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f probe_link
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_1250_yaml/1256_yaml_xfiles.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,271 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# SPDX-Version: 3.0
+# SPDX-CreationInfo: 2025-06-17; WEIDNER, Marc S.; <msw@coresecret.dev>
+# SPDX-ExternalRef: GIT https://git.coresecret.dev/msw/CISS.debian.installer.git
+# SPDX-FileContributor: WEIDNER, Marc S.; Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency
+# SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2024-2025; WEIDNER, Marc S.; <msw@coresecret.dev>
+# SPDX-FileType: SOURCE
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: EUPL-1.2 OR LicenseRef-CCLA-1.0
+# SPDX-LicenseComment: This file is part of the CISS.debian.installer.secure framework.
+# SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
+# SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
+
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
+
+#######################################
+# Debug helper: list variable names (no values).
+# Globals:
+#   CISS_SECRETS_MAP
+# Arguments:
+#   None
+# Returns:
+#   0: on success
+#######################################
+ciss_secrets_list_names() {
+  ### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
+  declare     var_k=""
+
+  for var_k in "${!CISS_SECRETS_MAP[@]}"; do
+
+    printf '%s.value -> %s\n' "${var_k}" "${CISS_SECRETS_MAP[${var_k}]}"
+
+  done
+
+  return 0
+}
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f ciss_secrets_list_names
+
+#######################################
+# Unset all previously created secret variables.
+# Globals:
+#   CISS_SECRETS_MAP
+# Arguments:
+#   None
+# Returns:
+#   0: on success
+#######################################
+ciss_secrets_unset() {
+  ### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
+  declare     var_k="" var_v=""
+
+  ### SECRETS handling ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  guard_trace on
+
+  for var_k in "${!CISS_SECRETS_MAP[@]}"; do
+
+    var_v="${CISS_SECRETS_MAP[${var_k}]}"
+
+    if [[ -v "${var_v}" ]]; then
+
+      unset -v "${var_v}" 2>/dev/null || true
+
+    fi
+
+  done
+
+  CISS_SECRETS_MAP=()
+
+  guard_trace off
+  ### SECRETS handling ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+  return 0
+}
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f ciss_secrets_unset
+
+#######################################
+# Build the canonical var name from a dotted path (without 'secrets.' and without '.value').
+# Globals:
+#   None
+# Arguments:
+#   1: Variable path
+# Returns:
+#   0: on success
+#######################################
+ciss_secret_varname_from_path() {
+  ### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
+  declare     var_path="${1:-}"
+
+  var_path="${var_path//[^A-Za-z0-9_]/_}"
+  var_path="${var_path^^}"
+
+  printf 'CISS_SECRET_%s' "${var_path}"
+  return 0
+}
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f ciss_secret_varname_from_path
+
+#######################################
+# Wipes the specified file securely.
+# Globals:
+#   None
+# Arguments:
+#   1: File to wipe
+# Returns:
+#   0: on success
+#######################################
+ciss_secrets_wiper() {
+  ### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
+  declare     var_file="${1:-}"
+
+  if [[ -f "${var_file}" ]]; then
+    : >| "${var_file}"
+    shred -vfzu -n 5 "${var_file}" > /dev/null 2>&1 || rm -f -- "${var_file}"
+  fi
+
+  return 0
+}
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f ciss_secrets_wiper
+
+#######################################
+# Purpose:
+#   Parsing of only "*.value" keys from 'SECRETS.yaml' into Bash globals.
+#   If the file contains SOPS markers, decrypt once (streaming) with sops/age, then yq parses in a single pass.
+#   No base64, plain values preserved (including newlines). No repeated per-key decrypts or yq calls.
+# Conventions:
+#   Variables: CISS_SECRET_<UPPER_SNAKE_CASE_PATH> (PATH excludes "secrets." and trailing ".value")
+#   All with "declare -g" (no export).
+#   Mapping: CISS_SECRETS_MAP["foo.bar"]=CISS_SECRET_FOO_BAR
+# Globals:
+#   CISS_SECRETS_AGE
+#   CISS_SECRETS_MAP
+#   CISS_SECRETS_SOURCE
+#   DIR_CNF
+# Arguments:
+#   None
+# Returns:
+#   0: on success
+#   ERR_DECRYPTION_SOPS: on failure
+#   ERR_MISSING_AGE_BIN: on failure
+#   ERR_MISSING_AGE_KEY: on failure
+#######################################
+yaml_secret() {
+  ### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
+  declare -r  SOPS_AGE_KEY_FILE="${CISS_SECRETS_AGE}"
+  declare -a  __names=()
+  declare     secrets_encrypted="" secrets_if="${CISS_SECRETS_SOURCE}" secrets_of="${DIR_CNF}/SECRETS_DECRYPTED.yaml" \
+              __SECRETS="${DIR_CNF}/SECRETS_BASH.var" \
+              __base="" __name="" __umask="" __path_wo_prefix="" __val="" __varname=""
+
+  __umask=$(umask)
+  umask 0077
+
+  ### SECRETS handling ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  guard_trace on
+
+  secrets_encrypted="$(yq -r '.secrets.x_files // false' -- "${secrets_if}")" || secrets_encrypted="false"
+  do_log "debug" "file_only" "1256() 'secrets_encrypted' according to secrets.x_files: '${secrets_encrypted}'."
+
+  if grep -qE '(^|\s)sops:\s*$' -- "${secrets_if}" 2>/dev/null || grep -q 'ENC\[' -- "${secrets_if}" 2>/dev/null; then
+
+    secrets_encrypted="true"
+    do_log "debug" "file_only" "1256() 'secrets_encrypted' according to heuristic mode: '${secrets_encrypted}'."
+
+  fi
+
+
+  if [[ "${secrets_encrypted}" == "true" ]]; then
+
+    if ! command -v sops >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+
+      do_log "fatal" "file_only" "1260() SOPS not found but SECRETS.yaml appears to be SOPS-managed."
+      return "${ERR_MISSING_AGE_BIN}"
+
+    fi
+
+    [[ -r "${SOPS_AGE_KEY_FILE}" ]] || return "${ERR_MISSING_AGE_KEY}"
+
+    sops -d --input-type=yaml --output-type=yaml -- "${secrets_if}" >| "${secrets_of}"
+
+    [[ -r "${secrets_of}" ]] || return "${ERR_DECRYPTION_SOPS}"
+
+    ciss_secrets_wiper "${secrets_if}" && mv "${secrets_of}" "${secrets_if}"
+
+  fi
+
+  yq -o=shell "${secrets_if}" >| "${__SECRETS}" && ciss_secrets_wiper "${secrets_if}"
+
+  ### Keep only '*_value=' lines, normalize empty RHS, quote unquoted simple RHS.
+  LC_ALL=C sed -n -E '
+    /^[[:space:]]*(#|$)/b
+    s/^[[:space:]]*(export|declare[[:space:]]+-x)[[:space:]]+//;
+    /^[[:space:]]*[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*_value=/!b
+
+    s/^([[:space:]]*[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*_value)=[[:space:]]*$/\1='\'''\''/; t print
+    /^[[:space:]]*[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*_value=[[:space:]]*('"'"'|\"|\$'"'"')/b print
+    s/^([[:space:]]*[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*_value)=([^[[:space:]]'"'"'$][^[:space:]]*)[[:space:]]*$/\1='"'"'\2'"'"'/; t print
+    s/^([[:space:]]*[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*_value)=[[:space:]]*(.+)[[:space:]]*$/\1='"'"'\2'"'"'/; t print
+    :print
+    p
+  ' -- "${__SECRETS}" >| "${__SECRETS}.value_only"
+
+  mv -f -- "${__SECRETS}.value_only" "${__SECRETS}"
+
+  # shellcheck disable=SC1091 source=./${__SECRETS}
+  source "${__SECRETS}"
+
+  ciss_secrets_wiper "${__SECRETS}"
+
+  # shellcheck disable=SC2312
+  mapfile -t __names < <(printf '%s\n' "${!secrets_@}")
+
+  for __name in "${__names[@]}"; do
+
+    ### Keep only *_value variables
+    [[ "${__name}" == *_value ]] || continue
+
+    ### Validate strict Bash identifier (defensive: strip accidental CR).
+    __name="${__name%$'\r'}"
+    [[ "${__name}" =~ ^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*$ ]] || continue
+
+    ### Only read if actually set; indirect check without triggering nounset.
+    if [[ -n "${!__name+x}" ]]; then
+
+      __val="${!__name}"
+
+    else
+
+      __val=""
+
+    fi
+
+    ### Strip suffix/prefix for the map key.
+    __base="${__name%_value}"
+    __path_wo_prefix="${__base#secrets_}"
+
+    ### Canonical CISS name.
+    __varname="$(ciss_secret_varname_from_path "${__path_wo_prefix}")"
+
+    ### Assign verbatim (preserves newlines).
+    unset -v "${__varname}"
+    declare -g "${__varname}"
+    printf -v "${__varname}" '%s' "${__val}"
+
+    CISS_SECRETS_MAP["${__path_wo_prefix}"]="${__varname}"
+
+  done
+
+  ### Hygiene: remove the intermediate variables to reduce secret surface, e.g., unset 'secrets_*_value' after transfer.
+  for __name in "${__names[@]}"; do
+
+    unset -v "${__name}"
+
+  done
+
+  umask "${__umask}"
+
+  guard_trace off
+  ### SECRETS handling ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+  guard_dir; return 0
+}
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f yaml_secret
+# vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_1250_yaml/1257_yaml_xnuke.sh

@@ -10,23 +10,27 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Generates 'nuke=HASH' Bootparameter.
 # Globals:
+#   CISS_SECRET_LUKS_NUKE
 #   DIR_CNF
 #   VAR_NUKE_HASH
 # Arguments:
 #   None
 # Returns:
 #   0: on success
-#   ERR_GENERATE_SALT
-#   ERR_READ_NUKE_FILE
+#   ERR_GENERATE_SALT: on failure
 #######################################
 nuke_passphrase() {
-  declare -r var_nuke_pwd_file="${DIR_CNF}/password_luks_nuke.txt"
-  declare    var_temp_nuke_hash="" var_temp_plain_nuke_pwd="" var_salt="" var_nuke_rounds=""
+  ### SECRETS handling ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  guard_trace on
+
+  ### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
+  declare    var_nuke_pwd="${CISS_SECRET_LUKS_NUKE}"
+  declare    var_temp_nuke_hash="" var_salt="" var_nuke_rounds=""
 
   # shellcheck disable=SC2312
   var_nuke_rounds="$(
@@ -40,30 +44,30 @@ nuke_passphrase() {
   ' "${DIR_CNF}/partitioning.yaml" | head -n1
   )"
 
-  [[ ! -f "${var_nuke_pwd_file}" ]] && return 0
-
-  guard_trace on
-  if ! read_password_file "${var_nuke_pwd_file}" var_temp_plain_nuke_pwd; then
-    return "${ERR_READ_NUKE_FILE}"
-  fi
-  guard_trace off
+  [[ -z "${var_nuke_pwd}" ]] && return 0
 
 
   if ! var_salt="$(generate_salt)"; then
+
     return "${ERR_GENERATE_SALT}"
+
   fi
 
+  var_temp_nuke_hash=$(mkpasswd --method=sha-512 --salt="${var_salt}" --rounds="${var_nuke_rounds:-8388608}" "${var_nuke_pwd}")
 
-  guard_trace on
-  var_temp_nuke_hash=$(mkpasswd --method=sha-512 --salt="${var_salt}" --rounds="${var_nuke_rounds:-8388608}" "${var_temp_plain_nuke_pwd}")
-  guard_trace off
-
+  # shellcheck disable=SC2034
   declare -grx VAR_NUKE_HASH="${var_temp_nuke_hash}"
-  unset var_temp_nuke_hash var_temp_plain_nuke_pwd
+
+  unset var_temp_nuke_hash var_nuke_pwd CISS_SECRET_LUKS_NUKE
 
   do_log "debug" "file_only" "0105() NUKE hash starts with: [${VAR_NUKE_HASH:0:32}...]"
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
-}
+  guard_trace off
+  ### SECRETS handling ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
+  guard_dir; return 0
+}
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f nuke_passphrase
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_3200_partitioning/3200_partitioning.sh

@@ -10,13 +10,14 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # EFI System Partition | EF00 | UEFI Bootloader (ESP, FAT32)
 # BIOS Boot Partition  | EF02 | BIOS Bootloader area (GRUB)
 # Linux SWAP           | 8200 | Linux Swap
 # Linux ext4/btrfs     | 8300 | Linux Filesystem (root, home)
+# Linux LUKS           | 8309 | Linux LUKS
 #######################################
 
 #######################################
@@ -42,23 +43,28 @@ guard_sourcing
 # - LUKS encryption enabled.
 # - Specific device partition data for each mount path.
 # Globals:
+#   ARY_CRYPT_MOUNT_PATHS
+#   ARY_FORMT_MOUNT_PATHS
 #   ARY_FSTAB_MOUNT_PATHS
+#   ARY_PATHS_SORTED
 #   DIR_LOG
 #   HMP_FSTAB_MOUNT_FTYPE
+#   HMP_PATH_DEV_PART
 #   HMP_PATH_PARTUUID
 #   VAR_RECIPE_FIRMWARE
 #   VAR_RECIPE_STRING
 #   VAR_RECIPE_TABLE
+#   VAR_ROOT_FS
 #   VAR_SETUP_PART
 # Arguments:
 #   None
 # Returns:
-#   ERR_PARTITIONTBL
-#   ERR_PART_CREATE
-#   ERR_PART_READ
-#   ERR_TABLE_CREATE
-#   ERR_TABLE_DELETE
 #   0: on success
+#   ERR_PARTITIONTBL: on failure
+#   ERR_PART_CREATE: on failure
+#   ERR_PART_READ: on failure
+#   ERR_TABLE_CREATE: on failure
+#   ERR_TABLE_DELETE: on failure
 #######################################
 partitioning() {
   ### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
@@ -179,6 +185,7 @@ partitioning() {
         var_end_arg="${var_end}"
       fi
 
+      # shellcheck disable=SC2249
       case "${VAR_RECIPE_TABLE,,}" in
 
         gpt)
@@ -211,6 +218,7 @@ partitioning() {
       ### Assign the correct GPT typecode via sgdisk if the table is GPT.
       if [[ "${VAR_RECIPE_TABLE,,}" == "gpt" ]]; then
 
+        # shellcheck disable=SC2249
         case "${var_mount_path,,}" in
 
           "/")
@@ -253,13 +261,15 @@ partitioning() {
 
         esac
 
+        # shellcheck disable=SC2249
         case "${var_encryption,,}" in
 
           true)
 
             case "${var_mount_path,,}" in
 
-              /tmp|swap) : ;;
+              /tmp|swap)
+                typecode="ca7d7ccb-63ed-4c53-861c-1742536059cc" ;;  ### Linux LUKS Partition
 
               *)
                 typecode="ca7d7ccb-63ed-4c53-861c-1742536059cc" ;;  ### Linux LUKS Partition
@@ -283,6 +293,7 @@ partitioning() {
       ### Set the bootable flag if necessary.
       if [[ "${var_boot,,}" == "true" ]]; then
 
+        # shellcheck disable=SC2249
         case "${VAR_RECIPE_TABLE,,}:${VAR_RECIPE_FIRMWARE,,}" in
 
           gpt:uefi|mbr:uefi)
@@ -304,16 +315,22 @@ partitioning() {
       udevadm settle
 
       for i in {1..10}; do
+
         var_uuid=$(blkid -s PARTUUID -o value "/dev/${var_dev}${var_part}") && [[ -n "${var_uuid}" ]] && break
         sleep 0.25
+
       done
 
       if [[ -z "${var_uuid}" ]]; then
+
         do_log "fatal" "file_only" "3200() Partition: '/dev/${var_dev}${var_part}' could not read PARTUUID."
         return "${ERR_PART_READ}"
+
       else
+
         HMP_PATH_PARTUUID["${var_mount_path}"]="${var_uuid}"
         do_log "debug" "file_only" "3200() [HMP_PATH_PARTUUID]: '${var_mount_path}' -> '${HMP_PATH_PARTUUID["${var_mount_path}"]}'."
+
       fi
 
       ### Gathering information for forthcoming modules 32n0().
@@ -337,17 +354,21 @@ partitioning() {
 
       ### Gathering information for '/etc/fstab'-generation in 4200().
       if [[ "${var_mount_true}" == "true" ]]; then
+
         # shellcheck disable=SC2034
         ARY_FSTAB_MOUNT_PATHS+=("${var_mount_path}")
         do_log "debug" "file_only" "3200() [ARY_FSTAB_MOUNT_PATHS]: '${var_mount_path}'."
         HMP_FSTAB_MOUNT_FTYPE["${var_mount_path}"]="${var_fs}"
         do_log "debug" "file_only" "3200() [HMP_FSTAB_MOUNT_FTYPE]: '${var_mount_path}' -> '${HMP_FSTAB_MOUNT_FTYPE["${var_mount_path}"]}'."
+
       fi
 
       ### Gathering information for '/etc/initramfs-tools/conf.d/fsroot'-generation in 4121().
       if [[ "${var_mount_path}" == "/" ]]; then
+
         # shellcheck disable=SC2034
         VAR_ROOT_FS="${var_fs}"
+
       fi
 
     done
@@ -381,6 +402,9 @@ partitioning() {
   printf "%s\n" "${ary_paths_unsorted[@]}" >| "${DIR_LOG}/3200_mount_paths_unsorted.log"
   printf "%s\n" "${ARY_PATHS_SORTED[@]}" >| "${DIR_LOG}/3200_mount_paths_sorted.log"
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f partitioning
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_3200_partitioning/3210_benchmarking_encryption.sh

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Benchmark cryptsetup KDF to determine pbkdf-memory and pbkdf-force-iterations for given pbkdf-threads.
@@ -27,7 +27,8 @@ guard_sourcing
 #   0: on success
 #######################################
 benchmarking_encryption() {
-  declare var_result=""
+  ### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
+  declare       var_result=""
   # shellcheck disable=SC2155
   declare -girx VAR_KDF_THREADS=$(yq_val ".recipe.${VAR_RECIPE_STRING}.control.kdf.threads" "${VAR_SETUP_PART}")
   # shellcheck disable=SC2155
@@ -37,7 +38,7 @@ benchmarking_encryption() {
   sync
 
   echo "BENCHMARK CRYPTSETUP ARGON2ID KDF PARAMETER - DROPPING PAGES ..."
-  echo 3 >| /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
+  echo 3 >| /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches || true
 
   # shellcheck disable=SC2312
   var_result=$(cryptsetup benchmark --pbkdf argon2id --iter-time "${VAR_ITER_TIME:-3000}" --pbkdf-parallel "${VAR_KDF_THREADS:-1}" 2>/dev/null \
@@ -53,6 +54,9 @@ benchmarking_encryption() {
   # shellcheck disable=SC2155
   declare -girx VAR_KDF_MEMORY=$(awk -F'[ ,]+' '{print $4}' <<<"${var_result}")
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f benchmarking_encryption
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_3200_partitioning/3220_partition_encryption.sh

@@ -10,12 +10,15 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Function to encrypt the respective partition on each entry of 'ARY_CRYPT_MOUNT_PATHS'.
 # Globals:
 #   ARY_CRYPT_MOUNT_PATHS
+#   CISS_SECRET_LUKS_BACKUP
+#   CISS_SECRET_LUKS_BOOT
+#   CISS_SECRET_LUKS_COMMON
 #   DIR_BAK
 #   DIR_CNF
 #   DIR_LOG
@@ -23,29 +26,31 @@ guard_sourcing
 #   HMP_EPHEMERAL_FS_LABEL
 #   HMP_PATH_DEV_PART
 #   HMP_PATH_ENCLABEL
-#   HMP_PATH_FSUUID
 #   HMP_PATH_LUKSUUID
+#   VAR_CRYPT_BOOT
 #   VAR_CRYPT_RECOVERY
 #   VAR_CRYPT_ROOT
+#   VAR_FINAL_FQDN
 #   VAR_ITER_TIME
 #   VAR_KDF_ITERATIONS
 #   VAR_KDF_MEMORY
 #   VAR_KDF_THREADS
+#   VAR_LUKS_BACKUP
+#   VAR_LUKS_PGP
+#   VAR_LUKS_URL
 #   VAR_RECIPE_STRING
 #   VAR_SETUP_PART
+#   VAR_SETUP_PATH
 # Arguments:
 #   None
 # Returns:
 #   0: on success
+#   ERR_LUKS_HEADER_ENC: on failure
 #######################################
 partition_encryption() {
   ### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
   declare -Ag HMP_PATH_LUKSUUID      # Used in: 3290() - [Mount Path:LUKS UUID].
                                      # Used in: 4210() - [Mount Path:LUKS UUID].
-  declare -Ag HMP_PATH_FSUUID        # Used in: 3240() - [Mount Path:Filesystem UUID].
-                                     # Used in: 3290() - [Mount Path:Filesystem UUID].
-                                     # Used in: 4200() - [Mount Path:Filesystem UUID].
-                                     # Used in: 4210() - [Mount Path:Filesystem UUID].
   declare -Ag HMP_EPHEMERAL_ENCLABEL # Used in: 4200() - [Mount Path:LUKS Encryption Label].
   declare -Ag HMP_EPHEMERAL_FS_LABEL # Used in: 4210() - [Mount Path:Ephemeral Host FS Label]. Substituted by FS-UUID
 
@@ -58,10 +63,34 @@ partition_encryption() {
               var_encryption_ephemeral="" var_encryption_integrity="" var_encryption_cipher="" var_encryption_hash="" \
               var_encryption_key="" var_encryption_label="" var_encryption_meta="" var_encryption_slot="" \
               var_encryption_pbkdf="" var_encryption_rng="" var_filesystem_label="" var_mount_path="" var_uuid="" var_fs="" \
-              var_fs_uuid=""
+              var_luks_backup_file="" var_luks_backup_name="" var_pgp_publickey="" var_luks_backup_pgp="" \
+              var_temp_plain_nc_auth=""
 
   declare -a  ary_luks_opts=()
 
+  ### SECRETS handling ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  guard_trace on
+  printf '%s' "${CISS_SECRET_LUKS_BOOT}" >| "${DIR_CNF}/password_luks_boot.txt" && chmod 0600 "${DIR_CNF}/password_luks_boot.txt"
+  printf '%s' "${CISS_SECRET_LUKS_COMMON}" >| "${DIR_CNF}/password_luks_common.txt" && chmod 0600 "${DIR_CNF}/password_luks_common.txt"
+  unset CISS_SECRET_LUKS_BOOT CISS_SECRET_LUKS_COMMON
+  guard_trace on
+  ### SECRETS handling ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+  if [[ -n "${VAR_LUKS_URL}" ]]; then
+
+    VAR_LUKS_URL=${VAR_LUKS_URL%/}
+
+    ### SECRETS handling -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+    guard_trace on
+    var_temp_plain_nc_auth="${CISS_SECRET_LUKS_BACKUP}"
+    unset CISS_SECRET_LUKS_BACKUP
+    guard_trace on
+    ### SECRETS handling -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+    do_log "debug" "file_only" "3220() Var: [var_temp_plain_nc_auth] set."
+
+  fi
+
   for var_encryption_path in "${ARY_CRYPT_MOUNT_PATHS[@]}"; do
 
     ### Initialize Arrays and Variables
@@ -128,15 +157,6 @@ partition_encryption() {
 
           var_filesystem_label=$(get_label "${var_encryption_path}" "${var_fs}" "file")
 
-          mkfs.ext4 -L "${var_filesystem_label}" "/dev/${var_dev}" 1M
-          do_log "info" "file_only" "3220() Ephemeral: '${var_encryption_path}' prepared on: '/dev/${var_dev}'."
-
-          var_fs_uuid=$(blkid -s UUID -o value "/dev/${var_dev}")
-          ### Gathering information for '/etc/fstab'-generation in 4040() and '/etc/crypttab'-generation in 4060().
-          # shellcheck disable=SC2034
-          HMP_PATH_FSUUID["${var_encryption_path}"]="${var_fs_uuid}"
-          do_log "debug" "file_only" "3220() [HMP_PATH_FSUUID]       : '${var_encryption_path}' -> '${HMP_PATH_FSUUID["${var_encryption_path}"]}'"
-
           HMP_EPHEMERAL_ENCLABEL["${var_encryption_path}"]="${var_encryption_label}"
           HMP_EPHEMERAL_FS_LABEL["${var_encryption_path}"]="${var_filesystem_label}"
 
@@ -172,18 +192,19 @@ partition_encryption() {
 
     fi
 
-    cryptsetup luksHeaderBackup --header-backup-file="${DIR_BAK}/luks_header_${var_dev}.bak" "/dev/${var_dev}"
-    do_log "info" "file_only" "3220() Partition: '/dev/${var_dev}' LUKS Header saved: '${DIR_BAK}/luks_header_${var_dev}.bak'."
-
-    ### Opening encrypted container.
+    ### Opening the encrypted container.
     if [[ "${var_encryption_path,,}" == "/boot" ]]; then
+
       cryptsetup luksOpen "/dev/${var_dev}" \
         --key-file="${DIR_CNF}/password_luks_boot.txt" \
         "${var_encryption_label}"
+
     else
+
       cryptsetup luksOpen "/dev/${var_dev}" \
         --key-file="${DIR_CNF}/password_luks_common.txt" \
         "${var_encryption_label}"
+
     fi
     do_log "info" "file_only" "3220() Partition: '/dev/${var_dev}' opened as '/dev/mapper/${var_encryption_label}'."
 
@@ -203,8 +224,95 @@ partition_encryption() {
     do_log "debug" "file_only" "3220() [HMP_PATH_LUKSUUID]: '${var_encryption_path}' -> '${HMP_PATH_LUKSUUID["${var_encryption_path}"]}'"
     do_log "debug" "file_only" "3220() [HMP_PATH_ENCLABEL]: '${var_encryption_path}' -> '${HMP_PATH_ENCLABEL["${var_encryption_path}"]}'"
 
+    ### Backup the LUKS Header.
+    if [[ "${VAR_LUKS_BACKUP}" == "true" ]]; then
+
+      var_luks_backup_file="${DIR_BAK}/luks_header_${var_dev}.bak"
+      var_luks_backup_name="${VAR_FINAL_FQDN}_luks_header_${var_dev}.bak.pgp"
+      var_luks_backup_pgp="${DIR_BAK}/luks_header_${var_dev}.bak.pgp"
+
+      case "${VAR_LUKS_PGP}" in
+
+        ciss)    var_pgp_publickey="${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/.pubkey/marc_s_weidner_msw@coresecret.dev_0xE62E84F8_public.asc" ;;
+        physnet) var_pgp_publickey="${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/.pubkey/zimnol_andre_h_git.cs@physnet.eu_0x8A659CC7B4D63AE6_public.asc" ;;
+        none)    do_log "error" "file_only" "3220() No PGP public key for LUKS Header encryption provided."; continue ;;
+        *)       do_log "fatal" "file_only" "3220() No valid PGP public key for LUKS Header encryption provided."; return "${ERR_LUKS_HEADER_ENC}" ;;
+
+      esac
+
+      if cryptsetup luksHeaderBackup --header-backup-file="${var_luks_backup_file}" "/dev/${var_dev}"; then
+
+        do_log "info" "file_only" "3220() Partition: '/dev/${var_dev}' LUKS Header saved: '${var_luks_backup_file}'."
+
+      else
+
+        do_log "fatal" "file_only" "3220() Partition: '/dev/${var_dev}' LUKS Header backup failed for: '${var_luks_backup_file}'."
+        return "${ERR_LUKS_HEADER_ENC}"
+
+      fi
+
+      if gpg --batch --yes --no-tty --compress-level 0 \
+        --recipient-file "${var_pgp_publickey}" \
+        --encrypt -o "${var_luks_backup_pgp}" -- "${var_luks_backup_file}"; then
+
+        do_log "info" "file_only" "3220() Partition: '/dev/${var_dev}' LUKS Header encrypted: '${var_luks_backup_pgp}'."
+
+        if command -v shred >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+
+          shred -vfzu -n 5 "${var_luks_backup_file}" || rm -f "${var_luks_backup_file}"
+
+        else
+
+          rm -f "${var_luks_backup_file}"
+
+        fi
+
+      else
+
+        do_log "fatal" "file_only" "3220() GPG encryption failed for '${var_luks_backup_file}'. Keeping plaintext for diagnostics."
+        return "${ERR_LUKS_HEADER_ENC}"
+
+      fi
+
+      if [[ -n "${VAR_LUKS_URL}" ]]; then
+
+        ### SECRETS handling ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+        guard_trace on
+
+        if curl --silent --show-error --fail --retry 2 "${VAR_LUKS_URL}/public.php/webdav/${var_luks_backup_name}" \
+          --upload-file "${var_luks_backup_pgp}" --user "${var_temp_plain_nc_auth}" > /dev/null 2>&1; then
+
+          do_log "info" "file_only" "3220() Partition: '/dev/${var_dev}' LUKS Header upload: '${VAR_LUKS_URL}' successful."
+
+          rm -f "${var_luks_backup_pgp}"
+
+        else
+
+          do_log "warn" "file_only" "3220() Partition: '/dev/${var_dev}' LUKS Header upload: '${VAR_LUKS_URL}' failed."
+
+        fi
+
+        guard_trace off
+        ### SECRETS handling ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+      fi
+
+    fi
+
   done
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  ### SECRETS handling ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  guard_trace on
+  [[ -n "${VAR_LUKS_URL}" ]] && unset var_temp_plain_nc_auth
+  guard_trace off
+  ### SECRETS handling ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+  ciss_secrets_wiper "${DIR_CNF}/password_luks_boot.txt"
+  ciss_secrets_wiper "${DIR_CNF}/password_luks_common.txt"
+
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f partition_encryption
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_3200_partitioning/3240_partition_formatting.sh

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Function to format the respective partition on each entry of 'ARY_FORMT_MOUNT_PATHS'.
@@ -59,10 +59,11 @@ partition_formatting() {
 
     case "${var_format_path,,}" in
       swap|/tmp)
-        do_log "info" "file_only" "3240() Partition: '/dev/${var_dev}' ephemeral encryption already prepared in 3220(): '${var_format_path}'."
+        do_log "info" "file_only" "3240() Partition: '/dev/${var_dev}' ephemeral encryption devices do not need formatting: '${var_format_path}'."
         ### Nothing more to do here.
         continue
         ;;
+      *) : ;;
     esac
 
     if [[ "${var_encryption_enable,,}" == "true" ]]; then
@@ -137,6 +138,9 @@ partition_formatting() {
 
   done
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f partition_formatting
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_3200_partitioning/3280_mount_partition.sh

@@ -10,12 +10,11 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Function to create the mount command, incl. mount path and options, and mount the respective device.
 # Globals:
-#   ERR_MOUNTING_DEV
 #   TARGET
 # Arguments:
 #   1: MOUNT_PATH
@@ -24,6 +23,7 @@ guard_sourcing
 #   4: MOUNT_FILESYSTEM
 # Returns:
 #   0: on success
+#   ERR_MOUNTING_DEV: on failure
 #######################################
 mount_with_dir() {
   declare var_mount_path="${1}" var_mount_device="${2}" var_mount_options="${3:-}" var_mount_fs="${4:-}"
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ mount_with_dir() {
   ### Already absolute path.
   elif [[ "${var_mount_device}" == /dev/* ]]; then
 
-    : ### Do nothing
+    : ### Do nothing.
 
   ### Alternative checks for LABEL and PARTUUID.
   else
@@ -104,16 +104,23 @@ mount_with_dir() {
 
   return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f mount_with_dir
 
 #######################################
 # Device Path Resolver.
 # Outputs '/dev/mapper/<encryption_label>'
 # Outputs '/dev/<dev><partition>'
+# Globals:
+#   None
 # Arguments:
 #   1: Device
 #   2: Partition
 #   3: Boolean Encryption
 #   4: Encryption Label
+# Returns:
+#   0: on success
 #######################################
 resolve_device() {
   declare local_var_dev="$1" local_var_partition="$2" local_var_enc_boolean="$3" local_var_enc_label="$4"
@@ -130,15 +137,20 @@ resolve_device() {
 
   return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f resolve_device
 
 #######################################
 # Validates btrfs compression algo and level.
+# Globals:
+#   None
 # Arguments:
 #   1: var_fs_btrfs_compress
 #   2: var_fs_btrfs_level
 # Returns:
 #   0: Valid combination.
-#   1: Invalid combination.
+#   ERR_BTRFS_OPTION: on failure
 #######################################
 validate_btrfs_compression() {
   declare var_algo="$1" var_level="$2"
@@ -151,19 +163,20 @@ validate_btrfs_compression() {
 
   esac
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f validate_btrfs_compression
 
 #######################################
 # Function for mounting all partitions for debootstrap, including the generation of btrfs subvolumes.
 # Globals:
+#   ARY_CRYPT_MOUNT_PATHS
 #   ARY_PATHS_SORTED
 #   DIR_LOG
-#   ERR_BTRFS_INITPH
-#   ERR_BTRFS_OPTION
-#   ERR_BTRFS_SUBVOL
-#   ERR_MOUNTING_DEV
 #   HMP_FSTAB_MOUNT_OPTS
 #   HMP_PATH_DEV_PART
 #   HMP_PATH_FSUUID
+#   HMP_PATH_PARTUUID
 #   NL
 #   TARGET
 #   VAR_RECIPE_STRING
@@ -173,11 +186,10 @@ validate_btrfs_compression() {
 #   None
 # Returns:
 #   0: on success
-#   ERR_BTRFS_INITPH
-#   ERR_BTRFS_OPTION
-#   ERR_BTRFS_SUBVOL
-#   ERR_MOUNTING_DEV
-#   ERR_MOUNTING_ROOT
+#   ERR_BTRFS_INITPH: on failure
+#   ERR_BTRFS_OPTION: on failure
+#   ERR_BTRFS_SUBVOL: on failure
+#   ERR_MOUNTING_DEV: on failure
 #######################################
 mount_partition() {
   ### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
@@ -187,7 +199,7 @@ mount_partition() {
   declare     var_mount_path="" var_dev_part="" var_dev="" var_btrfs_options="" \
               var_encryption_label="" var_fs_btrfs_compress="" var_fs_btrfs_level="" var_fs_btrfs_snapshot="" \
               var_fs_btrfs_subvolume="" var_fs_version="" var_mount_options="" var_mount_optsnap="" var_mount_path="" \
-              var_snapshot="" var_fs_uuid=""
+              var_snapshot="" var_fs_uuid="" var_partuuid=""
 
   declare -a  ary_cmd=() ary_cmd_mount=()
 
@@ -212,19 +224,18 @@ mount_partition() {
       var_encryption_label=$(get_label "${var_mount_path}" "${var_fs_version}" "luks")
     fi
 
-    var_fs_uuid="${HMP_PATH_FSUUID["${var_mount_path}"]}"
-
-    if [[ -z "${var_fs_uuid}" ]]; then
-      do_log "error" "file_only" "3280() FS-UUID for mount path: '${var_mount_path}' not found in: 'HMP_PATH_FSUUID'."
-      return "${ERR_MOUNTING_DEV}"
-    fi
-
     ### Mounting of Ephemeral 'SWAP' and '/tmp' as per https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption#UUID_and_LABEL
     if [[ "${var_mount_path,,}" == "swap" ]]; then
 
-      cryptsetup open --type plain --key-file /dev/random \
-        --offset 2048 --cipher aes-xts-plain64 --key-size 512 \
-        --sector-size 4096 "/dev/disk/by-uuid/${var_fs_uuid}" "${var_encryption_label}"
+      var_partuuid="${HMP_PATH_PARTUUID["${var_mount_path}"]}"
+
+      ### Gathering information for '/etc/fstab'-generation in 4040().
+      HMP_FSTAB_MOUNT_OPTS["SWAP"]="${var_mount_options}"
+
+      cryptsetup open --type plain \
+        --key-file /dev/urandom \
+        --cipher aes-xts-plain64 --key-size 512 \
+        "/dev/disk/by-partuuid/${var_partuuid}" "${var_encryption_label}"
 
       mkswap "/dev/mapper/${var_encryption_label}"
       do_log "debug" "file_only" "3280() [mkswap /dev/mapper/${var_encryption_label}]."
@@ -239,9 +250,12 @@ mount_partition() {
 
     elif [[ "${var_mount_path,,}" == "/tmp" ]]; then
 
-      cryptsetup open --type plain --key-file /dev/random \
-        --offset 2048 --cipher aes-xts-plain64 --key-size 512 \
-        --sector-size 4096 "/dev/disk/by-uuid/${var_fs_uuid}" "${var_encryption_label}"
+      var_partuuid="${HMP_PATH_PARTUUID["${var_mount_path}"]}"
+
+      cryptsetup open --type plain \
+        --key-file /dev/urandom \
+        --cipher aes-xts-plain64 --key-size 512 \
+        "/dev/disk/by-partuuid/${var_partuuid}" "${var_encryption_label}"
 
       mkdir -p "${TARGET}/tmp"
 
@@ -262,6 +276,8 @@ mount_partition() {
 
     fi
 
+    var_fs_uuid="${HMP_PATH_FSUUID["${var_mount_path}"]}"
+
     if [[ "${var_fs_version,,}" == "btrfs" ]]; then
 
       var_fs_btrfs_subvolume=$(get_label "${var_mount_path}" "${var_fs_version}" "sub")
@@ -350,6 +366,10 @@ mount_partition() {
         do_log "info" "file_only" "3280() Mounted: '${var_fs_uuid}' on: '${TARGET}${var_mount_path}' Options='${var_mount_options}'."
         ;;
 
+      *)
+        do_log "info" "file_only" "3280() No valid FS found for: '${var_mount_path}'."
+        ;;
+
       esac
 
     var_dev="${var_dev_part%.*}"
@@ -364,6 +384,9 @@ mount_partition() {
 
   done
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f mount_partition
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_3200_partitioning/3290_uuid_logger.sh

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Logger for all generated partition, LUKS container and file system UUIDs.
@@ -29,30 +29,41 @@ uuid_logger() {
 
   printf 'PARTITION UUID Partition:\n' >> "${LOG_UID}"
   for var_key in "${!HMP_PATH_PARTUUID[@]}"; do
+
     var_mountpoint="${var_key}"
     var_uuid="${HMP_PATH_PARTUUID[${var_key}]}"
     ### Left-aligned field width 63; "UUID=" starts directly after column 64.
     printf '%-63sUUID=%s\n' "${var_mountpoint}" "${var_uuid}" >> "${LOG_UID}"
+
   done
 
+
   printf '\n' >> "${LOG_UID}"
   printf 'LUKS CONTAINER UUID:\n' >> "${LOG_UID}"
   for var_key in "${!HMP_PATH_LUKSUUID[@]}"; do
+
     var_mountpoint="${var_key}"
     var_uuid="${HMP_PATH_LUKSUUID[${var_key}]}"
     ### Left-aligned field width 63; "UUID=" starts directly after column 64.
     printf '%-63sUUID=%s\n' "${var_mountpoint}" "${var_uuid}" >> "${LOG_UID}"
+
   done
 
+
   printf '\n' >> "${LOG_UID}"
   printf 'FILESYSTEM UUID:\n' >> "${LOG_UID}"
   for var_key in "${!HMP_PATH_FSUUID[@]}"; do
+
     var_mountpoint="${var_key}"
     var_uuid="${HMP_PATH_FSUUID[${var_key}]}"
     ### Left-aligned field width 63; "UUID=" starts directly after column 64.
     printf '%-63sUUID=%s\n' "${var_mountpoint}" "${var_uuid}" >> "${LOG_UID}"
+
   done
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f uuid_logger
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_3200_partitioning/3295_get_label.sh

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Returns standardized labels for the provided mount path depending on filesystem and art of label.
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ get_label() {
 
     file)
 
+      # shellcheck disable=SC2249
       case "${var_path}:${var_file}" in
 
         swap:*)               var_return_label="host_swap" ;;
@@ -117,4 +118,7 @@ get_label() {
 
   fi
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f get_label
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4000_debootstrap/4000_debootstrap.sh

@@ -10,32 +10,41 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Install a minimal Debian environment using the 'debootstrap' command.
 # Globals:
 #   LOG_DBS
+#   LOG_REC
+#   RECOVERY
 #   TARGET
 #   VAR_ARCHITECTURE
 #   VAR_CODENAME
+#   VAR_RUN_RECOVERY
 #   debootstrap_includes
 #   debootstrap_mirror
 # Arguments:
 #   None
 # Returns:
 #   0: on success
-#   ERR_DEBOOTSTRAP
+#   ERR_DEBOOTSTRAP: on failure
 #######################################
 func_debootstrap() {
   ### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
   declare -r var_arch="${VAR_ARCHITECTURE}"
   declare -r var_dist="${VAR_CODENAME}"
-  declare -r var_target="${TARGET}"
   declare -r var_mirror="${debootstrap_mirror}"
   declare -r var_includes="${debootstrap_includes}"
   declare -a ary_cmd=()
 
+  declare    var_log="${LOG_DBS}"
+  declare    var_target="${TARGET}"
+
+  ### Check for TARGET / RECOVERY.
+  [[ "${VAR_RUN_RECOVERY}" == "true" ]] && var_log="${LOG_REC}"
+  [[ "${VAR_RUN_RECOVERY}" == "true" ]] && var_target="${RECOVERY}"
+
   ary_cmd+=( "debootstrap" "--arch=${var_arch}" "--keep-debootstrap-dir" "--log-extra-deps" "--merged-usr" )
 
   if [[ -n "${var_includes}" ]]; then ary_cmd+=( "--include=${var_includes}" ); fi
@@ -45,7 +54,7 @@ func_debootstrap() {
   do_log "debug" "file_only" "4000() Executing: [${ary_cmd[*]}]"
 
   # shellcheck disable=SC2312
-  if "${ary_cmd[@]}" | tee "${LOG_DBS}"; then
+  if "${ary_cmd[@]}" | tee "${var_log}"; then
 
     do_log "info" "file_only" "4000() [${ary_cmd[*]}] successful."
 
@@ -54,6 +63,7 @@ func_debootstrap() {
     install -d -m 0700 -o root -g root "${var_target}/root/.ciss/cdi/hooks"
     install -d -m 0700 -o root -g root "${var_target}/root/.ciss/cdi/keys"
     install -d -m 0700 -o root -g root "${var_target}/root/.ciss/cdi/log"
+    install -d -m 0700 -o root -g root "${var_target}/root/.ciss/cdi/log/pre-env"
 
     mv -T "${var_target}/debootstrap" "${var_target}/root/.ciss/cdi/debootstrap"
 
@@ -61,7 +71,7 @@ func_debootstrap() {
     chmod 0700 "${var_target}/root/.ciss/cdi"
     chmod 0700 "${var_target}/root/.ciss/cdi/debootstrap"
 
-    guard_dir && return 0
+    guard_dir; return 0
 
   else
 
@@ -70,4 +80,7 @@ func_debootstrap() {
 
   fi
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f func_debootstrap
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4000_debootstrap/4005_debootstrap_checks.sh

@@ -10,12 +10,14 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Preliminary post debootstrap checks.
 # Globals:
+#   RECOVERY
 #   TARGET
+#   VAR_RUN_RECOVERY
 # Arguments:
 #   None
 # Returns:
@@ -24,10 +26,14 @@ guard_sourcing
 check_debootstrap() {
   ### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
   declare -r  var_logfile="/root/.ciss/cdi/log/4005_debootstrap_checks.log"
+  declare     var_target="${TARGET}"
 
-  chroot_logger "${TARGET}${var_logfile}"
+  ### Check for TARGET / RECOVERY.
+  [[ "${VAR_RUN_RECOVERY}" == "true" ]] && var_target="${RECOVERY}"
 
-  chroot_script "${TARGET}" "
+  chroot_logger "${var_target}${var_logfile}"
+
+  chroot_script "${var_target}" "
     {
       ### Header
       echo '==[debootstrap checks]=='
@@ -78,6 +84,9 @@ check_debootstrap() {
     } >> ${var_logfile}
   "
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f check_debootstrap
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4000_debootstrap/4010_prepare_mounts.sh

@@ -10,25 +10,26 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Configure the target system for chroot.
 # Globals:
-#   ERR_CHRT_MOUNTS
+#   RECOVERY
 #   TARGET
 #   VAR_CHROOT_ACTIVATED
 #   VAR_NEED_RUN_IN_TARGET
+#   VAR_RUN_RECOVERY
 # Arguments:
 #   None
 # Returns:
-#   ERR_CHRT_MOUNTS
 #   0: on success
+#   ERR_CHRT_MOUNTS: on failure
 #######################################
 prepare_mounts() {
 
   ### Notes
-  # This file mounts all necessary pseudo filesystems into the target root environment to enable chroot operations.
+  # This function mounts all necessary pseudo filesystems into the target root environment to enable chroot operations.
   # --rbind: recursive binding.
   # --make-rslave: In this case, the mount point is marked as 'slave'.
   # This means changes to the source mount (e.g., /proc) are propagated to the target mount (e.g., "${TARGET}/proc").
@@ -52,68 +53,80 @@ prepare_mounts() {
   )
 
   declare     var_path="" var_fs="" var_src="" var_opts=""
+  declare     var_target="${TARGET}"
+
+  ### Check for TARGET / RECOVERY.
+  [[ "${VAR_RUN_RECOVERY}" == "true" ]] && var_target="${RECOVERY}"
 
   for var_path in "${!HMP_SPECIAL_MOUNTS[@]}"; do
 
-    mkdir -p "${TARGET}${var_path}"
+    mkdir -p "${var_target}${var_path}"
 
   done
 
-
   for var_path in "${!HMP_SPECIAL_MOUNTS[@]}"; do
 
     IFS=" " read -r var_fs var_src var_opts <<< "${HMP_SPECIAL_MOUNTS[${var_path}]}"
 
-    if mountpoint -q "${TARGET}${var_path}"; then
+    if mountpoint -q "${var_target}${var_path}"; then
 
-      do_log "info" "file_only" "4010() Skipped: '${TARGET}${var_path}' is already a mountpoint."
+      do_log "info" "file_only" "4010() Skipped: '${var_target}${var_path}' is already a mountpoint."
       continue
 
     fi
 
-    if ! mount -t "${var_fs}" "${var_src}" "${TARGET}${var_path}" -o "${var_opts}"; then
+    if ! mount -t "${var_fs}" "${var_src}" "${var_target}${var_path}" -o "${var_opts}"; then
 
-      do_log "emergency" "file_only" "4010() Command: [mount -t ${var_fs} ${var_src} ${TARGET}${var_path} -o ${var_opts}] failed."
+      do_log "emergency" "file_only" "4010() Command: [mount -t ${var_fs} ${var_src} ${var_target}${var_path} -o ${var_opts}] failed."
       return "${ERR_CHRT_MOUNTS}"
 
     fi
 
-    do_log "info" "file_only" "4010() Command: [mount -t ${var_fs} ${var_src} ${TARGET}${var_path} -o ${var_opts}] successful."
+    do_log "info" "file_only" "4010() Command: [mount -t ${var_fs} ${var_src} ${var_target}${var_path} -o ${var_opts}] successful."
 
   done
 
-
   if [[ "${VAR_NEED_RUN_IN_TARGET:-false}" == "true" ]]; then
 
-    mkdir -p "${TARGET}/run"
+    mkdir -p "${var_target}/run"
 
-    if ! mount --make-rslave --rbind /run "${TARGET}/run"; then
+    if ! mount --make-rslave --rbind /run "${var_target}/run"; then
 
-      do_log "emergency" "file_only" "4010() Command: [mount --make-rslave --rbind /run ${TARGET}/run] failed."
+      do_log "emergency" "file_only" "4010() Command: [mount --make-rslave --rbind /run ${var_target}/run] failed."
       return "${ERR_CHRT_MOUNTS}"
 
     fi
 
-    do_log "info" "file_only" "4010() Command: [mount --make-rslave --rbind /run ${TARGET}/run] successful."
+    do_log "info" "file_only" "4010() Command: [mount --make-rslave --rbind /run ${var_target}/run] successful."
 
   fi
 
+  if ! chroot_exec "${var_target}" mkdir -p /etc/systemd/system/multi-user.target.wants; then
 
-  if ! chroot_exec "${TARGET}" mkdir -p /etc/systemd/system/multi-user.target.wants; then
-
-    do_log "emergency" "file_only" "4010() Command: [chroot_exec ${TARGET} mkdir -p /etc/systemd/system/multi-user.target.wants] failed."
+    do_log "emergency" "file_only" "4010() Command: [chroot_exec ${var_target} mkdir -p /etc/systemd/system/multi-user.target.wants] failed."
     return "${ERR_CHRT_MOUNTS}"
 
   fi
 
-  do_log "info" "file_only" "4010() Command: [chroot_exec ${TARGET} mkdir -p /etc/systemd/system/multi-user.target.wants] successful."
+  do_log "info" "file_only" "4010() Command: [chroot_exec ${var_target} mkdir -p /etc/systemd/system/multi-user.target.wants] successful."
 
-  mkdir -p "${TARGET}/media/cdrom0"
+  mkdir -p "${var_target}/media/cdrom0"
 
-  # shellcheck disable=SC2034
-  declare -gx VAR_CHROOT_ACTIVATED="system"
-  do_log "info" "file_only" "4010() Command: [declare -gx VAR_CHROOT_ACTIVATED=system]"
+  if   [[ "${VAR_RUN_RECOVERY}" == "false" ]]; then
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+    declare -gx VAR_CHROOT_ACTIVATED="system"
+    do_log "info" "file_only" "4010() Command: [declare -gx VAR_CHROOT_ACTIVATED=system]"
+
+  elif [[ "${VAR_RUN_RECOVERY}" == "true" ]]; then
+
+    declare -gx VAR_CHROOT_ACTIVATED="recovery"
+    do_log "info" "file_only" "4010() Command: [declare -gx VAR_CHROOT_ACTIVATED=recovery]"
+
+  fi
+
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f prepare_mounts
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4000_debootstrap/4011_prepare_xdg_root.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# SPDX-Version: 3.0
+# SPDX-CreationInfo: 2025-06-17; WEIDNER, Marc S.; <msw@coresecret.dev>
+# SPDX-ExternalRef: GIT https://git.coresecret.dev/msw/CISS.debian.installer.git
+# SPDX-FileContributor: WEIDNER, Marc S.; Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency
+# SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2024-2025; WEIDNER, Marc S.; <msw@coresecret.dev>
+# SPDX-FileType: SOURCE
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: EUPL-1.2 OR LicenseRef-CCLA-1.0
+# SPDX-LicenseComment: This file is part of the CISS.debian.installer.secure framework.
+# SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
+# SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
+
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
+
+#######################################
+# Prepare '/root' for XDG framework.
+# Globals:
+#   RECOVERY
+#   TARGET
+#   VAR_RUN_RECOVERY
+#   VAR_SETUP_PATH
+# Arguments:
+#   None
+# Returns:
+#   0: on success
+#######################################
+prepare_xdg_root() {
+  ### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
+  declare     var_target="${TARGET}"
+
+  ### Check for TARGET / RECOVERY.
+  [[ "${VAR_RUN_RECOVERY}" == "true" ]] && var_target="${RECOVERY}"
+
+  install -m 0755 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/etc/profile.d/ciss-xdg.sh" "${var_target}/etc/profile.d/"
+  install -m 0444 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/etc/default/ciss-xdg-profile" "${var_target}/etc/default/"
+  install -m 0700 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh" "${var_target}/root/"
+
+  # shellcheck disable=SC2016
+  chroot_script "${var_target}" '
+    install -d -m 0755 /etc/xdg
+
+    [[ -r /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh ]] && . /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh
+
+    ### Create canonical directories.
+    _xdg_umask="$(umask)"
+    umask 0077
+    [[ -d "${XDG_CONFIG_HOME}"     ]] || install -d -m 0700 -- "${XDG_CONFIG_HOME}"
+    [[ -d "${XDG_DATA_HOME}"       ]] || install -d -m 0700 -- "${XDG_DATA_HOME}"
+    [[ -d "${XDG_CACHE_HOME}"      ]] || install -d -m 0700 -- "${XDG_CACHE_HOME}"
+    [[ -d "${XDG_STATE_HOME}"      ]] || install -d -m 0700 -- "${XDG_STATE_HOME}"
+    [[ -d "${XDG_STATE_HOME}/bash" ]] || install -d -m 0700 -- "${XDG_STATE_HOME}/bash"
+    [[ -d "${XDG_STATE_HOME}/less" ]] || install -d -m 0700 -- "${XDG_STATE_HOME}/less"
+    umask "$_xdg_umask"
+    unset _xdg_umask
+    '
+
+  guard_dir; return 0
+}
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f prepare_xdg_root
+# vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4000_debootstrap/4015_check_usr_merge.sh

@@ -10,12 +10,14 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Check if the target system is not 'tainted: unmerged-usr'.
 # Globals:
+#   RECOVERY
 #   TARGET
+#   VAR_RUN_RECOVERY
 #   architecture
 # Arguments:
 #   None
@@ -25,25 +27,30 @@ guard_sourcing
 check_usr_merge() {
   ### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
   declare -r  var_logfile="/root/.ciss/cdi/log/4015_check_usr_merge.log"
+  declare     var_target="${TARGET}"
 
-  chroot_logger "${TARGET}${var_logfile}"
+  ### Check for TARGET / RECOVERY.
+  [[ "${VAR_RUN_RECOVERY}" == "true" ]] && var_target="${RECOVERY}"
+
+  chroot_logger "${var_target}${var_logfile}"
 
   # shellcheck disable=SC2312
-  chroot_script "${TARGET}" "
+  chroot_script "${var_target}" "
     test -L /bin  && test $(readlink -f /bin)  = '/usr/bin'  && echo 'MERGED:/bin'  >> ${var_logfile} || echo 'UNMERGED:/bin'  >> ${var_logfile}
     test -L /sbin && test $(readlink -f /sbin) = '/usr/sbin' && echo 'MERGED:/sbin' >> ${var_logfile} || echo 'UNMERGED:/sbin' >> ${var_logfile}
     test -L /lib  && test $(readlink -f /lib)  = '/usr/lib'  && echo 'MERGED:/lib'  >> ${var_logfile} || echo 'UNMERGED:/lib'  >> ${var_logfile}
-    echo ExitCode: \$? >> ${var_logfile}
   "
 
   if [[ "${architecture}" == "amd64" ]]; then
     # shellcheck disable=SC2312
-    chroot_script "${TARGET}" "
+    chroot_script "${var_target}" "
       test -L /lib64 && test $(readlink -f /lib64) = '/usr/lib64' && echo 'MERGED:/lib64' >> ${var_logfile} || echo 'UNMERGED:/lib64' >> ${var_logfile}
-      echo ExitCode: \$? >> ${var_logfile}
     "
   fi
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f check_usr_merge
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4000_debootstrap/4020_remove_x509.sh

@@ -10,12 +10,14 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Chroot hook for deleting all expired X.509 certificates in the target system.
 # Globals:
+#   RECOVERY
 #   TARGET
+#   VAR_RUN_RECOVERY
 #   VAR_SETUP_PATH
 # Arguments:
 #   None
@@ -23,21 +25,28 @@ guard_sourcing
 #   0: on success
 #######################################
 remove_x509() {
+  ### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
+  declare     var_target="${TARGET}"
+
+  ### Check for TARGET / RECOVERY.
+  [[ "${VAR_RUN_RECOVERY}" == "true" ]] && var_target="${RECOVERY}"
 
   install -m 0700 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/chroot/hooks/4020_remove_x509.hooks.sh" \
-    "${TARGET}/root/.ciss/cdi/hooks/4020_remove_x509.hooks.sh"
+    "${var_target}/root/.ciss/cdi/hooks/4020_remove_x509.hooks.sh"
 
+  if ! chroot_script "${var_target}" "/root/.ciss/cdi/hooks/4020_remove_x509.hooks.sh" "emergency"; then
 
-  if ! chroot_script "${TARGET}" "/root/.ciss/cdi/hooks/4020_remove_x509.hooks.sh" "emergency"; then
-
-    do_log "warn" "file_only" "4020() Command: [chroot_script ${TARGET} /root/.ciss/cdi/hooks/4020_remove_x509.hooks.sh emergency] failed."
+    do_log "warn" "file_only" "4020() Command: [chroot_script ${var_target} /root/.ciss/cdi/hooks/4020_remove_x509.hooks.sh emergency] failed."
 
   else
 
-    do_log "debug" "file_only" "4020() Command: [chroot_script ${TARGET} /root/.ciss/cdi/hooks/4020_remove_x509.hooks.sh emergency] successful."
+    do_log "debug" "file_only" "4020() Command: [chroot_script ${var_target} /root/.ciss/cdi/hooks/4020_remove_x509.hooks.sh emergency] successful."
 
   fi
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f remove_x509
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4000_debootstrap/4030_setup_hostname.sh

@@ -10,16 +10,18 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Configure the '/etc/hostname' | '/etc/hosts' | '/etc/mailname' files.
 # Globals:
+#   RECOVERY
 #   TARGET
 #   VAR_FINAL_FQDN
 #   VAR_FINAL_IPV4
 #   VAR_FINAL_IPV6
 #   VAR_LINK_IPV6
+#   VAR_RUN_RECOVERY
 #   network_ipv6
 # Arguments:
 #   None
@@ -27,36 +29,42 @@ guard_sourcing
 #   0: on success
 #######################################
 setup_hostname() {
-  ### Create the '${TARGET}/etc/hostname' file.
-  cat << EOF >| "${TARGET}/etc/hostname"
+  ### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
+  declare     var_target="${TARGET}"
+
+  ### Check for TARGET / RECOVERY.
+  [[ "${VAR_RUN_RECOVERY}" == "true" ]] && var_target="${RECOVERY}"
+
+  ### Create the '${var_target}/etc/hostname' file.
+  cat << EOF >| "${var_target}/etc/hostname"
 ${VAR_FINAL_FQDN}
 EOF
-  chmod 0644 "${TARGET}/etc/hostname"
-  do_log "info" "file_only" "4030() File generated: '${TARGET}/etc/hostname' | hostname '${VAR_FINAL_FQDN}'."
+  chmod 0644 "${var_target}/etc/hostname"
+  do_log "info" "file_only" "4030() File generated: '${var_target}/etc/hostname' | hostname '${VAR_FINAL_FQDN}'."
 
 
-  ### Create the '${TARGET}/etc/mailname' file.
-  cat << EOF >| "${TARGET}/etc/mailname"
+  ### Create the '${var_target}/etc/mailname' file.
+  cat << EOF >| "${var_target}/etc/mailname"
 ${VAR_FINAL_FQDN}
 EOF
-  chmod 0644 "${TARGET}/etc/mailname"
-  do_log "info" "file_only" "4030() File generated: '${TARGET}/etc/mailname' | mailname '${VAR_FINAL_FQDN}'."
+  chmod 0644 "${var_target}/etc/mailname"
+  do_log "info" "file_only" "4030() File generated: '${var_target}/etc/mailname' | mailname '${VAR_FINAL_FQDN}'."
 
 
-  ### Generate '${TARGET}/etc/hosts' basic IPv4 entries
-  cat << EOF >| "${TARGET}/etc/hosts"
+  ### Generate '${var_target}/etc/hosts' basic IPv4 entries
+  cat << EOF >| "${var_target}/etc/hosts"
 127.0.0.1 localhost
 ${VAR_FINAL_IPV4} ${VAR_FINAL_FQDN}
 
 EOF
-  chmod 0644 "${TARGET}/etc/hosts"
-  do_log "info" "file_only" "4030() File generated: '${TARGET}/etc/hosts' with basic IPv4 entries."
+  chmod 0644 "${var_target}/etc/hosts"
+  do_log "info" "file_only" "4030() File generated: '${var_target}/etc/hosts' with basic IPv4 entries."
 
 
-  ### Generate '${TARGET}/etc/hosts' basic IPv6 entries
+  ### Generate '${var_target}/etc/hosts' basic IPv6 entries
   if [[ "${VAR_LINK_IPV6,,}" == "true" || "${network_ipv6,,}" == "true" ]]; then
 
-    cat << EOF >> "${TARGET}/etc/hosts"
+    cat << EOF >> "${var_target}/etc/hosts"
 # The following lines are desirable for IPv6 capable hosts
 ::1     localhost ip6-localhost ip6-loopback
 fe00::0 ip6-localnet
@@ -68,10 +76,13 @@ ${VAR_FINAL_IPV6} ${VAR_FINAL_FQDN}
 
 EOF
 
-    do_log "info" "file_only" "4030() File updated: '${TARGET}/etc/hosts' with basic IPv6 entries."
+    do_log "info" "file_only" "4030() File updated: '${var_target}/etc/hosts' with basic IPv6 entries."
 
   fi
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f setup_hostname
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4000_debootstrap/4035_setup_resolv.sh

@@ -10,20 +10,18 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Configure the '/etc/resolv.conf' file.
 # Globals:
 #   ARY_IPV4_NS
 #   ARY_IPV6_NS
-#   DIR_BAK
+#   RECOVERY
 #   TARGET
-#   VAR_ARCHITECTURE
-#   VAR_CODENAME
 #   VAR_FINAL_IPV6
 #   VAR_LINK_IPV6
-#   VAR_VERSION
+#   VAR_RUN_RECOVERY
 # Arguments:
 #   None
 # Returns:
@@ -32,59 +30,66 @@ guard_sourcing
 setup_resolv() {
   ### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
   declare     ns=""
+  declare     var_target="${TARGET}"
 
-  if [[ -f "${TARGET}/etc/resolv.conf" ]]; then
+  ### Check for TARGET / RECOVERY.
+  [[ "${VAR_RUN_RECOVERY}" == "true" ]] && var_target="${RECOVERY}"
 
-    mkdir -p "${TARGET}/root/.ciss/cdi/backup/etc"
-    mv "${TARGET}/etc/resolv.conf" "${TARGET}/root/.ciss/cdi/backup/etc/resolv.conf.bak"
-    do_log "info" "file_only" "4035() Existing '${TARGET}/etc/resolv.conf' moved."
+  if [[ -f "${var_target}/etc/resolv.conf" ]]; then
+
+    mkdir -p "${var_target}/root/.ciss/cdi/backup/etc"
+    mv "${var_target}/etc/resolv.conf" "${var_target}/root/.ciss/cdi/backup/etc/resolv.conf.bak"
+    do_log "info" "file_only" "4035() Existing '${var_target}/etc/resolv.conf' moved."
 
   fi
 
-  touch "${TARGET}/etc/resolv.conf"
-  chmod 0644 "${TARGET}/etc/resolv.conf"
+  touch "${var_target}/etc/resolv.conf"
+  chmod 0644 "${var_target}/etc/resolv.conf"
 
   ### Create '/etc/resolv.conf' IPv4 entries for static configuration.
-  insert_header "${TARGET}/etc/resolv.conf"
-  insert_comments "${TARGET}/etc/resolv.conf"
-  cat << EOF >> "${TARGET}/etc/resolv.conf"
+  insert_header "${var_target}/etc/resolv.conf"
+  insert_comments "${var_target}/etc/resolv.conf"
+  cat << EOF >> "${var_target}/etc/resolv.conf"
 ### Custom DNS IPv4 configuration
 EOF
 
   for ns in "${ARY_IPV4_NS[@]}"; do
 
-    echo "nameserver ${ns}" >> "${TARGET}/etc/resolv.conf"
+    echo "nameserver ${ns}" >> "${var_target}/etc/resolv.conf"
     do_log "info" "file_only" "4035() IPv4 nameserver added: [${ns}]."
 
   done
 
-  echo "" >> "${TARGET}/etc/resolv.conf"
-  do_log "info" "file_only" "4035() IPv4 nameserver at: '${TARGET}/etc/resolv.conf' configured."
+  echo "" >> "${var_target}/etc/resolv.conf"
+  do_log "info" "file_only" "4035() IPv4 nameserver at: '${var_target}/etc/resolv.conf' configured."
 
 
   ### Create '/etc/resolv.conf' IPv6 entries for static configuration.
   if [[ "${VAR_LINK_IPV6,,}" == "true" || -n "${VAR_FINAL_IPV6}" ]]; then
 
-    cat << EOF >> "${TARGET}/etc/resolv.conf"
+    cat << EOF >> "${var_target}/etc/resolv.conf"
 ### Custom DNS IPv6 configuration
 EOF
 
     for ns in "${ARY_IPV6_NS[@]}"; do
 
-      echo "nameserver ${ns}" >> "${TARGET}/etc/resolv.conf"
+      echo "nameserver ${ns}" >> "${var_target}/etc/resolv.conf"
       do_log "info" "file_only" "4035() IPv6 nameserver added: [${ns}]."
 
     done
 
-    echo "" >> "${TARGET}/etc/resolv.conf"
-    do_log "info" "file_only" "4035() IPv6 nameserver at: '${TARGET}/etc/resolv.conf' configured."
+    echo "" >> "${var_target}/etc/resolv.conf"
+    do_log "info" "file_only" "4035() IPv6 nameserver at: '${var_target}/etc/resolv.conf' configured."
 
   fi
 
-  cat << EOF >> "${TARGET}/etc/resolv.conf"
+  cat << EOF >> "${var_target}/etc/resolv.conf"
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh
 EOF
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f setup_resolv
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4000_debootstrap/4040_setup_timezone.sh

@@ -10,12 +10,14 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Configure the '/etc/timezone' | '/etc/localtime' files.
 # Globals:
+#   RECOVERY
 #   TARGET
+#   VAR_RUN_RECOVERY
 #   ntp_timezone
 # Arguments:
 #   None
@@ -23,17 +25,26 @@ guard_sourcing
 #   0: on success
 #######################################
 setup_timezone() {
-  ### Create '${TARGET}/etc/timezone' file.
-  cat << EOF >| "${TARGET}/etc/timezone"
+  ### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
+  declare     var_target="${TARGET}"
+
+  ### Check for TARGET / RECOVERY.
+  [[ "${VAR_RUN_RECOVERY}" == "true" ]] && var_target="${RECOVERY}"
+
+  ### Create the '$ {var_target}/etc / timezone' file.
+  cat << EOF >| "${var_target}/etc/timezone"
 ${ntp_timezone:-UTC}
 EOF
-  chmod 0644 "${TARGET}/etc/timezone"
-  do_log "info" "file_only" "4040() File generated: '${TARGET}/etc/timezone' | timezone '${ntp_timezone:-UTC}'."
+  chmod 0644 "${var_target}/etc/timezone"
+  do_log "info" "file_only" "4040() File generated: '${var_target}/etc/timezone' | timezone '${ntp_timezone:-UTC}'."
 
-  chroot_exec "${TARGET}" ln -sf "/usr/share/zoneinfo/${ntp_timezone}" /etc/localtime
+  chroot_exec "${var_target}" ln -sf "/usr/share/zoneinfo/${ntp_timezone}" /etc/localtime
 
-  chroot_exec "${TARGET}" dpkg-reconfigure -f noninteractive tzdata
+  chroot_exec "${var_target}" dpkg-reconfigure -f noninteractive tzdata
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f setup_timezone
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4000_debootstrap/4050_setup_locales.sh

@@ -10,16 +10,16 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Set locale, locale overrides and configure keyboard layout.
 # Globals:
 #   ARY_LOCALE
+#   RECOVERY
 #   TARGET
-#   VAR_ARCHITECTURE
-#   VAR_CODENAME
-#   VAR_VERSION
+#   VAR_DATE
+#   VAR_RUN_RECOVERY
 #   locale_country
 #   locale_keyboard_xkb_keymap
 #   locale_language
@@ -42,15 +42,22 @@ guard_sourcing
 setup_locales() {
   ### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
   declare     var_locale_hook="/root/.ciss/cdi/hooks/4050_setup_locales.hooks.sh"
+  declare     var_target="${TARGET}"
+
+  ### Check for TARGET / RECOVERY.
+  [[ "${VAR_RUN_RECOVERY}" == "true" ]] && var_target="${RECOVERY}"
 
   ### Give priority to '${locale_locale}' over separately configured variables '${locale_country}' and '${locale_language}'.
   ### If 'locale_locale' is not set, build it from 'locale_language' and 'locale_country'.
   if [[ -n "${locale_language:-}" && -n "${locale_country:-}" && -z "${ARY_LOCALE[0]:-}" ]]; then
+
+    # shellcheck disable=SC2034
     ARY_LOCALE+="${locale_language}_${locale_country}.UTF-8"
+
   fi
 
   ### Creat Hook in target.
-  cat << EOF >| "${TARGET}${var_locale_hook}"
+  cat << EOF >| "${var_target}${var_locale_hook}"
 #!/bin/bash
 # SPDX-Version: 3.0
 # SPDX-CreationInfo: ${VAR_DATE}; WEIDNER, Marc S.; <msw@coresecret.dev>
@@ -72,7 +79,7 @@ declare    loc=""
 
 EOF
 
-  cat << 'EOF' >> "${TARGET}${var_locale_hook}"
+  cat << 'EOF' >> "${var_target}${var_locale_hook}"
 ary_locale+=( "${locale_0}" )
 [[ -n "${locale_1}" ]] && ary_locale+=( "${locale_1}" )
 
@@ -94,7 +101,7 @@ done
 
 EOF
 
-  cat << EOF >> "${TARGET}${var_locale_hook}"
+  cat << EOF >> "${var_target}${var_locale_hook}"
 update-locale \
 LANG=${ARY_LOCALE[0]} \
 LC_ADDRESS=${locale_override_address:-${ARY_LOCALE[0]}} \
@@ -112,13 +119,13 @@ LC_IDENTIFICATION=${ARY_LOCALE[0]}
 
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh
 EOF
-  chmod 0700 "${TARGET}${var_locale_hook}"
-  chroot_script "${TARGET}" "${var_locale_hook}"
+  chmod 0700 "${var_target}${var_locale_hook}"
+  chroot_script "${var_target}" "${var_locale_hook}"
 
   ### Set the keyboard layout for the system (for consoles).
-  insert_header   "${TARGET}/etc/default/keyboard"
-  insert_comments "${TARGET}/etc/default/keyboard"
-  cat << EOF >>   "${TARGET}/etc/default/keyboard"
+  insert_header   "${var_target}/etc/default/keyboard"
+  insert_comments "${var_target}/etc/default/keyboard"
+  cat << EOF >>   "${var_target}/etc/default/keyboard"
 # KEYBOARD CONFIGURATION FILE
 # Consult the keyboard(5) manual page.
 
@@ -130,9 +137,12 @@ BACKSPACE="guess"
 
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=conf
 EOF
-  chmod 0644 "${TARGET}/etc/default/keyboard"
-  do_log "info" "file_only" "4050() Keyboard layout updated: 'XKBLAYOUT=${locale_keyboard_xkb_keymap}' -> '${TARGET}/etc/default/keyboard'."
+  chmod 0644 "${var_target}/etc/default/keyboard"
+  do_log "info" "file_only" "4050() Keyboard layout updated: 'XKBLAYOUT=${locale_keyboard_xkb_keymap}' -> '${var_target}/etc/default/keyboard'."
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f setup_locales
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4000_debootstrap/README/README_4000.md

@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+---
+gitea: none
+include_toc: true
+---
+
+# 1. CISS.debian.installer
+
+**Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard**<br>
+*The CISS Debian Installer provides a fully automated and hardened installation process.*<br>
+**Master Version**: 8.00<br>
+**Build**: V8.00.000.2025.06.17<br>
+
+# 2. [4000_debootstrap.sh](../4000_debootstrap.sh)
+This module provisions a minimal Debian userspace into the installers target root (`$TARGET`) using `debootstrap`.
+It encapsulates argument construction, execution, logging, and the controlled hand-off of the `/debootstrap` working tree into a
+private, permissions-hardened folder under `root/.ciss/cdi/`.
+
+## 2.1. Responsibilities
+- Resolve architecture, distribution codename, mirror, and optionally include-set from the global environment.
+- Execute `debootstrap` with deterministic flags (`--keep-debootstrap-dir`, `--log-extra-deps`, `--merged-usr`) and optional `--include=`.
+- Stream all `debootstrap` output to a dedicated log (`$LOG_DBS`) for reproducibility and forensics.
+- Post-provisioning: create a sealed directory hierarchy beneath `$TARGET/root/.ciss/cdi/` and relocate the working directory 
+  from `$TARGET/debootstrap` to `$TARGET/root/.ciss/cdi/debootstrap`.
+- Emit structured progress diagnostics via the common logging facility.
+- Return a specific non-zero error code on failure to enable consistent trap-level handling.
+
+## 2.2. Inputs & Globals
+- **`$VAR_ARCHITECTURE`** — target architecture (e.g., `amd64`, `arm64`).
+- **`$VAR_CODENAME`** — Debian release codename (e.g., `trixie`).
+- **`$debootstrap_mirror`** — HTTP/HTTPS mirror base URL.
+- **`$debootstrap_includes`** — comma-separated package list to seed into the base system (optional).
+- **`$TARGET`** — absolute mount path of the target root filesystem.
+- **`$LOG_DBS`** — file path to receive `debootstrap` combined output via `tee`.
+- **`ERR_DEBOOTSTRAP`** — module-specific error code for uniform failure signaling.
+
+> All variables are expected to be pre-validated and exported by the installer setup/bootstrap chain.
+
+## 2.3. Execution Flow
+* **Command assembly**
+  - Build `ary_cmd` as:
+    ```
+    debootstrap \
+      --arch="${VAR_ARCHITECTURE}" \
+      --keep-debootstrap-dir \
+      --log-extra-deps \
+      --merged-usr \
+      [--include="${debootstrap_includes}"] \
+      "${VAR_CODENAME}" "${TARGET}" "${debootstrap_mirror}"
+    ```
+  - Emit a debug log line with the fully materialized command.
+
+* **Run & log**
+  - Execute the array-form command; pipe stdout/stderr to `$LOG_DBS` using `tee`.
+  - On success, emit an informational log entry; on failure, emit an emergency log and `return ${ERR_DEBOOTSTRAP}`.
+
+* **Post-provisioning layout (on success)**
+  - Create (mode `0700`, owned by `root:root`) under `$TARGET/root/.ciss/cdi/`:
+    - `backup/`, `debootstrap/`, `hooks/`, `keys/`, `log/`
+  - Move the working directory:
+    - `mv -T "$TARGET/debootstrap" "$TARGET/root/.ciss/cdi/debootstrap"`
+  - Reassert restrictive permissions on `.ciss/`, `.ciss/cdi/`, and `.ciss/cdi/debootstrap/`.
+  - Invoke `guard_dir` (module guard) and return `0`.
+
+## 2.4. Design Paradigms
+- **Array-based invocation**: Prevents word-splitting and globbing pitfalls; arguments are passed verbatim to `execve`.
+- **Deterministic defaults**:
+  - `--merged-usr`: aligns the base system with usrmerge conventions (Debian ≥ 12).
+  - `--keep-debootstrap-dir`: preserves provenance and the exact state of the bootstrap transaction.
+  - `--log-extra-deps`: surfaces additional dependency resolution in logs for auditability.
+- **Fail-fast and traceable**: Execution is meant to run under global hardening (`set -Ceuo pipefail`, `inherit_errexit`) and 
+  integrates with the installer trap/debug framework; logs are persisted for triage.
+
+## 2.5. Security Considerations
+- **Least exposure of artifacts**: The bootstrap working directory is relocated into a sealed, root-only area (`0700`).
+  This avoids exposing transient metadata under world-readable paths.
+- **No shell expansion in command string**: Array execution and explicit variables reduce injection risk and ambiguity.
+- **Privilege hygiene**: Directory creation and moves are executed with explicit ownership/mode; no reliance on ambient umask.
+- **Provenance retention**: Keeping the original `debootstrap` directory (under a protected path) allows later verification of
+  package selection, scripts, and logs.
+
+## 2.6. Logging & Artifacts
+- **Primary log**: `${LOG_DBS}` receives the raw `debootstrap` stream (via `tee`).
+- **Provenance**: `${TARGET}/root/.ciss/cdi/debootstrap/` contains the retained working directory after a successful run.
+- **Installer meta-folders**: `${TARGET}/root/.ciss/cdi/{backup,debootstrap,hooks,keys,log}/` (all `0700`).
+
+These artifacts integrate with the global debug facilities when enabled.
+
+## 2.7. Failure Modes & Exit Codes
+- **Network or mirror failure** → non-zero `debootstrap` exit → module returns `ERR_DEBOOTSTRAP`.
+- **Invalid codename/arch** → early `debootstrap` abort → `ERR_DEBOOTSTRAP`.
+- **Insufficient permissions or target not writable** → directory creation/move fails → `ERR_DEBOOTSTRAP`.
+
+Errors are surfaced to the installers `ERR`/`EXIT` traps, which will record environment, stack, and runtime context.
+
+## 2.8. Best Practices
+- Use `--include` judiciously; keep the base system minimal and defer optional packages to dedicated post-bootstrap tasks.
+- Treat `${TARGET}/root/.ciss/cdi/` as sensitive metadata: back it up or snapshot it if you require later audits.
+
+---
+**[no tracking | no logging | no advertising | no profiling | no bullshit](https://coresecret.eu/)**
+<!-- vim: set number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=markdown -->

func/cdi_4100_base/4100_generate_sources.sh

@@ -10,15 +10,14 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Generate target '/etc/apt/sources.list' entries.
 # Globals:
+#   RECOVERY
 #   TARGET
-#   VAR_ARCHITECTURE
-#   VAR_CODENAME
-#   VAR_VERSION
+#   VAR_RUN_RECOVERY
 #   apt_contrib
 #   apt_deb_sources
 #   apt_mirror_directory
@@ -39,8 +38,12 @@ guard_sourcing
 #######################################
 generate_sources() {
   ### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
-  declare -a ary_components=()
-  declare    var_arch="" var_codename="" var_deb_src="" var_dir="" var_hostname="" var_hostsecure="" var_url="" var_surl=""
+  declare -a  ary_components=()
+  declare     var_arch="" var_codename="" var_deb_src="" var_dir="" var_hostname="" var_hostsecure="" var_url="" var_surl=""
+  declare     var_target="${TARGET}"
+
+  ### Check for TARGET / RECOVERY.
+  [[ "${VAR_RUN_RECOVERY}" == "true" ]] && var_target="${RECOVERY}"
 
   # shellcheck disable=SC2154 # "${architecture}"
   var_arch="${architecture,,}"
@@ -77,25 +80,25 @@ generate_sources() {
 
   fi
 
-  : >| "${TARGET}/etc/apt/sources.list"
-  chmod 0644 "${TARGET}/etc/apt/sources.list"
+  : >| "${var_target}/etc/apt/sources.list"
+  chmod 0644 "${var_target}/etc/apt/sources.list"
 
   ### Main Repository
   # shellcheck disable=SC2153
-  insert_header "${TARGET}/etc/apt/sources.list"
-  insert_comments "${TARGET}/etc/apt/sources.list"
-  cat << EOF >> "${TARGET}/etc/apt/sources.list"
+  insert_header   "${var_target}/etc/apt/sources.list"
+  insert_comments "${var_target}/etc/apt/sources.list"
+  cat << EOF >>   "${var_target}/etc/apt/sources.list"
 #------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------#
 #                                                     OFFICIAL DEBIAN REPOS                                                    #
 #------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------#
 deb ${var_url} ${var_codename} ${ary_components[*]}
 EOF
-  do_log "info" "file_only" "4100() ${TARGET}/etc/apt/sources.list entry generated: 'deb ${var_url} ${var_codename} ${ary_components[*]}'."
+  do_log "info" "file_only" "4100() ${var_target}/etc/apt/sources.list entry generated: 'deb ${var_url} ${var_codename} ${ary_components[*]}'."
 
   if [[ "${var_deb_src}" == "true" ]]; then
 
-    echo "deb-src ${var_url} ${var_codename} ${ary_components[*]}" >> "${TARGET}/etc/apt/sources.list"
-    do_log "info" "file_only" "4100() ${TARGET}/etc/apt/sources.list entry generated: 'deb-src ${var_url} ${var_codename} ${ary_components[*]}'."
+    echo "deb-src ${var_url} ${var_codename} ${ary_components[*]}" >> "${var_target}/etc/apt/sources.list"
+    do_log "info" "file_only" "4100() ${var_target}/etc/apt/sources.list entry generated: 'deb-src ${var_url} ${var_codename} ${ary_components[*]}'."
 
   fi
 
@@ -103,16 +106,16 @@ EOF
   ### Security Repository
   if [[ "${apt_updates_security,,}" == "true" ]]; then
 
-    cat << EOF >> "${TARGET}/etc/apt/sources.list"
+    cat << EOF >> "${var_target}/etc/apt/sources.list"
 
 deb ${var_surl} ${var_codename}-security ${ary_components[*]}
 EOF
-    do_log "info" "file_only" "4100() ${TARGET}/etc/apt/sources.list entry generated: 'deb ${var_surl} ${var_codename}-security ${ary_components[*]}'."
+    do_log "info" "file_only" "4100() ${var_target}/etc/apt/sources.list entry generated: 'deb ${var_surl} ${var_codename}-security ${ary_components[*]}'."
 
     if [[ "${var_deb_src}" == "true" ]]; then
 
-      echo "deb-src ${var_surl} ${var_codename}-security ${ary_components[*]}" >> "${TARGET}/etc/apt/sources.list"
-      do_log "info" "file_only" "4100() ${TARGET}/etc/apt/sources.list entry generated: 'deb-src ${var_surl} ${var_codename}-security ${ary_components[*]}'."
+      echo "deb-src ${var_surl} ${var_codename}-security ${ary_components[*]}" >> "${var_target}/etc/apt/sources.list"
+      do_log "info" "file_only" "4100() ${var_target}/etc/apt/sources.list entry generated: 'deb-src ${var_surl} ${var_codename}-security ${ary_components[*]}'."
 
     fi
 
@@ -122,16 +125,16 @@ EOF
   ### Updates Repository
   if [[ "${apt_updates_release,,}" == "true" ]]; then
 
-    cat << EOF >> "${TARGET}/etc/apt/sources.list"
+    cat << EOF >> "${var_target}/etc/apt/sources.list"
 
 deb ${var_url} ${var_codename}-updates ${ary_components[*]}
 EOF
-    do_log "info" "file_only" "4100() ${TARGET}/etc/apt/sources.list entry generated: 'deb ${var_url} ${var_codename}-updates ${ary_components[*]}'."
+    do_log "info" "file_only" "4100() ${var_target}/etc/apt/sources.list entry generated: 'deb ${var_url} ${var_codename}-updates ${ary_components[*]}'."
 
     if [[ "${var_deb_src}" == "true" ]]; then
 
-      echo "deb-src ${var_url} ${var_codename}-updates ${ary_components[*]}" >> "${TARGET}/etc/apt/sources.list"
-      do_log "info" "file_only" "4100() ${TARGET}/etc/apt/sources.list entry generated: 'deb-src ${var_url} ${var_codename}-updates ${ary_components[*]}'."
+      echo "deb-src ${var_url} ${var_codename}-updates ${ary_components[*]}" >> "${var_target}/etc/apt/sources.list"
+      do_log "info" "file_only" "4100() ${var_target}/etc/apt/sources.list entry generated: 'deb-src ${var_url} ${var_codename}-updates ${ary_components[*]}'."
 
     fi
 
@@ -141,16 +144,16 @@ EOF
   ### Backports Repository
   if [[ "${apt_updates_backports,,}" == "true" ]]; then
 
-    cat << EOF >> "${TARGET}/etc/apt/sources.list"
+    cat << EOF >> "${var_target}/etc/apt/sources.list"
 
 deb ${var_url} ${var_codename}-backports ${ary_components[*]}
 EOF
-    do_log "info" "file_only" "4100() ${TARGET}/etc/apt/sources.list entry generated: 'deb ${var_url} ${var_codename}-backports ${ary_components[*]}'."
+    do_log "info" "file_only" "4100() ${var_target}/etc/apt/sources.list entry generated: 'deb ${var_url} ${var_codename}-backports ${ary_components[*]}'."
 
     if [[ "${var_deb_src,,}" == "true" ]]; then
 
-      echo "deb-src ${var_url} ${var_codename}-backports ${ary_components[*]}" >> "${TARGET}/etc/apt/sources.list"
-      do_log "info" "file_only" "4100() ${TARGET}/etc/apt/sources.list entry generated: 'deb-src ${var_url} ${var_codename}-backports ${ary_components[*]}'."
+      echo "deb-src ${var_url} ${var_codename}-backports ${ary_components[*]}" >> "${var_target}/etc/apt/sources.list"
+      do_log "info" "file_only" "4100() ${var_target}/etc/apt/sources.list entry generated: 'deb-src ${var_url} ${var_codename}-backports ${ary_components[*]}'."
 
     fi
 
@@ -158,32 +161,35 @@ EOF
 
 
   ### Clean up 'sources.list'
-  sed -i '/^#/!s/[[:space:]]\+/ /g' "${TARGET}/etc/apt/sources.list"
+  sed -i '/^#/!s/[[:space:]]\+/ /g' "${var_target}/etc/apt/sources.list"
 
-  cat << EOF >> "${TARGET}/etc/apt/sources.list"
+  cat << EOF >> "${var_target}/etc/apt/sources.list"
 
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=conf
 EOF
 
 
-  insert_header   "${TARGET}/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/90-no-pdiffs"
-  insert_comments "${TARGET}/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/90-no-pdiffs"
-  cat << 'EOF' >> "${TARGET}/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/90-no-pdiffs"
+  insert_header   "${var_target}/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/90-no-pdiffs"
+  insert_comments "${var_target}/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/90-no-pdiffs"
+  cat << 'EOF' >> "${var_target}/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/90-no-pdiffs"
 Acquire::PDiffs "false";
 
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=conf
 EOF
-  sed -i -E 's|^([[:space:]]*)#+|\1//|' "${TARGET}/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/90-no-pdiffs"
+  sed -i -E 's|^([[:space:]]*)#+|\1//|' "${var_target}/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/90-no-pdiffs"
 
-  insert_header   "${TARGET}/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/91-acquire"
-  insert_comments "${TARGET}/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/91-acquire"
-  cat << 'EOF' >> "${TARGET}/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/91-acquire"
+  insert_header   "${var_target}/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/91-acquire"
+  insert_comments "${var_target}/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/91-acquire"
+  cat << 'EOF' >> "${var_target}/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/91-acquire"
 Acquire::Retries "3";
 
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=conf
 EOF
-  sed -i -E 's|^([[:space:]]*)#+|\1//|' "${TARGET}/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/91-acquire"
+  sed -i -E 's|^([[:space:]]*)#+|\1//|' "${var_target}/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/91-acquire"
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f generate_sources
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4100_base/4105_generate_sources_822.sh

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Generate target '/etc/apt/sources.list.d/' deb.822 entries.
@@ -36,8 +36,12 @@ guard_sourcing
 #######################################
 generate_sources822() {
   ### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
-  declare -a ary_components=() ary_types=()
-  declare    var_arch="" var_codename="" var_deb_src="" var_dir="" var_hostname="" var_hostsecure="" var_url="" var_surl=""
+  declare -a  ary_components=() ary_types=()
+  declare     var_arch="" var_codename="" var_deb_src="" var_dir="" var_hostname="" var_hostsecure="" var_url="" var_surl=""
+  declare     var_target="${TARGET}"
+
+  ### Check for TARGET / RECOVERY.
+  [[ "${VAR_RUN_RECOVERY}" == "true" ]] && var_target="${RECOVERY}"
 
   # shellcheck disable=SC2154 # "${architecture}"
   var_arch="${architecture,,}"
@@ -79,9 +83,9 @@ generate_sources822() {
 
 
   ### Main Repository
-  insert_header   "${TARGET}/etc/apt/sources.list.d/trixie.sources"
-  insert_comments "${TARGET}/etc/apt/sources.list.d/trixie.sources"
-  cat << EOF >>   "${TARGET}/etc/apt/sources.list.d/trixie.sources"
+  insert_header   "${var_target}/etc/apt/sources.list.d/trixie.sources"
+  insert_comments "${var_target}/etc/apt/sources.list.d/trixie.sources"
+  cat << EOF >>   "${var_target}/etc/apt/sources.list.d/trixie.sources"
 #------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------#
 #                                                     OFFICIAL DEBIAN REPOS                                                    #
 #------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------#
@@ -98,9 +102,9 @@ EOF
 
   ### Security Repository
   if [[ "${apt_updates_security,,}" == "true" ]]; then
-    insert_header   "${TARGET}/etc/apt/sources.list.d/trixie-security.sources"
-    insert_comments "${TARGET}/etc/apt/sources.list.d/trixie-security.sources"
-    cat << EOF >>   "${TARGET}/etc/apt/sources.list.d/trixie-security.sources"
+    insert_header   "${var_target}/etc/apt/sources.list.d/trixie-security.sources"
+    insert_comments "${var_target}/etc/apt/sources.list.d/trixie-security.sources"
+    cat << EOF >>   "${var_target}/etc/apt/sources.list.d/trixie-security.sources"
 #------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------#
 #                                                     OFFICIAL DEBIAN REPOS                                                    #
 #------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------#
@@ -117,9 +121,9 @@ EOF
 
   ### Updates Repository
   if [[ "${apt_updates_release,,}" == "true" ]]; then
-    insert_header   "${TARGET}/etc/apt/sources.list.d/trixie-updates.sources"
-    insert_comments "${TARGET}/etc/apt/sources.list.d/trixie-updates.sources"
-    cat << EOF >>   "${TARGET}/etc/apt/sources.list.d/trixie-updates.sources"
+    insert_header   "${var_target}/etc/apt/sources.list.d/trixie-updates.sources"
+    insert_comments "${var_target}/etc/apt/sources.list.d/trixie-updates.sources"
+    cat << EOF >>   "${var_target}/etc/apt/sources.list.d/trixie-updates.sources"
 #------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------#
 #                                                     OFFICIAL DEBIAN REPOS                                                    #
 #------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------#
@@ -137,9 +141,9 @@ EOF
 
   ### Backports Repository
   if [[ "${apt_updates_backports,,}" == "true" ]]; then
-    insert_header   "${TARGET}/etc/apt/sources.list.d/trixie-backports.sources"
-    insert_comments "${TARGET}/etc/apt/sources.list.d/trixie-backports.sources"
-    cat << EOF >>   "${TARGET}/etc/apt/sources.list.d/trixie-backports.sources"
+    insert_header   "${var_target}/etc/apt/sources.list.d/trixie-backports.sources"
+    insert_comments "${var_target}/etc/apt/sources.list.d/trixie-backports.sources"
+    cat << EOF >>   "${var_target}/etc/apt/sources.list.d/trixie-backports.sources"
 #------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------#
 #                                                     OFFICIAL DEBIAN REPOS                                                    #
 #------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------#
@@ -156,30 +160,33 @@ EOF
   fi
 
 
-  if [[ -f "${TARGET}/etc/apt/sources.list" ]]; then
-    rm -f "${TARGET}/etc/apt/sources.list"
+  if [[ -f "${var_target}/etc/apt/sources.list" ]]; then
+    rm -f "${var_target}/etc/apt/sources.list"
   fi
 
 
-  insert_header   "${TARGET}/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/90-no-pdiffs"
-  insert_comments "${TARGET}/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/90-no-pdiffs"
-  cat << 'EOF' >> "${TARGET}/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/90-no-pdiffs"
+  insert_header   "${var_target}/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/90-no-pdiffs"
+  insert_comments "${var_target}/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/90-no-pdiffs"
+  cat << 'EOF' >> "${var_target}/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/90-no-pdiffs"
 Acquire::PDiffs "false";
 
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=conf
 EOF
-  sed -i -E 's|^([[:space:]]*)#+|\1//|' "${TARGET}/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/90-no-pdiffs"
+  sed -i -E 's|^([[:space:]]*)#+|\1//|' "${var_target}/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/90-no-pdiffs"
 
 
-  insert_header   "${TARGET}/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/91-acquire"
-  insert_comments "${TARGET}/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/91-acquire"
-  cat << 'EOF' >> "${TARGET}/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/91-acquire"
+  insert_header   "${var_target}/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/91-acquire"
+  insert_comments "${var_target}/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/91-acquire"
+  cat << 'EOF' >> "${var_target}/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/91-acquire"
 Acquire::Retries "3";
 
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=conf
 EOF
-  sed -i -E 's|^([[:space:]]*)#+|\1//|' "${TARGET}/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/91-acquire"
+  sed -i -E 's|^([[:space:]]*)#+|\1//|' "${var_target}/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/91-acquire"
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f generate_sources822
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4100_base/4110_update_sources.sh

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Update generated sources.
@@ -18,7 +18,9 @@ guard_sourcing
 # to suppress the 'update-initramfs'-Kernel-Hooks, according to the initramfs-tools manpage:
 # https://manpages.debian.org/testing/initramfs-tools-core/initramfs-tools.7.en.html
 # Globals:
+#   RECOVERY
 #   TARGET
+#   VAR_RUN_RECOVERY
 #   apt_updates_policy
 # Arguments:
 #   None
@@ -28,35 +30,42 @@ guard_sourcing
 update_sources() {
   ### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
   declare -r  var_logfile="/root/.ciss/cdi/log/4110_update_sources.log"
+  declare     var_target="${TARGET}"
 
-  chroot_logger "${TARGET}${var_logfile}"
+  ### Check for TARGET / RECOVERY.
+  [[ "${VAR_RUN_RECOVERY}" == "true" ]] && var_target="${RECOVERY}"
+
+  chroot_logger "${var_target}${var_logfile}"
 
   ### Update generated sources.
   # shellcheck disable=SC2312
-  chroot_script "${TARGET}" "apt-get update 2>&1 | tee -a ${var_logfile}; echo ExitCode: \$? >> ${var_logfile}"
+  chroot_script "${var_target}" "
+    [[ -r /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh ]] && . /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh
+    apt-get update 2>&1 | tee -a ${var_logfile}
+  "
   do_log "info" "file_only" "4110() Sources lists: updated successfully."
 
 
   ### Update unattended, security, or no unattended updates at all.
   if [[ "${apt_updates_policy,,}" == "unattended" ]]; then
 
-    chroot_script "${TARGET}" "
+    chroot_script "${var_target}" "
       export INITRD=No
+      [[ -r /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh ]] && . /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh
       apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends --no-install-suggests unattended-upgrades 2>&1 | tee -a ${var_logfile}
-      echo ExitCode: \$? >> ${var_logfile}
     "
     do_log "info" "file_only" "4110() The update policy was set at installation time to: '${apt_updates_policy}'."
 
   elif [[ "${apt_updates_policy,,}" == "security" ]]; then
 
-    chroot_script "${TARGET}" "
+    chroot_script "${var_target}" "
       export INITRD=No
+      [[ -r /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh ]] && . /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh
       apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends --no-install-suggests unattended-upgrades 2>&1 | tee -a ${var_logfile}
-      echo ExitCode: \$? >> ${var_logfile}
     "
 
     # shellcheck disable=SC2016
-    sed -i 's/^[[:space:]]*"origin=Debian,codename=\${distro_codename},label=Debian";/\/\/ &/' "${TARGET}/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/50unattended-upgrades"
+    sed -i 's/^[[:space:]]*"origin=Debian,codename=\${distro_codename},label=Debian";/\/\/ &/' "${var_target}/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/50unattended-upgrades"
     do_log "info" "file_only" "4110() The update policy was set at installation time to: '${apt_updates_policy}'."
 
   elif [[ "${apt_updates_policy,,}" == "none" ]]; then
@@ -69,6 +78,9 @@ update_sources() {
 
   fi
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f update_sources
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4100_base/4120_installation_kernel.sh

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Installation of the specified kernel.
@@ -34,29 +34,31 @@ installation_kernel() {
 
   if [[ -n "${VAR_KERNEL}" ]]; then
 
-    chroot_script "${TARGET}" '
+    chroot_script "${TARGET}" "
       export INITRD=No
-      apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends --no-install-suggests '"${VAR_KERNEL}"' initramfs-tools 2>&1 | tee -a '"${var_logfile}"'
-      echo ExitCode: $? >> '"${var_logfile}"'
-    '
+      [[ -r /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh ]] && . /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh
+      apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends --no-install-suggests ${VAR_KERNEL} initramfs-tools 2>&1 | tee -a ${var_logfile}
+    "
 
     do_log "info" "file_only" "4120() Kernel image: '${VAR_KERNEL}' installed successfully."
 
-    guard_dir && return 0
+    guard_dir; return 0
 
   else
 
     chroot_script "${TARGET}" "
       export INITRD=No
+      [[ -r /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh ]] && . /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh
       apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends --no-install-suggests ${image} initramfs-tools 2>&1 | tee -a ${var_logfile}
-      echo ExitCode: \$? >> ${var_logfile}
     "
 
     do_log "info" "file_only" "4120() Kernel image: '${image}' installed successfully."
 
-    guard_dir && return 0
+    guard_dir; return 0
 
   fi
-
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f installation_kernel
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4100_base/4121_installation_initramfs.sh

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Installation of 'initramfs'-environment.
@@ -94,6 +94,13 @@ FSTYPE=${VAR_ROOT_FS}
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh
 EOF
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  cat << EOF >>   "${TARGET}/etc/initramfs-tools/conf.d/resume"
+RESUME=none
+EOF
+
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f installation_initramfs
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4100_base/4130_installation_toolset.sh

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Check and set up the minimum required tools for the next installation steps.
@@ -49,8 +49,8 @@ installation_toolset() {
     [awk]="gawk"
     [gdisk]="gdisk"
     [gnupg]="gnupg"
-    [haveged]="haveged"
     [update-initramfs]="initramfs-tools"
+    [jitterentropy-rngd]="jitterentropy-rngd"
     [jq]="jq"
     [loadkeys]="kbd"
     [setfont]="kbd"
@@ -60,7 +60,9 @@ installation_toolset() {
     [parted]="parted"
     [lspci]="pciutils"
     [pwgen]="pwgen"
+    [rsyslogd]="rsyslog"
     [sudo]="sudo"
+    [pam_systemd]="libpam-systemd"
     [tree]="tree"
     [unzip]="unzip"
     [lsusb]="usbutils"
@@ -95,12 +97,15 @@ installation_toolset() {
 
     chroot_script "${TARGET}" "
       export INITRD=No
+      [[ -r /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh ]] && . /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh
       apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends --no-install-suggests ${ary_unique_pkgs[*]} 2>&1 | tee -a ${var_logfile}
-      echo ExitCode: \$? >> ${var_logfile}
     "
 
   fi
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f installation_toolset
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4100_base/4131_installation_systemd.sh

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Ensure systemd is in place.
@@ -35,8 +35,8 @@ installation_systemd() {
 
     chroot_script "${TARGET}" "
       export INITRD=No
+      [[ -r /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh ]] && . /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh
       apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends --no-install-suggests systemd systemd-sysv dbus 2>&1 | tee -a ${var_logfile}
-      echo ExitCode: \$? >> ${var_logfile}
     "
 
   else
@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ installation_systemd() {
     systemctl --version 2>&1 | tee -a ${var_logfile} | grep -qi 'systemd' || echo '[WARN]: systemd not verifiable' >> ${var_logfile}
   "
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f installation_systemd
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4100_base/4132_installation_machineid.sh

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Generate machine-id if missing.
@@ -33,6 +33,9 @@ installation_machineid() {
 
   fi
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f installation_machineid
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4100_base/4133_installation_masking.sh

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Turn off Energy saving mode and ctrl-alt-del.
@@ -25,15 +25,16 @@ installation_masking() {
   chroot_script "${TARGET}" "
     systemctl mask ctrl-alt-del.target sleep.target suspend.target hibernate.target hybrid-sleep.target
   "
-
   do_log "info" "file_only" "4133() Masked: [ctrl-alt-del.target sleep.target suspend.target hibernate.target hybrid-sleep.target]"
 
   chroot_script "${TARGET}" "
-      systemctl mask plymouth-start.service plymouth-quit.service plymouth-quit-wait.service plymouth-read-write.service
+    systemctl mask plymouth-start.service plymouth-quit.service plymouth-quit-wait.service plymouth-read-write.service
   "
-
   do_log "info" "file_only" "4133() Masked: [plymouth-start.service plymouth-quit.service plymouth-quit-wait.service plymouth-read-write.service]"
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f installation_masking
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4100_base/4140_installation_microcode.sh

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Install microcode updates depending on architecture (amd64, arm64, intel64) and environment (Baremetal, VM).
@@ -56,16 +56,16 @@ installation_microcode() {
 
       chroot_script "${TARGET}" "
         export INITRD=No
+        [[ -r /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh ]] && . /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh
         apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends --no-install-suggests ${var_microcode_pkgs} 2>&1 | tee -a ${var_logfile}
-        echo ExitCode: \$? >> ${var_logfile}
       "
 
     else
 
       chroot_script "${TARGET}" "
         export INITRD=No
+        [[ -r /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh ]] && . /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh
         apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends --no-install-suggests --only-upgrade ${var_microcode_pkgs} 2>&1 | tee -a ${var_logfile}
-        echo ExitCode: \$? >> ${var_logfile}
       "
 
     fi
@@ -76,6 +76,9 @@ installation_microcode() {
 
   fi
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f installation_microcode
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4100_base/4145_installation_firmware.sh

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Install microcode updates depending on architecture (amd64, arm64, intel64) and environment (Baremetal, VM).
@@ -294,12 +294,15 @@ installation_firmware() {
 
   chroot_script "${TARGET}" "
     export INITRD=No
+    [[ -r /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh ]] && . /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh
     apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends --no-install-suggests ${ary_pkgs_resolved[*]} 2>&1 | tee -a ${var_logfile}
-    echo ExitCode: \$? >> ${var_logfile}
   "
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f installation_firmware
 
 #######################################
 # Helper: Wildcardize a module alias (bus-aware, conservative)
@@ -352,4 +355,7 @@ wildcard_mod_alias() {
 
   return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f wildcard_mod_alias
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4100_base/4150_installation_chrony.sh

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Setup chrony NTPSec client.
@@ -49,8 +49,8 @@ installation_chrony() {
 
   chroot_script "${TARGET}" "
     export INITRD=No
+    [[ -r /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh ]] && . /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh
     apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends --no-install-suggests chrony 2>&1 | tee -a ${var_logfile}
-    echo ExitCode: \$? >> ${var_logfile}
   "
 
   if [[ ! -e "${TARGET}/etc/systemd/system/multi-user.target.wants/chrony.service" ]]; then
@@ -71,13 +71,15 @@ installation_chrony() {
   do_log "debug" "file_only" "4150() Executing: [chroot_script ${TARGET} chronyd -Q -f /etc/chrony/chrony.conf]."
   chroot_script "${TARGET}" "
     chronyd -Q -f /etc/chrony/chrony.conf 2>&1 | tee -a ${var_logfile}
-    echo ExitCode: \$? >> ${var_logfile}
   "
 
   do_log "info" "file_only" "4150() Chrony NTPsec client installed."
 
   rm -f "${var_of}"
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f installation_chrony
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4100_base/4160_installation_eza.sh

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Install Cisofy Lynis.
@@ -49,11 +49,14 @@ EOF
 
   chroot_script "${TARGET}" "
     export INITRD=No
+    [[ -r /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh ]] && . /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh
     apt-get update
     apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends --no-install-suggests eza 2>&1 | tee -a ${var_logfile}
-    echo ExitCode: \$? >> ${var_logfile}
   "
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f installation_eza
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4100_base/4170_installation_lynis.sh

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Install Cisofy Lynis.
@@ -49,11 +49,14 @@ EOF
 
   chroot_script "${TARGET}" "
     export INITRD=No
+    [[ -r /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh ]] && . /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh
     apt-get update
     apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends --no-install-suggests lynis 2>&1 | tee -a ${var_logfile}
-    echo ExitCode: \$? >> ${var_logfile}
   "
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f installation_lynis
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4200_boot/4200_generate_fstab.sh

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Wrapper to write '/etc/fstab' entries.
@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ write_fstab() {
 
   return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f write_fstab
 
 #######################################
 # Generate the '/etc/fstab' target entries.
@@ -90,7 +93,7 @@ EOF
         var_fs_uuid="/dev/mapper/${var_dmapper}"
         var_fs_path="${var_path}"
         var_fs_type="${HMP_FSTAB_MOUNT_FTYPE["${var_path}"]}"
-        var_fs_opts="${HMP_FSTAB_MOUNT_OPTS["${var_path}"]},x-systemd.makefs,x-systemd.fsck=no"
+        var_fs_opts="${HMP_FSTAB_MOUNT_OPTS["${var_path}"]}"
         var_fs_pass="0"
         ;;
 
@@ -146,6 +149,9 @@ EOF
         continue
         ;;
 
+      *)
+        do_log "info" "file_only" "4200() No valid FS found for: '${var_fs_path}'."
+
     esac
 
   done
@@ -155,7 +161,7 @@ EOF
   var_fs_uuid="/dev/mapper/${var_dmapper}"
   var_fs_path="none"
   var_fs_type="swap"
-  var_fs_opts="defaults"
+  var_fs_opts="${HMP_FSTAB_MOUNT_OPTS["SWAP"]}"
   var_fs_pass="0"
   write_fstab "${var_fs_uuid}" "${var_fs_path}" "${var_fs_type}" "${var_fs_opts}" "${var_fs_pass}"
 
@@ -163,11 +169,10 @@ EOF
   mkdir -p "${TARGET}/media/cdrom0"
   cat << 'EOF' >> "${TARGET}/etc/fstab"
 
-/dev/sr0                                   /media/cdrom0               auto              noauto,nofail,ro,user,x-systemd.automount,x-systemd.device-timeout=0                                0 0
-#/dev/sr0                                  /media/cdrom0               udf,iso9660       user,noauto                                                                                         0 0
+# /dev/sr0                                 /media/cdrom0               auto              noauto,nofail,ro,user,x-systemd.automount,x-systemd.device-timeout=0                                0 0                                                                                        0 0
 
 EOF
-  do_log "info" "file_only" "4200() fstab entry generated: '/dev/sr0  /media/cdrom0  udf,iso9660  user,noauto  0 0'."
+  do_log "info" "file_only" "4200() fstab entry generated: '/dev/sr0  /media/cdrom0  auto  noauto,nofail,ro,user,x-systemd.automount,x-systemd.device-timeout=0  0 0'."
 
   cat << 'EOF' >> "${TARGET}/etc/fstab"
 ### Secure tmpfs mounts for a hardened system
@@ -185,6 +190,9 @@ tmpfs                                      /run                        tmpfs
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=200 ft=sh
 EOF
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f generate_fstab
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4200_boot/4205_check_fstab.sh

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Basic '/etc/fstab' checks inside chroot.
@@ -48,6 +48,9 @@ check_fstab() {
     } 2>&1 | tee -a '"${var_logfile}"'
   '
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f check_fstab
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4200_boot/4210_generate_crypttab.sh

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # '/etc/crypttab' entry writer and logger.
@@ -32,6 +32,9 @@ write_crypttab() {
 
   return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f write_crypttab
 
 #######################################
 # Generate the '/etc/crypttab' target entries.
@@ -43,13 +46,14 @@ write_crypttab() {
 #   TARGET
 #   VAR_DROPBEAR
 # Arguments:
-#  None
+#   None
 # Returns:
 #   0: on success
 #######################################
 generate_crypttab() {
   ### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
-  declare     var_key="" var_encryption_label="" var_luks_uuid="" var_ephemeral_enclabel="" var_host_fs_label=""
+  declare     var_key="" var_encryption_label="" var_luks_uuid="" var_ephemeral_enclabel="" var_host_fs_label="" \
+              var_host_partuuid=""
 
   ensure_lowercase "VAR_DROPBEAR"
 
@@ -86,26 +90,26 @@ EOF
       case  "${var_key,,}" in
 
         "/")
-          write_crypttab "${var_encryption_label}" "UUID=${var_luks_uuid}" "none" "luks,discard,initramfs,keyscript=decrypt_keyctl,tries=1"
+          write_crypttab "${var_encryption_label}" "UUID=${var_luks_uuid}" "pw_main" "check,discard,initramfs,keyscript=decrypt_keyctl,luks,noauto,same-cpu-crypt,tries=1"
           ;;
 
         "/usr")
-          write_crypttab "${var_encryption_label}" "UUID=${var_luks_uuid}" "none" "luks,discard,initramfs,keyscript=decrypt_keyctl,tries=1"
+          write_crypttab "${var_encryption_label}" "UUID=${var_luks_uuid}" "pw_main" "check,discard,initramfs,keyscript=decrypt_keyctl,luks,noauto,same-cpu-crypt,tries=1"
           ;;
 
         "/boot")
-          write_crypttab "${var_encryption_label}" "UUID=${var_luks_uuid}" "none" "luks,discard,noauto"
+          write_crypttab "${var_encryption_label}" "UUID=${var_luks_uuid}" "pw_boot" "check,discard,initramfs,keyscript=decrypt_keyctl,luks,noauto,same-cpu-crypt,tries=1"
           ;;
 
         *)
-          write_crypttab "${var_encryption_label}" "UUID=${var_luks_uuid}" "none" "luks,discard,initramfs,keyscript=decrypt_keyctl,tries=1"
+          write_crypttab "${var_encryption_label}" "UUID=${var_luks_uuid}" "pw_main" "check,discard,initramfs,keyscript=decrypt_keyctl,luks,noauto,same-cpu-crypt,tries=1"
           ;;
 
       esac
 
     else
 
-      write_crypttab "${var_encryption_label}" "UUID=${var_luks_uuid}" "none" "luks,discard"
+      write_crypttab "${var_encryption_label}" "UUID=${var_luks_uuid}" "none" "check,discard,luks,same-cpu-crypt"
 
     fi
 
@@ -121,15 +125,17 @@ EOF
     case "${var_key,,}" in
 
       swap)
-        #write_crypttab "${var_ephemeral_enclabel}" "LABEL=${var_host_fs_label}" "/dev/random" "swap,offset=2048,cipher=aes-xts-plain64,size=512,sector-size=4096,discard"
-        write_crypttab "${var_ephemeral_enclabel}" "PARTUUID=${var_host_partuuid}" "/dev/random" "offset=2048,cipher=aes-xts-plain64,size=512,sector-size=4096,discard,plain,swap"
+        write_crypttab "${var_ephemeral_enclabel}" "PARTUUID=${var_host_partuuid}" "/dev/random" "cipher=aes-xts-plain64,size=512,discard,swap"
         ;;
 
       /tmp)
-        #write_crypttab "${var_ephemeral_enclabel}" "LABEL=${var_host_fs_label}" "/dev/random" "offset=2048,cipher=aes-xts-plain64,size=512,sector-size=4096,discard,tmp=ext4"
-        write_crypttab "${var_ephemeral_enclabel}" "PARTUUID=${var_host_partuuid}" "/dev/random" "offset=2048,cipher=aes-xts-plain64,size=512,sector-size=4096,discard,plain"
-        chroot_script "${TARGET}" "systemctl mask tmp.mount"
-        do_log "info" "file_only" "4210() Masked: [tmp.mount]"
+        write_crypttab "${var_ephemeral_enclabel}" "PARTUUID=${var_host_partuuid}" "/dev/random" "cipher=aes-xts-plain64,size=512,discard,tmp=ext4"
+        mkdir -p "${TARGET}/etc/tmpfiles.d"
+        insert_header   "${TARGET}/etc/tmpfiles.d/10-tmp.conf"
+        insert_comments "${TARGET}/etc/tmpfiles.d/10-tmp.conf"
+        cat << 'EOF' >> "${TARGET}/etc/tmpfiles.d/10-tmp.conf"
+d /tmp 1777 root root -
+EOF
         ;;
 
       *)
@@ -146,6 +152,9 @@ EOF
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=200 ft=sh
 EOF
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f generate_crypttab
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4200_boot/4220_installation_cryptsetup.sh

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Installation of 'cryptsetup' and 'cryptsetup-initramfs' after '/etc/crypttab' generation.
@@ -30,12 +30,15 @@ installation_cryptsetup() {
 
   chroot_logger "${TARGET}${var_logfile}"
 
-  chroot_script "${TARGET}" '
+  chroot_script "${TARGET}" "
     export INITRD=No
-    apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends --no-install-suggests cryptsetup cryptsetup-initramfs 2>&1 | tee -a '"${var_logfile}"'
-    echo ExitCode: $? >> '"${var_logfile}"'
-  '
+    [[ -r /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh ]] && . /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh
+    apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends --no-install-suggests cryptsetup cryptsetup-initramfs 2>&1 | tee -a ${var_logfile}
+  "
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f installation_cryptsetup
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4200_boot/4230_installation_grub.sh

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # --- UEFI GRUB Installation Strategy ---
@@ -38,16 +38,17 @@ guard_sourcing
 #   VAR_SETUP_PATH
 #   grub_background_enable
 #   grub_background_path
-#   grub_latest
+#   grub_bootdev
+#   grub_force_efi
 #   grub_prober
 #   grub_skip
+#   grub_update_nvram
 #   var_update_grub_required
 # Arguments:
 #   None
 # Returns:
 #   0: on success
-#   ERR_GRUB_BACKGROUND
-#   ERR_GRUB_EFI_FORCE
+#   ERR_GRUB_ARCHITECTURE: on failure
 #######################################
 installation_grub() {
   ### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
@@ -77,16 +78,16 @@ installation_grub() {
         amd64)
           chroot_script "${TARGET}" "
             export INITRD=No
+            [[ -r /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh ]] && . /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh
             apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends grub2-common grub-efi-amd64 grub-efi-amd64-bin 2>&1 | tee -a ${var_logfile}
-            echo ExitCode: \$? >> ${var_logfile}
           "
           ;;
 
         arm64)
           chroot_script "${TARGET}" "
             export INITRD=No
+            [[ -r /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh ]] && . /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh
             apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends grub2-common grub-efi-arm64 grub-efi-arm64-bin 2>&1 | tee -a ${var_logfile}
-            echo ExitCode: \$? >> ${var_logfile}
           "
           ;;
 
@@ -100,8 +101,8 @@ installation_grub() {
 
       chroot_script "${TARGET}" "
         export INITRD=No
+        [[ -r /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh ]] && . /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh
         apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends grub2-common grub-pc grub-pc-bin 2>&1 | tee -a ${var_logfile}
-        echo ExitCode: \$? >> ${var_logfile}
       "
 
     fi
@@ -208,8 +209,11 @@ EOF
   fi
   chmod -R 0700 "${TARGET}/etc/grub.d"
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f installation_grub
 
 #######################################
 # Installs GRUB to BIOS in BIOS mode.
@@ -222,7 +226,7 @@ EOF
 #   None
 # Returns:
 #   0: on success
-#   ERR_GRUB_INSTALL
+#   ERR_GRUB_INSTALL: on failure
 #######################################
 install_grub_bios() {
   ### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
@@ -253,21 +257,22 @@ install_grub_bios() {
 
   return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f install_grub_bios
 
 #######################################
 # Installs GRUB to ESP in UEFI mode.
 # Globals:
 #   TARGET
 #   VAR_MODINFO_PATH
-#   grub_bootdev
-#   grub_force_efi
 #   grub_update_nvram
 #   var_update_grub_required
 # Arguments:
 #   None
 # Returns:
 #   0: on success
-#   ERR_GRUB_INSTALL
+#   ERR_GRUB_INSTALL: on failure
 #######################################
 install_grub_uefi() {
   ### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
@@ -294,12 +299,15 @@ install_grub_uefi() {
 
   [[ "${grub_update_nvram}" == "false" ]] && ary_uefi_arg+=( --no-nvram )
 
-  chroot_exec "${TARGET}" grub-install "${ary_uefi_arg[@]}" "${grub_bootdev}" || return "${ERR_GRUB_INSTALL}"
-  do_log "info" "file_only" "4230() Installed: GRUB on Device: '${grub_bootdev}' [UEFI]."
+  chroot_exec "${TARGET}" grub-install "${ary_uefi_arg[@]}" || return "${ERR_GRUB_INSTALL}"
+  do_log "info" "file_only" "4230() Installed: GRUB on [ESP]."
   var_update_grub_required="true"
 
   return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f install_grub_uefi
 
 #######################################
 # Get the path of the required Grub modules.
@@ -316,6 +324,7 @@ get_grub_modinfo_path() {
   ### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
   declare -gx VAR_MODINFO_PATH=""
 
+  # shellcheck disable=SC2249
   case "${VAR_RECIPE_FIRMWARE}" in
 
     uefi)
@@ -339,4 +348,7 @@ get_grub_modinfo_path() {
 
   return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f get_grub_modinfo_path
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4200_boot/4240_update_grub_password.sh

@@ -10,31 +10,34 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Append the GRUB superuser block to '/etc/grub.d/40_custom'.
 # Globals:
-#   DIR_CNF
+#   CISS_SECRET_GRUB
 #   TARGET
 # Arguments:
 #   None
 # Returns:
 #   0: on success
-#   ERR_READ_GRUB_FILE
+#   ERR_READ_GRUB_FILE: on failure
 #######################################
 update_grub_password() {
   ### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
-  declare var_username="superadmin" var_password="" var_password_file="${DIR_CNF}/password_grub.txt" \
+  declare var_username="superadmin" var_password="" \
           var_of="${TARGET}/etc/grub.d/40_custom" var_grub_entry=""
 
+  ### SECRETS handling ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   guard_trace on
 
-  var_password=$(<"${var_password_file}") || return "${ERR_READ_GRUB_FILE}"
+  var_password="${CISS_SECRET_GRUB}" || return "${ERR_READ_GRUB_FILE}"
+  unset CISS_SECRET_GRUB
 
   var_grub_entry=$(generate_grub_password_pbkdf2 "${var_username}" "${var_password}")
 
   guard_trace off
+  ### SECRETS handling ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
   ### Append if not already present.
   if ! grep -q "set superusers=" "${var_of}"; then
@@ -48,11 +51,16 @@ update_grub_password() {
 
   chroot_exec "${TARGET}" update-grub
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f update_grub_password
 
 #######################################
 # Generate PBKDF2 password hash for GRUB.
+# Globals:
+#   None
 # Arguments:
 #   1: Username (default to superadmin).
 #   2: User password.
@@ -79,4 +87,7 @@ EOF
 
  return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f generate_grub_password_pbkdf2
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4200_boot/4250_update_grub_bootparameter.sh

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
 ### Options in "GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX" are always effective, (incl. recovery).
 ### Options in "GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT" are effective ONLY during normal boot (NOT during recovery mode).
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Hardening: update the Grub boot parameter and the Dropbear and Nuke parameters if opted in.
@@ -58,18 +58,18 @@ update_grub_bootparameter() {
 
   if [[ "${VAR_SEC_FW}" == "apparmor" ]]; then
 
-    VV_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="${VV_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX} apparmor=1 security=apparmor lsm=lockdown,yama,integrity,apparmor,bpf"
+    VV_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="${VV_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX:+${VV_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX} }apparmor=1 security=apparmor lsm=lockdown,yama,integrity,apparmor,bpf"
 
   elif [[ "${VAR_SEC_FW}" == "selinux" ]]; then
 
     ### We start in permissive mode first, so we don't pass 'enforcing=1' through the command line.
-    VV_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="${VV_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX} selinux=1 security=selinux"
+    VV_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="${VV_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX:+${VV_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX} }selinux=1 security=selinux"
 
   fi
 
   if [[ "${VAR_DROPBEAR}" == "true" ]]; then
     var_label="${HMP_PATH_ENCLABEL["/"]}"
-    VV_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="${VV_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX:+${VV_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX} }cryptdevice=${VAR_CRYPT_ROOT}:cryptroot root=/dev/mapper/${var_label}"
+    VV_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="${VV_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX} cryptdevice=${VAR_CRYPT_ROOT}:cryptroot root=/dev/mapper/${var_label}"
   fi
 
   if [[ "${VAR_NUKE}" == "true" ]]; then
@@ -83,6 +83,9 @@ update_grub_bootparameter() {
 
   chroot_exec "${TARGET}" update-grub
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f update_grub_bootparameter
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4300_network/4300_installation_network.sh

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Setup network.
@@ -24,9 +24,9 @@ guard_sourcing
 #   VAR_FINAL_IPV6_CIDR
 #   VAR_FINAL_IPV6_GW
 #   VAR_FINAL_NIC
-#   VAR_LINK_IPV6
 #   network_autoconfig_enable
 #   network_choose_interface_auto
+#   network_static_dns_dhcp_override
 #   network_static_ipv4nameserver_0
 #   network_static_ipv6address
 #   network_static_ipv6nameserver_0
@@ -45,23 +45,20 @@ installation_network() {
 
   chroot_script "${TARGET}" "
     export INITRD=No
+    [[ -r /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh ]] && . /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh
     apt-get purge -y dhcpcd isc-dhcp-client 2>&1 | tee -a ${var_logfile}
-    echo ExitCode: \$? >> ${var_logfile}
   "
 
   chroot_script "${TARGET}" "
-      export INITRD=No
-      apt-get install -y --no-install-suggests ifupdown dhcpcd-base 2>&1 | tee -a ${var_logfile}
-      echo ExitCode: \$? >> ${var_logfile}
+    export INITRD=No
+    [[ -r /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh ]] && . /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh
+    apt-get install -y --no-install-suggests dhcpcd-base ifupdown 2>&1 | tee -a ${var_logfile}
   "
 
-  echo "systemctl disable systemd-networkd NetworkManager" >> "${TARGET}${var_logfile}"
-  echo "systemctl disable dhcpcd.service" >> "${TARGET}${var_logfile}"
-
   chroot_script "${TARGET}" "
+    export INITRD=No
+    [[ -r /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh ]] && . /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh
     systemctl disable systemd-networkd NetworkManager 2>/dev/null | tee -a ${var_logfile} || true
-    systemctl disable dhcpcd.service 2>/dev/null | tee -a ${var_logfile} || true
-    echo ExitCode: \$? >> ${var_logfile}
   "
 
   mkdir -p "${TARGET}/etc/network/interfaces.d"
@@ -80,7 +77,7 @@ installation_network() {
   # For servers or systems with static interfaces that should always be available (e.g., eth0 on a server).
   # For configurations where the interface should be active regardless of the cable status.
   # allow-hotplug:
-  # For systems with dynamic or removable network devices (e.g., laptops or USB adapters).
+  # For systems with dynamic or removable network devices (e.g., laptops, USB adapters, VMs).
   # To avoid boot delays when interfaces are unavailable.
 
   insert_header   "${TARGET}/etc/network/interfaces"
@@ -89,15 +86,10 @@ installation_network() {
 # This file describes the network interfaces available on your system
 # and how to activate them. For more information, see interfaces(5).
 
-source-directory /etc/network/interfaces.d
-
 # The loopback network interface
 auto lo
 iface lo inet loopback
 
-auto ${VAR_FINAL_NIC}
-
-# vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh
 EOF
   chmod 0644 "${TARGET}/etc/network/interfaces"
   do_log "info" "file_only" "4300() Header '${TARGET}/etc/network/interfaces' created."
@@ -106,86 +98,68 @@ EOF
   ### Configure network interfaces based on 'preseed.yaml' and create network configuration files for IPv4.
   if [[ "${network_autoconfig_enable}" == "true" && "${network_choose_interface_auto}" == "true" ]]; then
 
-    insert_header   "${TARGET}/etc/network/interfaces.d/10-ipv4-dhcp"
-    insert_comments "${TARGET}/etc/network/interfaces.d/10-ipv4-dhcp"
-    cat << EOF >>   "${TARGET}/etc/network/interfaces.d/10-ipv4-dhcp"
+    cat << EOF >>   "${TARGET}/etc/network/interfaces"
 # The primary network interface: IPv4 via DHCP
+auto ${VAR_FINAL_NIC}
 iface ${VAR_FINAL_NIC} inet dhcp
 
-# vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh
 EOF
-    chmod 0644 "${TARGET}/etc/network/interfaces.d/10-ipv4-dhcp"
     do_log "info" "file_only" "4300() IPv4 on the primary NIC: '${VAR_FINAL_NIC}' configured with DHCP."
 
   elif [[ "${network_autoconfig_enable}" == "true" && "${network_choose_interface_auto}" == "false" ]]; then
 
-    insert_header   "${TARGET}/etc/network/interfaces.d/10-ipv4-dhcp"
-    insert_comments "${TARGET}/etc/network/interfaces.d/10-ipv4-dhcp"
-    cat << EOF >>   "${TARGET}/etc/network/interfaces.d/10-ipv4-dhcp"
+    cat << EOF >>   "${TARGET}/etc/network/interfaces"
 # The primary network interface: IPv4 via DHCP
+auto ${VAR_FINAL_NIC}
 iface ${VAR_FINAL_NIC} inet dhcp
 
-# vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh
 EOF
-    chmod 0644 "${TARGET}/etc/network/interfaces.d/10-ipv4-dhcp"
     do_log "info" "file_only" "4300() IPv4 on the primary NIC: '${VAR_FINAL_NIC}' configured with DHCP."
 
   fi
 
   if [[ "${network_autoconfig_enable}" == "false" ]]; then
 
-    insert_header   "${TARGET}/etc/network/interfaces.d/10-ipv4-static"
-    insert_comments "${TARGET}/etc/network/interfaces.d/10-ipv4-static"
-    cat << EOF >>   "${TARGET}/etc/network/interfaces.d/10-ipv4-static"
+    cat << EOF >>   "${TARGET}/etc/network/interfaces"
 # The primary network interface: IPv4 via static IP
+auto ${VAR_FINAL_NIC}
 iface ${VAR_FINAL_NIC} inet static
-    address ${VAR_FINAL_IPV4}
-    netmask ${VAR_FINAL_IPV4_SUBNET}
-    gateway ${VAR_FINAL_IPV4_GW}
-    dns-nameservers ${ARY_IPV4_NS[*]}
+  address ${VAR_FINAL_IPV4}
+  netmask ${VAR_FINAL_IPV4_SUBNET}
+  gateway ${VAR_FINAL_IPV4_GW}
 
-# vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh
 EOF
-    chmod 0644  "${TARGET}/etc/network/interfaces.d/10-ipv4-static"
     do_log "info" "file_only" "4300() IPv4 on the primary NIC: '${VAR_FINAL_NIC}' configured statically."
 
   fi
 
-
   ### Configure network interfaces based on 'preseed.yaml' and create network configuration files for IPv6.
   if [[ "${network_autoconfig_enable}" == "true" && -z "${network_static_ipv6address}" ]]; then
 
-    insert_header   "${TARGET}/etc/network/interfaces.d/10-ipv6-dhcp"
-    insert_comments "${TARGET}/etc/network/interfaces.d/10-ipv6-dhcp"
-    cat << EOF >>   "${TARGET}/etc/network/interfaces.d/10-ipv6-dhcp"
+    cat << EOF >>   "${TARGET}/etc/network/interfaces"
 # The primary network interface: IPv6 via SLAAC (+ stateless DHCPv6 for DNS)
 iface ${VAR_FINAL_NIC} inet6 auto
-    accept_ra 2
-    dhcp 1
+  accept_ra 2
 
-# vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh
 EOF
-    chmod 0644 "${TARGET}/etc/network/interfaces.d/10-ipv6-dhcp"
-    do_log "info" "file_only" "4300() IPv6 on the primary NIC: '${VAR_FINAL_NIC}' configured with DHCP."
+    do_log "info" "file_only" "4300() IPv6 on the primary NIC: '${VAR_FINAL_NIC}' configured with stateless DHCPv6."
 
   elif [[ "${network_autoconfig_enable}" == "false" || -n "${network_static_ipv6address}" ]]; then
 
-    insert_header   "${TARGET}/etc/network/interfaces.d/10-ipv6-static"
-    insert_comments "${TARGET}/etc/network/interfaces.d/10-ipv6-static"
-    cat << EOF >>   "${TARGET}/etc/network/interfaces.d/10-ipv6-static"
+    cat << EOF >>   "${TARGET}/etc/network/interfaces"
 # The primary network interface: IPv6 via static IP
 iface ${VAR_FINAL_NIC} inet6 static
-    address ${VAR_FINAL_IPV6_CIDR}
-    gateway ${VAR_FINAL_IPV6_GW}
-    dns-nameservers ${ARY_IPV6_NS[*]}
+  address ${VAR_FINAL_IPV6_CIDR}
+  gateway ${VAR_FINAL_IPV6_GW}
+  ### Optional harden, no RA on static v6
+  pre-up sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.ens3.accept_ra=0
 
-# vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh
 EOF
-    chmod 0644 "${TARGET}/etc/network/interfaces.d/10-ipv6-static"
     do_log "info" "file_only" "4300() IPv6 on the primary NIC: '${VAR_FINAL_NIC}' configured statically."
 
   fi
 
+  printf '# vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=conf\n' >> "${TARGET}/etc/network/interfaces"
 
   ### Prepare basic 'dhcpcd-base' DHCP Client options.
   if [[ -f "${TARGET}/etc/dhcpcd.conf" ]]; then
@@ -199,6 +173,9 @@ EOF
   insert_header   "${TARGET}/etc/dhcpcd.conf"
   insert_comments "${TARGET}/etc/dhcpcd.conf"
   cat << 'EOF' >> "${TARGET}/etc/dhcpcd.conf"
+### No Global APIPA-Fallback.
+noipv4ll
+
 ### A ServerID is required by RFC2131.
 require dhcp_server_identifier
 
@@ -210,6 +187,7 @@ option host_name
 option domain_name
 option domain_search
 option domain_name_servers
+option rapid_commit
 
 ### Most distributions have NTP support.
 option ntp_servers
@@ -219,18 +197,18 @@ fqdn both
 
 EOF
 
-
   ### Ensure 'dhcpcd-base' DHCP Client is not overwriting the static nameserver settings.
   ### Collect static DNS from YAML (IPv4 and IPv6).
   [[ -n "${network_static_ipv4nameserver_0:-}" ]] && ary_dns_supersede+=( "${ARY_IPV4_NS[@]}" )
   [[ -n "${network_static_ipv6nameserver_0:-}" ]] && ary_dns_supersede+=( "${ARY_IPV6_NS[@]}" )
 
-  if [[ "${#ary_dns_supersede[@]}" -gt 0 ]]; then
+  if [[ "${#ary_dns_supersede[@]}" -gt 0 && "${network_static_dns_dhcp_override}" == "true" ]]; then
 
     cat << EOF >>   "${TARGET}/etc/dhcpcd.conf"
 ### Enforce static DNS
 nooption domain_name_servers
 nohook rdnssd
+nohook resolvconf
 
 ### Static DNS-resolvers
 interface ${VAR_FINAL_NIC}
@@ -243,18 +221,23 @@ EOF
 
   fi
 
+  if [[ "${VAR_LINK_IPV6}" == "true" && -n "${network_static_ipv6address}" ]]; then
+    echo "  noipv6rs" >> "${TARGET}/etc/dhcpcd.conf"
+  fi
+
 
   ### Footer (always).
   echo '' >> "${TARGET}/etc/dhcpcd.conf"
   echo '# vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=conf' >> "${TARGET}/etc/dhcpcd.conf"
 
-
   ### Check dhcpcd connectivity.
   chroot_script "${TARGET}" "
-      dhcpcd -T ${VAR_FINAL_NIC} | tee -a ${var_logfile}
-      echo ExitCode: \$? >> ${var_logfile}
+    dhcpcd -T ${VAR_FINAL_NIC} | tee -a ${var_logfile}
   "
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f installation_network
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4300_network/4305_installation_netsec.sh

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Installation of packages 'fail2ban' and 'ufw'.
@@ -28,11 +28,14 @@ installation_netsec() {
   chroot_logger "${TARGET}${var_logfile}"
 
   chroot_script "${TARGET}" "
-      export INITRD=No
-      apt-get install -y --no-install-suggests fail2ban ufw 2>&1 | tee -a ${var_logfile}
-      echo ExitCode: \$? >> ${var_logfile}
+    export INITRD=No
+    [[ -r /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh ]] && . /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh
+    apt-get install -y --no-install-suggests fail2ban ufw 2>&1 | tee -a ${var_logfile}
   "
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f installation_netsec
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4300_network/4310_dropbear_build.sh

@@ -10,22 +10,19 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Build Ultra Hardened dropbear-2025.88 from sources.
 # Globals:
 #   DIR_TMP
-#   PATH
-#   PATH_SEPARATOR
-#   SHELLOPTS
-#   VAR_DEBUG_TRACE
+#   TARGET
 #   VAR_SETUP_PATH
 # Arguments:
 #   None
 # Returns:
 #   0: on success
-#   ERR_PATH_NOT_VALID
+#   ERR_PATH_NOT_VALID: on failure
 #######################################
 dropbear_build() {
   ### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
@@ -74,6 +71,9 @@ dropbear_build() {
 
   guard_trace off
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f dropbear_build
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4300_network/4311_dropbear_initramfs.sh

@@ -10,13 +10,15 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Install the 'dropbear-initramfs' and replace the binaries with those from the previous Ultra Hardened build.
 # Globals:
 #   DIR_TMP
+#   RECOVERY
 #   TARGET
+#   VAR_RUN_RECOVERY
 # Arguments:
 #   None
 # Returns:
@@ -26,45 +28,83 @@ dropbear_initramfs() {
   ### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
   declare     var_file=""
   declare -r  var_logfile="/root/.ciss/cdi/log/4311_dropbear_initramfs.log"
+  declare     var_target="${TARGET}"
 
-  chroot_logger "${TARGET}${var_logfile}"
+  ### Check for TARGET / RECOVERY.
+  [[ "${VAR_RUN_RECOVERY}" == "true" ]] && var_target="${RECOVERY}"
 
-  chroot_script "${TARGET}" '
+  chroot_logger "${var_target}${var_logfile}"
+
+  chroot_script "${var_target}" "
     export INITRD=No
-    apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends --no-install-suggests dropbear-initramfs 2>&1 | tee -a '"${var_logfile}"'
-    echo ExitCode: $? >> '"${var_logfile}"'
-  '
+    [[ -r /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh ]] && . /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh
+    apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends --no-install-suggests dropbear-initramfs dropbear-bin 2>&1 | tee -a ${var_logfile}
+  "
 
-
-  chroot_script "${TARGET}" '
+  chroot_script "${var_target}" "
     export INITRD=No
-    apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends --no-install-suggests gpgv 2>&1 | tee -a '"${var_logfile}"'
-    echo ExitCode: $? >> '"${var_logfile}"'
-  '
+    [[ -r /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh ]] && . /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh
+    apt-get purge -y dropbear dropbear-run || true
+  "
 
-
-  chroot_script "${TARGET}" '
+  chroot_script "${var_target}" "
     export INITRD=No
-    apt-mark hold dropbear dropbear-initramfs 2>&1 | tee -a '"${var_logfile}"'
-    echo ExitCode: $? >> '"${var_logfile}"'
-  '
+    [[ -r /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh ]] && . /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh
+    apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends --no-install-suggests gpgv 2>&1 | tee -a ${var_logfile}
+  "
 
+  chroot_script "${var_target}" "
+    export INITRD=No
+    [[ -r /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh ]] && . /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh
+    apt-mark hold dropbear dropbear-initramfs 2>&1 | tee -a ${var_logfile}
+  "
 
-  mv "${TARGET}/usr/sbin/dropbear" "${TARGET}/usr/sbin/dropbear.trixie"
-  install -D -m 0755 -o root -g root "${DIR_TMP}/build/dropbear-2025.88/dropbear" "${TARGET}/usr/sbin/"
+  mv "${var_target}/usr/sbin/dropbear" "${var_target}/usr/sbin/dropbear.trixie"
+  install -D -m 0755 -o root -g root "${DIR_TMP}/build/dropbear-2025.88/dropbear" "${var_target}/usr/sbin/"
   do_log "debug" "file_only" "4311() Installation [dropbear] successful."
 
 
   for var_file in dbclient dropbearconvert dropbearkey; do
-    mv "${TARGET}/usr/bin/${var_file}" "${TARGET}/usr/bin/${var_file}.trixie"
-    install -D -m 0755 -o root -g root "${DIR_TMP}/build/dropbear-2025.88/${var_file}" "${TARGET}/usr/bin/"
+
+    mv "${var_target}/usr/bin/${var_file}" "${var_target}/usr/bin/${var_file}.trixie"
+    install -D -m 0755 -o root -g root "${DIR_TMP}/build/dropbear-2025.88/${var_file}" "${var_target}/usr/bin/"
     do_log "debug" "file_only" "4311() Installation [${var_file}] successful."
+
   done
 
+  mkdir -p "${var_target}/etc/initramfs-tools/scripts/init-bottom"
 
-  insert_header   "${TARGET}/etc/apt/preferences.d/99-mask-dropbear"
-  insert_comments "${TARGET}/etc/apt/preferences.d/99-mask-dropbear"
-  cat << 'EOF' >> "${TARGET}/etc/apt/preferences.d/99-mask-dropbear"
+  cat << 'EOF' >| "${var_target}/etc/initramfs-tools/scripts/init-bottom/zzzz-dropbear-kill"
+#!/bin/sh
+
+PREREQ=""
+prereqs() { echo "${PREREQ}"; }
+# shellcheck disable=SC2249
+case "${1}" in
+  prereqs) prereqs; exit 0 ;;
+esac
+
+### Stop dropbear shipped in the initramfs after root pivot.
+[ -x /bin/pidof ] || exit 0
+
+P=$(/bin/pidof dropbear 2>/dev/null) || true
+
+[ -n "${P}" ] || exit 0
+
+/bin/kill -TERM "${P}" 2>/dev/null || true
+/bin/sleep 1
+
+/bin/kill -KILL "${P}" 2>/dev/null || true
+exit 0
+
+# vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh
+EOF
+
+  chmod 0755 "${var_target}/etc/initramfs-tools/scripts/init-bottom/zzzz-dropbear-kill"
+
+  insert_header   "${var_target}/etc/apt/preferences.d/99-mask-dropbear"
+  insert_comments "${var_target}/etc/apt/preferences.d/99-mask-dropbear"
+  cat << 'EOF' >> "${var_target}/etc/apt/preferences.d/99-mask-dropbear"
 # Never install the dropbear daemon package at all.
 Package: dropbear
 Pin: release *
@@ -73,10 +113,9 @@ Pin-Priority: -1
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=conf
 EOF
 
-
-  insert_header   "${TARGET}/etc/apt/preferences.d/99-mask-dropbear-initramfs"
-  insert_comments "${TARGET}/etc/apt/preferences.d/99-mask-dropbear-initramfs"
-  cat << 'EOF' >> "${TARGET}/etc/apt/preferences.d/99-mask-dropbear-initramfs"
+  insert_header   "${var_target}/etc/apt/preferences.d/99-mask-dropbear-initramfs"
+  insert_comments "${var_target}/etc/apt/preferences.d/99-mask-dropbear-initramfs"
+  cat << 'EOF' >> "${var_target}/etc/apt/preferences.d/99-mask-dropbear-initramfs"
 # Keep the currently installed initramfs integration; never upgrade it.
 Package: dropbear-initramfs
 Pin: release *
@@ -85,10 +124,12 @@ Pin-Priority: -1
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=conf
 EOF
 
-
-  chroot_script "${TARGET}" "systemctl mask dropbear.service dropbear.socket"
+  chroot_script "${var_target}" "systemctl mask dropbear.service dropbear.socket"
   do_log "info" "file_only" "4311() Masked: [dropbear.service dropbear.socket]"
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f dropbear_initramfs
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4300_network/4312_dropbear_setup.sh

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Set up the 'dropbear-initramfs' environment.
@@ -39,14 +39,16 @@ guard_sourcing
 #######################################
 dropbear_setup() {
   ### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
-  declare     network_static_ipv4ntpserver_0="192.53.103.108" \
+  declare -r  network_static_ipv4ntpserver_0="192.53.103.108" \
               var_force_command_string='command="/usr/local/bin/unlock_wrapper.sh",no-agent-forwarding,no-port-forwarding,no-X11-forwarding '
 
   ### Prepare strong dropbear host keys.
   rm -f "${TARGET}"/etc/dropbear/initramfs/dropbear*key*
 
-  chroot_exec "${TARGET}" /usr/bin/dropbearkey -t rsa -s 4096 -f /etc/dropbear/initramfs/dropbear_rsa_host_key -C "root@${VAR_FINAL_FQDN}"
-  chroot_exec "${TARGET}" /usr/bin/dropbearkey -t ed25519 -f /etc/dropbear/initramfs/dropbear_ed25519_host_key -C "root@${VAR_FINAL_FQDN}"
+  # shellcheck disable=SC2312
+  chroot_exec "${TARGET}" /usr/bin/dropbearkey -t rsa -s 4096 -f /etc/dropbear/initramfs/dropbear_rsa_host_key -C "root@${VAR_FINAL_FQDN}-$(date -I)"
+  # shellcheck disable=SC2312
+  chroot_exec "${TARGET}" /usr/bin/dropbearkey -t ed25519 -f /etc/dropbear/initramfs/dropbear_ed25519_host_key -C "root@${VAR_FINAL_FQDN}-$(date -I)"
 
   chmod 0600 "${TARGET}"/etc/dropbear/initramfs/dropbear*key*
   chown root:root "${TARGET}"/etc/dropbear/initramfs/dropbear*key*
@@ -138,8 +140,11 @@ EOF
 
   fi
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f dropbear_setup
 
 #######################################
 # Write '/etc/dropbear/initramfs/dropbear.conf'.
@@ -195,6 +200,10 @@ DROPBEAR_OPTIONS="-b /etc/dropbear/banner -E -I 300 -K 60 -p ${dropbear_port}"
 EOF
 
   do_log "info" "file_only" "4312() Written: '${TARGET}/etc/dropbear/initramfs/dropbear.conf'."
+  do_log "info" "file_only" "4312() Written: 'DROPBEAR_OPTIONS=\"-b /etc/dropbear/banner -E -I 300 -K 60 -p ${dropbear_port}\"'."
   return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f write_dropbear_conf
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4300_network/4320_update_initramfs.sh

@@ -10,12 +10,13 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Deploy all changes made using the 'update-grub' and 'update-initramfs' commands.
 # Globals:
 #   TARGET
+#   VAR_KERNEL
 # Arguments:
 #   None
 # Returns:
@@ -24,24 +25,29 @@ guard_sourcing
 update_initramfs() {
   ### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
   declare -r  var_logfile="/root/.ciss/cdi/log/4320_update_initramfs.log"
+  # shellcheck disable=SC2153
+  declare -r  var_kernel="${VAR_KERNEL#linux-image-}"
 
   chroot_logger "${TARGET}${var_logfile}"
 
   chroot_script "${TARGET}" "
-      update-grub 2>&1 | tee -a ${var_logfile}
-      echo ExitCode: \$? >> ${var_logfile}
-    "
-
-  chroot_script "${TARGET}" "
-    update-initramfs -c -v -k all 2>&1 | tee -a ${var_logfile}
-    echo ExitCode: \$? >> ${var_logfile}
+    update-grub 2>&1 | tee -a ${var_logfile}
   "
 
   chroot_script "${TARGET}" "
-        update-grub 2>&1 | tee -a ${var_logfile}
-        echo ExitCode: \$? >> ${var_logfile}
-      "
+    depmod -a ${var_kernel} 2>&1 | tee -a ${var_logfile}
+    update-initramfs -c -v -k all 2>&1 | tee -a ${var_logfile}
+  "
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  chroot_script "${TARGET}" "
+    update-grub 2>&1 | tee -a ${var_logfile}
+  "
+
+  chmod 0400 "${TARGET}/boot/grub/grub.cfg"
+
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f update_initramfs
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4300_network/4330_installation_ssh.sh

@@ -10,20 +10,25 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Setup ssh server.
 # Globals:
+#   RECOVERY
 #   TARGET
 #   VAR_DROPBEAR
 #   VAR_FINAL_FQDN
 #   VAR_FINAL_IPV4
 #   VAR_FINAL_IPV6
+#   VAR_FINAL_NIC
+#   VAR_LINK_IPV6
+#   VAR_RUN_RECOVERY
 #   VAR_SETUP_PATH
 #   VAR_SSH_CA
 #   VAR_SSH_PORT
 #   VAR_USER_MAX
+#   network_static_ipv6address
 # Arguments:
 #   None
 # Returns:
@@ -31,14 +36,52 @@ guard_sourcing
 #######################################
 installation_ssh() {
   ### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
-  declare -a ary_user=()
-  declare -i i=0
-  declare    var_auth="" var_name="" var_ca="" var_pub=""
+  declare -a  ary_user=()
+  declare -i  i=0
+  declare -r  var_logfile="/root/.ciss/cdi/log/4330_installation_ssh.log"
+  declare     var_auth="" var_name="" var_ca="" var_pub=""
+  declare     var_target="${TARGET}"
 
-  chroot_exec "${TARGET}" apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends --no-install-suggests ssh
+  ### Check for TARGET / RECOVERY.
+  [[ "${VAR_RUN_RECOVERY}" == "true" ]] && var_target="${RECOVERY}"
 
-  install -D -m 0644 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/etc/banner" "${TARGET}/etc/"
-  install -D -m 0644 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/etc/motd" "${TARGET}/etc/"
+  chroot_logger "${var_target}${var_logfile}"
+
+  chroot_script "${var_target}" "
+    export INITRD=No
+    [[ -r /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh ]] && . /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh
+    apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends --no-install-suggests ssh 2>&1 | tee -a ${var_logfile}
+  "
+
+  mkdir -p "${var_target}/etc/systemd/system/ssh.service.d"
+
+  if [[ "${VAR_LINK_IPV6}" == "true" && -n "${network_static_ipv6address}" ]]; then
+
+    # shellcheck disable=SC2312
+    cat << EOF >| "${var_target}/etc/systemd/system/ssh.service.d/override.conf"
+[Unit]
+After=ifup@${VAR_FINAL_NIC}.service network.target
+Wants=ifup@${VAR_FINAL_NIC}.service
+
+[Service]
+### Block until the exact v6 address is present and not tentative.
+### If any tentative IPv6 address exists on the device, wait and retry.
+### Check for the exact global address (fixed-string match, include trailing "/").
+ExecStartPre=/bin/sh -c '\
+  for i in \$(seq 1 60); do \
+    ip -6 addr show dev ${VAR_FINAL_NIC} tentative | grep -q "inet6" && { sleep 0.5; continue; }; \
+    ip -6 addr show dev ${VAR_FINAL_NIC} scope global | grep -Fq " ${VAR_FINAL_IPV6}/" && exit 0; \
+    sleep 0.5; \
+  done; \
+  echo "IPv6 address ${VAR_FINAL_IPV6} on ${VAR_FINAL_NIC} not ready"; exit 1'
+TimeoutStartSec=40s
+Restart=on-failure
+RestartSec=2s
+EOF
+  fi
+
+  install -D -m 0644 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/etc/banner" "${var_target}/etc/"
+  install -D -m 0644 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/etc/motd" "${var_target}/etc/"
   do_log "info" "file_only" "4420() Installed SSH '/etc/banner' and '/etc/motd'."
 
   ### Only process those for which both *_name and *_authentication_access_ssh are set.
@@ -51,67 +94,95 @@ installation_ssh() {
     fi
   done
 
-  rm -rf "${TARGET}"/etc/ssh/ssh_host_*key*
+  chroot_script "${var_target}" "
+    awk '\$5 >= 4000' /etc/ssh/moduli >| /etc/ssh/moduli.safe
+    rm -rf /etc/ssh/moduli
+    mv /etc/ssh/moduli.safe /etc/ssh/moduli
+  "
 
-  #shellcheck disable=SC2312
-  chroot_exec "${TARGET}" ssh-keygen -o -N "" -t ed25519 -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key -C "root@${VAR_FINAL_FQDN}-$(date -I)"
-  #shellcheck disable=SC2312
-  chroot_exec "${TARGET}" ssh-keygen -o -N "" -t rsa -b 4096 -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key -C "root@${VAR_FINAL_FQDN}-$(date -I)"
+  rm -rf "${var_target}"/etc/ssh/ssh_host_*key*
 
-  mkdir -p "${TARGET}/root/.ciss/cdi/backup/etc/ssh"
-  cp "${TARGET}/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "${TARGET}/root/.ciss/cdi/backup/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak"
-  cp "${TARGET}/etc/ssh/ssh_config" "${TARGET}/root/.ciss/cdi/backup/etc/ssh/ssh_config.bak"
-  rm -f "${TARGET}/etc/ssh/sshd_config"
+  if [[ -f "${var_target}/etc/dropbear/initramfs/dropbear_ed25519_host_key" ]]; then
 
-  install -D -m 0600 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "${TARGET}/etc/ssh/sshd_config"
-  chmod 0600 "${TARGET}/etc/ssh/ssh_config"
+    chroot_script "${var_target}" "
+      dropbearconvert dropbear openssh /etc/dropbear/initramfs/dropbear_ed25519_host_key /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
+    "
 
-  insert_comments "${TARGET}/etc/ssh/sshd_config"
+    chroot_script "${var_target}" "
+      dropbearconvert dropbear openssh /etc/dropbear/initramfs/dropbear_rsa_host_key /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+    "
 
-  # shellcheck disable=SC2153
-  sed -i -E "s|^[[:space:]]*ListenAddressIPV4[[:space:]]+.*$|$(printf '%-29s%s' 'ListenAddress' "${VAR_FINAL_IPV4}")|" "${TARGET}/etc/ssh/sshd_config"
+    chroot_script "${var_target}" "
+      dropbearkey -y -f /etc/dropbear/initramfs/dropbear_ed25519_host_key /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key.pub
+    "
+
+    chroot_script "${var_target}" "
+      dropbearkey -y -f /etc/dropbear/initramfs/dropbear_rsa_host_key /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub
+    "
 
-  if [[ -n "${VAR_FINAL_IPV6}" ]]; then
-    sed -i -E "s|^[[:space:]]*ListenAddressIPV6[[:space:]]+.*$|$(printf '%-29s%s' 'ListenAddress' "${VAR_FINAL_IPV6}")|" "${TARGET}/etc/ssh/sshd_config"
   else
-    sed -i "/^[[:space:]]*ListenAddressIPV6[[:space:]]*/d" "${TARGET}/etc/ssh/sshd_config"
+
+    # shellcheck disable=SC2312
+    chroot_exec "${var_target}" ssh-keygen -o -N "" -t ed25519 -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key -C "root@${VAR_FINAL_FQDN}-$(date -I)"
+    # shellcheck disable=SC2312
+    chroot_exec "${var_target}" ssh-keygen -o -N "" -t rsa -b 4096 -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key -C "root@${VAR_FINAL_FQDN}-$(date -I)"
+
   fi
 
-  sed -i -E "s|^[[:space:]]*Port[[:space:]]+.*$|$(printf '%-29s%s' 'Port' "${VAR_SSH_PORT}")|" "${TARGET}/etc/ssh/sshd_config"
+  mkdir -p "${var_target}/root/.ciss/cdi/backup/etc/ssh"
+  cp "${var_target}/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "${var_target}/root/.ciss/cdi/backup/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak"
+  cp "${var_target}/etc/ssh/ssh_config" "${var_target}/root/.ciss/cdi/backup/etc/ssh/ssh_config.bak"
+  rm -f "${var_target}/etc/ssh/sshd_config"
+
+  install -D -m 0600 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "${var_target}/etc/ssh/sshd_config"
+  chmod 0600 "${var_target}/etc/ssh/ssh_config"
+
+  insert_comments "${var_target}/etc/ssh/sshd_config"
+
+  # shellcheck disable=SC2153
+  sed -i -E "s|^[[:space:]]*ListenAddressIPV4[[:space:]]+.*$|$(printf '%-29s%s' 'ListenAddress' "${VAR_FINAL_IPV4}")|" "${var_target}/etc/ssh/sshd_config"
+
+  if [[ -n "${VAR_FINAL_IPV6}" ]]; then
+    sed -i -E "s|^[[:space:]]*ListenAddressIPV6[[:space:]]+.*$|$(printf '%-29s%s' 'ListenAddress' "${VAR_FINAL_IPV6}")|" "${var_target}/etc/ssh/sshd_config"
+  else
+    sed -i "/^[[:space:]]*ListenAddressIPV6[[:space:]]*/d" "${var_target}/etc/ssh/sshd_config"
+  fi
+
+  sed -i -E "s|^[[:space:]]*Port[[:space:]]+.*$|$(printf '%-29s%s' 'Port' "${VAR_SSH_PORT}")|" "${var_target}/etc/ssh/sshd_config"
 
   if (( ${#ary_user[@]} > 0 )); then
-    sed -i -E "s|^\s*AllowUsers\s+.*$|$(printf '%-29s%s' 'AllowUsers' "root ${ary_user[*]}")|" "${TARGET}/etc/ssh/sshd_config"
+    sed -i -E "s|^\s*AllowUsers\s+.*$|$(printf '%-29s%s' 'AllowUsers' "root ${ary_user[*]}")|" "${var_target}/etc/ssh/sshd_config"
   fi
 
   if [[ -n "${VAR_SSH_CA}" ]]; then
     var_ca="${VAR_SSH_CA##*/}"
-    install -D -m 0644 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}${VAR_SSH_CA}" "${TARGET}/etc/ssh/"
-    sed -i -E "s|^\s*TrustedUserCAKeys\s+.*$|$(printf '%-29s%s' 'TrustedUserCAKeys' "/etc/ssh/${var_ca}")|" "${TARGET}/etc/ssh/sshd_config"
+    install -D -m 0644 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}${VAR_SSH_CA}" "${var_target}/etc/ssh/"
+    sed -i -E "s|^\s*TrustedUserCAKeys\s+.*$|$(printf '%-29s%s' 'TrustedUserCAKeys' "/etc/ssh/${var_ca}")|" "${var_target}/etc/ssh/sshd_config"
   fi
 
   ### Preparing the test environment in chroot.
-  chroot_exec "${TARGET}" install -d -o root -g root -m 0755 /run/sshd
+  chroot_exec "${var_target}" install -d -o root -g root -m 0755 /run/sshd
 
   ### Syntax test (hard).
-  if ! chroot_script "${TARGET}" "sshd -t -f /etc/ssh/sshd_config"; then
+  if ! chroot_script "${var_target}" "sshd -t -f /etc/ssh/sshd_config"; then
     do_log "emergency" "file_only" "4420() [sshd -t -f /etc/ssh/sshd_config] failed."
     return "${ERR_CONF_VALIDATION}"
   fi
 
   ### Effective configuration (soft, purely informative).
-  if ! chroot_script "${TARGET}" "sshd -T -f /etc/ssh/sshd_config >| /root/.ciss/cdi/log/sshd_config.log"; then
+  if ! chroot_script "${var_target}" "sshd -T -f /etc/ssh/sshd_config >| /root/.ciss/cdi/log/sshd_config.log"; then
     do_log "warn" "file_only" "4420() [sshd -T -f /etc/ssh/sshd_config] failed. Likely env. Continuing."
   fi
 
-  chroot_script "${TARGET}" "ssh-keygen -r ${VAR_FINAL_FQDN}. >| /root/.ciss/cdi/log/SSHFP.log"
+  chroot_script "${var_target}" "ssh-keygen -r ${VAR_FINAL_FQDN}. >| /root/.ciss/cdi/log/SSHFP.log"
 
   if [[ "${VAR_DROPBEAR}" == "true" ]]; then
 
-    printf "### Dropbear SSHFP RR: \n" >> "${TARGET}/root/.ciss/cdi/log/SSHFP.log"
+    printf "### Dropbear SSHFP RR: \n" >> "${var_target}/root/.ciss/cdi/log/SSHFP.log"
 
-    for var_pub in "${TARGET}"/etc/dropbear/initramfs/dropbear*.pub; do
+    for var_pub in "${var_target}"/etc/dropbear/initramfs/dropbear*.pub; do
 
-      chroot_script "${TARGET}" "ssh-keygen -E sha256 -r ${VAR_FINAL_FQDN}. -f ${var_pub#/target} >> /root/.ciss/cdi/log/SSHFP.log"
+      chroot_script "${var_target}" "ssh-keygen -E sha256 -r ${VAR_FINAL_FQDN}. -f ${var_pub#/target} >> /root/.ciss/cdi/log/SSHFP.log"
 
     done
 
@@ -122,9 +193,9 @@ installation_ssh() {
   # environment variables: TMOUT                                                            #
   # TMOUT=14400 ensures that users are automatically logged out after 4 hours of inactivity.#
   ###########################################################################################
-  insert_header   "${TARGET}/etc/profile.d/idle-users.sh"
-  insert_comments "${TARGET}/etc/profile.d/idle-users.sh"
-  cat << EOF >>   "${TARGET}/etc/profile.d/idle-users.sh"
+  insert_header   "${var_target}/etc/profile.d/idle-users.sh"
+  insert_comments "${var_target}/etc/profile.d/idle-users.sh"
+  cat << EOF >>   "${var_target}/etc/profile.d/idle-users.sh"
 case $- in
   *i*)
     TMOUT=14400
@@ -136,6 +207,9 @@ esac
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh
 EOF
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f installation_ssh
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4400_hardening/4400_kernel_modules.sh

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Entropy collection improvements '/usr/lib/modules-load.d/30_security-misc.conf'.
@@ -47,8 +47,11 @@ EOF
 
   do_log "info" "file_only" "4400() Installed: '/usr/lib/modules-load.d/30_security-misc.conf'."
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f kernel_modules
 
 #######################################
 # Blacklist some kind of potential hazardous modules via '/etc/modprobe.d/0000_ciss_debian_installer.conf'.
@@ -68,6 +71,9 @@ kernel_modprobe() {
 
   do_log "info" "file_only" "4400() Installed: '/etc/modprobe.d/0000_ciss_debian_installer.conf'."
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f kernel_modprobe
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4400_hardening/4410_kernel_sysctl.sh

@@ -10,10 +10,10 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
-# Install Kernel Hardening-Presets '/etc/sysctl.d/99_local.hardened'.
+# Install Kernel Hardening-Presets '/etc/sysctl.d/9999_ciss_debian_installer.hardened'.
 # Globals:
 #   TARGET
 #   VAR_SETUP_PATH
@@ -23,13 +23,16 @@ guard_sourcing
 #   0: on success
 #######################################
 kernel_sysctl() {
-  install -D -m 0644 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/etc/sysctl.d/99_local.hardened" \
-    "${TARGET}/etc/sysctl.d/99_local.hardened"
+  install -D -m 0644 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/etc/sysctl.d/9999_ciss_debian_installer.hardened" \
+    "${TARGET}/etc/sysctl.d/9999_ciss_debian_installer.hardened"
 
-  insert_comments "${TARGET}/etc/sysctl.d/99_local.hardened"
+  insert_comments "${TARGET}/etc/sysctl.d/9999_ciss_debian_installer.hardened"
 
-  do_log "info" "file_only" "4410() Installed: '/etc/sysctl.d/99_local.hardened'."
+  do_log "info" "file_only" "4410() Installed: '/etc/sysctl.d/9999_ciss_debian_installer.hardened'."
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f kernel_sysctl
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4400_hardening/4420_hardening_fail2ban.sh

@@ -10,18 +10,21 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Hardening 'fail2ban'.
 # Globals:
 #   ARY_ALLOW_IPV4
 #   ARY_ALLOW_IPV6
+#   RECOVERY
 #   TARGET
 #   VAR_FINAL_FQDN
 #   VAR_FINAL_IPV4
 #   VAR_FINAL_IPV6
+#   VAR_LINK_IPV6
 #   VAR_PROVIDER
+#   VAR_RUN_RECOVERY
 #   VAR_SSH_PORT
 # Arguments:
 #   None
@@ -31,68 +34,121 @@ guard_sourcing
 hardening_fail2ban() {
   ### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
   declare -r  var_logfile="/root/.ciss/cdi/log/4420_hardening_fail2ban.log"
+  declare     var_target="${TARGET}"
 
-  chroot_logger "${TARGET}${var_logfile}"
+  ### Check for TARGET / RECOVERY.
+  [[ "${VAR_RUN_RECOVERY}" == "true" ]] && var_target="${RECOVERY}"
 
-  mkdir -p "${TARGET}/root/.ciss/cdi/backup/etc/fail2ban/jail.d"
-  cp "${TARGET}/etc/fail2ban/fail2ban.conf" "${TARGET}/root/.ciss/cdi/backup/etc/fail2ban/fail2ban.conf.bak"
-  mv "${TARGET}/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/defaults-debian.conf" "${TARGET}/root/.ciss/cdi/backup/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/defaults-debian.conf.bak"
+  chroot_logger "${var_target}${var_logfile}"
+
+  mkdir -p "${var_target}/root/.ciss/cdi/backup/etc/fail2ban/jail.d"
+  cp "${var_target}/etc/fail2ban/fail2ban.conf" "${var_target}/root/.ciss/cdi/backup/etc/fail2ban/fail2ban.conf.bak"
+  mv "${var_target}/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/defaults-debian.conf" "${var_target}/root/.ciss/cdi/backup/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/defaults-debian.conf.bak"
 
   # https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=1024305
-  insert_header   "${TARGET}/etc/fail2ban/fail2ban.local"
-  insert_comments "${TARGET}/etc/fail2ban/fail2ban.local"
-  cat << 'EOF' >> "${TARGET}/etc/fail2ban/fail2ban.local"
+  insert_header   "${var_target}/etc/fail2ban/fail2ban.local"
+  insert_comments "${var_target}/etc/fail2ban/fail2ban.local"
+  cat << 'EOF' >> "${var_target}/etc/fail2ban/fail2ban.local"
 [DEFAULT]
-allowipv6 = auto
+allowipv6             = auto
 
 EOF
 
-  insert_header   "${TARGET}/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/centurion-default.conf"
-  insert_comments "${TARGET}/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/centurion-default.conf"
+  insert_header   "${var_target}/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/ciss-default.conf"
+  insert_comments "${var_target}/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/ciss-default.conf"
+
   if [[ "${#ARY_ALLOW_IPV4[@]}" -gt 0 ]]; then
 
     ### fail2ban ufw aggressive mode, one attempt for jumphost configuration.
-    cat << EOF >> "${TARGET}/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/centurion-default.conf"
+    cat << EOF >> "${var_target}/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/ciss-default.conf"
 [DEFAULT]
-usedns    = yes
-ignoreip  = 127.0.0.0/8 ::1
+banaction             = nftables-multiport
+banaction_allports    = nftables-allports
+dbpurgeage            = 384d
+#                       127.0.0.1/8 - IPv4 loopback range (local host)
+#                       ::1/128     - IPv6 loopback
+#                       fe80::/10   - IPv6 link-local (on-link only; NDP/RA/DAD)
+#                       ff00::/8    - IPv6 multicast (not an unicast host)
+#                       ::/128      - IPv6 unspecified (all zeros; never a real peer)
+ignoreip              = 127.0.0.1/8 ::1/128 fe80::/10 ff00::/8 ::/128
 # ${VAR_FINAL_FQDN}
   ${VAR_FINAL_IPV4}
+EOF
+
+    if [[ "${VAR_LINK_IPV6}" == "true" ]]; then
+
+      cat << EOF >> "${var_target}/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/ciss-default.conf"
   ${VAR_FINAL_IPV6}/64
+EOF
+    fi
+
+    cat << EOF >> "${var_target}/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/ciss-default.conf"
 # Jumphost
   ${ARY_ALLOW_IPV4[*]}
+EOF
+
+    if [[ "${VAR_LINK_IPV6}" == "true" ]]; then
+
+      cat << EOF >> "${var_target}/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/ciss-default.conf"
   ${ARY_ALLOW_IPV6[*]}
-maxretry  = 8
-findtime  = 12h
-bantime   = 12h
+EOF
+    fi
+
+    cat << EOF >> "${var_target}/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/ciss-default.conf"
+usedns                = yes
+
+[recidive]
+enabled               = true
+banaction             = nftables[type=custom, family=inet, table=f2b-table, chain=f2b-chain, blocktype=drop]
+bantime               = 8d
+bantime.increment     = true
+bantime.factor        = 1
+bantime.maxtime       = 128d
+bantime.multipliers   = 1 2 4 8 16
+bantime.overalljails  = true
+bantime.rndtime       = 877s
+filter                = recidive
+findtime              = 16d
+logpath               = /var/log/fail2ban/fail2ban.log*
+maxretry              = 3
 
 [sshd]
-enabled   = true
-backend   = systemd
-filter    = sshd
-mode      = normal
-port      = ${VAR_SSH_PORT}
-protocol  = tcp
-logpath   = /var/log/auth.log
-maxretry  = 3
-findtime  = 1d
-bantime   = 1d
+enabled               = true
+backend               = systemd
+bantime               = 1h
+bantime.increment     = true
+bantime.factor        = 1
+bantime.maxtime       = 16d
+bantime.multipliers   = 1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 384
+bantime.overalljails  = true
+bantime.rndtime       = 877s
+filter                = sshd
+findtime              = 16m
+mode                  = aggressive
+port                  = ${VAR_SSH_PORT}
+protocol              = tcp
+maxretry              = 4
 
 #
-# ufw aggressive approach:
+# CISS aggressive approach:
 # Any valid client communicating with our server should be going directly to the service ports opened in ufw (ssh, 80, ...).
-# Any client touching other ports is treated malicious and therefore should be blocked access to ALL ports after 1 attempt.
+# Any client touching other ports is treated as malicious and therefore should be blocked access to ALL ports after 1 attempt.
 #
 
 [ufw]
-enabled   = true
-filter    = ufw.aggressive
-action    = iptables-allports
-logpath   = /var/log/ufw.log
-maxretry  = 1
-findtime  = 1d
-bantime   = 1d
-protocol  = tcp,udp
+enabled               = true
+banaction             = nftables[type=custom, family=inet, table=f2b-table, chain=f2b-chain, blocktype=drop]
+bantime               = 1h
+bantime.increment     = true
+bantime.factor        = 1
+bantime.maxtime       = 16d
+bantime.multipliers   = 1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 384
+bantime.overalljails  = true
+bantime.rndtime       = 877s
+filter                = ciss-ufw
+findtime              = 16m
+logpath               = /var/log/ufw.log
+maxretry              = 1
 
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=conf
 EOF
@@ -100,44 +156,83 @@ EOF
   else
 
     ### fail2ban ufw aggressive mode, 32 attempts for NO jumphost configuration.
-    cat << EOF >> "${TARGET}/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/centurion-default.conf"
+    cat << EOF >> "${var_target}/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/ciss-default.conf"
 [DEFAULT]
-usedns    = yes
-ignoreip  = 127.0.0.0/8 ::1
+banaction             = nftables-multiport
+banaction_allports    = nftables-allports
+dbpurgeage            = 384d
+#                       127.0.0.1/8 - IPv4 loopback range (local host)
+#                       ::1/128     - IPv6 loopback
+#                       fe80::/10   - IPv6 link-local (on-link only; NDP/RA/DAD)
+#                       ff00::/8    - IPv6 multicast (not an unicast host)
+#                       ::/128      - IPv6 unspecified (all zeros; never a real peer)
+ignoreip              = 127.0.0.1/8 ::1/128 fe80::/10 ff00::/8 ::/128
 # ${VAR_FINAL_FQDN}
   ${VAR_FINAL_IPV4}
+EOF
+
+    if [[ "${VAR_LINK_IPV6}" == "true" ]]; then
+
+      cat << EOF >> "${var_target}/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/ciss-default.conf"
   ${VAR_FINAL_IPV6}/64
-maxretry  = 8
-findtime  = 12h
-bantime   = 12h
+EOF
+    fi
+
+    cat << EOF >> "${var_target}/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/ciss-default.conf"
+usedns                = yes
+
+[recidive]
+enabled               = true
+banaction             = nftables[type=custom, family=inet, table=f2b-table, chain=f2b-chain, blocktype=drop]
+bantime               = 8d
+bantime.increment     = true
+bantime.factor        = 1
+bantime.maxtime       = 128d
+bantime.multipliers   = 1 2 4 8 16
+bantime.overalljails  = true
+bantime.rndtime       = 877s
+filter                = recidive
+findtime              = 16d
+logpath               = /var/log/fail2ban/fail2ban.log*
+maxretry              = 3
 
 [sshd]
-enabled   = true
-backend   = systemd
-filter    = sshd
-mode      = normal
-port      = ${VAR_SSH_PORT}
-protocol  = tcp
-logpath   = /var/log/auth.log
-maxretry  = 3
-findtime  = 1d
-bantime   = 1d
+enabled               = true
+backend               = systemd
+bantime               = 1h
+bantime.increment     = true
+bantime.factor        = 1
+bantime.maxtime       = 16d
+bantime.multipliers   = 1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 384
+bantime.overalljails  = true
+bantime.rndtime       = 877s
+filter                = sshd
+findtime              = 16m
+mode                  = normal
+port                  = ${VAR_SSH_PORT}
+protocol              = tcp
+maxretry              = 4
 
 #
-# ufw aggressive approach:
+# CISS aggressive approach:
 # Any valid client communicating with our server should be going directly to the service ports opened in ufw (ssh, 80, ...).
-# Any client touching other ports is treated malicious and therefore should be blocked access to ALL ports after 32 attempts.
+# Any client touching other ports is treated as malicious and therefore should be blocked access to ALL ports after 3 attempts.
 #
 
 [ufw]
-enabled   = true
-filter    = ufw.aggressive
-action    = iptables-allports
-logpath   = /var/log/ufw.log
-maxretry  = 32
-findtime  = 1d
-bantime   = 1d
-protocol  = tcp,udp
+enabled               = true
+banaction             = nftables[type=custom, family=inet, table=f2b-table, chain=f2b-chain, blocktype=drop]
+bantime               = 1h
+bantime.increment     = true
+bantime.factor        = 1
+bantime.maxtime       = 16d
+bantime.multipliers   = 1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 384
+bantime.overalljails  = true
+bantime.rndtime       = 877s
+filter                = ciss-ufw
+findtime              = 16m
+logpath               = /var/log/ufw.log
+maxretry              = 3
 
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=conf
 EOF
@@ -146,15 +241,20 @@ EOF
 
   ### Provider Hetzner needs special ignoreip rules.
   if [[ "${VAR_PROVIDER}" == "hetzner" ]]; then
-    sed -i '0,/^maxretry/{s/^maxretry/# Hetzner Intern\n  172.31.1.1\/16\n&/}' "${TARGET}/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/centurion-default.conf"
+
+    sed -i '0,/^maxretry/{s/^maxretry/# Hetzner Intern\n  172.31.1.1\/16\n&/}' "${var_target}/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/ciss-default.conf"
+
   fi
 
-  insert_header   "${TARGET}/etc/fail2ban/filter.d/ufw.aggressive.conf"
-  insert_comments "${TARGET}/etc/fail2ban/filter.d/ufw.aggressive.conf"
-  cat << EOF >>   "${TARGET}/etc/fail2ban/filter.d/ufw.aggressive.conf"
+  insert_header   "${var_target}/etc/fail2ban/filter.d/ciss-ufw.conf"
+  insert_comments "${var_target}/etc/fail2ban/filter.d/ciss-ufw.conf"
+  cat << EOF >>   "${var_target}/etc/fail2ban/filter.d/ciss-ufw.conf"
 [Definition]
-failregex = ^.*UFW BLOCK.* SRC=<HOST> .*DPT=\d+ .*
-ignoreregex =
+# Match UFW BLOCK/REJECT with a source IP and *any* port field (SPT or DPT), protocol may be missing.
+failregex             = ^.*UFW (?:BLOCK|REJECT).*?\bSRC=<HOST>\b.*?(?:\bDPT=\d+\b|\bSPT=\d+\b).*$
+ignoreregex           =
+
+# vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=conf
 EOF
 
   # Hardening of fail2ban systemd: https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/fail2ban#Service_hardening
@@ -162,12 +262,12 @@ EOF
   # file. "CAP_NET_ADMIN" and "CAP_NET_RAW" allow fail2ban to operate on any firewall that has a command-line shell interface.
   # By using 'ProtectSystem=strict' the filesystem hierarchy will only be read-only; 'ReadWritePaths' allows Fail2ban to have
   # write access on required paths.
-  mkdir -p "${TARGET}/etc/systemd/system/fail2ban.service.d"
-  mkdir -p "${TARGET}/var/log/fail2ban"
+  mkdir -p "${var_target}/etc/systemd/system/fail2ban.service.d"
+  mkdir -p "${var_target}/var/log/fail2ban"
 
-  insert_header   "${TARGET}/etc/systemd/system/fail2ban.service.d/override.conf"
-  insert_comments "${TARGET}/etc/systemd/system/fail2ban.service.d/override.conf"
-  cat << EOF >>   "${TARGET}/etc/systemd/system/fail2ban.service.d/override.conf"
+  insert_header   "${var_target}/etc/systemd/system/fail2ban.service.d/override.conf"
+  insert_comments "${var_target}/etc/systemd/system/fail2ban.service.d/override.conf"
+  cat << EOF >>   "${var_target}/etc/systemd/system/fail2ban.service.d/override.conf"
 [Service]
 PrivateDevices=yes
 PrivateTmp=yes
@@ -183,32 +283,63 @@ ProtectClock=true
 ProtectHostname=true
 EOF
 
-  cat << 'EOF' >> "${TARGET}/etc/fail2ban/fail2ban.local"
+  cat << 'EOF' >> "${var_target}/etc/fail2ban/fail2ban.local"
 [Definition]
-logtarget = /var/log/fail2ban/fail2ban.log
+logtarget             = /var/log/fail2ban/fail2ban.log
+
+[Database]
+# Keep entries for at least 384 days to cover recidive findtime.
+dbpurgeage            = 384d
 
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=conf
 EOF
 
   ### Logrotate must be updated too.
-  mkdir -p "${TARGET}/root/.ciss/cdi/backup/etc/logrotate.d"
-  cp "${TARGET}/etc/logrotate.d/fail2ban" "${TARGET}/root/.ciss/cdi/backup/etc/logrotate.d/fail2ban.bak"
-  sed -i 's/\/var\/log\/fail2ban.log/\/var\/log\/fail2ban\/fail2ban.log/1' "${TARGET}/etc/logrotate.d/fail2ban"
-  touch "${TARGET}/var/log/fail2ban/fail2ban.log"
-  chmod 640 "${TARGET}/var/log/fail2ban/fail2ban.log"
+  mkdir -p "${var_target}/root/.ciss/cdi/backup/etc/logrotate.d"
+  cp "${var_target}/etc/logrotate.d/fail2ban" "${var_target}/root/.ciss/cdi/backup/etc/logrotate.d/fail2ban.bak"
+  cat << EOF >| "${var_target}/etc/logrotate.d/fail2ban"
+/var/log/fail2ban/fail2ban.log {
+    daily
+    rotate 384
+    maxage 384
+    notifempty
+    dateext
+    dateyesterday
+    compress
+    compresscmd /usr/bin/zstd
+    compressext .zst
+    compressoptions -20
+    uncompresscmd /usr/bin/unzstd
+    delaycompress
+    shred
+    missingok
+    postrotate
+        fail2ban-client flushlogs 1>/dev/null
+    endscript
+    # If fail2ban runs as non-root it still needs to have write access
+    # to logfiles.
+    # create 640 fail2ban adm
+    create 640 root adm
+}
+EOF
+  touch "${var_target}/var/log/fail2ban/fail2ban.log"
+  chmod 0640 "${var_target}/var/log/fail2ban/fail2ban.log"
 
-  if [[ ! -f "${TARGET}/var/log/ufw.log" ]]; then
-    install -d -m 0755 "${TARGET}/var/log"
-    : >| "${TARGET}/var/log/ufw.log"
-    chmod 0640 "${TARGET}/var/log/ufw.log"
+  if [[ ! -f "${var_target}/var/log/ufw.log" ]]; then
+    install -d -m 0755 "${var_target}/var/log"
+    : >| "${var_target}/var/log/ufw.log"
+    chmod 0640 "${var_target}/var/log/ufw.log"
   fi
 
   ### Merge / Dump-Parse via 'fail2ban-client -d'. All '*.conf', '*.local', and 'jail.*'-files are read, inherited, and merged.
   ### Syntax, path, and key errors result in a non-zero exit.
-  chroot_script "${TARGET}" "
+  chroot_script "${var_target}" "
     fail2ban-client -d >> ${var_logfile} && echo "OK: config parsed" >> ${var_logfile} || echo "ERROR: config invalid" >> ${var_logfile}
   "
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f hardening_fail2ban
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4400_hardening/4430_hardening_files.sh

@@ -10,29 +10,66 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Hardening files and directories.
 # Globals:
-#   None
+#   RECOVERY
+#   TARGET
+#   VAR_RUN_RECOVERY
+#   VAR_SETUP_PATH
 # Arguments:
 #   None
 # Returns:
 #   0: on success
 #######################################
 hardening_files() {
-  chmod 0700 "${TARGET}/etc/cron.d" "${TARGET}/etc/cron.daily" "${TARGET}/etc/cron.hourly" "${TARGET}/etc/cron.monthly" \
-             "${TARGET}/etc/cron.weekly"
-  chmod 0700 "${TARGET}/etc/sudoers.d"
-  chmod 0700 "${TARGET}/etc/crontab"
+  declare     var_bin="" var_binary=""
+  declare     var_target="${TARGET}"
 
-  rm -f "${TARGET}/etc/issue" "${TARGET}/etc/issue.net"
-  install -m 0644 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/etc/issue" "${TARGET}/etc/issue"
-  install -m 0644 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/etc/issue.net" "${TARGET}/etc/issue.net"
+  ### Check for TARGET / RECOVERY.
+  [[ "${VAR_RUN_RECOVERY}" == "true" ]] && var_target="${RECOVERY}"
 
-  install -d -m 0700 -o root -g root "${TARGET}/root/.ansible"
+  chmod 0700 "${var_target}/etc/cron.d" "${var_target}/etc/cron.daily" "${var_target}/etc/cron.hourly" "${var_target}/etc/cron.monthly" \
+             "${var_target}/etc/cron.weekly"
+  chmod 0700 "${var_target}/etc/sudoers.d"
+  chmod 0700 "${var_target}/etc/crontab"
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  [[ -f "${var_target}/etc/cron.deny" ]] && rm "${var_target}/etc/cron.deny"
+
+  ### /etc/issue ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  rm -f "${var_target}/etc/issue" "${var_target}/etc/issue.net"
+  install -m 0644 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/etc/issue" "${var_target}/etc/issue"
+  install -m 0644 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/etc/issue.net" "${var_target}/etc/issue.net"
+
+  ### /root/.ansible -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  install -d -m 0700 -o root -g root "${var_target}/root/.ansible"
+
+  ### /usr/bin/compiler --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  for var_bin in as gcc g++ cc clang; do
+    var_binary=$(readlink -f "${var_target}/usr/bin/${var_bin}") || {
+      do_log "info" "file_only" "4430() Binary: '${var_bin}' not found, skipping."
+      continue
+    }
+    chmod 0700 "${var_binary}" || {
+      do_log "info" "file_only" "4430() Binary chmod 0700: '${var_bin}' failed, skipping."
+    }
+  done
+
+  ### /etc/update-motd.d/10-uname ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  mkdir -p "${var_target}/root/.ciss/cdi/backup/etc/update-motd.d"
+  cp -af "${var_target}/etc/update-motd.d/10-uname" "${var_target}/root/.ciss/cdi/backup/etc/update-motd.d/10-uname"
+
+  cat << 'EOF' >| "${var_target}/etc/update-motd.d/10-uname"
+#!/bin/sh
+uname -snrm
+EOF
+  chmod 0755 /etc/update-motd.d/10-uname
+
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f hardening_files
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4400_hardening/4440_hardening_haveged.sh

@@ -10,21 +10,29 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Hardening haveged.
 # Globals:
+#   RECOVERY
 #   TARGET
+#   VAR_RUN_RECOVERY
 # Arguments:
 #   None
 # Returns:
 #   0: on success
 #######################################
 hardening_haveged() {
-  insert_header   "${TARGET}/etc/default/haveged"
-  insert_comments "${TARGET}/etc/default/haveged"
-  cat << EOF >>   "${TARGET}/etc/default/haveged"
+  ### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
+  declare    var_target="${TARGET}"
+
+  ### Check for TARGET / RECOVERY.
+  [[ "${VAR_RUN_RECOVERY}" == "true" ]] && var_target="${RECOVERY}"
+
+  insert_header   "${var_target}/etc/default/haveged"
+  insert_comments "${var_target}/etc/default/haveged"
+  cat << EOF >>   "${var_target}/etc/default/haveged"
 # Configuration file for haveged
 # Minimal, sane defaults for server/headless systems.
 # -w <bits> : target entropy level in bits; 1024 ensures fast pool fill on boot
@@ -36,6 +44,9 @@ DAEMON_ARGS="-w 2048 -v 1"
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh
 EOF
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f hardening_haveged
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4400_hardening/4442_hardening_jitterentropy.sh

@@ -10,31 +10,36 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
-# Updating 'machine-id' to 'whonix id'.
+# Hardening hardening_jitterentropy.
 # Globals:
+#   RECOVERY
 #   TARGET
-#   VAR_SETUP_PATH
+#   VAR_RUN_RECOVERY
 # Arguments:
 #   None
 # Returns:
 #   0: on success
 #######################################
-setup_machineid() {
-  if [[ -f "${TARGET}/var/lib/dbus/machine-id" ]]; then
-    rm -f "${TARGET}/var/lib/dbus/machine-id"
-  fi
-  install -m 0644 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/etc/machine-id" "${TARGET}/var/lib/dbus/machine-id"
+hardening_jitterentropy() {
+  declare    var_target="${TARGET}"
 
-  if [[ -f "${TARGET}/etc/machine-id" ]]; then
-    rm -f "${TARGET}/etc/machine-id"
-  fi
-  install -m 0644 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/etc/machine-id" "${TARGET}/etc/machine-id"
+  ### Check for TARGET / RECOVERY.
+  [[ "${VAR_RUN_RECOVERY}" == "true" ]] && var_target="${RECOVERY}"
 
-  do_log "info" "file_only" "Machine ID updated: 'machine-id' to 'whonix id'."
+  mkdir -p "${var_target}/etc/systemd/system/jitterentropy-rngd.service.d"
 
-  return 0
+  cat << EOF >> "${var_target}/etc/systemd/system/jitterentropy-rngd.service.d/override.conf"
+[Service]
+ExecStart=
+ExecStart=/usr/sbin/jitterentropy-rngd --osr=2
+EOF
+
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f hardening_jitterentropy
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4400_hardening/4445_hardening_logrotate.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# SPDX-Version: 3.0
+# SPDX-CreationInfo: 2025-06-17; WEIDNER, Marc S.; <msw@coresecret.dev>
+# SPDX-ExternalRef: GIT https://git.coresecret.dev/msw/CISS.debian.installer.git
+# SPDX-FileContributor: WEIDNER, Marc S.; Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency
+# SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2024-2025; WEIDNER, Marc S.; <msw@coresecret.dev>
+# SPDX-FileType: SOURCE
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: EUPL-1.2 OR LicenseRef-CCLA-1.0
+# SPDX-LicenseComment: This file is part of the CISS.debian.installer.secure framework.
+# SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
+# SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
+
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
+
+#######################################
+# Hardening '/etc/logrotate'.
+# Globals:
+#   RECOVERY
+#   TARGET
+#   VAR_RUN_RECOVERY
+# Arguments:
+#   None
+# Returns:
+#   0: on success
+#######################################
+hardening_logrotate() {
+  ### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
+  declare     var_target="${TARGET}"
+
+  ### Check for TARGET / RECOVERY.
+  [[ "${VAR_RUN_RECOVERY}" == "true" ]] && var_target="${RECOVERY}"
+
+  rm -f           "${var_target}/etc/logrotate.conf"
+  insert_header   "${var_target}/etc/logrotate.conf"
+  insert_comments "${var_target}/etc/logrotate.conf"
+  cat << EOF >>   "${var_target}/etc/logrotate.conf"
+# See "man logrotate" for details. Global options do not affect preceding include directives.
+
+# Rotate log files daily
+daily
+
+# Keep 384 daily worth of backlogs.
+rotate 384
+
+# Hard cap: delete rotated logs older than 384 days.
+maxage 384
+
+# Do not rotate the log if it is empty (this overrides the ifempty option).
+notifempty
+
+# Create new (empty) log files after rotating old ones.
+create
+
+# Use date as a suffix of the rotated file.
+dateext
+
+# Use yesterday's instead of today's date to create the dateext extension, so that the rotated log file has a date in its name
+# that is the same as the timestamps within it.
+dateyesterday
+
+# Enable compression
+compress
+
+# Use zstd instead of gzip.
+compresscmd /usr/bin/zstd
+
+# File extension for compressed logs.
+compressext .zst
+
+# Set zstd level 3 (default).
+compressoptions -20
+
+# How to decompress for 'logrotate -d' or similar.
+uncompresscmd /usr/bin/unzstd
+
+# Keep the most recent rotation uncompressed for one cycle.
+delaycompress
+
+# Delete log files using shred -u instead of unlink().
+shred
+
+# packages drop log rotation information into this directory
+include /etc/logrotate.d
+
+# system-specific logs may also be configured here.
+
+# vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=conf
+EOF
+
+  guard_dir; return 0
+}
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f hardening_logrotate
+# vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4400_hardening/4450_hardening_memory.sh

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # NOTE:
@@ -43,22 +43,27 @@ guard_sourcing
 #   '/etc/pam.d/common-session'
 #   '/etc/pam.d/common-session-noninteractive'
 # Globals:
+#   RECOVERY
 #   TARGET
-#   VAR_ARCHITECTURE
-#   VAR_CODENAME
-#   VAR_VERSION
+#   VAR_RUN_RECOVERY
 # Arguments:
 #   None
 # Returns:
 #   0: on success
 #######################################
 hardening_memory() {
-  mkdir -p "${TARGET}/etc/systemd/coredump.conf.d"
-  mkdir -p "${TARGET}/etc/systemd/system.conf.d"
+  ### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
+  declare     var_target="${TARGET}"
 
-  insert_header   "${TARGET}/etc/security/limits.d/99-ciss-core.conf"
-  insert_comments "${TARGET}/etc/security/limits.d/99-ciss-core.conf"
-  cat << 'EOF' >> "${TARGET}/etc/security/limits.d/99-ciss-core.conf"
+  ### Check for TARGET / RECOVERY.
+  [[ "${VAR_RUN_RECOVERY}" == "true" ]] && var_target="${RECOVERY}"
+
+  mkdir -p "${var_target}/etc/systemd/coredump.conf.d"
+  mkdir -p "${var_target}/etc/systemd/system.conf.d"
+
+  insert_header   "${var_target}/etc/security/limits.d/99-ciss-core.conf"
+  insert_comments "${var_target}/etc/security/limits.d/99-ciss-core.conf"
+  cat << 'EOF' >> "${var_target}/etc/security/limits.d/99-ciss-core.conf"
 # Enforce: no core dumps for all logins by default.
 # Format: <domain> <type> <item> <value>
 *     hard core 0
@@ -70,9 +75,9 @@ root  soft core 0
 EOF
 
 
-  insert_header   "${TARGET}/etc/systemd/coredump.conf.d/disable.conf"
-  insert_comments "${TARGET}/etc/systemd/coredump.conf.d/disable.conf"
-  cat << 'EOF' >> "${TARGET}/etc/systemd/coredump.conf.d/disable.conf"
+  insert_header   "${var_target}/etc/systemd/coredump.conf.d/disable.conf"
+  insert_comments "${var_target}/etc/systemd/coredump.conf.d/disable.conf"
+  cat << 'EOF' >> "${var_target}/etc/systemd/coredump.conf.d/disable.conf"
 ### Do not store core images anywhere, keep the at most minimal metadata.
 
 [Coredump]
@@ -85,30 +90,41 @@ JournalSizeMax=0
 EOF
 
 
-  [[ -f  "${TARGET}/etc/systemd/system.conf.d/10-coredump-debian.conf" ]] && \
-    mv "${TARGET}/etc/systemd/system.conf.d/10-coredump-debian.conf" "${TARGET}/etc/systemd/system.conf.d/10-coredump-debian.conf.bak"
+  [[ -f  "${var_target}/etc/systemd/system.conf.d/10-coredump-debian.conf" ]] && \
+    mv "${var_target}/etc/systemd/system.conf.d/10-coredump-debian.conf" "${var_target}/etc/systemd/system.conf.d/10-coredump-debian.conf.bak"
 
 
-  insert_header   "${TARGET}/etc/systemd/system.conf.d/99-ciss-core.conf"
-  insert_comments "${TARGET}/etc/systemd/system.conf.d/99-ciss-core.conf"
-  cat << 'EOF' >> "${TARGET}/etc/systemd/system.conf.d/99-ciss-core.conf"
+  insert_header   "${var_target}/etc/systemd/system.conf.d/99-ciss-core.conf"
+  insert_comments "${var_target}/etc/systemd/system.conf.d/99-ciss-core.conf"
+  cat << 'EOF' >> "${var_target}/etc/systemd/system.conf.d/99-ciss-core.conf"
 [Manager]
 DefaultLimitCORE=0
 
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=conf
 EOF
 
-  guard_pam_limits
+  ### Unified in 4520()
+  #   - write_pam_login()
+  #   - write_pam_sshd()
+  #   - write_pam_su()
+  #   - write_pam_sudo()
+  #   - write_pam_sudo-i()
+  # guard_pam_limits
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f hardening_memory
 
 #######################################
 # Ensure 'pam_limits.so' is activated in:
 #   '/etc/pam.d/common-session'
 #   '/etc/pam.d/common-session-noninteractive'
 # Globals:
+#   RECOVERY
 #   TARGET
+#   VAR_RUN_RECOVERY
 # Arguments:
 #   None
 # Returns:
@@ -116,8 +132,13 @@ EOF
 #######################################
 guard_pam_limits() {
   ### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
-  declare     var_file_0="${TARGET}/etc/pam.d/common-session"
-  declare     var_file_1="${TARGET}/etc/pam.d/common-session-noninteractive"
+  declare     var_target="${TARGET}"
+
+  ### Check for TARGET / RECOVERY.
+  [[ "${VAR_RUN_RECOVERY}" == "true" ]] && var_target="${RECOVERY}"
+
+  declare     var_file_0="${var_target}/etc/pam.d/common-session"
+  declare     var_file_1="${var_target}/etc/pam.d/common-session-noninteractive"
   declare     var_line='session required pam_limits.so' var_file=""
   declare -i  var_changed=0
 
@@ -156,6 +177,9 @@ guard_pam_limits() {
 
   (( var_changed )) && do_log "info" "file_only" "4460() Activated pam_limits.so: (common-session[*])"
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f guard_pam_limits
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4400_hardening/4460_hardening_openssl.sh

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Hardening OpenSSL library defaults (system-wide), TLSv1.2-, TLSv1.3-, AES-256-only.
@@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ hardening_openssl() {
   insert_comments "${TARGET}/etc/ssl/openssl.cnf"
   cat "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/etc/ssl/openssl.cnf" >> "${TARGET}/etc/ssl/openssl.cnf"
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f hardening_openssl
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4400_hardening/4470_hardening_ufw.sh

@@ -10,12 +10,15 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Hardening 'ufw'.
 # Globals:
+#   RECOVERY
 #   TARGET
+#   VAR_FINAL_NIC
+#   VAR_RUN_RECOVERY
 #   VAR_SSH_PORT
 #   VAR_UFW_OUT
 # Arguments:
@@ -26,15 +29,22 @@ guard_sourcing
 hardening_ufw() {
   ### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
   declare -r  var_logfile="/root/.ciss/cdi/log/4470_hardening_ufw.log"
+  declare     var_target="${TARGET}"
 
-  chroot_logger "${TARGET}${var_logfile}"
+  ### Check for TARGET / RECOVERY.
+  [[ "${VAR_RUN_RECOVERY}" == "true" ]] && var_target="${RECOVERY}"
 
-  if [[ ! -f "${TARGET}/var/log/ufw.log" ]]; then
-    touch "${TARGET}/var/log/ufw.log"
-    chmod 0640 "${TARGET}/var/log/ufw.log"
+  declare -r  var_rules="${var_target}/etc/ufw/before6.rules"
+
+
+  chroot_logger "${var_target}${var_logfile}"
+
+  if [[ ! -f "${var_target}/var/log/ufw.log" ]]; then
+    touch "${var_target}/var/log/ufw.log"
+    chmod 0640 "${var_target}/var/log/ufw.log"
   fi
 
-  chroot_script "${TARGET}" "
+  chroot_script "${var_target}" "
     ufw --force reset
     ufw logging medium
     ufw default deny incoming
@@ -47,7 +57,7 @@ hardening_ufw() {
   ### Ensure that a standard set of the most commonly used ports are open if a default-'deny'-outbound policy is selected.
   if [[ "${VAR_UFW_OUT}" = "deny" ]]; then
 
-    chroot_script "${TARGET}" "
+    chroot_script "${var_target}" "
       ufw allow out   21/tcp comment 'Outgoing FTP'
       ufw allow out   22/tcp comment 'Outgoing SSH'
       ufw allow out   25/tcp comment 'Outgoing SMTP'
@@ -70,16 +80,31 @@ hardening_ufw() {
   fi
 
   ### Allowing ICMP IPv4 outgoing per default.
-  sed -i "/# ok icmp code for FORWARD/i \# ok icmp codes for OUTPUT" "${TARGET}/etc/ufw/before.rules"
-  sed -i "/# ok icmp code for FORWARD/i \-A ufw-before-output -p icmp --icmp-type destination-unreachable -j ACCEPT" "${TARGET}/etc/ufw/before.rules"
-  sed -i "/# ok icmp code for FORWARD/i \-A ufw-before-output -p icmp --icmp-type time-exceeded -j ACCEPT" "${TARGET}/etc/ufw/before.rules"
-  sed -i "/# ok icmp code for FORWARD/i \-A ufw-before-output -p icmp --icmp-type parameter-problem -j ACCEPT" "${TARGET}/etc/ufw/before.rules"
-  sed -i "/# ok icmp code for FORWARD/i \-A ufw-before-output -p icmp --icmp-type echo-request -j ACCEPT" "${TARGET}/etc/ufw/before.rules"
+  sed -i "/# ok icmp code for FORWARD/i \# ok icmp codes for OUTPUT" "${var_target}/etc/ufw/before.rules"
+  sed -i "/# ok icmp code for FORWARD/i \-A ufw-before-output -p icmp --icmp-type destination-unreachable -j ACCEPT" "${var_target}/etc/ufw/before.rules"
+  sed -i "/# ok icmp code for FORWARD/i \-A ufw-before-output -p icmp --icmp-type time-exceeded -j ACCEPT" "${var_target}/etc/ufw/before.rules"
+  sed -i "/# ok icmp code for FORWARD/i \-A ufw-before-output -p icmp --icmp-type parameter-problem -j ACCEPT" "${var_target}/etc/ufw/before.rules"
+  sed -i "/# ok icmp code for FORWARD/i \-A ufw-before-output -p icmp --icmp-type echo-request -j ACCEPT" "${var_target}/etc/ufw/before.rules"
 
-  chroot_script "${TARGET}" "echo 'y' | ufw enable 2>&1"
+  ### Remove previous custom blocks (idempotent).
+  sed -i "/^# BEGIN custom MLD rules/,/^# END custom MLD rules/d" "${var_rules}"
+  sed -i "/^# BEGIN custom MLD OUTPUT rules/,/^# END custom MLD OUTPUT rules/d" "${var_rules}"
 
-  chroot_script "${TARGET}" "ufw status verbose >> ${var_logfile}"
+  ### Inbound MLD (INPUT chain), insert before the existing echo-request rule.
+  ### Allows MLDv1 (130/131/132) and MLDv2 (143) to link-local multicast (ff02::/16)
+  sed -i "/-A ufw6-before-input .*--icmpv6-type echo-request -j ACCEPT/i # BEGIN custom MLD rules\n-A ufw6-before-input -i ${VAR_FINAL_NIC} -p icmpv6 --icmpv6-type 130 -d ff02::/16 -j ACCEPT\n-A ufw6-before-input -i ${VAR_FINAL_NIC} -p icmpv6 --icmpv6-type 131 -d ff02::/16 -j ACCEPT\n-A ufw6-before-input -i ${VAR_FINAL_NIC} -p icmpv6 --icmpv6-type 132 -d ff02::/16 -j ACCEPT\n-A ufw6-before-input -i ${VAR_FINAL_NIC} -p icmpv6 --icmpv6-type 143 -d ff02::/16 -j ACCEPT\n# END custom MLD rules" "${var_rules}"
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  ### Outbound MLD (OUTPUT chain), insert before echo-request.
+  ### Useful if local daemons join multicast groups, and you want clean logs.
+  sed -i "/-A ufw6-before-output .*--icmpv6-type echo-request -j ACCEPT/i # BEGIN custom MLD OUTPUT rules\n-A ufw6-before-output -o ${VAR_FINAL_NIC} -p icmpv6 --icmpv6-type 131 -d ff02::/16 -j ACCEPT\n-A ufw6-before-output -o ${VAR_FINAL_NIC} -p icmpv6 --icmpv6-type 143 -d ff02::/16 -j ACCEPT\n# END custom MLD OUTPUT rules" "${var_rules}"
+
+  chroot_script "${var_target}" "echo 'y' | ufw enable 2>&1"
+
+  chroot_script "${var_target}" "ufw status verbose >> ${var_logfile}"
+
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f hardening_ufw
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4400_hardening/4480_hardening_usb.sh

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Hardening 'usb-guard'.
@@ -30,27 +30,34 @@ hardening_usb() {
   ### Preparing USBGuard: see https://www.privacy-handbuch.de/handbuch_91a.htm
   chroot_script "${TARGET}" "
     export INITRD=No
+    [[ -r /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh ]] && . /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh
     apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends --no-install-suggests usbguard 2>&1 | tee -a ${var_logfile}
-    echo ExitCode: \$? >> ${var_logfile}
 
     touch /tmp/rules.conf
     usbguard generate-policy >| /tmp/rules.conf
 
     if [[ -f /etc/usbguard/rules.conf && -s /etc/usbguard/rules.conf ]]; then
+
       mkdir -p /root/.ciss/cdi/backup/etc/usbguard
       mv /etc/usbguard/rules.conf /root/.ciss/cdi/backup/etc/usbguard/usbguard_rules.conf
       mv /tmp/rules.conf /etc/usbguard/rules.conf
       chmod 0600 /etc/usbguard/rules.conf
+
     else
+
       rm -f /etc/usbguard/rules.conf
       mv /tmp/rules.conf /etc/usbguard/rules.conf
       chmod 0600 /etc/usbguard/rules.conf
+
     fi
 
     #cp -a /etc/usbguard/usbguard-daemon.conf /root/.ciss/cdi/backup/etc/usbguard/usbguard-daemon.conf
     #sed -i 's/PresentDevicePolicy=apply-policy/PresentDevicePolicy=allow/' /etc/usbguard/usbguard-daemon.conf
   "
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f hardening_usb
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4400_hardening/4490_hardening_virus.sh

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Installing anti-rootkit and antivirus packages.
@@ -29,10 +29,13 @@ hardening_virus() {
 
   chroot_script "${TARGET}" "
     export INITRD=No
+    [[ -r /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh ]] && . /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh
     apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends --no-install-suggests rkhunter 2>&1 | tee -a ${var_logfile}
-    echo ExitCode: \$? >> ${var_logfile}
   "
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f hardening_virus
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4500_user/4500_accounts_preparation.sh

@@ -10,13 +10,15 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
-# Prepare '/etc/skel'-Directory.
+# Account generation preparation.
 # Globals:
+#   RECOVERY
 #   TARGET
-#   VAR_SETUP_PATH
+#   VAR_RUN_RECOVERY
+#   VAR_USER_ROOT_SPECIFIC
 # Arguments:
 #   None
 # Returns:
@@ -24,39 +26,37 @@ guard_sourcing
 #######################################
 accounts_preparation() {
   ### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
-  declare -r  var_logfile="/root/.ciss/cdi/log/4130_installation_toolset.log"
+  declare -r  var_logfile="/root/.ciss/cdi/log/4500_accounts_preparation.sh.log"
+  declare     var_target="${TARGET}"
 
-  chroot_logger "${TARGET}${var_logfile}"
+  ### Check for TARGET / RECOVERY.
+  [[ "${VAR_RUN_RECOVERY}" == "true" ]] && var_target="${RECOVERY}"
 
-  chroot_script "${TARGET}" "
+  chroot_logger "${var_target}${var_logfile}"
+
+  chroot_script "${var_target}" "
     export INITRD=No
+    [[ -r /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh ]] && . /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh
     apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends --no-install-suggests bash-completion fzf 2>&1 | tee -a ${var_logfile}
-    echo ExitCode: \$? >> ${var_logfile}
   "
 
-  mkdir -p "${TARGET}/etc/skel/.ciss"
+  mkdir -p "${var_target}/etc/skel/.ciss"
 
-  install -m 0600 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/etc/skel/.bashrc" "${TARGET}/etc/skel/.bashrc"
-  install -m 0600 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/etc/skel/.zshrc" "${TARGET}/etc/skel/.zshrc"
-  install -m 0600 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/etc/skel/.ciss/theme_eza_ciss.yml" "${TARGET}/etc/skel/.ciss/"
-  install -m 0600 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/root/.ciss/alias" "${TARGET}/etc/skel/.ciss/alias"
-  install -m 0600 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/root/.ciss/clean_logout.sh" "${TARGET}/etc/skel/.ciss/clean_logout.sh"
-  install -m 0600 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/root/.ciss/f2bchk.sh" "${TARGET}/etc/skel/.ciss/f2bchk.sh"
-  install -m 0600 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/root/.ciss/scan_libwrap" "${TARGET}/etc/skel/.ciss/scan_libwrap"
-  install -m 0600 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/root/.ciss/shortcuts" "${TARGET}/etc/skel/.ciss/shortcuts"
+  case "${VAR_USER_ROOT_SPECIFIC}" in
 
-  insert_comments "${TARGET}/etc/skel/.bashrc"
-  insert_comments "${TARGET}/etc/skel/.zshrc"
-  insert_comments "${TARGET}/etc/skel/.ciss/alias"
-  insert_comments "${TARGET}/etc/skel/.ciss/clean_logout.sh"
-  insert_comments "${TARGET}/etc/skel/.ciss/f2bchk.sh"
-  insert_comments "${TARGET}/etc/skel/.ciss/scan_libwrap"
-  insert_comments "${TARGET}/etc/skel/.ciss/shortcuts"
+    "ciss"   ) accounts_preparation_ciss ;;
 
-  ### In order to be able to copy/paste from vim, one needs to create a '.vimrc' in every home directory with the following content:
-  echo 'set clipboard=unnamed' >| "${TARGET}/etc/skel/.vimrc"
-  chmod 0600 "${TARGET}/etc/skel/.vimrc"
+    "physnet") accounts_preparation_physnet ;;
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+    "none"   ) do_log "info" "file_only" "4500() Account preparation [none] selected." ;;
+
+    *        ) do_log "warn" "file_only" "4500() Account preparation nothing selected. Keeping defaults." ;;
+
+  esac
+
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f accounts_preparation
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4500_user/4501_accounts_preparation_ciss.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# SPDX-Version: 3.0
+# SPDX-CreationInfo: 2025-06-17; WEIDNER, Marc S.; <msw@coresecret.dev>
+# SPDX-ExternalRef: GIT https://git.coresecret.dev/msw/CISS.debian.installer.git
+# SPDX-FileContributor: WEIDNER, Marc S.; Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency
+# SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2024-2025; WEIDNER, Marc S.; <msw@coresecret.dev>
+# SPDX-FileType: SOURCE
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: EUPL-1.2 OR LicenseRef-CCLA-1.0
+# SPDX-LicenseComment: This file is part of the CISS.debian.installer.secure framework.
+# SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
+# SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
+
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
+
+#######################################
+# Account preparation CISS specific.
+# Globals:
+#   RECOVERY
+#   TARGET
+#   VAR_RUN_RECOVERY
+#   VAR_SETUP_PATH
+# Arguments:
+#   None
+# Returns:
+#   0: on success
+#######################################
+accounts_preparation_ciss() {
+  ### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
+  declare     var_target="${TARGET}"
+
+  ### Check for TARGET / RECOVERY.
+  [[ "${VAR_RUN_RECOVERY}" == "true" ]] && var_target="${RECOVERY}"
+
+  install -d -m 0755 -- "${var_target}/etc/skel/.cache"
+  install -d -m 0755 -- "${var_target}/etc/skel/.config"
+  install -d -m 0755 -- "${var_target}/etc/skel/.local/share"
+  install -d -m 0755 -- "${var_target}/etc/skel/.local/state"
+  install -d -m 0755 -- "${var_target}/etc/skel/.local/state/bash"
+  install -d -m 0755 -- "${var_target}/etc/skel/.local/state/less"
+
+  install -m 0600 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/etc/skel/.ciss.bashrc" "${var_target}/etc/skel/.bashrc"
+  install -m 0600 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/etc/skel/.ciss.zshrc" "${var_target}/etc/skel/.zshrc"
+  install -m 0600 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/etc/skel/.zshenv" "${var_target}/etc/skel/.zshenv"
+  install -m 0600 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/etc/skel/.ciss/theme_eza_ciss.yml" "${var_target}/etc/skel/.ciss/"
+  install -m 0600 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/etc/skel/.ciss/alias" "${var_target}/etc/skel/.ciss/"
+  install -m 0700 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/etc/skel/.ciss/check_chrony.sh" "${var_target}/etc/skel/.ciss/"
+  install -m 0700 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/etc/skel/.ciss/clean_logout.sh" "${var_target}/etc/skel/.ciss/"
+  install -m 0600 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/etc/skel/.ciss/f2bchk" "${var_target}/etc/skel/.ciss/"
+  install -m 0600 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/etc/skel/.ciss/scan_libwrap" "${var_target}/etc/skel/.ciss/"
+  install -m 0600 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/etc/skel/.ciss/shortcuts" "${var_target}/etc/skel/.ciss/"
+
+  insert_comments "${var_target}/etc/skel/.bashrc"
+  insert_comments "${var_target}/etc/skel/.zshrc"
+  insert_comments "${var_target}/etc/skel/.ciss/alias"
+  insert_comments "${var_target}/etc/skel/.ciss/check_chrony.sh"
+  insert_comments "${var_target}/etc/skel/.ciss/clean_logout.sh"
+  insert_comments "${var_target}/etc/skel/.ciss/f2bchk"
+  insert_comments "${var_target}/etc/skel/.ciss/scan_libwrap"
+  insert_comments "${var_target}/etc/skel/.ciss/shortcuts"
+
+  guard_dir; return 0
+}
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f accounts_preparation_ciss
+# vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4500_user/4502_accounts_preparation_physnet.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# SPDX-Version: 3.0
+# SPDX-CreationInfo: 2025-06-17; WEIDNER, Marc S.; <msw@coresecret.dev>
+# SPDX-ExternalRef: GIT https://git.coresecret.dev/msw/CISS.debian.installer.git
+# SPDX-FileContributor: WEIDNER, Marc S.; Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency
+# SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2024-2025; WEIDNER, Marc S.; <msw@coresecret.dev>
+# SPDX-FileType: SOURCE
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: EUPL-1.2 OR LicenseRef-CCLA-1.0
+# SPDX-LicenseComment: This file is part of the CISS.debian.installer.secure framework.
+# SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
+# SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
+
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
+
+#######################################
+# Account preparation PHYSNET specific.
+# Globals:
+#   RECOVERY
+#   TARGET
+#   VAR_RUN_RECOVERY
+#   VAR_SETUP_PATH
+# Arguments:
+#   None
+# Returns:
+#   0: on success
+#######################################
+accounts_preparation_physnet() {
+  ### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
+  declare     var_target="${TARGET}"
+
+  ### Check for TARGET / RECOVERY.
+  [[ "${VAR_RUN_RECOVERY}" == "true" ]] && var_target="${RECOVERY}"
+
+  install -d -m 0755 -- "${var_target}/etc/skel/.cache"
+  install -d -m 0755 -- "${var_target}/etc/skel/.config"
+  install -d -m 0755 -- "${var_target}/etc/skel/.local/share"
+  install -d -m 0755 -- "${var_target}/etc/skel/.local/state"
+  install -d -m 0755 -- "${var_target}/etc/skel/.local/state/bash"
+  install -d -m 0755 -- "${var_target}/etc/skel/.local/state/less"
+
+  install -m 0600 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/etc/skel/.physnet.bashrc" "${var_target}/etc/skel/.bashrc"
+  install -m 0600 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/etc/skel/.physnet.zshrc" "${var_target}/etc/skel/.zshrc"
+  install -m 0600 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/etc/skel/.ciss/theme_eza_ciss.yml" "${var_target}/etc/skel/.ciss/"
+  install -m 0600 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/etc/skel/.ciss/alias" "${var_target}/etc/skel/.ciss/"
+  install -m 0700 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/etc/skel/.ciss/check_chrony.sh" "${var_target}/etc/skel/.ciss/"
+  install -m 0700 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/etc/skel/.ciss/clean_logout.sh" "${var_target}/etc/skel/.ciss/"
+  install -m 0600 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/etc/skel/.ciss/f2bchk" "${var_target}/etc/skel/.ciss/"
+  install -m 0600 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/etc/skel/.ciss/scan_libwrap" "${var_target}/etc/skel/.ciss/"
+  install -m 0600 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/etc/skel/.ciss/shortcuts" "${var_target}/etc/skel/.ciss/"
+
+  insert_comments "${var_target}/etc/skel/.bashrc"
+  insert_comments "${var_target}/etc/skel/.zshrc"
+  insert_comments "${var_target}/etc/skel/.ciss/alias"
+  insert_comments "${var_target}/etc/skel/.ciss/check_chrony.sh"
+  insert_comments "${var_target}/etc/skel/.ciss/clean_logout.sh"
+  insert_comments "${var_target}/etc/skel/.ciss/f2bchk"
+  insert_comments "${var_target}/etc/skel/.ciss/scan_libwrap"
+  insert_comments "${var_target}/etc/skel/.ciss/shortcuts"
+
+  guard_dir; return 0
+}
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f accounts_preparation_physnet
+# vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

func/cdi_4500_user/4510_accounts_hardening.sh

@@ -10,12 +10,14 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-guard_sourcing
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SOURCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Hardening accounts: Google TOTP, Wordlists, masking ttys, expiration of accounts.
 # Globals:
+#   RECOVERY
 #   TARGET
+#   VAR_RUN_RECOVERY
 #   VAR_SETUP_PATH
 # Arguments:
 #   None
@@ -26,25 +28,30 @@ accounts_hardening() {
   ### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
   declare -a  ary_security_pkgs=()
   declare -r  var_logfile="/root/.ciss/cdi/log/4510_accounts_hardening.log"
+  declare     var_target="${TARGET}"
 
-  chroot_logger "${TARGET}${var_logfile}"
+  ### Check for TARGET / RECOVERY.
+  [[ "${VAR_RUN_RECOVERY}" == "true" ]] && var_target="${RECOVERY}"
+
+  chroot_logger "${var_target}${var_logfile}"
 
   ### Installing Google TOTP, Wordlists.
   ary_security_pkgs=( "libpam-google-authenticator" "wamerican" "wbritish" "wfrench" "wngerman" )
-  chroot_script "${TARGET}" "
+  chroot_script "${var_target}" "
     export INITRD=No
+    [[ -r /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh ]] && . /root/ciss_xdg_tmp.sh
     apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends --no-install-suggests ${ary_security_pkgs[*]} 2>&1 | tee -a ${var_logfile}
-    echo ExitCode: \$? >> ${var_logfile}
   "
 
   ### Preparing 2fa hardening.
-  install -d -m 0755 -o root -g root "${TARGET}/etc/ciss"
-  touch "${TARGET}/etc/ciss/2fa.users"
-  chmod 0640 "${TARGET}/etc/ciss/2fa.users"
+  install -d -m 0755 -o root -g root "${var_target}/etc/ciss"
+  insert_header   "${var_target}/etc/ciss/2fa.map"
+  insert_comments "${var_target}/etc/ciss/2fa.map"
+  chmod 0644      "${var_target}/etc/ciss/2fa.map"
 
   ### Keep 'tty1' active, disable the rest.
   # shellcheck disable=SC2016
-  chroot_script "${TARGET}" '
+  chroot_script "${var_target}" '
     systemctl unmask getty@tty1.service
     systemctl enable getty@tty1.service
     for t in tty2 tty3 tty4 tty5 tty6; do
@@ -53,7 +60,7 @@ accounts_hardening() {
     systemctl mask serial-getty@.service
   '
 
-  chroot_script "${TARGET}" "
+  chroot_script "${var_target}" "
     if [[ ! -f /etc/securetty ]]; then
       touch /etc/securetty
       chmod 0600 /etc/securetty
@@ -62,42 +69,49 @@ accounts_hardening() {
   "
 
   ### Hardening file permissions.
-  chown root:root   "${TARGET}/etc/passwd" "${TARGET}/etc/group"
-  chown root:shadow "${TARGET}/etc/shadow" "${TARGET}/etc/gshadow"
-  chmod 0644 "${TARGET}/etc/passwd" "${TARGET}/etc/group"
-  chmod 0640 "${TARGET}/etc/shadow" "${TARGET}/etc/gshadow"
-  chmod 0600 "${TARGET}/etc/security/access.conf"
+  chown root:root   "${var_target}/etc/passwd" "${var_target}/etc/group"
+  chown root:shadow "${var_target}/etc/shadow" "${var_target}/etc/gshadow"
+  chmod 0644        "${var_target}/etc/passwd" "${var_target}/etc/group"
+  chmod 0640        "${var_target}/etc/shadow" "${var_target}/etc/gshadow"
+  chmod 0600        "${var_target}/etc/security/access.conf"
 
   ### Hardening '/etc/login.defs'.
-  mkdir -p "${TARGET}/root/.ciss/cdi/backup/etc"
-  mv "${TARGET}/etc/login.defs" "${TARGET}/root/.ciss/cdi/backup/etc/login.defs.bak"
-  insert_header   "${TARGET}/etc/login.defs"
-  insert_comments "${TARGET}/etc/login.defs"
-  cat "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/etc/login.defs" >> "${TARGET}/etc/login.defs"
+  mkdir -p        "${var_target}/root/.ciss/cdi/backup/etc"
+  mv              "${var_target}/etc/login.defs" "${var_target}/root/.ciss/cdi/backup/etc/login.defs.bak"
+  insert_header   "${var_target}/etc/login.defs"
+  insert_comments "${var_target}/etc/login.defs"
+  cat             "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/etc/login.defs" >> "${var_target}/etc/login.defs"
 
   ### Hardening '/etc/security/pwquality.conf'.
-  mkdir -p "${TARGET}/root/.ciss/cdi/backup/etc/security"
-  mv "${TARGET}/etc/security/pwquality.conf" "${TARGET}/root/.ciss/cdi/backup/etc/security/pwquality.conf.bak"
-  insert_header   "${TARGET}/etc/security/pwquality.conf"
-  insert_comments "${TARGET}/etc/security/pwquality.conf"
-  cat "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/etc/security/pwquality.cnf" >> "${TARGET}/etc/security/pwquality.conf"
+  mkdir -p        "${var_target}/root/.ciss/cdi/backup/etc/security"
+  mv              "${var_target}/etc/security/pwquality.conf" "${var_target}/root/.ciss/cdi/backup/etc/security/pwquality.conf.bak"
+  insert_header   "${var_target}/etc/security/pwquality.conf"
+  insert_comments "${var_target}/etc/security/pwquality.conf"
+  cat             "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/etc/security/pwquality.cnf" >> "${var_target}/etc/security/pwquality.conf"
 
   ### Hardening '/etc/security/access.conf'.
-  mv "${TARGET}/etc/security/access.conf" "${TARGET}/root/.ciss/cdi/backup/etc/security/access.conf.bak"
-  insert_header   "${TARGET}/etc/security/access.conf"
-  insert_comments "${TARGET}/etc/security/access.conf"
-  cat "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/etc/security/access.cnf" >> "${TARGET}/etc/security/access.conf"
+  mv              "${var_target}/etc/security/access.conf" "${var_target}/root/.ciss/cdi/backup/etc/security/access.conf.bak"
+  insert_header   "${var_target}/etc/security/access.conf"
+  insert_comments "${var_target}/etc/security/access.conf"
+  cat             "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/etc/security/access.cnf" >> "${var_target}/etc/security/access.conf"
 
   ### Hardening password expiration; defaults to 16,384 days.
   install -m 0700 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/chroot/hooks/4510_password_expiration.hooks.sh" \
-    "${TARGET}/root/.ciss/cdi/hooks/4510_password_expiration.hooks.sh"
+    "${var_target}/root/.ciss/cdi/hooks/4510_password_expiration.hooks.sh"
+
+  if ! chroot_script "${var_target}" "/root/.ciss/cdi/hooks/4510_password_expiration.hooks.sh" "emergency"; then
+
+    do_log "warn" "file_only" "4510() Command: [chroot_script ${var_target} /root/.ciss/cdi/hooks/4510_password_expiration.hooks.sh emergency] failed."
 
-  if ! chroot_script "${TARGET}" "/root/.ciss/cdi/hooks/4510_password_expiration.hooks.sh" "emergency"; then
-    do_log "warn" "file_only" "4510() Command: [chroot_script ${TARGET} /root/.ciss/cdi/hooks/4510_password_expiration.hooks.sh emergency] failed."
   else
-    do_log "debug" "file_only" "4510() Command: [chroot_script ${TARGET} /root/.ciss/cdi/hooks/4510_password_expiration.hooks.sh emergency] successful."
+
+    do_log "debug" "file_only" "4510() Command: [chroot_script ${var_target} /root/.ciss/cdi/hooks/4510_password_expiration.hooks.sh emergency] successful."
+
   fi
 
-  guard_dir && return 0
+  guard_dir; return 0
 }
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f accounts_hardening
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh