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V9.14.026.2026.06.12 
Signed-off-by: Marc S. Weidner <msw@coresecret.dev>
2026-06-12 04:52:18 +01:00

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Table of Contents

1. CISS.debian.live.builder

Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard
Debian Live Build Generator for hardened live environment and CISS Debian Installer
Master Version: 9.14
Build: V9.14.026.2026.06.12

2. CISS.debian.live.builder – Boot & Trust Chain (Technical Documentation)

Status: 2026-06-10
Audience: CICA CISO, CISS staff, technically proficient administrators
Summary: The CISS.debian.live.builder Live-ISO establishes a two-stage verification chain around the live root: after the CISS LUKS/dm-integrity container has been opened, and the live medium context has been exposed, 0030-ciss-verify-checksums verifies the mounted live-medium checksum manifest, detached signature, and signer fingerprint; later, 0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest verifies the signed rootfs attestation manifest, and the exact final SquashFS payload bytes copied into the decrypted LUKS mapper. UEFI Secure Boot can use either the default Microsoft/Debian shim chain, or a CISS-signed UKI chain for systems that trust the CISS Secure Boot key material.

3. Overview

  • Trust anchor: Pinned fingerprint (FPR) of the signing key embedded at build time in initramfs hooks.

  • Integrity and authenticity verification:

    1. Mounted live medium: After 0024-ciss-crypt-squash has opened the encrypted container and exposed /run/live/medium, verify sha512sum.txt using gpgv, FPR pinning, and checksum execution.
    2. Decrypted rootfs payload: Verify the external rootfs attestation manifest using gpgv and FPR pinning, then verify the exact SquashFS payload bytes from the decrypted mapper with sha512sum -c.

  • Storage-level confidentiality and keyed sector integrity: dm-crypt (AES-XTS-512) and dm-integrity (HMAC-SHA-512, 4 KiB).

  • Remotely unlock: CISS hardened and build dropbear, modern primitives only, no passwords, no agent/forwarding.

3.1. Secure Boot Profiles

The builder supports two built-time Secure Boot profiles:

  • debian-shim (default): keeps the broadly portable live-build path. The ISO is built as iso-hybrid with BIOS and UEFI bootloaders, and UEFI Secure Boot loads the Microsoft-signed Debian shim before Debian-signed GRUB.
  • ciss-uki: intended for amd64 systems whose firmware trusts the CISS Secure Boot public key through db, or a custom PK/KEK/db model. A late binary hook builds and signs a UKI from the final binary/live/vmlinuz-* and binary/live/initrd.img-* artifacts, then installs it as EFI/BOOT/BOOTX64.EFI inside binary/boot/grub/efi.img and mirrors it into the ISO EFI tree when live-build created one.

The ciss-uki path is:

UEFI firmware -> EFI/BOOT/BOOTX64.EFI (CISS-signed UKI) -> Linux

The private EFI signing key remains outside binary/, chroot/ and config/includes.*; the binary hooks fail if the CISS private Secure Boot key names are detected in those paths before live-build checksum generation.

4. Primitives & Parameters

Component Primitive / Parameter Purpose
LUKS2 aes-xts-plain64, --key-size 512, --sector-size 4096 Confidentiality (2×256-bit XTS)
dm-integrity hmac-sha512 (keyed), journal Keyed per-sector integrity for the opened mapping; not origin authenticity
PBKDF argon2id, --iter-time 1000 ms, --pbkdf-memory 262144, --pbkdf-parallel 1 Bounded key derivation cost for initramfs unlock
Signatures Ed25519 or RSA-4096 (FPR pinned) Public verifiability, non-repudiation
Verification gpgv --no-default-keyring No agent dependency in initramfs
Hash lists sha512sum format Deterministic content verification
Dropbear Modern KEX/AEAD (per localoptions.h) Minimal attack surface, remote unlock

5. Diagram: CISS Live ISO Boot Flow

flowchart TD
  subgraph Trusted HW Manufacturer
    0000["System Power On"] e00@--> 0010["CPU reset 0xFFFFFFF0, POST"];
    0010 e01@--> 0020["UEFI DXE Phase enumerates devices"];
    0020 e02@--> 0030["Secure Boot (if enabled): db, dbx, KEK, PK loaded from NVRAM"];
    e00@{ animation: fast }
    e01@{ animation: fast }
    e02@{ animation: fast }
  end

  subgraph Trusted Secure Boot
    0030 e03@--> |debian-shim| 0040["Secure Boot: load & verify \EFI\BOOT\BOOTX64.EFI (shim)"];
    0040 e04@--> |SUCCESSFUL| 0050["shim: load & verify \EFI\BOOT\GRUBX64.EFI"];
    0050 e05@--> 0060["GRUB: load vmlinuz + initrd.img, set cmdline"];
    0030 e06a@--> |ciss-uki| 0045["Secure Boot: load & verify \EFI\BOOT\BOOTX64.EFI (CISS UKI)"];
    0045 e06b@--> 0060;
    e03@{ animation: fast }
    e04@{ animation: fast }
    e05@{ animation: fast }
    e06a@{ animation: fast }
    e06b@{ animation: fast }

  end

  subgraph Trusted Live ISO
    0060 e06@--> 0070["Transfer Control to Kernel Entry Point"];
    0070 e07@--> 0080["Decompress Kernel"];
    0080 e08@--> 0090["/init Phase"];
    0090 e09@--> 0100["Starting CISS.hardened dropbear"];
    0100 e10@--> 0110["Executing live-boot, mounting ISO FS"];
    0110 e11@--> 0122["Executing 0022-ciss: Hardening tmpfs for OverlayFS upper/work"];
    0122 e12@--> 0124["Executing 0024-ciss: LUKS open (dm-crypt & integrity)"];
    0124 e13@--> |SUCCESSFUL| LUKS["Decrypted mapper exposed; livefs_root=/run/live/medium set"];
    LUKS e14@--> 0126["Executing 0026-ciss: Hardening early sysctls"];
    0126 e15@--> 0130["Executing 0030-ciss: Mounted live-medium checksum and signature verification"];
    0130 e16@--> |SUCCESSFUL| ROOT["9990-overlay: Mount SquashFS / OverlayFS"];
    ROOT e17@--> 0142["Executing 0042-ciss: Attestation of RootFS SquashFS payload"];
    0142 e18@--> 0145["init-bottom: stop CISS.hardened dropbear, tear down initramfs net"];
    0145 e19@--> 9050["Switching root (run-init / pivot_root)"];
    9050 e20@--> 9010["Starting /sbin/init -> systemd"];
    9010 e21@--> 9020["Starting Target Units"];
    0100    -.-> 0145;
    e06@{ animation: fast }
    e07@{ animation: fast }
    e08@{ animation: fast }
    e09@{ animation: fast }
    e10@{ animation: fast }
    e11@{ animation: fast }
    e12@{ animation: fast }
    e13@{ animation: fast }
    e14@{ animation: fast }
    e15@{ animation: fast }
    e16@{ animation: fast }
    e17@{ animation: fast }
    e18@{ animation: fast }
    e19@{ animation: fast }
    e20@{ animation: fast }
    e21@{ animation: fast }
  end

  subgraph Finale State
      9020 e24@--> 9030{{"CISS.debian.live.builder Waiting for Login"}};
      X{{"CISS.debian.live.builder Boot process halted"}};
      e24@{ animation: fast }
  end

0030 -- FAIL --> X;
0040 -- FAIL --> X;
0124 -- FAIL --> X;
0130 -- FAIL --> X;
0142 -- FAIL --> X;

6. Diagram: CISS Live ISO LUKS and dm-integrity layering

ISO medium
└── /live/ciss_rootfs.crypt
    └── LUKS2 / dm-crypt / dm-integrity
        └── /dev/mapper/crypt_liveiso
            └── SquashFS rootfs [SHA-512 over exact SquashFS byte stream]
                └── OverlayFS / running root filesystem

---
config:
      theme: forest
---
flowchart TD
0{{"Plain device: CD-ROM / USB"}} --> 1["ISO medium (ISO9660 + ESP)"];
1 --> 2["/live/ciss_rootfs.crypt"];
2 --> 3["LUKS2 / dm-crypt / dm-integrity"];
3 --> 4["/dev/mapper/crypt_liveiso"];
4 --> 5["SquashFS rootfs byte stream"];
5 --> 6["OverlayFS / running root filesystem"];

Note: dm-integrity provides keyed sector integrity for the opened LUKS mapping. It is not treated as origin authenticity; origin authenticity is provided by the signed checksum and rootfs attestation manifests plus pinned signer fingerprints.

7. CISS Live ISO LUKS Build-Time Core Steps

cryptsetup luksFormat \
  --batch-mode \
  --cipher aes-xts-plain64 \
  --integrity hmac-sha512 \
  --iter-time 1000 \
  --key-file "/proc/$$/fd/${KEYFD}" \
  --key-size 512 \
  --label crypt_liveiso \
  --luks2-keyslots-size 16777216 \
  --luks2-metadata-size 4194304 \
  --pbkdf argon2id \
  --pbkdf-memory 262144 \
  --pbkdf-parallel 1 \
  --sector-size 4096 \
  --type luks2 \
  --use-random \
  --verbose \
  "${LUKSFS}"

Signing keys: Ed25519 and RSA-4096; FPR pinned at build time in hooks. Signing keys are additionally signed by an offline GPG Root-CA (out-of-band trust chain).

8. Mounted Live-Medium Checksum Verification (CISS modified hook 0030-ciss-verify-checksums, live-bottom)

Goal: After 0024-ciss-crypt-squash has opened the encrypted container and exposed the live medium context, but before the final live root is accepted, verify:

  1. Detached signature of sha512sum.txt using gpgv against the embedded public key.
  2. FPR pinning: Parse VALIDSIG and require exact match with the build-time pinned FPR.
  3. Optional: Script self-IA – hash the executed hook and compare against the signed list (drift/bitrot detector).

Core call (initramfs):

/usr/bin/gpgv --keyring "$KEYFILE" --status-fd 1 sha512sum.txt.sig sha512sum.txt
# parse [GNUPG:] VALIDSIG ... <FPR> ...

9. Late Root-FS Attestation and dmsetup Health (CISS hook 0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest, called by 9990-overlay.sh)

Goal: After LUKS unlocked, validate the decrypted rootfs payload selected at build time and the actual mapping topology.

  • Attested boundary: the final binary/live/filesystem.squashfs byte stream, immediately before it is copied into /dev/mapper/crypt_liveiso by zzzz_ciss_crypt_squash.hook.binary.
  • Runtime verification boundary: the first byte count declared by # Bytes : Final filesystem.squashfs <bytes> in the signed manifest, read from the decrypted mapper. Any LUKS allocation slack after the SquashFS payload is intentionally excluded.
  • Attestation files: /run/live/medium/live/filesystem.squashfs.sha512sum.txt[.sig]
  • Key source: /etc/ciss/keys/*.gpg (accepted only if FPR == build-pin)

Core calls (initramfs):

# 1) Signature and FPR pin (no agent)
/usr/bin/gpgv --keyring "${KEYFILE}" --status-fd 1 "${SIG}" "${DATA}"

# 2) Mandatory content hash verification
dd if="${CDLB_MAPPER_DEV}" ... | /usr/bin/sha512sum -c /run/ciss-rootfs-attestation.sha512sum

10. Failure Policy (fail-closed, deterministic)

  • Abort on: missing checksum manifest, unsupported checksum manifest/tool state, failed checksum, empty checksum manifest, missing VALIDSIG, FPR mismatch, missing key/signature, malformed rootfs attestation manifest, or rootfs payload hash mismatch.
  • A signed rootfs manifest alone is not sufficient. Boot continues only after the manifest signature/FPR, and the decrypted SquashFS payload bytes both verify successfully.
  • dm-integrity protects the opened LUKS mapping against sector corruption or tampering under the LUKS key, but it is not treated as origin authenticity. Origin authenticity is provided by the signed rootfs attestation manifest and pinned signer fingerprint.

11. CISS hardened and built dropbear

• Public-key auth only, no passwords
• Modern KEX / AEAD (e.g., curve25519, sntrup761x25519-sha512, mlkem768x25519-sha256; AES-GCM)
• No agent / X11 / TCP forwarding, no SFTP
• Strict timeouts / keep-alives, restricted cipher / KEX set
• Port 44137 (per CISS convention)

Concrete selection compiled via localoptions.h at ISO build time.

12. Integration Points & Paths

13. Diagram: CISS Live ISO Build, Boot, and Run Time Trust Chain & Verification Paths

flowchart TD

  subgraph ISO Build Time
    A["Embed and pin GPG FPR (into ISO & RootFS as needed)"] e00@--> B["Generate mounted-medium sha512sum.txt and .sig"];
    B e01@--> C["Build filesystem.squashfs and wrap it into ciss_rootfs.crypt"];
    e00@{ animation: fast }
    e01@{ animation: fast }
  end

  subgraph ISO Boot Time
    C e02@--> D["0024 opens ciss_rootfs.crypt with LUKS2 and dm-integrity"];
    D e03@-->|SUCCESSFUL| E["Decrypted mapper exposed and livefs_root=/run/live/medium set"];
    E e04@--> F["0030 verifies mounted live-medium manifest, signature, FPR, and checksums"];
    F e05@-->|SUCCESSFUL| G["Mounted live medium verified"];
    G e06@--> H["9990-overlay mounts SquashFS / OverlayFS"];
    H e07@--> I["0042 verifies signed rootfs attestation manifest and FPR"];
    I e08@--> J["0042 verifies exact SquashFS bytes from /dev/mapper/crypt_liveiso"];
    J e09@-->|SUCCESSFUL| K["RootFS SquashFS payload attestation successful"];
    e02@{ animation: fast }
    e03@{ animation: fast }
    e04@{ animation: fast }
    e05@{ animation: fast }
    e06@{ animation: fast }
    e07@{ animation: fast }
    e08@{ animation: fast }
    e09@{ animation: fast }
  end

  subgraph ISO Run Time
    K e10@--> L{{"CISS.debian.live.builder ISO running"}};
    X{{"CISS.debian.live.builder Boot process halted"}};
    e10@{ animation: fast }
  end

D -- FAIL --> X;
F -- FAIL --> X;
I -- FAIL --> X;
J -- FAIL --> X;

14. Closing Remarks

This achieves a portable, self-contained trust chain without a Microsoft-db, providing strong protection at the mounted-medium and decrypted-rootfs-payload boundaries. The dual-verification phases make the state transparent and deterministic without treating dm-integrity, LUKS, or private infrastructure as substitutes for origin authenticity.

no tracking | no logging | no advertising | no profiling | no bullshit

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