V9.14.028.2026.06.18

Signed-off-by: Marc S. Weidner <msw@coresecret.dev>

.archive/0030-ciss-verify-checksums

@@ -46,20 +46,24 @@ Verify_checksums() {
 
   LIVE_VERIFY_CHECKSUMS_SIGNATURES="false"
 
-  _KEYFILE=""
+  _CHECKSUM_LOG_DIR="${LIVE_VERIFY_CHECKSUMS_LOG_DIR:-/run}"
 
-  _MANIFEST_FOUND="false"
+  _KEYFILE=""
 
   _MP=""
 
-  _RETURN_PGP=""
+  _MANIFEST_FOUND="false"
 
-  _RETURN_SHA=""
+  _TOOL_FOUND="false"
 
   _VERIFICATION_EXECUTED="false"
 
   _VERIFICATION_SUCCEEDED="false"
 
+  _RETURN_PGP=""
+
+  _RETURN_SHA=""
+
   ### Parse commandline arguments ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   # shellcheck disable=SC2154
   for _PARAMETER in ${LIVE_BOOT_CMDLINE}; do
@@ -118,6 +122,14 @@ Verify_checksums() {
 
   done
 
+  if [ "${LIVE_VERIFY_CHECKSUMS_SIGNATURES}" = "true" ] && [ -z "${_KEYFILE}" ]; then
+
+    printf "\e[91m[FATAL] No pinned GPG key file found while checksum signature verification is enabled. \n\e[0m"
+    sleep 8
+    panic "No pinned GPG key file found while checksum signature verification is enabled."
+
+  fi
+
   # shellcheck disable=SC2164
   cd "${_MOUNTPOINT}"
 
@@ -215,11 +227,13 @@ Verify_checksums() {
       if [ -e "${_CHECKSUM}" ]; then
 
         _MANIFEST_FOUND="true"
+
         printf "\e[95m[INFO] Found: [%s] ... \n\e[0m" "${_CHECKSUM}"
 
         if [ -e "/usr/bin/${_DIGEST}sum" ]; then
 
-          _VERIFICATION_EXECUTED="true"
+          _TOOL_FOUND="true"
+
           printf "\e[95m[INFO] Found: [%s] ... \n\e[0m" "/usr/bin/${_DIGEST}sum"
 
           if [ "${LIVE_VERIFY_CHECKSUMS_SIGNATURES}" = "true" ]; then
@@ -247,19 +261,34 @@ Verify_checksums() {
           fi
 
           # shellcheck disable=SC2312
-          if grep -v '^#' "${_CHECKSUM}" | /usr/bin/"${_DIGEST}"sum -c > "${_TTY}"; then
+          _VERIFICATION_EXECUTED="true"
+          _CHECKSUM_LOG="${_CHECKSUM_LOG_DIR}/ciss-${_DIGEST}sum-check.log"
+          if ! grep -v '^#' "${_CHECKSUM}" | grep -q '[^[:space:]]'; then
+
+            _RETURN_SHA="254"
+            : > "${_CHECKSUM_LOG}"
+            printf "\e[91m[FATAL] Checksum manifest has no checksum entries: [%s] \n\e[0m" "${_CHECKSUM}"
+
+          elif grep -v '^#' "${_CHECKSUM}" | /usr/bin/"${_DIGEST}"sum -c > "${_CHECKSUM_LOG}" 2>&1; then
 
             _RETURN_SHA="${?}"
-            _VERIFICATION_SUCCEEDED="true"
+            cat "${_CHECKSUM_LOG}" > "${_TTY}"
             printf "\e[92m[INFO] Found: [%s] successful verified: [%s] \n\e[0m" "/usr/bin/${_DIGEST}sum" "${_CHECKSUM}"
 
           else
 
             _RETURN_SHA="${?}"
+            cat "${_CHECKSUM_LOG}" > "${_TTY}"
             printf "\e[91m[FATAL] Found: [%s] unsuccessful verified: [%s] \n\e[0m" "/usr/bin/${_DIGEST}sum" "${_CHECKSUM}"
 
           fi
 
+          if { [ "${_RETURN_PGP}" = "0" ] || [ "${_RETURN_PGP}" = "na" ]; } && [ "${_RETURN_SHA}" = "0" ]; then
+
+            _VERIFICATION_SUCCEEDED="true"
+
+          fi
+
           # Stop after the first verification.
           break 2
 
@@ -281,28 +310,31 @@ Verify_checksums() {
 
   if [ "${_MANIFEST_FOUND}" != "true" ]; then
 
-    printf "\e[91m[FATAL] No supported checksum manifest found. \n\e[0m"
+    printf "\e[91m[FATAL] No supported checksum manifest found. Checksum verification is fail-closed. \n\e[0m"
     sleep 8
-    panic "No supported checksum manifest found."
+    panic "No supported checksum manifest found. Checksum verification is fail-closed."
-    return 1
+
+  fi
+
+  if [ "${_TOOL_FOUND}" != "true" ]; then
+
+    printf "\e[91m[FATAL] Checksum manifest found, but no supported checksum tool is available. Checksum verification is fail-closed. \n\e[0m"
+    sleep 8
+    panic "Checksum manifest found, but no supported checksum tool is available. Checksum verification is fail-closed."
 
   fi
 
   if [ "${_VERIFICATION_EXECUTED}" != "true" ]; then
 
-    printf "\e[91m[FATAL] No supported checksum verification tool was available. \n\e[0m"
+    printf "\e[91m[FATAL] Checksum verification was not executed. Checksum verification is fail-closed. \n\e[0m"
     sleep 8
-    panic "No supported checksum verification tool was available."
+    panic "Checksum verification was not executed. Checksum verification is fail-closed."
-    return 1
 
   fi
 
   if [ "${_VERIFICATION_SUCCEEDED}" != "true" ]; then
 
-    printf "\e[91m[FATAL] No supported checksum manifest was verified successfully. \n\e[0m"
+    printf "\e[91m[FATAL] Checksum verification did not complete successfully. Evaluating fail-closed failure state. \n\e[0m"
-    sleep 8
-    panic "No supported checksum manifest was verified successfully."
-    return 1
 
   fi
 
@@ -329,7 +361,6 @@ Verify_checksums() {
       printf "\e[91m[FATAL] CDLB modified: [%s] done. \n\e[0m" "${CDLB_SCRIPT_FULL}"
       sleep 8
       panic "Verification of [GPG signature] file successful, while verification of [sha checksum] file failed."
-      return 1
       ;;
 
     *",0")
@@ -337,7 +368,6 @@ Verify_checksums() {
       printf "\e[91m[FATAL] CDLB modified: [%s] done. \n\e[0m" "${CDLB_SCRIPT_FULL}"
       sleep 8
       panic "Verification of [GPG signature] file failed, while verification of [sha checksum] file successful."
-      return 1
       ;;
 
     "na,"*)
@@ -345,14 +375,12 @@ Verify_checksums() {
       printf "\e[91m[FATAL] CDLB modified: [%s] done. \n\e[0m" "${CDLB_SCRIPT_FULL}"
       sleep 8
       panic "Verification of checksum file failed."
-      return 1
       ;;
 
     *)
-      printf "\e[91m[FATAL] Checksum verification ended in an unsupported state. \n\e[0m"
+      printf "\e[91m[FATAL] Unknown checksum verification state: [%s,%s]. \n\e[0m" "${_RETURN_PGP:-unset}" "${_RETURN_SHA:-unset}"
       sleep 8
-      panic "Checksum verification ended in an unsupported state."
+      panic "Unknown checksum verification state. Checksum verification is fail-closed."
-      return 1
       ;;
 
   esac

.archive/generate_PRIVATE_trixie_0.yaml

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.live.builder
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-# Version Master V9.14.022.2026.06.10
+# Version Master V9.14.028.2026.06.18
 
 name: 🔐 Generating a Private Live ISO TRIXIE.
 

.archive/generate_PRIVATE_trixie_1.yaml

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.live.builder
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-# Version Master V9.14.022.2026.06.10
+# Version Master V9.14.028.2026.06.18
 
 name: 🔐 Generating a Private Live ISO TRIXIE.
 

.archive/generate_PUBLIC_iso.yaml

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.live.builder
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-# Version Master V9.14.022.2026.06.10
+# Version Master V9.14.028.2026.06.18
 
 name: 💙 Generating a PUBLIC Live ISO.
 

.gitea/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/ISSUE_TEMPLATE.yaml

@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ body:
     attributes:
       label: "Version"
       description: "Which version are you running? Use `./ciss_live_builder.sh -v`."
-      placeholder: "e.g., Master V9.14.022.2026.06.10"
+      placeholder: "e.g., Master V9.14.028.2026.06.18"
     validations:
       required: true
 

.gitea/TODO/dockerfile

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.live.builder
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-# Version Master V9.14.022.2026.06.10
+# Version Master V9.14.028.2026.06.18
 
 FROM debian:bookworm
 

.gitea/TODO/render-md-to-html.yaml

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.live.builder
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-# Version Master V9.14.022.2026.06.10
+# Version Master V9.14.028.2026.06.18
 
 name: 🔁 Render README.md to README.html.
 

.gitea/trigger/t_generate_PRIVATE_trixie_0.yaml

@@ -11,5 +11,5 @@
 
 build:
   counter: 1023
-  version: V9.14.022.2026.06.10
+  version: V9.14.028.2026.06.18
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=yaml

.gitea/trigger/t_generate_PUBLIC.yaml

@@ -11,5 +11,5 @@
 
 build:
   counter: 1023
-  version: V9.14.022.2026.06.10
+  version: V9.14.028.2026.06.18
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=yaml

.gitea/trigger/t_generate_dns.yaml

@@ -11,5 +11,5 @@
 
 build:
   counter: 1023
-  version: V9.14.022.2026.06.10
+  version: V9.14.028.2026.06.18
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=yaml

.gitea/workflows/generate_PRIVATE_trixie_0.yaml

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.live.builder
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-# Version Master V9.14.022.2026.06.10
+# Version Master V9.14.028.2026.06.18
 
 name: 🔐 Generating a Private Live ISO TRIXIE.
 

.gitea/workflows/generate_PRIVATE_trixie_1.yaml

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.live.builder
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-# Version Master V9.14.022.2026.06.10
+# Version Master V9.14.028.2026.06.18
 
 name: 🔐 Generating a Private Live ISO TRIXIE.
 

.gitea/workflows/generate_PUBLIC_iso.yaml

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.live.builder
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-# Version Master V9.14.022.2026.06.10
+# Version Master V9.14.028.2026.06.18
 
 name: 💙 Generating a PUBLIC Live ISO.
 

.gitea/workflows/linter_char_scripts.yaml

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.live.builder
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-# Version Master V9.14.022.2026.06.10
+# Version Master V9.14.028.2026.06.18
 
 # Gitea Workflow: Shell-Script Linting
 #

.gitea/workflows/render-dnssec-status.yaml

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.live.builder
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-# Version Master V9.14.022.2026.06.10
+# Version Master V9.14.028.2026.06.18
 
 name: 🛡️ Retrieve DNSSEC status of coresecret.dev.
 

.gitea/workflows/render-dot-to-png.yaml

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.live.builder
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-# Version Master V9.14.022.2026.06.10
+# Version Master V9.14.028.2026.06.18
 
 name: 🔁 Render Graphviz Diagrams.
 

.version.properties

@@ -15,5 +15,5 @@ properties_SPDX-License-Identifier="LicenseRef-CNCL-1.1 OR LicenseRef-CCLA-1.1 "
 properties_SPDX-LicenseComment="This file is part of the CISS.debian.installer.secure framework."
 properties_SPDX-PackageName="CISS.debian.live.builder"
 properties_SPDX-Security-Contact="security@coresecret.eu"
-properties_version="V9.14.022.2026.06.10"
+properties_version="V9.14.028.2026.06.18"
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=conf

CISS.debian.live.builder.spdx

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ Creator: Person: Marc S. Weidner (Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency)
 Created: 2025-05-07T12:00:00Z
 Package: CISS.debian.live.builder
 PackageName: CISS.debian.live.builder
-PackageVersion: Master V9.14.022.2026.06.10
+PackageVersion: Master V9.14.028.2026.06.18
 PackageSupplier: Organization: Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency
 PackageDownloadLocation: https://git.coresecret.dev/msw/CISS.debian.live.builder
 PackageHomePage: https://git.coresecret.dev/msw/CISS.debian.live.builder

README.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 gitea: none
 include_toc: true
 ---
-[![Static Badge](https://badges.coresecret.dev/badge/Release-V9.14.022.2026.06.10-white?style=plastic&logo=linux&logoColor=white&logoSize=auto&label=Release&color=%23FCC624)](https://git.coresecret.dev/msw/CISS.debian.live.builder)
+[![Static Badge](https://badges.coresecret.dev/badge/Release-V9.14.028.2026.06.18-white?style=plastic&logo=linux&logoColor=white&logoSize=auto&label=Release&color=%23FCC624)](https://git.coresecret.dev/msw/CISS.debian.live.builder)
  
 [![Static Badge](https://badges.coresecret.dev/badge/Licence-EUPL1.2-white?style=plastic&logo=europeanunion&logoColor=white&logoSize=auto&label=Licence&color=%23003399)](https://eupl.eu/1.2/en/)  
 [![Static Badge](https://badges.coresecret.dev/badge/opensourceinitiative-Compliant-white?style=plastic&logo=opensourceinitiative&logoColor=white&logoSize=auto&label=OSI&color=%233DA639)](https://opensource.org/license/eupl-1-2)  
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ include_toc: true
 **Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard**<br>
 *Debian Live Build Generator for hardened live environment and CISS Debian Installer*<br>
 **Master Version**: 9.14<br>
-**Build**: V9.14.022.2026.06.10<br>
+**Build**: V9.14.028.2026.06.18<br>
 
 **CISS.debian.live.builder — First of its own.**<br>
 **World-class CIA: Designed, handcrafted, and powered by Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency.**
@@ -46,9 +46,10 @@ Beyond a conventional live system, **CISS.debian.live.builder** assembles a **fu
 in a single, deterministic build step: a LUKS2 container backed by `dm-integrity` hosting the SquashFS root filesystem, combined
 with a hardened initramfs chain including a dedicated Dropbear build pipeline for remote LUKS unlock. The resulting ISO ships
 with a hardened kernel configuration, strict sysctl and network tuning, pre-configured SSH hardening and fail2ban, and a
-customised `verify-checksums` path providing both ISO-edge verification and runtime attestation of the live root. All components
+customised `verify-checksums` path providing fail-closed mounted-medium verification plus runtime attestation of the exact
-are aligned with the `CISS.debian.installer` baseline, ensuring a unified cryptographic and security posture from first boot to 
+final SquashFS payload bytes selected for the encrypted live root. All components are aligned with the `CISS.debian.installer`
-an installed system. For an overview of the entire build process, see:
+baseline, ensuring a unified cryptographic and security posture from first boot to an installed system. For an overview of the
+entire build process, see:
 **[MAN_CISS_ISO_BOOT_CHAIN.md](docs/MAN_CISS_ISO_BOOT_CHAIN.md)**
 
 When built with the ``--dhcp-centurion`` profile, the live system ships with a strict network and resolver policy: 
@@ -60,12 +61,17 @@ and spoofing surfaces.
 
 Internally, the builder employs a dedicated secret-handling pipeline backed by a tmpfs-only secrets directory
 (`/dev/shm/cdlb_secrets`). Sensitive material such as root passwords, SSH keys, and signing keys never appears on the command
-line, is guarded by strict `0400 root:root` permissions, and any symlink inside the secret path is treated as a hard failure
+line. The secret root must be an existing `root:root` tmpfs or ramfs directory with `0700` permissions and no symlinks or
-that aborts the run. Critical code paths temporarily disable Bash xtrace so that credentials never leak into debug logs, and
+special files below it. Filename-only secret arguments are rejected when they contain path separators, traversal names, shell
-transient secret files are shredded (`shred -fzu`) as soon as they are no longer needed. GNUPG homes used for signing are
+metacharacters, or unsafe leading dashes. Critical code paths temporarily disable Bash xtrace so that credentials never leak
-wiped, unencrypted chroot artifacts and includes are removed after `lb build`, and the final artifact is reduced to the
+into debug logs; the final exact-value sanitization pass runs only after xtrace has been stopped and its debug file descriptor
-encrypted SquashFS inside the LUKS2 container. At runtime, LUKS passphrases in the live ISO and installer are transported via
+has been closed, then redacts still-known secret values from debug, variable, and error logs as defense in depth. Transient
-named pipes inside the initramfs instead of process arguments, further minimizing exposure in process listings.
+secret files are shredded (`shred -fzu`) as soon as they are no longer needed; this is best-effort on SSD/NVMe media, so the
+architecture relies primarily on tmpfs for secret staging. GNUPG homes used for signing are wiped,
+unencrypted chroot artifacts and includes are removed after `lb build`, and cleanup is intentionally destructive only inside
+the exact build directory carrying the `.ciss-live-builder-owned` marker. At runtime, LUKS passphrases in the live ISO and
+installer are transported via named pipes inside the initramfs instead of process arguments, further minimizing exposure in
+process listings.
 
 Check out more leading world-class services powered by Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency:
 * [CenturionDNS Resolver](https://eddns.eu/)
@@ -123,7 +129,7 @@ lockstep avoids those mismatches and gives me predictable artifacts across build
 
 The live ISO acts as a sealed, immutable execution environment. All relevant configuration, all installation logic, and all 
 security decisions are rendered into the image at build time and treated as read-only at runtime. On top of that logical 
- immutability, I now layer cryptographic protection of the live root file system itself. The live image contains a LUKS2 container
+immutability, I now layer cryptographic protection of the live root file system itself. The live image contains a LUKS2 container
 file with dm-integrity that wraps the SquashFS payload. The initramfs knows how to locate this container, unlock it, verify its 
 integrity, and then present the decrypted SquashFS as the root component of an OverlayFS stack. The detailed boot and 
 verification chain is documented separately in **[CISS ISO Boot Chain](docs/MAN_CISS_ISO_BOOT_CHAIN.md)**<br>
@@ -131,7 +137,7 @@ verification chain is documented separately in **[CISS ISO Boot Chain](docs/MAN_
 In compact form, my expectations for the system are:<br>
 
 * Every bit that matters for boot and provisioning is covered by checksums that I control and that are signed with keys under my solely authoritative HSM.
-* The live root runs out of a LUKS2 dm-integrity container so that a tampered or bit-rotted SquashFS never becomes a trusted root.
+* The live root runs out of a LUKS2 dm-integrity container, and the final SquashFS byte stream copied into the decrypted mapper is verified against a signed rootfs attestation manifest, so a tampered or bit-rotted SquashFS never becomes a trusted root. During boot, `0024-ciss-crypt-squash` copies `/live/filesystem.squashfs.sha512sum.txt[.sig]` from the real ISO medium to `/run/ciss-rootfs-attestation/`; `0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest` then verifies that cached manifest/signature pair against `/etc/ciss/keys/<FPR>.gpg` and the exact bytes read from `/dev/mapper/crypt_liveiso`.
 * Verification steps are not advisory. Any anomaly causes a hard abort during boot.
 * After the live environment has reached a stable, verified state, it can hand off to ``CISS.debian.installer``. The installer operates from the same image, does not pull random payloads from the internet, and keeps the target system behind a hardened firewall until the entire provisioning process has completed.
 * For unattended, headless scenarios I also support builds where the target system is installed without ever exposing a shell over the console. After installation and reboot, the machine waits for a decryption passphrase via an embedded Dropbear SSH instance in the initramfs, limited to public key authentication and guarded by strict cryptographic policies. In such variants even ``/boot`` can be encrypted, with GRUB taking care of unlocking the boot partition.
@@ -175,7 +181,7 @@ installer toolchain.
 
 This project adheres strictly to a structured versioning scheme following the pattern x.y.z-Date.
 
-Example: `V9.14.022.2026.06.10`
+Example: `V9.14.028.2026.06.18`
 
 `x.y.z` represents major (x), minor (y), and patch (z) version increments.
 
@@ -369,7 +375,7 @@ For further details see: **[90-ciss-local.hardened.md](docs/documentation/90-cis
   `--primordial-ssh <port>` configure the CDI Primordial overlay clone. `--primordial-ssh` also adds an outgoing-only UFW TCP
   exception for a bootstrap/recovery SSH port when the live system's UFW outgoing policy is `deny`. It adds no incoming firewall
   rule and does not replace `--ssh-port`. If the requested port already matches an existing outgoing SSH exception, the current
-  hook still emits the requested labelled rule because this repository has no separate UFW rule deduplication layer.
+  hook still emits the requested labeled rule because this repository has no separate UFW rule deduplication layer.
 * **Rationale**: Implements a default-deny firewall, reducing lateral movement and data exfiltration risks immediately after
   deployment.
 
@@ -493,10 +499,13 @@ To use **``CISS.debian.live.builder``** as intended, the following baseline is e
    
 2. Preparation:
    1. Ensure you are root.
-   2. Create the build directory `mkdir /opt/cdlb` and the tmpfs secrets directory `mkdir /dev/shm/cdlb_secrets`.
+   2. Create the build directory `install -d -m 0755 -o root -g root /opt/cdlb` and the tmpfs secrets directory
+      `install -d -m 0700 -o root -g root /dev/shm/cdlb_secrets`.
    3. Place your desired SSH public key in the `authorized_keys` file, for example, in the `/dev/shm/cdlb_secrets` directory.
    4. Place your desired Password in the `password.txt` file, for example, in the `/dev/shm/cdlb_secrets` directory.
-   5. Make any other changes you need to.
+   5. Keep files below `/dev/shm/cdlb_secrets` as regular, non-symlink files owned by `root:root`; the builder normalizes them
+      to `0400` before use.
+   6. Make any other changes you need to.
 
 3. Run the config builder script `./ciss_live_builder.sh` and the integrated `lb build` command (example):
 
@@ -505,7 +514,7 @@ To use **``CISS.debian.live.builder``** as intended, the following baseline is e
    timestamp=$(date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S%z)
    ./ciss_live_builder.sh \
      --architecture amd64 \
-     --autobuild=6.16.3+deb13-amd64 \
+     --autobuild=7.0.10+deb13-amd64 \
      --build-directory /opt/cdlb \
      --cdi \
      --change-splash hexagon \
@@ -525,9 +534,9 @@ To use **``CISS.debian.live.builder``** as intended, the following baseline is e
      --signing_key_pass=signing_key_pass.txt \
      --signing_key=signing_key.asc \
      --ssh-port 4242 \
-     --primordial-url https://git.coresecret.dev/ahz/PhysNet.primordial.git \
+     --primordial-key SSH-key-filename-for-Primordial-overlay-clone \
-     --primordial-key id--git.coresecret.dev--PhysNet.primordial_deploy--ed25519--newton--2025-10 \
+     --primordial-ssh SSH-port-for-Primordial-overlay-clone \
-     --primordial-ssh 42842 \
+     --primordial-url URL-to-Primordial-overlay-clone \
      --ssh-pubkey /dev/shm/cdlb_secrets \
      --sshfp \
      --trixie
@@ -559,10 +568,13 @@ preview it or run it.
 
 2. Preparation:
    1. Ensure you are root.
-   2. Create the build directory `mkdir /opt/cdlb` and the tmpfs secrets directory `mkdir /dev/shm/cdlb_secrets`.
+   2. Create the build directory `install -d -m 0755 -o root -g root /opt/cdlb` and the tmpfs secrets directory
+      `install -d -m 0700 -o root -g root /dev/shm/cdlb_secrets`.
    3. Place your desired SSH public key in the `authorized_keys` file, for example, in the `/dev/shm/cdlb_secrets` directory.
    4. Place your desired Password in the `password.txt` file, for example, in the `/dev/shm/cdlb_secrets` directory.
-   5. Copy and edit the sample and set your options (no spaces around commas in lists): 
+   5. Keep files below `/dev/shm/cdlb_secrets` as regular, non-symlink files owned by `root:root`; the builder normalizes them
+      to `0400` before use.
+   6. Copy and edit the sample and set your options (no spaces around commas in lists):
 
     ````bash
     cp config.mk.sample config.mk
@@ -577,9 +589,9 @@ preview it or run it.
     SSH_PUBKEY=/dev/shm/cdlb_secrets
 
     # Optional
-    PRIMORDIAL_URL=https://git.coresecret.dev/ahz/PhysNet.primordial.git
+    PRIMORDIAL_KEY=SSH-key-filename-for-Primordial-overlay-clone
-    PRIMORDIAL_KEY=id--git.coresecret.dev--PhysNet.primordial_deploy--ed25519--newton--2025-10
+    PRIMORDIAL_SSH_PORT=SSH-port-for-Primordial-overlay-clone
-    PRIMORDIAL_SSH_PORT=42842
+    PRIMORDIAL_URL=URL-to-Primordial-overlay-clone
     PROVIDER_NETCUP_IPV6=2001:cdb::1
     # comma-separated; IPv6 in [] is fine
     JUMP_HOSTS=[2001:db8::1],[2001:db8::2]     

REPOSITORY.md

@@ -8,13 +8,13 @@ include_toc: true
 **Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard**<br>
 *Debian Live Build Generator for hardened live environment and CISS Debian Installer*<br>
 **Master Version**: 9.14<br>
-**Build**: V9.14.022.2026.06.10<br>
+**Build**: V9.14.028.2026.06.18<br>
 
 # 2. Repository Structure
 
 **Project:** Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard (CISS) — Debian Live Builder  
 **Branch:** `master`  
-**Repository State:** Master Version **9.14**, Build **V9.14.022.2026.06.10** (as of 2025-10-11)
+**Repository State:** Master Version **9.14**, Build **V9.14.028.2026.06.18** (as of 2025-10-11)
 
 ## 3.1. Top-Level Layout
 

ciss.secureboot/private/README.md

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ include_toc: true
 **Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard**<br>
 *Debian Live Build Generator for hardened live environment and CISS Debian Installer*<br>
 **Master Version**: 9.14<br>
-**Build**: V9.14.022.2026.06.10<br>
+**Build**: V9.14.028.2026.06.18<br>
 
 # 2. CISS Secure Boot Private Material
 

ciss.secureboot/public/README.md

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ include_toc: true
 **Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard**<br>
 *Debian Live Build Generator for hardened live environment and CISS Debian Installer*<br>
 **Master Version**: 9.14<br>
-**Build**: V9.14.022.2026.06.10<br>
+**Build**: V9.14.028.2026.06.18<br>
 
 # 2. CISS Secure Boot Public Material
 

ciss_live_builder.sh

@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ declare -grx  VAR_SETUP_PATH="$(cd "$(dirname "${0}")" && pwd)"          # '/roo
 declare -grx  VAR_TMP_SECRET="/dev/shm/cdlb_secrets"                     # Fixed tmpfs path to store securely build artifacts.
 declare -grx  VAR_WORKDIR="$(dirname "${VAR_SETUP_FULL}")"               # '/root/git/CISS.debian.live.builder'
 
+clear
+
 ### PRELIMINARY CHECKS.
 ### No ash, dash, ksh, sh.
 # shellcheck disable=SC2292
@@ -116,7 +118,6 @@ for arg in "$@"; do case "${arg,,}" in -v|--version) . ./lib/lib_version.sh   ;
 for arg in "$@"; do case "${arg,,}" in -d|--debug)   . ./meta_sources_debug.sh; debugger "${@}";; esac; done
 
 ### ALL CHECKS DONE. READY TO START THE SCRIPT.
-clear
 printf '\033[95m'
 cat bootscreen.txt
 printf '\033[0m\n'
@@ -143,6 +144,7 @@ find "${VAR_TMP_SECRET}" -type f -exec chown root:root {} +
 [[ "${VAR_SETUP}" == true ]] && {
   source_guard "./lib/lib_arg_parser.sh"
   source_guard "./lib/lib_arg_priority_check.sh"
+  source_guard "./lib/lib_build_dir_safety.sh"
   source_guard "./lib/lib_boot_screen.sh"
   source_guard "./lib/lib_cdi.sh"
   source_guard "./lib/lib_change_splash.sh"
@@ -160,6 +162,7 @@ find "${VAR_TMP_SECRET}" -type f -exec chown root:root {} +
   source_guard "./lib/lib_clean_screen.sh"
   source_guard "./lib/lib_clean_up.sh"
   source_guard "./lib/lib_copy_integrity.sh"
+  source_guard "./lib/lib_debug_sanitize.sh"
   source_guard "./lib/lib_gnupg.sh"
   source_guard "./lib/lib_hardening_root_pw.sh"
   source_guard "./lib/lib_hardening_ssh_tcp.sh"
@@ -173,6 +176,7 @@ find "${VAR_TMP_SECRET}" -type f -exec chown root:root {} +
   source_guard "./lib/lib_provider_netcup.sh"
   source_guard "./lib/lib_run_analysis.sh"
   source_guard "./lib/lib_sanitizer.sh"
+  source_guard "./lib/lib_secret_validation.sh"
   source_guard "./lib/lib_secureboot_profile.sh"
   source_guard "./lib/lib_trap_on_err.sh"
   source_guard "./lib/lib_trap_on_exit.sh"
@@ -180,22 +184,6 @@ find "${VAR_TMP_SECRET}" -type f -exec chown root:root {} +
   source_guard "./lib/lib_usage.sh"
 }
 
-### PRE-SCAN SECURE BOOT PROFILE FOR BUILD-HOST PACKAGE CHECKS.
-### Formal validation still happens in arg_parser().
-for ((idx=0; idx<${#ARY_PARAM_ARRAY[@]}; idx++)); do
-  case "${ARY_PARAM_ARRAY[idx],,}" in
-    --secure-boot-profile=*)
-      declare -gx VAR_CISS_SECUREBOOT_PROFILE="${ARY_PARAM_ARRAY[idx]#*=}"
-      ;;
-    --secure-boot-profile)
-      if [[ -n "${ARY_PARAM_ARRAY[idx + 1]:-}" ]]; then
-        declare -gx VAR_CISS_SECUREBOOT_PROFILE="${ARY_PARAM_ARRAY[idx + 1]}"
-      fi
-      ;;
-  esac
-done
-unset idx
-
 ### CHECKING REQUIRED PACKAGES.
 check_pkgs
 
@@ -221,9 +209,30 @@ if ! ${VAR_HANDLER_AUTOBUILD}; then boot_screen; fi
 if ! ${VAR_HANDLER_AUTOBUILD}; then printf "XXX\nInitialization done ... \nXXX\n15\n" >&3; fi
 
 ### Updating Status of Dialog Gauge Bar.
-if ! ${VAR_HANDLER_AUTOBUILD}; then printf "XXX\nActivate traps ... \nXXX\n50\n" >&3; fi
+if ! ${VAR_HANDLER_AUTOBUILD}; then printf "XXX\nValidating secrets artifacts ... \nXXX\n20\n" >&3; fi
+validate_secret_root "${VAR_TMP_SECRET}"
+harden_secret_root_files "${VAR_TMP_SECRET}"
 
-### Following the CISS Bash naming and ordering scheme:
+### Updating Status of Dialog Gauge Bar.
+if ! ${VAR_HANDLER_AUTOBUILD}; then printf "XXX\nPre-Scan Secure-Boot ... \nXXX\n30\n" >&3; fi
+### PRE-SCAN SECURE BOOT PROFILE FOR BUILD-HOST PACKAGE CHECKS.
+### Formal validation still happens in arg_parser().
+for ((idx=0; idx<${#ARY_PARAM_ARRAY[@]}; idx++)); do
+  case "${ARY_PARAM_ARRAY[idx],,}" in
+    --secure-boot-profile=*)
+      declare -gx VAR_CISS_SECUREBOOT_PROFILE="${ARY_PARAM_ARRAY[idx]#*=}"
+      ;;
+    --secure-boot-profile)
+      if [[ -n "${ARY_PARAM_ARRAY[idx + 1]:-}" ]]; then
+        declare -gx VAR_CISS_SECUREBOOT_PROFILE="${ARY_PARAM_ARRAY[idx + 1]}"
+      fi
+      ;;
+  esac
+done
+unset idx
+
+### Updating Status of Dialog Gauge Bar.
+if ! ${VAR_HANDLER_AUTOBUILD}; then printf "XXX\nTraps active ... \nXXX\n50\n" >&3; fi
 trap 'trap_on_exit "$?" "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}" "${LINENO}" "${FUNCNAME[0]:-main}" "${BASH_COMMAND}"' EXIT
 trap 'trap_on_err  "$?" "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}" "${LINENO}" "${FUNCNAME[0]:-main}" "${BASH_COMMAND}"' ERR
 
@@ -234,9 +243,13 @@ declare -ar  ARY_ARG_SANITIZED=("$@")
 declare -grx VAR_ARG_SANITIZED="${ARY_ARG_SANITIZED[*]}"
 
 ### Updating Status of Dialog Gauge Bar.
-if ! ${VAR_HANDLER_AUTOBUILD}; then printf "XXX\nParsing Arguments ... \nXXX\n90\n" >&3; fi
+if ! ${VAR_HANDLER_AUTOBUILD}; then printf "XXX\nParsing Arguments ... \nXXX\n80\n" >&3; fi
 arg_parser "$@"
 
+### Updating Status of Dialog Gauge Bar.
+if ! ${VAR_HANDLER_AUTOBUILD}; then printf "XXX\nValidate secret Arguments ... \nXXX\n95\n" >&3; fi
+validate_selected_secret_inputs
+
 ### Updating Status of Dialog Gauge Bar.
 if ! ${VAR_HANDLER_AUTOBUILD}; then printf "XXX\nFinal checks ... \nXXX\n95\n" >&3; fi
 clean_ip

config/hooks/live/zzzz_ciss_crypt_squash.hook.binary

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 #!/bin/bash
+# shellcheck disable=SC2154
 # SPDX-Version: 3.0
 # SPDX-CreationInfo: 2025-10-11; WEIDNER, Marc S.; <msw@coresecret.dev>
 # SPDX-ExternalRef: GIT https://git.coresecret.dev/msw/CISS.debian.live.builder.git
@@ -9,90 +10,18 @@
 # SPDX-LicenseComment: This file is part of the CISS.debian.installer.secure framework.
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.live.builder
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
-# shellcheck disable=SC2154
 set -Ceuo pipefail
 
-# Final live-build binary hook for encrypted root filesystem packaging. Preallocate a LUKS2 container, format it with the
+# Final live-build binary hook for encrypted root filesystem packaging. It creates and signs a deterministic attestation
-# generated build secret, copy the generated filesystem.squashfs into the opened encrypted mapping, generate and sign a
+# manifest for the final filesystem.squashfs byte stream, preallocates a LUKS2 container, formats it with the generated build
-# SHA-512 attestation manifest for the complete decrypted mapper, then close the container, shred the temporary LUKS secret,
+# secret, copies the generated filesystem.squashfs into the opened encrypted mapping, then closes the container, shreds the
-# and remove the plaintext SquashFS from the ISO payload.
+# temporary LUKS secret, and removes the plaintext SquashFS from the ISO payload.
 
 printf "\e[95m🧪 '%s' starting ... \e[0m\n" "${0}"
 
 __umask=$(umask)
 umask 0077
 
-#######################################
-# Prints a fatal error message and terminates the hook.
-# Globals:
-#   None
-# Arguments:
-#   1: Error message
-# Returns:
-#   42: always exits with failure
-#######################################
-die() {
-  declare message="${1}"
-  printf "\e[91m❌ %s \e[0m\n" "${message}" >&2
-  exit 42
-}
-
-#######################################
-# Checks whether a required command exists.
-# Globals:
-#   None
-# Arguments:
-#   1: Command name
-# Returns:
-#   0: on success
-#   42: if the command is missing
-#######################################
-require_command() {
-  declare command_name="${1}"
-
-  command -v "${command_name}" >/dev/null 2>&1 || die "Required command not found: '${command_name}'."
-
-  return 0
-}
-
-#######################################
-# Checks whether a required file exists and is readable.
-# Globals:
-#   None
-# Arguments:
-#   1: File path
-#   2: Human-readable file description
-# Returns:
-#   0: on success
-#   42: if the file is missing or unreadable
-#######################################
-require_file() {
-  declare file_path="${1}"
-  declare description="${2}"
-
-  [[ -f "${file_path}" && -r "${file_path}" ]] || die "Missing or unreadable ${description}: '${file_path}'."
-
-  return 0
-}
-
-#######################################
-# Checks whether a required environment variable is non-empty.
-# Globals:
-#   None
-# Arguments:
-#   1: Variable name
-# Returns:
-#   0: on success
-#   42: if the variable is empty or unset
-#######################################
-require_variable() {
-  declare variable_name="${1}"
-
-  [[ -n "${!variable_name:-}" ]] || die "Required environment variable is empty or unset: '${variable_name}'."
-
-  return 0
-}
-
 #######################################
 # Pre allocates space for LUKS container.
 # Globals:
@@ -136,29 +65,163 @@ preallocate() {
 # shellcheck disable=SC2034
 readonly -f preallocate
 
-declare ROOTFS="${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}/binary/live/filesystem.squashfs"
+#######################################
-declare LUKSFS="${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}/binary/live/ciss_rootfs.crypt"
+# Validate that the rootfs attestation artifacts exist in the final ISO payload tree.
-declare MAPPER_DEV="/dev/mapper/crypt_liveiso"
+# Globals:
-declare ROOTFS_ATTESTATION="${LUKSFS}.decrypted.sha512sum.txt"
+#   None
-declare ROOTFS_ATTESTATION_SIG="${ROOTFS_ATTESTATION}.sig"
+# Arguments:
-declare KEYFD=""
+#   1: Rootfs attestation manifest path
+# Returns:
+#   0: on success
+#   42: on failure
+#######################################
+require_rootfs_attestation_artifacts() {
+  declare manifest="${1}"
+  declare signature="${manifest}.sig"
+  declare artifact=""
 
-require_command gpg
+  for artifact in "${manifest}" "${signature}"; do
-require_command gpgv
-require_command sha512sum
-require_file "${ROOTFS}" "final SquashFS payload"
-require_variable VAR_SIGNING_KEY_FPR
-require_variable VAR_SIGNING_KEY_PASSFILE
-require_variable VAR_VERIFY_KEYRING
-require_file "${VAR_SIGNING_KEY_PASSFILE}" "GPG signing passphrase file"
-require_file "${VAR_VERIFY_KEYRING}" "GPG verification keyring"
 
-[[ "${VAR_SIGNER:-false}" == "true" ]] || die "Rootfs attestation requires an enabled artifact signer."
+    if [[ ! -e "${artifact}" ]]; then
 
-rm -f -- "${ROOTFS_ATTESTATION}" "${ROOTFS_ATTESTATION_SIG}"
+      printf "\e[91m❌ Required rootfs attestation artifact missing: [%s]. \e[0m\n" "${artifact}" >&2
+      return 42
 
+    fi
+
+    if [[ -L "${artifact}" || ! -f "${artifact}" ]]; then
+
+      printf "\e[91m❌ Required rootfs attestation artifact is not a regular file: [%s]. \e[0m\n" "${artifact}" >&2
+      return 42
+
+    fi
+
+    if [[ ! -s "${artifact}" ]]; then
+
+      printf "\e[91m❌ Required rootfs attestation artifact is empty: [%s]. \e[0m\n" "${artifact}" >&2
+      return 42
+
+    fi
+
+    if [[ ! -r "${artifact}" ]]; then
+
+      printf "\e[91m❌ Required rootfs attestation artifact is not readable: [%s]. \e[0m\n" "${artifact}" >&2
+      return 42
+
+    fi
+
+  done
+
+  return 0
+}
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f require_rootfs_attestation_artifacts
+
+#######################################
+# Create and sign the rootfs attestation manifest for the exact SquashFS payload copied into the LUKS mapper.
+# Globals:
+#   VAR_SIGNING_KEY_FPR
+#   VAR_SIGNING_KEY_PASSFILE
+#   VAR_VERIFY_KEYRING
+# Arguments:
+#   1: Final SquashFS payload file
+#   2: Manifest path below binary/live
+# Returns:
+#   0: on success
+#   42: on failure
+#######################################
+create_attestation() {
+  declare rootfs_file="${1}"
+  declare rootfs_attestation="${2}"
+  declare rootfs_hash=""
+  declare rootfs_size=""
+
+  rootfs_size="$(stat -c%s -- "${rootfs_file}")"
+  rootfs_hash="$(LC_ALL=C sha512sum "${rootfs_file}")"
+  rootfs_hash="${rootfs_hash%% *}"
+
+  if printf '%s  %s\n' "${rootfs_hash}" "${rootfs_file}" | LC_ALL=C sha512sum -c --strict --quiet; then
+
+    printf "\e[92m✅ [LC_ALL=C sha512sum -c --strict --quiet of %s] successful. \e[0m\n" "${rootfs_file}"
+
+  else
+
+    printf "\e[91m❌ [LC_ALL=C sha512sum -c --strict --quiet of %s] NOT successful. \e[0m\n" "${rootfs_file}"
+    return 42
+
+  fi
+
+  # The attested boundary is the final SquashFS byte stream before LUKS wrapping. The boot verifier reads exactly this many
+  # bytes from the decrypted mapper and intentionally excludes the LUKS allocation slack after the SquashFS payload.
+  cat << EOF >| "${rootfs_attestation}"
+# CISS.debian.live.builder Master ${VAR_VERSION}
+# Attestation file for filesystem.squashfs Version 1.0.0
+# Boundary : Final filesystem.squashfs byte stream copied into /dev/mapper/crypt_liveiso
+# Bytes    : Final filesystem.squashfs ${rootfs_size}
+${rootfs_hash}  filesystem.squashfs
+EOF
+
+  chmod 0444 "${rootfs_attestation}"
+
+  if gpg --batch --yes --pinentry-mode loopback --passphrase-file "${VAR_SIGNING_KEY_PASSFILE}" --local-user "${VAR_SIGNING_KEY_FPR}" \
+    --detach-sign --output "${rootfs_attestation}.sig" "${rootfs_attestation}"; then
+
+    printf "\e[92m✅ [gpg of %s] successful. \e[0m\n" "${rootfs_attestation}"
+
+  else
+
+    printf "\e[91m❌ [gpg of %s] NOT successful. \e[0m\n" "${rootfs_attestation}"
+    return 42
+
+  fi
+
+  chmod 0444 "${rootfs_attestation}.sig"
+
+  if gpgv --keyring "${VAR_VERIFY_KEYRING}" "${rootfs_attestation}.sig" "${rootfs_attestation}"; then
+
+    printf "\e[92m✅ [gpgv of %s] successful. \e[0m\n" "${rootfs_attestation}.sig"
+
+  else
+
+    printf "\e[91m❌ [gpgv of %s] NOT successful. \e[0m\n" "${rootfs_attestation}.sig"
+    return 42
+
+  fi
+
+  return 0
+}
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f create_attestation
+
+declare    LIVE_PAYLOAD_DIR="${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}/binary/live"
+declare    ROOTFS_ATTESTATION_NAME="filesystem.squashfs.sha512sum.txt"
+declare    ROOTFS_ATTESTATION_REL="live/${ROOTFS_ATTESTATION_NAME}"
+declare    LUKSFS="${LIVE_PAYLOAD_DIR}/ciss_rootfs.crypt"
+declare    ROOTFS="${LIVE_PAYLOAD_DIR}/filesystem.squashfs"
+declare    ROOTFS_ATTESTATION="${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}/binary/${ROOTFS_ATTESTATION_REL}"
+declare    DM_LAB="crypt_liveiso"
+declare    DEVMAP="/dev/mapper/${DM_LAB}"
+declare    LUKS_KEY_FILE="${VAR_TMP_SECRET}/${VAR_LUKS_KEY:-luks.txt}"
+declare    KEYFD=""
+# Keep Argon2 keyslot memory and parallel costs bounded for later initramfs unlocks on smaller systems.
+declare -i LUKS_PBKDF_MEMORY_KIB=262144
+declare -i LUKS_PBKDF_PARALLEL=1
 # shellcheck disable=SC2155
-declare -i VAR_ROOTFS_SIZE=$(stat -c%s -- "${ROOTFS}")
+declare -i VAR_ROOTFS_SIZE="$(stat -c%s -- "${ROOTFS}")"
+
+### Attestation Boundary
+#   - The attested boundary is the final SquashFS byte stream before LUKS wrapping.
+#   - The boot verifier reads exactly this many bytes from the decrypted mapper and intentionally excludes the LUKS allocation
+#     slack after the SquashFS payload.
+printf "\e[95m🧪 Attestation of filesystem.squashfs ... \e[0m\n"
+
+create_attestation "${ROOTFS}" "${ROOTFS_ATTESTATION}"
+require_rootfs_attestation_artifacts "${ROOTFS_ATTESTATION}"
+
+printf "\e[92m✅ Attestation of filesystem.squashfs successful: ISO paths [/%s] and [/%s.sig]. \e[0m\n" \
+  "${ROOTFS_ATTESTATION_REL}" "${ROOTFS_ATTESTATION_REL}"
 
 ### Safety margin:
 #   - LUKS2-Header and Metadata
@@ -172,7 +235,7 @@ declare -i VAR_LUKSFS_SIZE=$(( ( (BASE_SIZE + ALIGN_BYTES - 1) / ALIGN_BYTES ) *
 
 preallocate "${LUKSFS}" "${VAR_LUKSFS_SIZE}"
 
-exec {KEYFD}<"${VAR_TMP_SECRET}/luks.txt"
+exec {KEYFD}<"${LUKS_KEY_FILE}"
 
 if [[ "${VAR_CDLB_INSIDE_RUNNER}" == "false" ]]; then
 
@@ -183,10 +246,12 @@ if [[ "${VAR_CDLB_INSIDE_RUNNER}" == "false" ]]; then
     --iter-time 1000 \
     --key-file "/proc/$$/fd/${KEYFD}" \
     --key-size 512 \
-    --label crypt_liveiso \
+    --label "${DM_LAB}" \
     --luks2-keyslots-size 16777216 \
     --luks2-metadata-size 4194304 \
     --pbkdf argon2id \
+    --pbkdf-memory "${LUKS_PBKDF_MEMORY_KIB}" \
+    --pbkdf-parallel "${LUKS_PBKDF_PARALLEL}" \
     --sector-size 4096 \
     --type luks2 \
     --use-random \
@@ -198,13 +263,16 @@ elif [[ "${VAR_CDLB_INSIDE_RUNNER}" == "true" ]]; then
   cryptsetup luksFormat \
     --batch-mode \
     --cipher aes-xts-plain64 \
+    --integrity hmac-sha512 \
     --iter-time 1000 \
     --key-file "/proc/$$/fd/${KEYFD}" \
     --key-size 512 \
-    --label crypt_liveiso \
+    --label "${DM_LAB}" \
     --luks2-keyslots-size 16777216 \
     --luks2-metadata-size 4194304 \
     --pbkdf argon2id \
+    --pbkdf-memory "${LUKS_PBKDF_MEMORY_KIB}" \
+    --pbkdf-parallel "${LUKS_PBKDF_PARALLEL}" \
     --sector-size 4096 \
     --type luks2 \
     --use-random \
@@ -213,10 +281,10 @@ elif [[ "${VAR_CDLB_INSIDE_RUNNER}" == "true" ]]; then
 
 fi
 
-cryptsetup open --key-file "/proc/$$/fd/${KEYFD}" "${LUKSFS}" crypt_liveiso
+cryptsetup open --key-file "/proc/$$/fd/${KEYFD}" "${LUKSFS}" "${DM_LAB}"
 
 # shellcheck disable=SC2155
-declare -i LUKS_FREE=$(blockdev --getsize64 "${MAPPER_DEV}")
+declare -i LUKS_FREE=$(blockdev --getsize64 "${DEVMAP}")
 declare -i SQUASH_FS="${VAR_ROOTFS_SIZE}"
 
 if (( LUKS_FREE >= SQUASH_FS )); then
@@ -230,30 +298,18 @@ else
 
 fi
 
-dd if="${ROOTFS}" of="${MAPPER_DEV}" bs=8M status=progress conv=fsync
+dd if="${ROOTFS}" of="${DEVMAP}" bs=8M status=progress conv=fsync
 sync
-
+cryptsetup close "${DM_LAB}"
-# The selected boot root is the complete decrypted mapper. Hashing this exact block payload binds the signed manifest to the
-# bytes later mounted as SquashFS, including the mapper padding after the SquashFS image.
-LC_ALL=C sha512sum "${MAPPER_DEV}" >| "${ROOTFS_ATTESTATION}"
-
-gpg --batch --yes --pinentry-mode loopback --passphrase-file "${VAR_SIGNING_KEY_PASSFILE}" --local-user "${VAR_SIGNING_KEY_FPR}" \
-  --detach-sign --output "${ROOTFS_ATTESTATION_SIG}" "${ROOTFS_ATTESTATION}"
-
-gpgv --keyring "${VAR_VERIFY_KEYRING}" "${ROOTFS_ATTESTATION_SIG}" "${ROOTFS_ATTESTATION}"
-
-(cd / && LC_ALL=C sha512sum -c --strict --quiet "${ROOTFS_ATTESTATION}")
-
-chmod 0444 "${ROOTFS_ATTESTATION}" "${ROOTFS_ATTESTATION_SIG}"
-
-cryptsetup close crypt_liveiso
 
 exec {KEYFD}<&-
 
-shred -fzu -n 5 -- "${VAR_TMP_SECRET}/luks.txt"
+shred -fzu -n 5 -- "${LUKS_KEY_FILE}"
 
 rm -f -- "${ROOTFS}"
 
+require_rootfs_attestation_artifacts "${ROOTFS_ATTESTATION}"
+
 umask "${__umask}"
 __umask=""
 

config/includes.chroot/etc/initramfs-tools/hooks/9999_ciss_debian_live_builder.sh

@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ install -d -m 0755  "${DESTDIR}/usr/sbin"
 
 
 ### Include binaries -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-for bin in bash blkid busybox dd dmsetup gpgv losetup lsblk mkpasswd mountpoint sha384sum sha512sum sort stty timeout tr tree udevadm whois; do
+for bin in awk bash blkid busybox dd dmsetup gawk gpgv losetup lsblk mkpasswd mountpoint sha384sum sha512sum sort stty timeout tr tree udevadm whois; do
 
   path="$(command -v "${bin}" 2>/dev/null || true)"
 
@@ -123,7 +123,6 @@ if [ -d "${src_dir}" ]; then
 
 fi
 
-
 ### Install Dropbear configuration ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 install -m 0444 /etc/dropbear/initramfs/dropbear.conf "${DESTDIR}/etc/dropbear/dropbear.conf"
 printf "\e[92mSuccessfully executed: [install -m 0444 /etc/dropbear/initramfs/dropbear.conf %s/etc/dropbear/dropbear.conf] \n\e[0m" "${DESTDIR}"
@@ -146,6 +145,13 @@ printf "\e[92mSuccessfully executed: [install -m 0444 /etc/dropbear/initramfs/ba
 install -m 0444 /etc/banner "${DESTDIR}/etc/dropbear/banner"
 printf "\e[92mSuccessfully executed: [install -m 0444 /etc/dropbear/initramfs/banner %s/etc/dropbear/banner] \n\e[0m" "${DESTDIR}"
 
+### Ensure live-boot runtime scripts in the initramfs are executable -----------------------------------------------------------
+if [ -d "${DESTDIR}/usr/lib/live/boot" ]; then
+
+  find "${DESTDIR}/usr/lib/live/boot" -type f -exec chmod +x -- {} +
+  printf "\e[92mSuccessfully executed: [find %s/usr/lib/live/boot -type f -exec chmod +x -- {} +] \n\e[0m" "${DESTDIR}"
+
+fi
 ### EOS
 
 printf "\e[92mSuccessfully executed: [/etc/initramfs-tools/hooks/9999_ciss_debian_live_builder.sh] \n\e[0m"

config/includes.chroot/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.live.builder
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-# Version Master V9.14.022.2026.06.10
+# Version Master V9.14.028.2026.06.18
 
 [git.coresecret.dev]:42842 ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIGQA107AVmg1D/jnyXiqbPf38zQRl8s3c+PM1zbfpeQl
 [git.coresecret.dev]:42842 ssh-rsa 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

config/includes.chroot/etc/ssh/sshd_config

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.live.builder
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-# Version Master V9.14.022.2026.06.10
+# Version Master V9.14.028.2026.06.18
 
 ### https://www.ssh-audit.com/
 ### ssh -Q cipher | cipher-auth | compression | kex | kex-gss | key | key-cert | key-plain | key-sig | mac | protocol-version | sig

config/includes.chroot/etc/sysctl.d/90-ciss-local.hardened

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.live.builder
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-# Version Master V9.14.022.2026.06.10
+# Version Master V9.14.028.2026.06.18
 
 ### https://docs.kernel.org/
 ### https://github.com/a13xp0p0v/kernel-hardening-checker/

config/includes.chroot/preseed/.iso/preseed_hash_generator.sh

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.live.builder
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
-declare -gr VERSION="Master V9.14.022.2026.06.10"
+declare -gr VERSION="Master V9.14.028.2026.06.18"
 
 ### VERY EARLY CHECK FOR DEBUGGING
 if [[ $* == *" --debug "* ]]; then

config/includes.chroot/preseed/preseed.cfg

@@ -112,4 +112,4 @@ d-i preseed/late_command string sh /preseed/.ash/3_di_preseed_late_command.sh
 
 # Please consider donating to my work at: https://coresecret.eu/spenden/
 ###########################################################################################
-# Written by: ./preseed_hash_generator.sh Version: Master V9.14.022.2026.06.10 at: 10:18:37.9542
+# Written by: ./preseed_hash_generator.sh Version: Master V9.14.028.2026.06.18 at: 10:18:37.9542

config/includes.chroot/usr/lib/live/boot/0024-ciss-crypt-squash

@@ -295,6 +295,10 @@ export CDLB_MAPPER_NAME="crypt_liveiso"
 export CDLB_MAPPER_DEV="/dev/mapper/${CDLB_MAPPER_NAME}"
 export CDLB_MNT_MEDIUM="/run/live/medium"
 export CDLB_MNT_ROOTFS="/run/live/rootfs"
+export CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_NAME="filesystem.squashfs.sha512sum.txt"
+export CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_CACHE_DIR="/run/ciss-rootfs-attestation"
+export CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_MANIFEST="${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_CACHE_DIR}/${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_NAME}"
+export CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_SIGNATURE="${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_MANIFEST}.sig"
 export CDLB_REMOTE_WAIT_SECS="${CDLB_REMOTE_WAIT_SECS:-3600}"
 _PARAMETER=""
 _dev=""
@@ -377,6 +381,66 @@ fi
 
 printf "\e[92m[INFO] CISS LUKS FS         : [%s%s] \n\e[0m" "${CDLB_MNT_MEDIUM}" "${CDLB_LUKS_FS}"
 
+### Preserve rootfs attestation evidence before live-boot may replace or unmount the medium view. -----------------------------
+CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_SOURCE="${CDLB_MNT_MEDIUM}/live/${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_NAME}"
+CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_SOURCE_SIG="${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_SOURCE}.sig"
+
+if [ ! -f "${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_SOURCE}" ] || [ ! -f "${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_SOURCE_SIG}" ]; then
+
+  printf "\e[91m[FATAL] Boot failure        : Rootfs attestation artifacts not found on live medium: [%s] [%s] \n\e[0m" \
+    "${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_SOURCE}" "${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_SOURCE_SIG}"
+  sleep 8
+  log   "[FATAL] Boot failure        : Rootfs attestation artifacts not found on live medium: [${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_SOURCE}] [${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_SOURCE_SIG}]"
+  panic "[FATAL] Boot failure        : Rootfs attestation artifacts not found on live medium: [${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_SOURCE}] [${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_SOURCE_SIG}]"
+
+fi
+
+if ! mkdir -p "${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_CACHE_DIR}"; then
+
+  printf "\e[91m[FATAL] Boot failure        : Failed to create rootfs attestation cache directory: [%s] \n\e[0m" \
+    "${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_CACHE_DIR}"
+  sleep 8
+  log   "[FATAL] Boot failure        : Failed to create rootfs attestation cache directory: [${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_CACHE_DIR}]"
+  panic "[FATAL] Boot failure        : Failed to create rootfs attestation cache directory: [${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_CACHE_DIR}]"
+
+fi
+
+if ! chmod 0755 "${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_CACHE_DIR}"; then
+
+  printf "\e[91m[FATAL] Boot failure        : Failed to permission rootfs attestation cache directory: [%s] \n\e[0m" \
+    "${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_CACHE_DIR}"
+  sleep 8
+  log   "[FATAL] Boot failure        : Failed to permission rootfs attestation cache directory: [${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_CACHE_DIR}]"
+  panic "[FATAL] Boot failure        : Failed to permission rootfs attestation cache directory: [${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_CACHE_DIR}]"
+
+fi
+
+if ! cp "${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_SOURCE}" "${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_MANIFEST}" || \
+   ! cp "${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_SOURCE_SIG}" "${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_SIGNATURE}"; then
+
+  printf "\e[91m[FATAL] Boot failure        : Failed to preserve rootfs attestation artifacts in: [%s] \n\e[0m" \
+    "${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_CACHE_DIR}"
+  sleep 8
+  log   "[FATAL] Boot failure        : Failed to preserve rootfs attestation artifacts in: [${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_CACHE_DIR}]"
+  panic "[FATAL] Boot failure        : Failed to preserve rootfs attestation artifacts in: [${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_CACHE_DIR}]"
+
+fi
+
+if ! chmod 0444 "${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_MANIFEST}" "${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_SIGNATURE}"; then
+
+  printf "\e[91m[FATAL] Boot failure        : Failed to make rootfs attestation cache read-only: [%s] \n\e[0m" \
+    "${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_CACHE_DIR}"
+  sleep 8
+  log   "[FATAL] Boot failure        : Failed to make rootfs attestation cache read-only: [${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_CACHE_DIR}]"
+  panic "[FATAL] Boot failure        : Failed to make rootfs attestation cache read-only: [${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_CACHE_DIR}]"
+
+fi
+
+chmod 0555 "${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_CACHE_DIR}" 2>&- || true
+
+printf "\e[92m[INFO] Rootfs attestation   : Preserved [%s] and [%s] \n\e[0m" \
+  "${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_MANIFEST}" "${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_SIGNATURE}"
+
 ### Attach a loop device read-only to the encrypted file. ----------------------------------------------------------------------
 if ! LOOP="$(losetup -f --show -r "${CDLB_MNT_MEDIUM}${CDLB_LUKS_FS}")"; then
 
@@ -587,6 +651,10 @@ export CDLB_MAPPER_NAME=${CDLB_MAPPER_NAME}
 export CDLB_MAPPER_DEV=${CDLB_MAPPER_DEV}
 export CDLB_MNT_MEDIUM=${CDLB_MNT_MEDIUM}
 export CDLB_MNT_ROOTFS=${CDLB_MNT_ROOTFS}
+export CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_NAME=${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_NAME}
+export CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_CACHE_DIR=${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_CACHE_DIR}
+export CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_MANIFEST=${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_MANIFEST}
+export CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_SIGNATURE=${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_SIGNATURE}
 export CDLB_REMOTE_WAIT_SECS=${CDLB_REMOTE_WAIT_SECS}
 EOF
 chmod 0444 /run/ciss-rootdev 2>&- || true

config/includes.chroot/usr/lib/live/boot/0030-ciss-verify-checksums

@@ -15,12 +15,14 @@
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
 # Module summary:
-# This live-boot component implements the verify-checksums mode for the mounted live medium.
+# This live-boot component implements verify-checksums mode for the mounted live medium.
-# It reads the live-boot command line to decide whether checksum verification is enabled and which digests to accept.
+# It reads the live-boot command line to decide whether checksum verification is enabled, which digests to accept, and
-# It locates the pinned CISS GPG key material on the live medium, optionally verifies this script's signed hash,
+# whether checksum signature verification is required. When signature verification is enabled, it requires to be pinned CISS GPG
-# optionally verifies signed checksum files, and checks the first matching checksum manifest with the matching digest tool. It
+# key material from the live medium, verifies this script's signed SHA-512 hash, and verifies the selected checksum manifest
-# writes detailed checksum output to the verification TTY. It panics instead of continuing boot when integrity or
+# signature before accepting checksum results. It checks the first supported checksum manifest with an available matching digest
-# authenticity verification fails.
+# tool and writes detailed checksum command output to the verification TTY when checksum execution runs. It fails closed by
+# panicking on missing manifests, missing digest tools, empty manifests, failed signatures, failed checksums, or unknown
+# verification states.
 
 ### Modified Version of the original file:
 ### https://salsa.debian.org/live-team/live-boot 'components/0030-ciss-verify-checksums'
@@ -87,6 +89,8 @@ Verify_checksums() {
 
   _CHECKSUM_LOG=""
 
+  _CHECKSUM_LOG_DIR="${LIVE_VERIFY_CHECKSUMS_LOG_DIR:-/run}"
+
   _KEYFILE=""
 
   _MANIFEST_FOUND="false"
@@ -97,6 +101,8 @@ Verify_checksums() {
 
   _RETURN_SHA=""
 
+  _TOOL_FOUND="false"
+
   _VERIFICATION_EXECUTED="false"
 
   _VERIFICATION_SUCCEEDED="false"
@@ -159,6 +165,14 @@ Verify_checksums() {
 
   done
 
+  if [ "${LIVE_VERIFY_CHECKSUMS_SIGNATURES}" = "true" ] && [ -z "${_KEYFILE}" ]; then
+
+    log_er "No pinned GPG key file found while checksum signature verification is enabled."
+    sleep 8
+    panic  "[FATAL] No pinned GPG key file found while checksum signature verification is enabled."
+
+  fi
+
   # shellcheck disable=SC2164
   cd "${_MOUNTPOINT}"
 
@@ -256,11 +270,13 @@ Verify_checksums() {
       if [ -e "${_CHECKSUM}" ]; then
 
         _MANIFEST_FOUND="true"
+
         log_in "Found: [${_CHECKSUM}] ..."
 
         if [ -e "/usr/bin/${_DIGEST}sum" ]; then
 
-          _VERIFICATION_EXECUTED="true"
+          _TOOL_FOUND="true"
+
           log_in "Found: [/usr/bin/${_DIGEST}sum] ..."
 
           if [ "${LIVE_VERIFY_CHECKSUMS_SIGNATURES}" = "true" ]; then
@@ -288,11 +304,17 @@ Verify_checksums() {
           fi
 
           # shellcheck disable=SC2312
-          _CHECKSUM_LOG="/run/ciss-${_DIGEST}sum-check.log"
+          _CHECKSUM_LOG="${_CHECKSUM_LOG_DIR}/ciss-${_DIGEST}sum-check.log"
-          if grep -v '^#' "${_CHECKSUM}" | LC_ALL=C /usr/bin/"${_DIGEST}"sum -c > "${_CHECKSUM_LOG}" 2>&1; then
+          _VERIFICATION_EXECUTED="true"
+          if ! grep -v '^#' "${_CHECKSUM}" | grep -q '[^[:space:]]'; then
+
+            _RETURN_SHA="254"
+            : > "${_CHECKSUM_LOG}"
+            log_er "Checksum manifest has no checksum entries: [${_CHECKSUM}]"
+
+          elif grep -v '^#' "${_CHECKSUM}" | LC_ALL=C /usr/bin/"${_DIGEST}"sum -c > "${_CHECKSUM_LOG}" 2>&1; then
 
             _RETURN_SHA="${?}"
-            _VERIFICATION_SUCCEEDED="true"
             cat "${_CHECKSUM_LOG}" > "${_TTY}"
             log_ok "Found: [/usr/bin/${_DIGEST}sum] successful verified: [${_CHECKSUM}]"
 
@@ -308,6 +330,12 @@ Verify_checksums() {
 
           fi
 
+          if { [ "${_RETURN_PGP}" = "0" ] || [ "${_RETURN_PGP}" = "na" ]; } && [ "${_RETURN_SHA}" = "0" ]; then
+
+            _VERIFICATION_SUCCEEDED="true"
+
+          fi
+
           # Stop after the first verification.
           break 2
 
@@ -329,28 +357,31 @@ Verify_checksums() {
 
   if [ "${_MANIFEST_FOUND}" != "true" ]; then
 
-    log_er "No supported checksum manifest found."
+    log_er "No supported checksum manifest found. Checksum verification is fail-closed."
     sleep 8
-    panic  "No supported checksum manifest found."
+    panic  "[FATAL] No supported checksum manifest found. Checksum verification is fail-closed."
-    return 1
+
+  fi
+
+  if [ "${_TOOL_FOUND}" != "true" ]; then
+
+    log_er "Checksum manifest found, but no supported checksum tool is available. Checksum verification is fail-closed."
+    sleep 8
+    panic  "[FATAL] Checksum manifest found, but no supported checksum tool is available. Checksum verification is fail-closed."
 
   fi
 
   if [ "${_VERIFICATION_EXECUTED}" != "true" ]; then
 
-    log_er "No supported checksum verification tool was available."
+    log_er "Checksum verification was not executed. Checksum verification is fail-closed."
     sleep 8
-    panic  "No supported checksum verification tool was available."
+    panic  "[FATAL] Checksum verification was not executed. Checksum verification is fail-closed."
-    return 1
 
   fi
 
   if [ "${_VERIFICATION_SUCCEEDED}" != "true" ]; then
 
-    log_er "No supported checksum manifest was verified successfully."
+    log_er "[FATAL] Checksum verification did not complete successfully. Evaluating fail-closed failure state."
-    sleep 8
-    panic  "No supported checksum manifest was verified successfully."
-    return 1
 
   fi
 
@@ -372,28 +403,24 @@ Verify_checksums() {
       log_er "Verification of [GPG signature] file successful, while verification of [sha checksum] file failed."
       sleep 8
       panic  "Verification of [GPG signature] file successful, while verification of [sha checksum] file failed."
-      return 1
       ;;
 
     *",0")
       log_er "Verification of [GPG signature] file failed, while verification of [sha checksum] file successful."
       sleep 8
       panic  "Verification of [GPG signature] file failed, while verification of [sha checksum] file successful."
-      return 1
       ;;
 
     "na,"*)
       log_er "Verification of [sha checksum] file failed."
       sleep 8
       panic  "Verification of [sha checksum] file failed."
-      return 1
       ;;
 
     *)
-      log_er "Checksum verification ended in an unsupported state."
+      log_er "Unknown checksum verification state: [${_RETURN_PGP:-unset},${_RETURN_SHA:-unset}]."
       sleep 8
-      panic  "Checksum verification ended in an unsupported state."
+      panic  "[FATAL] Unknown checksum verification state. Checksum verification is fail-closed."
-      return 1
       ;;
 
   esac

config/includes.chroot/usr/lib/live/boot/0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest

@@ -15,11 +15,13 @@
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
 
 # Module summary:
-# - Runs after the encrypted live root filesystem has been decrypted and selected for the SquashFS root mount.
+# - Runs after the encrypted live root filesystem has been decrypted.
-# - Requires the pinned public key and the signed decrypted-mapper SHA-512 manifest from the mounted live medium.
+# - Requires the pinned public key, external rootfs attestation manifest, and detached signature to exist as readable,
-# - Verifies the manifest signature and pinned signer fingerprint, then verifies the complete selected decrypted mapper against
+#   non-empty regular files.
-#   the manifest.
+# - Verifies the attestation signature with gpgv against the pinned key material and expected signer fingerprint.
-# - Panics on missing, malformed, mismatched, or unverifiable evidence.
+# - Verifies the exact final SquashFS byte stream copied into the decrypted LUKS mapper. The signed manifest provides both the
+#   SHA-512 digest and the exact byte length; allocation slack after that SquashFS payload is intentionally out of scope.
+# - Panics on missing, malformed, unauthentic, or mismatched evidence.
 
 set -eu
 
@@ -33,13 +35,15 @@ export CDLB_EXP_CA_FPR="@EXP_CA_FPR@"
 
 ### Name of the top-level dm-crypt mapping (e.g., cryptsetup --label): zzzz_ciss_crypt_squash.hook.binary ----------------------
 export CDLB_MAPPER_NAME="${CDLB_MAPPER_NAME:-crypt_liveiso}"
+export CDLB_MAPPER_DEV="${CDLB_MAPPER_DEV:-/dev/mapper/${CDLB_MAPPER_NAME}}"
+export CDLB_MNT_MEDIUM="${CDLB_MNT_MEDIUM:-/run/live/medium}"
 
-### Rootfs selection and attestation file locations. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+### Locations of the attestation file of filesystem.squashfs on the verified live medium. --------------------------------------
-CDLB_LUKS_FS="${CDLB_LUKS_FS:-/live/ciss_rootfs.crypt}"
+CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_NAME="${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_NAME:-filesystem.squashfs.sha512sum.txt}"
-CDLB_MAPPER_DEV="${CDLB_MAPPER_DEV:-/dev/mapper/${CDLB_MAPPER_NAME}}"
+CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_MANIFEST="${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_MANIFEST:-${CDLB_MNT_MEDIUM}/live/${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_NAME}}"
-CDLB_MNT_MEDIUM="${CDLB_MNT_MEDIUM:-/run/live/medium}"
+CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_SIGNATURE="${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_SIGNATURE:-${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_MANIFEST}.sig}"
-CDLB_ATTEST_ROOTFS_SHA="${CDLB_ATTEST_ROOTFS_SHA:-${CDLB_MNT_MEDIUM}${CDLB_LUKS_FS}.decrypted.sha512sum.txt}"
+CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_CACHE_DIR="${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_CACHE_DIR:-/run/ciss-rootfs-attestation}"
-CDLB_ATTEST_ROOTFS_SIG="${CDLB_ATTEST_ROOTFS_SIG:-${CDLB_ATTEST_ROOTFS_SHA}.sig}"
+CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_CHECK="${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_CHECK:-/run/ciss-rootfs-attestation.sha512sum}"
 CDLB_KEY_DIR="${CDLB_KEY_DIR:-/etc/ciss/keys}"
 
 ### Declare functions ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -71,6 +75,17 @@ log_ok() { printf '\e[92m[INFO] %s \n\e[0m' "$*"; }
 #######################################
 log_er() { printf '\e[91m[FATAL] %s \n\e[0m' "$*"; }
 
+### Provide a local fail-closed fallback when this file is executed as a subprocess outside the live-boot shell context. --------
+if ! command -v panic >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+
+  panic() {
+    log_er "${*}"
+    printf '%s\n' "0042 FATAL: ${*}" >/dev/console 2>/dev/null || :
+    exit 1
+  }
+
+fi
+
 #######################################
 # Validate a boot-time attestation input file.
 # Globals:
@@ -91,13 +106,11 @@ require_attestation_file() {
 
       log_er "0042()              : ${artifact_label} is a broken symlink, not a regular file: [${artifact_path}]"
       panic  "0042()              : ${artifact_label} is a broken symlink, not a regular file: [${artifact_path}]"
-      return 1
 
     fi
 
     log_er "0042()              : ${artifact_label} missing: [${artifact_path}]"
     panic  "0042()              : ${artifact_label} missing: [${artifact_path}]"
-    return 1
 
   fi
 
@@ -105,7 +118,6 @@ require_attestation_file() {
 
     log_er "0042()              : ${artifact_label} is not a regular file: [${artifact_path}]"
     panic  "0042()              : ${artifact_label} is not a regular file: [${artifact_path}]"
-    return 1
 
   fi
 
@@ -113,7 +125,6 @@ require_attestation_file() {
 
     log_er "0042()              : ${artifact_label} is empty: [${artifact_path}]"
     panic  "0042()              : ${artifact_label} is empty: [${artifact_path}]"
-    return 1
 
   fi
 
@@ -121,7 +132,6 @@ require_attestation_file() {
 
     log_er "0042()              : ${artifact_label} is not readable: [${artifact_path}]"
     panic  "0042()              : ${artifact_label} is not readable: [${artifact_path}]"
-    return 1
 
   fi
 
@@ -129,48 +139,231 @@ require_attestation_file() {
 }
 
 #######################################
-# Validate the selected decrypted rootfs payload.
+# Resolve rootfs attestation paths on known live medium mountpoints.
 # Globals:
-#   None
+#   CDLB_MNT_MEDIUM
+#   CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_MANIFEST
+#   CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_NAME
+#   CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_SIGNATURE
 # Arguments:
-#   1: Absolute payload path
+#   None
 # Returns:
 #   0: on success
 #######################################
-require_rootfs_payload() {
+resolve_rootfs_attestation_artifacts() {
-  payload_path="${1}"
+  medium_path=""
+  manifest_path=""
+  signature_path=""
 
-  if [ ! -b "${payload_path}" ]; then
+  if [ -f "${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_MANIFEST}" ] && [ -f "${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_SIGNATURE}" ]; then
 
-    log_er "0042()              : Selected rootfs payload is not a block device: [${payload_path}]"
+    return 0
-    panic  "0042()              : Selected rootfs payload is not a block device: [${payload_path}]"
-    return 1
 
   fi
 
-  if [ ! -r "${payload_path}" ]; then
+  manifest_path="${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_CACHE_DIR}/${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_NAME}"
+  signature_path="${manifest_path}.sig"
 
-    log_er "0042()              : Selected rootfs payload is not readable: [${payload_path}]"
+  if [ -f "${manifest_path}" ] && [ -f "${signature_path}" ]; then
-    panic  "0042()              : Selected rootfs payload is not readable: [${payload_path}]"
+
-    return 1
+    CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_MANIFEST="${manifest_path}"
+    CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_SIGNATURE="${signature_path}"
+    return 0
+
+  fi
+
+  for medium_path in "${CDLB_MNT_MEDIUM}" /run/live/medium /lib/live/mount/medium /cdrom; do
+
+    [ -n "${medium_path}" ] || continue
+
+    manifest_path="${medium_path}/live/${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_NAME}"
+    signature_path="${manifest_path}.sig"
+
+    if [ -f "${manifest_path}" ] && [ -f "${signature_path}" ]; then
+
+      CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_MANIFEST="${manifest_path}"
+      CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_SIGNATURE="${signature_path}"
+      return 0
+
+    fi
+
+  done
+
+  log_er "0042()              : Rootfs attestation artifacts not found. Expected manifest/signature: [${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_MANIFEST}] [${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_SIGNATURE}]"
+  panic  "0042()              : Rootfs attestation artifacts not found. Expected manifest/signature: [${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_MANIFEST}] [${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_SIGNATURE}]"
+
+  return 1
+}
+
+#######################################
+# Validate the decrypted rootfs payload device.
+# Globals:
+#   None
+# Arguments:
+#   1: Absolute payload device path
+# Returns:
+#   0: on success
+#######################################
+require_rootfs_payload_device() {
+  artifact_path="${1}"
+
+  if [ ! -e "${artifact_path}" ]; then
+
+    log_er "0042()              : Rootfs payload device missing: [${artifact_path}]"
+    panic  "0042()              : Rootfs payload device missing: [${artifact_path}]"
+
+  fi
+
+  if [ -b "${artifact_path}" ]; then
+
+    :
+
+  elif [ -L "${artifact_path}" ] || [ ! -f "${artifact_path}" ]; then
+
+    log_er "0042()              : Rootfs payload must be a block device or regular test fixture: [${artifact_path}]"
+    panic  "0042()              : Rootfs payload must be a block device or regular test fixture: [${artifact_path}]"
+
+  fi
+
+  if [ ! -r "${artifact_path}" ]; then
+
+    log_er "0042()              : Rootfs payload is not readable: [${artifact_path}]"
+    panic  "0042()              : Rootfs payload is not readable: [${artifact_path}]"
 
   fi
 
   return 0
 }
 
-HASH_FILE="${CDLB_ATTEST_ROOTFS_SHA}"
+#######################################
-SIGN_FILE="${CDLB_ATTEST_ROOTFS_SIG}"
+# Stream exactly the attested SquashFS payload bytes from the decrypted mapper.
+# Globals:
+#   None
+# Arguments:
+#   1: Payload device or regular test fixture
+#   2: Exact payload byte count
+# Returns:
+#   0: on success
+#######################################
+stream_rootfs_payload() {
+  payload_device="${1}"
+  payload_size="${2}"
+  block_size=1048576
+  full_blocks=$((payload_size / block_size))
+  remainder=$((payload_size % block_size))
+
+  if [ "${full_blocks}" -gt 0 ]; then
+
+    dd if="${payload_device}" bs="${block_size}" count="${full_blocks}" 2>/dev/null || return 1
+
+  fi
+
+  if [ "${remainder}" -gt 0 ]; then
+
+    dd if="${payload_device}" bs="${block_size}" skip="${full_blocks}" count=1 2>/dev/null | dd bs=1 count="${remainder}" 2>/dev/null || return 1
+
+  fi
+
+  return 0
+}
+
+#######################################
+# Verify the attested SquashFS payload hash against the decrypted mapper bytes.
+# Globals:
+#   CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_CHECK
+# Arguments:
+#   1: Manifest path
+#   2: Payload device path
+# Returns:
+#   0: on success
+#######################################
+verify_rootfs_payload() {
+  manifest_path="${1}"
+  payload_device="${2}"
+  payload_size=""
+  payload_hash=""
+
+  payload_size="$(awk '/^# Bytes[[:space:]]*:[[:space:]]Final filesystem[.]squashfs[[:space:]]+[0-9]+[[:space:]]*$/ {print $NF; exit}' "${manifest_path}")"
+  payload_hash="$(awk '($0 !~ /^#/ && NF >= 2){print $1; exit}' "${manifest_path}")"
+
+  case "${payload_size}" in
+
+    ""|*[!0-9]*)
+      log_er "0042()              : Rootfs attestation manifest has invalid payload size."
+      panic  "0042()              : Rootfs attestation manifest has invalid payload size."
+      ;;
+
+  esac
+
+  if [ "${payload_size}" -le 0 ]; then
+
+    log_er "0042()              : Rootfs attestation manifest has empty payload size."
+    panic  "0042()              : Rootfs attestation manifest has empty payload size."
+
+  fi
+
+  case "${payload_hash}" in
+
+    ""|*[!0123456789abcdefABCDEF]*)
+      log_er "0042()              : Rootfs attestation manifest has invalid SHA-512 payload hash."
+      panic  "0042()              : Rootfs attestation manifest has invalid SHA-512 payload hash."
+      ;;
+
+  esac
+
+  if [ "${#payload_hash}" -ne 128 ]; then
+
+    log_er "0042()              : Rootfs attestation manifest SHA-512 payload hash has invalid length."
+    panic  "0042()              : Rootfs attestation manifest SHA-512 payload hash has invalid length."
+
+  fi
+
+  if ! printf '%s  -\n' "${payload_hash}" > "${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_CHECK}"; then
+
+    log_er "0042()              : Failed to prepare transient rootfs payload checksum file."
+    panic  "0042()              : Failed to prepare transient rootfs payload checksum file."
+
+  fi
+
+  chmod 0600 "${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_CHECK}" 2>/dev/null || :
+
+  log_in "0042()               : Verifying exact SquashFS payload bytes from: [${payload_device}]"
+
+  # stream_rootfs_payload may be evaluated in a pipeline here; sha512sum -c is the fail-closed authority for truncated or
+  # tampered payload bytes.
+  # shellcheck disable=SC2310
+  if ! stream_rootfs_payload "${payload_device}" "${payload_size}" | /usr/bin/sha512sum -c "${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_CHECK}"; then
+
+    log_er "0042()              : Rootfs payload SHA-512 verification failed."
+    panic  "0042()              : Rootfs payload SHA-512 verification failed."
+
+  fi
+
+  log_ok "0042()               : Rootfs payload SHA-512 verification successful."
+
+  return 0
+}
+
+resolve_rootfs_attestation_artifacts
+
+HASH_FILE="${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_MANIFEST}"
+SIGN_FILE="${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_SIGNATURE}"
 KEYFILE="${CDLB_KEY_DIR}/${CDLB_EXP_FPR}.gpg"
 
-require_attestation_file "Public key"            "${KEYFILE}"
+log_in "0042()               : Validating [${KEYFILE}]"
+require_attestation_file "Public key"                   "${KEYFILE}"
+log_in "0042()               : Validating [${HASH_FILE}]"
 require_attestation_file "Rootfs attestation manifest"  "${HASH_FILE}"
+log_in "0042()               : Validating [${SIGN_FILE}]"
 require_attestation_file "Rootfs attestation signature" "${SIGN_FILE}"
-require_rootfs_payload "${CDLB_MAPPER_DEV}"
+log_in "0042()               : Validating [${CDLB_MAPPER_DEV}]"
+require_rootfs_payload_device "${CDLB_MAPPER_DEV}"
 
-log_in "0042()               : Verifying signed rootfs attestation manifest with pinned GPG FPR."
+log_ok "0042()               : Rootfs attestation inputs are present and readable."
 
-if ! _STATUS="$(/usr/bin/gpgv --no-default-keyring --keyring "${KEYFILE}" --status-fd 1 "${SIGN_FILE}" "${HASH_FILE}" 2>&1)"; then
+log_in "0042()               : Verifying rootfs attestation manifest with 'gpgv' and pinned GPG FPR."
+
+if ! _STATUS="$(/usr/bin/gpgv --keyring "${KEYFILE}" --status-fd 1 "${SIGN_FILE}" "${HASH_FILE}" 2>&1)"; then
 
   log_er "0042()              : gpgv verification failed for signature: [${SIGN_FILE}]"
 
@@ -182,7 +375,6 @@ if ! _STATUS="$(/usr/bin/gpgv --no-default-keyring --keyring "${KEYFILE}" --stat
 
   sleep 8
   panic  "0042()              : gpgv verification failed for signature: [${SIGN_FILE}]"
-  exit 1
 
 fi
 
@@ -198,51 +390,10 @@ else
   log_er "0042()              : Signature FPR mismatch: got: [${_CDLB_SIG_FILE_FPR}] expected: [${CDLB_EXP_FPR}]"
   sleep 8
   panic "[FATAL] Signature FPR mismatch: got: [${_CDLB_SIG_FILE_FPR}] expected: [${CDLB_EXP_FPR}]."
-  exit 1
 
 fi
 
-_ATTEST_RECORD_COUNT="$(awk 'NF && $1 !~ /^#/ { count++ } END { print count + 0 }' "${HASH_FILE}")"
+verify_rootfs_payload "${HASH_FILE}" "${CDLB_MAPPER_DEV}"
-
-if [ "${_ATTEST_RECORD_COUNT}" -ne 1 ]; then
-
-  log_er "0042()              : Rootfs attestation manifest must contain exactly one checksum record: [${HASH_FILE}]"
-  sleep 8
-  panic  "0042()              : Rootfs attestation manifest must contain exactly one checksum record: [${HASH_FILE}]"
-  exit 1
-
-fi
-
-_ATTESTED_PAYLOAD="$(awk 'NF && $1 !~ /^#/ { print $2; exit }' "${HASH_FILE}")"
-
-if [ "${_ATTESTED_PAYLOAD}" != "${CDLB_MAPPER_DEV}" ]; then
-
-  log_er "0042()              : Rootfs attestation manifest targets [${_ATTESTED_PAYLOAD}], expected selected payload [${CDLB_MAPPER_DEV}]"
-  sleep 8
-  panic  "0042()              : Rootfs attestation manifest does not target the selected rootfs payload."
-  exit 1
-
-fi
-
-log_in "0042()               : Verifying selected decrypted rootfs mapper content: [${CDLB_MAPPER_DEV}]"
-
-if ! _CHECKSUM_STATUS="$(cd / && LC_ALL=C /usr/bin/sha512sum -c --strict --quiet "${HASH_FILE}" 2>&1)"; then
-
-  log_er "0042()              : Rootfs payload checksum verification failed: [${CDLB_MAPPER_DEV}]"
-
-  if [ -n "${_CHECKSUM_STATUS}" ]; then
-
-    printf '%s\n' "${_CHECKSUM_STATUS}" >&2
-
-  fi
-
-  sleep 8
-  panic  "0042()              : Rootfs payload checksum verification failed: [${CDLB_MAPPER_DEV}]"
-  exit 1
-
-fi
-
-log_ok "0042()               : Rootfs payload checksum verification successful: [${CDLB_MAPPER_DEV}]"
 
 printf "\e[92m[INFO] Successfully applied : [/usr/lib/live/boot/0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest] \n\e[0m"
 

config/includes.chroot/usr/lib/live/boot/9990-overlay.sh

@@ -497,7 +497,23 @@ setup_unionfs ()
 
   ### CISS override for /usr/lib/live/boot/0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest -------------------------------------------------------
   printf "\e[95m[INFO] Calling              : [/usr/lib/live/boot/0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest] ... \n\e[0m"
-  [ -x /usr/lib/live/boot/0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest ] && /usr/lib/live/boot/0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest
+
+  chmod +x /usr/lib/live/boot/0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest
+
+  if [ -x /usr/lib/live/boot/0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest ]; then
+
+      if ! /usr/lib/live/boot/0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest; then
+
+        panic "[FATAL] [/usr/lib/live/boot/0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest] failed."
+
+      fi
+
+  else
+
+    panic "[FATAL] [/usr/lib/live/boot/0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest] missing or not executable."
+
+  fi
+
   printf "\e[92m[INFO] Calling              : [/usr/lib/live/boot/0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest] done. \n\e[0m"
   ### CISS override for /usr/lib/live/boot/0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest -------------------------------------------------------
 

docs/AUDIT_DNSSEC.md

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ include_toc: true
 **Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard**<br>
 *Debian Live Build Generator for hardened live environment and CISS Debian Installer*<br>
 **Master Version**: 9.14<br>
-**Build**: V9.14.022.2026.06.10<br>
+**Build**: V9.14.028.2026.06.18<br>
 
 # 2. DNSSEC Status
 

docs/AUDIT_HAVEGED.md

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ include_toc: true
 **Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard**<br>
 *Debian Live Build Generator for hardened live environment and CISS Debian Installer*<br>
 **Master Version**: 9.14<br>
-**Build**: V9.14.022.2026.06.10<br>
+**Build**: V9.14.028.2026.06.18<br>
 
 # 2. Haveged Audit on Netcup RS 2000 G11
 

docs/AUDIT_LYNIS.md

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ include_toc: true
 **Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard**<br>
 *Debian Live Build Generator for hardened live environment and CISS Debian Installer*<br>
 **Master Version**: 9.14<br>
-**Build**: V9.14.022.2026.06.10<br>
+**Build**: V9.14.028.2026.06.18<br>
 
 # 2. Lynis Audit:
 

docs/AUDIT_SSH.md

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ include_toc: true
 **Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard**<br>
 *Debian Live Build Generator for hardened live environment and CISS Debian Installer*<br>
 **Master Version**: 9.14<br>
-**Build**: V9.14.022.2026.06.10<br>
+**Build**: V9.14.028.2026.06.18<br>
 
 # 2. SSH Audit by ssh-audit.com
 

docs/AUDIT_TLS.md

@@ -8,15 +8,14 @@ include_toc: true
 **Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard**<br>
 *Debian Live Build Generator for hardened live environment and CISS Debian Installer*<br>
 **Master Version**: 9.14<br>
-**Build**: V9.14.022.2026.06.10<br>
+**Build**: V9.14.028.2026.06.18<br>
 
 # 2. TLS Audit:
 ````text
 ./testssl.sh --show-each --wide --phone-out --full https://git.coresecret.dev/
-
 #####################################################################
-  testssl.sh version 3.2.2 from https://testssl.sh/
+  testssl.sh version 3.2.3 from https://testssl.sh/
-  (2e77f5e 2025-09-22 19:35:27)
+  (0ff7a34 2026-06-01 09:45:44)
 
   This program is free software. Distribution and modification under
   GPLv2 permitted. USAGE w/o ANY WARRANTY. USE IT AT YOUR OWN RISK!
@@ -27,7 +26,7 @@ include_toc: true
   Using OpenSSL 1.0.2-bad (Mar 28 2025)  [~179 ciphers]
   on kali:./bin/openssl.Linux.x86_64
 
- Start 2025-09-28 16:12:17        -->> 152.53.110.40:443 (git.coresecret.dev) <<--
+ Start 2026-06-17 14:44:50        -->> 152.53.110.40:443 (git.coresecret.dev) <<--
 
  Further IP addresses:   2a0a:4cc0:80:330f:152:53:110:40
  rDNS (152.53.110.40):   git.coresecret.dev.
@@ -73,11 +72,11 @@ TLSv1
 TLSv1.1
  -
 TLSv1.2 (server order)
- xc030   ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384       ECDH 448   AESGCM      256      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+ xc02c   ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384     ECDH 448   AESGCM      256      TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
- xcca8   ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305       ECDH 448   ChaCha20    256      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
+ xcca9   ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305     ECDH 448   ChaCha20    256      TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
 TLSv1.3 (server order)
- x1302   TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384            ECDH 448   AESGCM      256      TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+ x1302   TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384            MLKEM1024  AESGCM      256      TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
- x1303   TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256      ECDH 448   ChaCha20    256      TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
+ x1303   TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256      MLKEM1024  ChaCha20    256      TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
 
  Has server cipher order?     yes (OK) -- TLS 1.3 and below
 
@@ -88,21 +87,21 @@ TLSv1.3 (server order)
 
 Hexcode  Cipher Suite Name (OpenSSL)       KeyExch.   Encryption  Bits     Cipher Suite Name (IANA/RFC)
 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- x1302   TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384            ECDH 448   AESGCM      256      TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384                             available
+ x1302   TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384            MLKEM1024  AESGCM      256      TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384                             available
- x1303   TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256      ECDH 448   ChaCha20    256      TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256                       available
+ x1303   TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256      MLKEM1024  ChaCha20    256      TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256                       available
  xcc14   ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305-OLD ECDH       ChaCha20    256      TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256_OLD  not a/v
  xcc13   ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305-OLD   ECDH       ChaCha20    256      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256_OLD    not a/v
  xcc15   DHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305-OLD     DH         ChaCha20    256      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256_OLD      not a/v
- xc030   ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384       ECDH 521   AESGCM      256      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384              available
+ xc030   ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384       ECDH       AESGCM      256      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384              not a/v
- xc02c   ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384     ECDH       AESGCM      256      TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384            not a/v
+ xc02c   ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384     ECDH 521   AESGCM      256      TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384            available
  xc028   ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384           ECDH       AES         256      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384              not a/v
  xc024   ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384         ECDH       AES         256      TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384            not a/v
  xc014   ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA              ECDH       AES         256      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA                 not a/v
  xc00a   ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA            ECDH       AES         256      TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA               not a/v
  xa3     DHE-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384         DH         AESGCM      256      TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384                not a/v
  x9f     DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384         DH         AESGCM      256      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384                not a/v
- xcca9   ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305     ECDH       ChaCha20    256      TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256      not a/v
+ xcca9   ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305     ECDH 448   ChaCha20    256      TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256      available
- xcca8   ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305       ECDH 448   ChaCha20    256      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256        available
+ xcca8   ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305       ECDH       ChaCha20    256      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256        not a/v
  xccaa   DHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305         DH         ChaCha20    256      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256          not a/v
  xc0af   ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-CCM8           ECDH       AESCCM8     256      TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8                 not a/v
  xc0ad   ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-CCM            ECDH       AESCCM      256      TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM                   not a/v
@@ -170,9 +169,10 @@ Hexcode  Cipher Suite Name (OpenSSL)       KeyExch.   Encryption  Bits     Ciphe
  xc086   -                                 ECDH       CamelliaGCM 128      TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256       not a/v
  xc08a   -                                 ECDH       CamelliaGCM 128      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256         not a/v
 
+ KEMs offered                 MLKEM1024 X25519MLKEM768 SecP384r1MLKEM1024
  Elliptic curves offered:     secp384r1 secp521r1 X448
- TLS 1.2 sig_algs offered:    RSA-PSS-RSAE+SHA256 RSA-PSS-RSAE+SHA384 RSA-PSS-RSAE+SHA512 RSA+SHA256 RSA+SHA384 RSA+SHA512 RSA+SHA224
+ TLS 1.2 sig_algs offered:    ECDSA+SHA256 ECDSA+SHA384 ECDSA+SHA512 ECDSA+SHA224
- TLS 1.3 sig_algs offered:    RSA-PSS-RSAE+SHA256 RSA-PSS-RSAE+SHA384 RSA-PSS-RSAE+SHA512
+ TLS 1.3 sig_algs offered:    ECDSA+SHA384
 
  Testing server defaults (Server Hello)
 
@@ -185,33 +185,33 @@ Hexcode  Cipher Suite Name (OpenSSL)       KeyExch.   Encryption  Bits     Ciphe
  TLS clock skew               Random values, no fingerprinting possible
  Certificate Compression      none
  Client Authentication        none
- Signature Algorithm          SHA256 with RSA
+ Signature Algorithm          ECDSA with SHA256
- Server key size              RSA 4096 bits (exponent is 65537)
+ Server key size              EC 384 bits (curve P-384)
- Server key usage             Digital Signature, Key Encipherment
+ Server key usage             Digital Signature
- Server extended key usage    TLS Web Server Authentication, TLS Web Client Authentication
+ Server extended key usage    TLS Web Server Authentication
- Serial                       13292523EB168BD226CE46 (OK: length 11)
+ Serial                       85135AE9A772A9778768548CDED9F483 (OK: length 16)
- Fingerprints                 SHA1 1CCF67686A5FFF33D163EFC9E67AB5C70D1122B8
+ Fingerprints                 SHA1 7745E895B49A44DA786509D124F7BAEF5BCDE21A
-                              SHA256 565271C2C74AF9EF5F0DCA16453A643C13E43CBD5B87AB82A622E929C48C8B7B
+                              SHA256 EBAC1DAD82CFAF97644D2F9A03082DE9ABC2B44AD4C86FE6FA202D3EF7243FE4
  Common Name (CN)             coresecret.dev
- subjectAltName (SAN)         coresecret.dev git.coresecret.dev lab.coresecret.dev run.coresecret.dev www.coresecret.dev
+ subjectAltName (SAN)         coresecret.dev badges.coresecret.dev cendev.eu git.coresecret.dev lab.coresecret.dev phpmyadmin.git.coresecret.dev
+                              run.coresecret.dev uml.coresecret.dev www.coresecret.dev
  Trust (hostname)             Ok via SAN (same w/o SNI)
  Chain of trust               Ok
  EV cert (experimental)       no
- Certificate Validity (UTC)   178 >= 60 days (2025-09-27 18:27 --> 2026-03-25 22:59)
+ Certificate Validity (UTC)   89 >= 60 days (2026-06-16 00:00 --> 2026-09-14 23:59)
  ETS/"eTLS", visibility info  not present
- In pwnedkeys.com DB          not in database Certificate Revocation List  http://crl.buypass.no/crl/BPClass2CA5.crl, not revoked
+ In pwnedkeys.com DB          not in database
- OCSP URI                     http://ocsp.buypass.com, not revoked
+ Certificate Revocation List  --
+ OCSP URI                     http://ocsp.sectigo.com, not revoked
  OCSP stapling                offered, not revoked
- OCSP must staple extension   --
+ OCSP must staple extension   supported
  DNS CAA RR (experimental)    available - please check for match with "Issuer" below
-                              communications=error, iodef=mailto:dns@coresecret.eu, issue=;, issue=buypass.no, issue=certum.pl,
+                              contactemail=caa@coresecret.eu, iodef=mailto:caa@coresecret.eu, issue=;, issue=certum.pl, issue=letsencrypt.org;,
-                              issue=letsencrypt.org;, issue=quantumsign.eu;, issue=sectigo.com, issuect=quantumsign.eu;, issuect=quantumsign.eu;,
+                              issue=quantumsign.eu;, issue=sectigo.com, issuemail=certum.pl, issuevmc=sectigo.com, issuewild=;
-                              issuect=quantumsign.eu;, issuect=quantumsign.eu;, issuect=quantumsign.eu;, issuect=quantumsign.eu;,
-                              issuect=quantumsign.eu;, issuect=quantumsign.eu;, issuemail=buypass.no, issuemail=certum.pl, issuewild=;
  Certificate Transparency     yes (certificate extension)
  Certificates provided        2
- Issuer                       Buypass Class 2 CA 5 (Buypass AS-983163327 from NO)
+ Issuer                       ZeroSSL ECC DV SSL CA 2 (ZeroSSL GmbH from AT)
- Intermediate cert validity   #1: ok > 40 days (2027-05-23 12:57). Buypass Class 2 CA 5 <-- Buypass Class 2 Root CA
+ Intermediate cert validity   #1: ok > 40 days (2035-09-23 23:59). ZeroSSL ECC DV SSL CA 2 <-- Sectigo Public Server Authentication Root E46
  Intermediate Bad OCSP (exp.) Ok
 
 
@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ Hexcode  Cipher Suite Name (OpenSSL)       KeyExch.   Encryption  Bits     Ciphe
  Public Key Pinning           --
  Server banner                nginx
  Application banner           --
- Cookie(s)                    2 issued: 2/2 secure, 2/2 HttpOnly
+ Cookie(s)                    1 issued: 1/1 secure, 1/1 HttpOnly
  Security headers             X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
                               X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
                               Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; connect-src 'self'; font-src 'self' data:; form-action 'self'
@@ -236,7 +236,6 @@ Hexcode  Cipher Suite Name (OpenSSL)       KeyExch.   Encryption  Bits     Ciphe
                               Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy: cross-origin
                               Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy: unsafe-none
                               X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block
-                              Permissions-Policy: interest-cohort=()
                               Referrer-Policy: no-referrer
                               Cache-Control: no-cache
  Reverse Proxy banner         --
@@ -257,8 +256,7 @@ Hexcode  Cipher Suite Name (OpenSSL)       KeyExch.   Encryption  Bits     Ciphe
  SWEET32 (CVE-2016-2183, CVE-2016-6329)    not vulnerable (OK)
  FREAK (CVE-2015-0204)                     not vulnerable (OK)
  DROWN (CVE-2016-0800, CVE-2016-0703)      not vulnerable on this host and port (OK)
-                                           make sure you don't use this certificate elsewhere with SSLv2 enabled services, see
+                                           no RSA certificate, thus certificate can't be used with SSLv2 elsewhere
-                                           https://search.censys.io/search?resource=hosts&virtual_hosts=INCLUDE&q=565271C2C74AF9EF5F0DCA16453A643C13E43CBD5B87AB82A622E929C48C8B7B
  LOGJAM (CVE-2015-4000), experimental      not vulnerable (OK): no DH EXPORT ciphers, no DH key detected with <= TLS 1.2
  BEAST (CVE-2011-3389)                     not vulnerable (OK), no SSL3 or TLS1
  LUCKY13 (CVE-2013-0169), experimental     not vulnerable (OK)
@@ -271,24 +269,24 @@ Hexcode  Cipher Suite Name (OpenSSL)       KeyExch.   Encryption  Bits     Ciphe
  Browser                      Protocol  Cipher Suite Name (OpenSSL)       Forward Secrecy
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Android 7.0 (native)         No connection
- Android 8.1 (native)         TLSv1.2   ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384       384 bit ECDH (P-384)
+ Android 8.1 (native)         TLSv1.2   ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384     384 bit ECDH (P-384)
  Android 9.0 (native)         TLSv1.3   TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384            384 bit ECDH (P-384)
  Android 10.0 (native)        TLSv1.3   TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384            384 bit ECDH (P-384)
  Android 11/12 (native)       TLSv1.3   TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384            384 bit ECDH (P-384)
  Android 13/14 (native)       TLSv1.3   TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384            384 bit ECDH (P-384)
- Android 15 (native)          TLSv1.3   TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384            384 bit ECDH (P-384)
+ Android 15 (native)          TLSv1.3   TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384            X25519MLKEM768
  Chrome 101 (Win 10)          TLSv1.3   TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384            384 bit ECDH (P-384)
- Chromium 137 (Win 11)        TLSv1.3   TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384            384 bit ECDH (P-384)
+ Chromium 137 (Win 11)        TLSv1.3   TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384            X25519MLKEM768
  Firefox 100 (Win 10)         TLSv1.3   TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384            521 bit ECDH (P-521)
- Firefox 137 (Win 11)         TLSv1.3   TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384            521 bit ECDH (P-521)
+ Firefox 137 (Win 11)         TLSv1.3   TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384            X25519MLKEM768
  IE 8 Win 7                   No connection
- IE 11 Win 7                  No connection
+ IE 11 Win 7                  TLSv1.2   ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384     384 bit ECDH (P-384)
- IE 11 Win 8.1                No connection
+ IE 11 Win 8.1                TLSv1.2   ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384     384 bit ECDH (P-384)
- IE 11 Win Phone 8.1          No connection
+ IE 11 Win Phone 8.1          TLSv1.2   ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384     384 bit ECDH (P-384)
- IE 11 Win 10                 TLSv1.2   ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384       384 bit ECDH (P-384)
+ IE 11 Win 10                 TLSv1.2   ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384     384 bit ECDH (P-384)
- Edge 15 Win 10               TLSv1.2   ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384       384 bit ECDH (P-384)
+ Edge 15 Win 10               TLSv1.2   ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384     384 bit ECDH (P-384)
  Edge 101 Win 10 21H2         TLSv1.3   TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384            384 bit ECDH (P-384)
- Edge 133 Win 11 23H2         TLSv1.3   TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384            384 bit ECDH (P-384)
+ Edge 133 Win 11 23H2         TLSv1.3   TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384            X25519MLKEM768
  Safari 18.4 (iOS 18.4)       TLSv1.3   TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384            521 bit ECDH (P-521)
  Safari 15.4 (macOS 12.3.1)   TLSv1.3   TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384            521 bit ECDH (P-521)
  Safari 18.4 (macOS 15.4)     TLSv1.3   TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384            521 bit ECDH (P-521)
@@ -299,11 +297,11 @@ Hexcode  Cipher Suite Name (OpenSSL)       KeyExch.   Encryption  Bits     Ciphe
  Java 21.0.6 (OpenJDK)        TLSv1.3   TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384            448 bit ECDH (X448)
  go 1.17.8                    TLSv1.3   TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384            521 bit ECDH (P-521)
  LibreSSL 3.3.6 (macOS)       TLSv1.3   TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384            521 bit ECDH (P-521)
- OpenSSL 1.0.2e               TLSv1.2   ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384       521 bit ECDH (P-521)
+ OpenSSL 1.0.2e               TLSv1.2   ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384     521 bit ECDH (P-521)
  OpenSSL 1.1.1d (Debian)      TLSv1.3   TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384            448 bit ECDH (X448)
  OpenSSL 3.0.15 (Debian)      TLSv1.3   TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384            448 bit ECDH (X448)
- OpenSSL 3.5.0 (git)          TLSv1.3   TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384            448 bit ECDH (X448)
+ OpenSSL 3.5.0 (git)          TLSv1.3   TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384            X25519MLKEM768
- Apple Mail (16.0)            TLSv1.2   ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384       521 bit ECDH (P-521)
+ Apple Mail (16.0)            TLSv1.2   ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384     521 bit ECDH (P-521)
  Thunderbird (91.9)           TLSv1.3   TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384            521 bit ECDH (P-521)
 
 
@@ -317,7 +315,7 @@ Hexcode  Cipher Suite Name (OpenSSL)       KeyExch.   Encryption  Bits     Ciphe
  Final Score                  100
  Overall Grade                A+
 
- Done 2025-09-28 16:13:50 [  95s] -->> 152.53.110.40:443 (git.coresecret.dev) <<--
+ Done 2026-06-17 14:46:05 [  78s] -->> 152.53.110.40:443 (git.coresecret.dev) <<--
 ````
 
 ---

docs/BOOTPARAMS.md

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ include_toc: true
 **Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard**<br>
 *Debian Live Build Generator for hardened live environment and CISS Debian Installer*<br>
 **Master Version**: 9.14<br>
-**Build**: V9.14.022.2026.06.10<br>
+**Build**: V9.14.028.2026.06.18<br>
 
 # 2. Hardened Kernel Boot Parameters
 

docs/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -8,10 +8,33 @@ include_toc: true
 **Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard**<br>
 *Debian Live Build Generator for hardened live environment and CISS Debian Installer*<br>
 **Master Version**: 9.14<br>
-**Build**: V9.14.022.2026.06.10<br>
+**Build**: V9.14.028.2026.06.18<br>
 
 # 2. Changelog
 
+## V9.14.028.2026.06.18
+* **Changed**: [0024-ciss-crypt-squash](../config/includes.chroot/usr/lib/live/boot/0024-ciss-crypt-squash) Explicitly permissions the runtime rootfs attestation cache and fails closed on cache creation or chmod errors.
+* **Changed**: [MAN_CISS_ISO_BOOT_CHAIN.md](MAN_CISS_ISO_BOOT_CHAIN.md) Documents the rootfs attestation artifact custody path from build-time `binary/live` creation through the `0024` runtime cache and `0042` verification.
+* **Changed**: [README.md](../README.md) Documents the runtime rootfs attestation cache handoff.
+
+## V9.14.026.2026.06.17
+* **Updated**: git.coresecret.dev nginx Mainline 1.31.1 custom build with OpenSSL 4.0.1 to support PQC KEX algorithms:
+* * ``MLKEM1024`` ``SecP384r1MLKEM1024`` ``X25519MLKEM768`` 
+* * ECDH: ``X448`` ``secp521r1`` ``secp384r1``
+* **Updated**: [AUDIT_TLS.md](AUDIT_TLS.md)
+
+## V9.14.024.2026.06.11
+* **Added**: [lib_build_dir_safety.sh](../lib/lib_build_dir_safety.sh) Integrated Security Audit Finding A12
+* **Added**: [lib_debug_sanitize.sh](../lib/lib_debug_sanitize.sh) Integrated Security Audit Finding A11
+* **Added**: [lib_secret_validation.sh](../lib/lib_secret_validation.sh) Integrated Security Audit Finding A10
+* **Changed**: [zzzz_ciss_crypt_squash.hook.binary](../config/hooks/live/zzzz_ciss_crypt_squash.hook.binary) Integrated Security Audit Finding A01 + A10
+* **Changed**: [0030-ciss-verify-checksums](../config/includes.chroot/usr/lib/live/boot/0030-ciss-verify-checksums) Integrated Security Audit Finding A02
+* **Changed**: [0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest](../config/includes.chroot/usr/lib/live/boot/0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest) Integrated Security Audit Finding A01
+* **Changed**: [lib_ciss_upgrades_boot.sh](../lib/lib_ciss_upgrades_boot.sh) Integrated Security Audit Finding A01
+* **Changed**: [lib_lb_config_start.sh](../lib/lib_lb_config_start.sh) Integrated Security Audit Finding A12
+* **Changed**: [README.md](../README.md) Integrated Security Audit Finding A01 + A02
+* **Changed**: [lib_usage.sh](../lib/lib_usage.sh) Integrated Security Audit Finding A10
+
 ## V9.14.022.2026.06.10
 * **Added**: [lib_logo.sh](../lib/lib_logo.sh)
 * **Added**: [9999_cdi_starter.sh](../scripts/usr/local/sbin/9999_cdi_starter.sh) Retrieve rdns for Primordial-Workflow™
@@ -196,7 +219,7 @@ include_toc: true
 * **Added**: [lib_ciss_upgrades_build.sh](../lib/lib_ciss_upgrades_build.sh) Updates for CISS and PhysNet Primordial-Workflow™.
 * **Added**: [lib_gnupg.sh](../lib/lib_gnupg.sh) Updates for CISS and PhysNet Primordial-Workflow™.
 * **Added**: [lib_primordial.sh](../lib/lib_primordial.sh) Updates for CISS and PhysNet Primordial-Workflow™.
-* **Added**: [0030-ciss-verify-checksums](../scripts/usr/lib/live/boot/0030-ciss-verify-checksums) Unified handling via includes.chroot.
+* **Added**: [0030-ciss-verify-checksums](../.archive/0030-ciss-verify-checksums) Unified handling via includes.chroot.
 * **Bugfixes**: [linter_char_scripts.yaml](../.gitea/workflows/linter_char_scripts.yaml) - WORKFLOW_ID="${GITHUB_WORKFLOW:-linter_char_scripts.yaml}"
 * **Bugfixes**: [render-dnssec-status.yaml](../.gitea/workflows/render-dnssec-status.yaml) - WORKFLOW_ID="${GITHUB_WORKFLOW:-render-dnssec-status.yaml}"
 * **Bugfixes**: [render-dot-to-png.yaml](../.gitea/workflows/render-dot-to-png.yaml) - WORKFLOW_ID="${GITHUB_WORKFLOW:-render-dot-to-png.yaml}"

docs/CNET.md

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ include_toc: true
 **Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard**<br>
 *Debian Live Build Generator for hardened live environment and CISS Debian Installer*<br>
 **Master Version**: 9.14<br>
-**Build**: V9.14.022.2026.06.10<br>
+**Build**: V9.14.028.2026.06.18<br>
 
 # 2. Centurion Net - Developer Branch Overview
 

docs/CODING_CONVENTION.md

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ include_toc: true
 **Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard**<br>
 *Debian Live Build Generator for hardened live environment and CISS Debian Installer*<br>
 **Master Version**: 9.14<br>
-**Build**: V9.14.022.2026.06.10<br>
+**Build**: V9.14.028.2026.06.18<br>
 
 # 2. Purpose
 

docs/CONTRIBUTING.md

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ include_toc: true
 **Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard**<br>
 *Debian Live Build Generator for hardened live environment and CISS Debian Installer*<br>
 **Master Version**: 9.14<br>
-**Build**: V9.14.022.2026.06.10<br>
+**Build**: V9.14.028.2026.06.18<br>
 
 # 2. Contributing / participating
 

docs/CREDITS.md

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ include_toc: true
 **Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard**<br>
 *Debian Live Build Generator for hardened live environment and CISS Debian Installer*<br>
 **Master Version**: 9.14<br>
-**Build**: V9.14.022.2026.06.10<br>
+**Build**: V9.14.028.2026.06.18<br>
 
 # 2. Credits
 

docs/DL_PUB_ISO.md

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ include_toc: true
 **Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard**<br>
 *Debian Live Build Generator for hardened live environment and CISS Debian Installer*<br>
 **Master Version**: 9.14<br>
-**Build**: V9.14.022.2026.06.10<br>
+**Build**: V9.14.028.2026.06.18<br>
 
 # 2. Download the latest PUBLIC CISS.debian.live.ISO
 

docs/DOCUMENTATION.md

@@ -8,14 +8,14 @@ include_toc: true
 **Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard**<br>
 *Debian Live Build Generator for hardened live environment and CISS Debian Installer*<br>
 **Master Version**: 9.14<br>
-**Build**: V9.14.022.2026.06.10<br>
+**Build**: V9.14.028.2026.06.18<br>
 
 # 2.1. Usage
 ````text
                         CDLB(1)                        CISS.debian.live.builder                        CDLB(1)
 
 CISS.debian.live.builder from https://git.coresecret.dev/msw
-Master V9.14.022.2026.06.10
+Master V9.14.028.2026.06.18
 A lightweight Shell Wrapper for building a hardened Debian Live ISO Image.
 
 (c) Marc S. Weidner, 2018 - 2026
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ A lightweight Shell Wrapper for building a hardened Debian Live ISO Image.
 
   --build-directory </path/to/build_directory>
     Where the Debian Live Build Image should be generated. RECOMMENDED path: </opt/cdlb>
+    Cleanup is destructive inside the exact builder-owned path and requires '.ciss-live-builder-owned'.
     MUST be provided.
 
   --change-splash <STRING> one of <club | hexagon>
@@ -57,6 +58,7 @@ A lightweight Shell Wrapper for building a hardened Debian Live ISO Image.
   --debug, -d
     Enables debug logging for the main program routine. Detailed logging information are written to:
     </tmp/ciss_live_builder_1801049.log>
+    After xtrace is stopped and its debug FD is closed, a final exact-value redaction pass sanitizes logs.
 
   --dhcp-centurion
     If a DHCP lease is provided, the provider's name server will be overridden and the hardened, privacy-focused
@@ -86,12 +88,12 @@ A lightweight Shell Wrapper for building a hardened Debian Live ISO Image.
 
   --key_age=*
     The SOPS AGE private keyring for decryption operations. Change '*' to your desired SOPS AGE key file.
-    File MUST be placed in:
+    This MUST be a filename only and MUST be placed in the root-owned tmpfs secret root:
     </dev/shm/cdlb_secrets>
 
   --key_luks=*
     The LUKS encryption / decryption passphrase for '/'-fs-encryption. Change '*' to your desired passphrase file.
-    File MUST be placed in:
+    This MUST be a filename only and MUST be placed in the root-owned tmpfs secret root:
     </dev/shm/cdlb_secrets>
 
   --log-statistics-only
@@ -140,7 +142,8 @@ A lightweight Shell Wrapper for building a hardened Debian Live ISO Image.
   --root-password-file </dev/shm/cdlb_secrets/password.txt>>
     Password file for 'root', if given, MUST be a string of 42 to 64 characters.
     If the argument is omitted, no further login authentication is required for the local console.
-    MUST be placed in:
+    The path MUST be absolute, regular, non-symlink, root-owned, and mode 0400 after normalization.
+    RECOMMENDED path:
     </dev/shm/cdlb_secrets/password.txt>
 
   --secure-boot-profile <STRING> one of <debian-shim | ciss-uki>
@@ -156,7 +159,7 @@ A lightweight Shell Wrapper for building a hardened Debian Live ISO Image.
     specified via '--signing_key=*'. If the keyring is protected, then provide the passphrase in its own file.
     Specify the fingerprint of the key to use via '--signing_key_fpr=*'.
     Optionally import an offline GPG CA signing public key via: '--signing_ca=*'.
-    Change '*' to your desired files / fingerprint. Files MUST be placed in:
+    Change '*' to your desired filename-only files / fingerprint. Files MUST be placed in:
     </dev/shm/cdlb_secrets>
 
   --sshfp
@@ -171,6 +174,7 @@ A lightweight Shell Wrapper for building a hardened Debian Live ISO Image.
 
   --ssh-pubkey </dev/shm/cdlb_secrets/>
     Imports the SSH Public Key from the file 'authorized_keys' into the Live ISO.
+    Directory MUST be absolute, regular, non-symlink, root-owned, and not group/world-writable.
     Key file MUST be placed in:
     </dev/shm/cdlb_secrets/authorized_keys>
 
@@ -186,7 +190,7 @@ A lightweight Shell Wrapper for building a hardened Debian Live ISO Image.
 💷 Please consider donating to my work at:
 🌐 https://coresecret.eu/spenden/
 
-                        V9.14.022.2026.06.10                        2026-05-17                         CDLB(1)
+                        V9.14.028.2026.06.18                        2026-05-17                         CDLB(1)
 ````
 
 # 3. Booting

docs/MAN_CISS_ISO_BOOT_CHAIN.md

@@ -8,28 +8,23 @@ include_toc: true
 **Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard**<br>
 *Debian Live Build Generator for hardened live environment and CISS Debian Installer*<br>
 **Master Version**: 9.14<br>
-**Build**: V9.14.022.2026.06.10<br>
+**Build**: V9.14.028.2026.06.18<br>
 
 # 2. CISS.debian.live.builder – Boot & Trust Chain (Technical Documentation)
 
-**Status:** 2026-06-10<br>
+**Status:** 2026-06-18<br>
 **Audience:** CICA CISO, CISS staff, technically proficient administrators<br>
-**Summary:** The **CISS.debian.live.builder** Live-ISO establishes a two-stage verification chain around the live root: an
+**Summary:** The **CISS.debian.live.builder** Live-ISO establishes a two-stage verification chain around the live root: after the CISS LUKS/dm-integrity container has been opened, and the live medium context has been exposed, `0030-ciss-verify-checksums` verifies the mounted live-medium checksum manifest, detached signature, and signer fingerprint; `0024-ciss-crypt-squash` preserves the rootfs attestation artifacts from the real ISO medium into a stable initramfs runtime cache; later, `0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest` verifies the signed rootfs attestation manifest, and the exact final SquashFS payload bytes copied into the decrypted LUKS mapper. UEFI Secure Boot can use either the default Microsoft/Debian shim chain, or a CISS-signed UKI chain for systems that trust the CISS Secure Boot key material.<br>
-ISO-edge checksum-manifest check and a late attestation of the complete selected decrypted rootfs mapper. The late check verifies
-both the signed SHA-512 manifest and the mapper bytes before boot continues. `dm-integrity` separately provides sector-integrity
-protection and is not a substitute for origin-bound signature and checksum attestation. UEFI Secure Boot can use either the
-default Microsoft/Debian shim chain, or a CISS-signed UKI chain for systems that trust the CISS Secure Boot key material.<br>
 
 # 3. Overview
 
 * **Trust anchor:** Pinned fingerprint (FPR) of the signing key embedded at build time in initramfs hooks.
-* **Integrity & authenticity verification:**
+* **Integrity and authenticity verification:**
 
-  1. **ISO edge:** Verify one supported checksum manifest using `gpgv`, FPR pinning, and the matching checksum tool.
+  1. **Mounted live medium:** After `0024-ciss-crypt-squash` has opened the encrypted container and exposed `/run/live/medium`, verify `sha512sum.txt` using `gpgv`, FPR pinning, and checksum execution.
-  2. **Late rootfs attestation:** Verify the signed mapper manifest and the complete selected decrypted mapper
+  2. **Decrypted rootfs payload:** Preserve the external rootfs attestation manifest and detached signature before live-boot may replace or unmount the medium view, verify the cached manifest using `gpgv` and FPR pinning, then verify the exact SquashFS payload bytes from the decrypted mapper with `sha512sum -c`.
-     `/dev/mapper/crypt_liveiso` with `sha512sum -c`.
 
-* **Storage-level protection:** `dm-crypt` (AES-XTS-512) and, outside runner builds, `dm-integrity` (HMAC-SHA-512, 4 KiB).
+* **Storage-level confidentiality and keyed sector integrity:** `dm-crypt` (AES-XTS-512) and `dm-integrity` (HMAC-SHA-512, 4 KiB).
 * **Remotely unlock:** CISS hardened and build dropbear, modern primitives only, no passwords, no agent/forwarding.
 
 # 3.1. Secure Boot Profiles
@@ -54,15 +49,15 @@ private Secure Boot key names are detected in those paths before live-build chec
 
 # 4. Primitives & Parameters
 
-| Component    | Primitive / Parameter                                     | Purpose                                                |
+| Component    | Primitive / Parameter                                                            | Purpose                                                                    |
-|--------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|
+|--------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
-| LUKS2        | `aes-xts-plain64`, `--key-size 512`, `--sector-size 4096` | Confidentiality (2×256-bit XTS)                        |
+| LUKS2        | `aes-xts-plain64`, `--key-size 512`, `--sector-size 4096`                        | Confidentiality (2×256-bit XTS)                                            |
-| dm-integrity | `hmac-sha512` (keyed), journal                            | Per-sector integrity inside the LUKS mapping; not origin attestation |
+| dm-integrity | `hmac-sha512` (keyed), journal                                                   | Keyed per-sector integrity for the opened mapping; not origin authenticity |
-| PBKDF        | `argon2id`, `--iter-time 1000` ms                         | Key derivation, hardware-agnostic                      |
+| PBKDF        | `argon2id`, `--iter-time 1000` ms, `--pbkdf-memory 262144`, `--pbkdf-parallel 1` | Bounded key derivation cost for initramfs unlock                           |
-| Signatures   | Ed25519 or RSA-4096 (FPR pinned)                          | Public verifiability, non-repudiation                  |
+| Signatures   | Ed25519 or RSA-4096 (FPR pinned)                                                 | Public verifiability, non-repudiation                                      |
-| Verification | `gpgv --no-default-keyring`                               | No agent dependency in initramfs                       |
+| Verification | `gpgv --keyring <pinned-keyring>`                                                | Explicit keyring selection and no agent dependency in initramfs            |
-| Hash lists   | `sha512sum` format                                        | Deterministic ISO-edge and decrypted-mapper verification |
+| Hash lists   | `sha512sum` format                                                               | Deterministic content verification                                         |
-| Dropbear     | Modern KEX/AEAD (per `localoptions.h`)                    | Minimal attack surface, remote unlock                  |
+| Dropbear     | Modern KEX/AEAD (per `localoptions.h`)                                           | Minimal attack surface, remote unlock                                      |
 
 # 5. Diagram: CISS Live ISO Boot Flow
 ```mermaid
@@ -97,12 +92,14 @@ flowchart TD
     0090 e09@--> 0100["Starting CISS.hardened dropbear"];
     0100 e10@--> 0110["Executing live-boot, mounting ISO FS"];
     0110 e11@--> 0122["Executing 0022-ciss: Hardening tmpfs for OverlayFS upper/work"];
-    0122 e12@--> 0124["Executing 0024-ciss: LUKS open (dm-crypt & integrity)"];
+    0122 e12@--> 0124["Executing 0024-ciss: Mount ISO medium and locate /live/ciss_rootfs.crypt"];
-    0124 e13@--> |SUCCESSFUL| LUKS["Unlocking LUKS2 Argon2id PBKDF → XTS + HMAC-SHA512"];
+    0124 e13@--> CACHE["0024-ciss: Preserve rootfs attestation artifacts in /run/ciss-rootfs-attestation"];
-    LUKS e14@--> ROOT["Assemble RootFS OverlayFS"];
+    CACHE e13b@--> LUKSOPEN["0024-ciss: LUKS open (dm-crypt & integrity)"];
-    ROOT e15@--> 0126["Executing 0026-ciss: Hardening early sysctls"];
+    LUKSOPEN e13c@--> |SUCCESSFUL| LUKS["Decrypted mapper exposed; livefs_root=/run/live/medium set"];
-    0126 e16@--> 0130["Executing 0030-ciss: Verification of authenticity and integrity via embedded and pinned GPG of ISO edge"];
+    LUKS e14@--> 0126["Executing 0026-ciss: Hardening early sysctls"];
-    0130 e17@--> |SUCCESSFUL| 0142["Executing 0042-ciss: Attestation of RootFS"];
+    0126 e15@--> 0130["Executing 0030-ciss: Mounted live-medium checksum and signature verification"];
+    0130 e16@--> |SUCCESSFUL| ROOT["9990-overlay: Mount SquashFS / OverlayFS"];
+    ROOT e17@--> 0142["Executing 0042-ciss: Attestation of RootFS SquashFS payload"];
     0142 e18@--> 0145["init-bottom: stop CISS.hardened dropbear, tear down initramfs net"];
     0145 e19@--> 9050["Switching root (run-init / pivot_root)"];
     9050 e20@--> 9010["Starting /sbin/init -> systemd"];
@@ -116,6 +113,8 @@ flowchart TD
     e11@{ animation: fast }
     e12@{ animation: fast }
     e13@{ animation: fast }
+    e13b@{ animation: fast }
+    e13c@{ animation: fast }
     e14@{ animation: fast }
     e15@{ animation: fast }
     e16@{ animation: fast }
@@ -135,28 +134,52 @@ flowchart TD
 0030 -- FAIL --> X;
 0040 -- FAIL --> X;
 0124 -- FAIL --> X;
+CACHE -- FAIL --> X;
+LUKSOPEN -- FAIL --> X;
 0130 -- FAIL --> X;
 0142 -- FAIL --> X;
 ```
 
 # 6. Diagram: CISS Live ISO LUKS and dm-integrity layering
+
+```text
+ISO medium
+└── /live/ciss_rootfs.crypt
+    └── LUKS2 / dm-crypt / dm-integrity
+        └── /dev/mapper/crypt_liveiso
+            └── SquashFS rootfs [SHA-512 over exact SquashFS byte stream]
+                └── OverlayFS / running root filesystem
+```
+
+Rootfs attestation evidence follows a separate side path:
+
+```text
+ISO medium
+├── /live/filesystem.squashfs.sha512sum.txt
+└── /live/filesystem.squashfs.sha512sum.txt.sig
+    └── copied by 0024-ciss-crypt-squash to:
+        ├── /run/ciss-rootfs-attestation/filesystem.squashfs.sha512sum.txt
+        └── /run/ciss-rootfs-attestation/filesystem.squashfs.sha512sum.txt.sig
+```
+
+The `/run/ciss-rootfs-attestation/` cache is only a stable initramfs runtime location. It is not a trust anchor. `0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest` still requires the cached manifest to verify against the detached signature, the pinned GPG fingerprint, and the actual decrypted mapper bytes.
+
 ```mermaid
 ---
 config:
       theme: forest
 ---
 flowchart TD
-0{{"Plain device: CD-ROM / USB"}} --> 1["ISO image (ISO9660 + ESP)"];
+0{{"Plain device: CD-ROM / USB"}} --> 1["ISO medium (ISO9660 + ESP)"];
-1 --> 2["Mount ISO9660 FS → /run/live/medium"];
+1 --> 2["/live/ciss_rootfs.crypt"];
-2 --> 3["Container file /run/live/medium/live/ciss_rootfs.crypt"];
+2 --> 3["LUKS2 / dm-crypt / dm-integrity"];
-3 --> 4["dm-integrity layer (HMAC-SHA-512, 4 KiB)"];
+3 --> 4["/dev/mapper/crypt_liveiso"];
-4 --> 5["dm-crypt LUKS2 (AES-XTS-512) → /dev/mapper/crypt_liveiso"];
+4 --> 5["SquashFS rootfs byte stream"];
-5 --> 6["Mount SquashFS from /dev/mapper/crypt_liveiso → /run/live/rootfs"];
+5 --> 6["OverlayFS / running root filesystem"];
 
 ```
 
-**Note:** `dm-integrity` detects sector corruption within its keyed mapping. The signed SHA-512 mapper manifest independently
+**Note:** `dm-integrity` provides keyed sector integrity for the opened LUKS mapping. It is not treated as origin authenticity; origin authenticity is provided by the signed checksum and rootfs attestation manifests plus pinned signer fingerprints.
-binds the selected decrypted rootfs payload to the signing key. Neither property substitutes for the other.
 
 # 7. CISS Live ISO LUKS Build-Time Core Steps
 ```sh
@@ -171,6 +194,8 @@ cryptsetup luksFormat \
   --luks2-keyslots-size 16777216 \
   --luks2-metadata-size 4194304 \
   --pbkdf argon2id \
+  --pbkdf-memory 262144 \
+  --pbkdf-parallel 1 \
   --sector-size 4096 \
   --type luks2 \
   --use-random \
@@ -178,62 +203,101 @@ cryptsetup luksFormat \
   "${LUKSFS}"
 ```
 
-After `filesystem.squashfs` is copied to `/dev/mapper/crypt_liveiso`, the binary hook hashes the complete decrypted mapper,
-including the mapper padding after the SquashFS image. It writes
-`binary/live/ciss_rootfs.crypt.decrypted.sha512sum.txt`, signs that manifest with the existing artifact-signing key, verifies the
-signature and checksum locally, and only then closes the mapping and removes the plaintext `filesystem.squashfs`.
-
 **Signing keys:** Ed25519 and RSA-4096; **FPR pinned at build time** in hooks. Signing keys are **additionally** signed by an offline GPG Root-CA (out-of-band trust chain).
 
-# 8. Early ISO-Edge Verification (CISS modified hook 0030-ciss-verify-checksums, live-bottom)
+## 7.1. Rootfs Attestation Artifacts Created at Build Time
 
-**Goal:** During live-boot, require one supported ISO-edge checksum manifest to be successfully verified:
+`config/hooks/live/zzzz_ciss_crypt_squash.hook.binary` runs in the live-build binary phase after `binary/live/filesystem.squashfs` exists and before the final ISO image is emitted.
+
+The hook expects:
+
+| Artifact                    | Build-time path                                            | Purpose                                                                                 |
+|-----------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Final plaintext SquashFS    | `${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}/binary/live/filesystem.squashfs` | Source byte stream that will be attested and copied into the encrypted mapper.          |
+| Signing key passphrase file | `${VAR_SIGNING_KEY_PASSFILE}`                              | Unlocks the configured signing key without exposing the passphrase on the command line. |
+| Verification keyring        | `${VAR_VERIFY_KEYRING}`                                    | Build-time self-check for the detached signature before the ISO is accepted.            |
+
+The hook creates:
+
+| Artifact                              | Build-time path                                                              | ISO path                                      |
+|---------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|
+| Encrypted live root container         | `${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}/binary/live/ciss_rootfs.crypt`                     | `/live/ciss_rootfs.crypt`                     |
+| Rootfs attestation manifest           | `${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}/binary/live/filesystem.squashfs.sha512sum.txt`     | `/live/filesystem.squashfs.sha512sum.txt`     |
+| Rootfs attestation detached signature | `${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}/binary/live/filesystem.squashfs.sha512sum.txt.sig` | `/live/filesystem.squashfs.sha512sum.txt.sig` |
+
+The manifest format is intentionally small and deterministic:
+
+```text
+# CISS.debian.live.builder Master <version>
+# Attestation file for filesystem.squashfs Version 1.0.0
+# Boundary : Final filesystem.squashfs byte stream copied into /dev/mapper/crypt_liveiso
+# Bytes    : Final filesystem.squashfs <exact-byte-count>
+<sha512-of-final-filesystem.squashfs>  filesystem.squashfs
+```
+
+The signed boundary is the final SquashFS byte stream before LUKS wrapping. The hook writes that byte stream into `/dev/mapper/crypt_liveiso`, closes the mapper, shreds the transient LUKS key file, removes `binary/live/filesystem.squashfs`, and keeps only `/live/ciss_rootfs.crypt` plus the manifest/signature pair in the final ISO payload tree.
+
+# 8. Mounted Live-Medium Checksum Verification (CISS modified hook 0030-ciss-verify-checksums, live-bottom)
+
+**Goal:** After `0024-ciss-crypt-squash` has opened the encrypted container and exposed the live medium context, but before the final live root is accepted, verify:
 
 1. **Detached signature of `sha512sum.txt`** using `gpgv` against the embedded public key.
 2. **FPR pinning:** Parse `VALIDSIG` and require exact match with the build-time pinned FPR.
 3. **Optional:** *Script self-IA* – hash the executed hook and compare against the signed list (drift/bitrot detector).
 
-Verification is fail-closed. Boot panics if no supported manifest is present, no matching checksum tool is available, checksum
-verification does not succeed, signature verification fails when requested, or verification ends in an unknown state.
-
 **Core call (initramfs):**
 
 ```sh
-/usr/bin/gpgv --no-default-keyring --keyring "$KEYFILE" --status-fd 1 --verify sha512sum.txt.sig sha512sum.txt
+/usr/bin/gpgv --keyring "$KEYFILE" --status-fd 1 sha512sum.txt.sig sha512sum.txt
 # parse [GNUPG:] VALIDSIG ... <FPR> ...
 ```
 
-# 9. Late Root-FS Payload Attestation (CISS hook 0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest, called by 9990-overlay.sh)
+# 9. Late Root-FS Attestation and dmsetup Health (CISS hook 0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest, called by 9990-overlay.sh)
 
-**Goal:** After LUKS unlock and rootfs selection, verify the authenticity of the manifest and the content of the actual selected
+**Goal:** After LUKS unlocked, and the live root has been mounted by `9990-overlay.sh`, validate the **decrypted** rootfs payload selected at build time and the **actual** mapping topology.
-decrypted rootfs payload.
 
-* **Exact attested boundary:** the complete `/dev/mapper/crypt_liveiso` block payload selected by `9990-overlay.sh` and mounted
+* **Attested boundary:** the final `binary/live/filesystem.squashfs` byte stream, immediately before it is copied into `/dev/mapper/crypt_liveiso` by `zzzz_ciss_crypt_squash.hook.binary`.
-  read-only as SquashFS, including mapper padding after the SquashFS image.
+* **Runtime verification boundary:** the first byte count declared by `# Bytes    : Final filesystem.squashfs <bytes>` in the signed manifest, read from the decrypted mapper. Any LUKS allocation slack after the SquashFS payload is intentionally excluded.
-* **Attestation files:** `/run/live/medium/live/ciss_rootfs.crypt.decrypted.sha512sum.txt[.sig]`
+* **ISO attestation files:** `/run/live/medium/live/filesystem.squashfs.sha512sum.txt[.sig]` while the original ISO medium is mounted by `0024-ciss-crypt-squash`.
-* **Key source:** `/etc/ciss/keys/<FPR>.gpg` in the initramfs; the valid signature FPR must equal the build-time pin.
+* **Runtime attestation cache:** `/run/ciss-rootfs-attestation/filesystem.squashfs.sha512sum.txt[.sig]`, copied by `0024-ciss-crypt-squash` before live-boot may replace or unmount the medium view during `toram` handling.
-* **Manifest constraint:** exactly one checksum record is accepted, and it must target the selected mapper path.
+* **Key source:** `/etc/ciss/keys/*.gpg` (accepted only if FPR == build-pin)
+
+## 9.1. Runtime Artifact Custody and Expectations
+
+| Step | Actor                           | Requires                                                                                                                                                                                                      | Copies / writes                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | Later consumer                                                               |
+|------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1    | `0024-ciss-crypt-squash`        | Mounted ISO medium at `/run/live/medium`; `/run/live/medium/live/ciss_rootfs.crypt`; `/run/live/medium/live/filesystem.squashfs.sha512sum.txt`; `/run/live/medium/live/filesystem.squashfs.sha512sum.txt.sig` | Copies the manifest to `/run/ciss-rootfs-attestation/filesystem.squashfs.sha512sum.txt` and the detached signature to `/run/ciss-rootfs-attestation/filesystem.squashfs.sha512sum.txt.sig`; sets the cache directory to `0755` before copy, cached files to `0444`, and best-effort final directory mode to `0555` | `0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest`                                              |
+| 2    | `0024-ciss-crypt-squash`        | `/run/live/medium/live/ciss_rootfs.crypt`; unlock passphrase from console or Dropbear path                                                                                                                    | Opens the encrypted container as `/dev/mapper/crypt_liveiso`; writes `/run/ciss-rootdev` with mapper, medium, and attestation-cache paths                                                                                                                                                                          | `9990-overlay.sh`                                                            |
+| 3    | `9990-main.sh`                  | `/conf/param.conf` with `PLAIN_ROOT=1` and `livefs_root=/run/live/medium`; optional `toram` boot parameter                                                                                                    | May copy live media to RAM and may leave `/run/live/medium` busy, replaced, or otherwise unsuitable as the only attestation source                                                                                                                                                                                 | `9990-overlay.sh` and `0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest`                        |
+| 4    | `9990-overlay.sh`               | `/run/ciss-rootdev`; `/dev/mapper/crypt_liveiso`                                                                                                                                                              | Sources `/run/ciss-rootdev`, overrides the image directory to `/dev/mapper/crypt_liveiso`, mounts the decrypted SquashFS read-only, and invokes `/usr/lib/live/boot/0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest`                                                                                                                 | `0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest`                                              |
+| 5    | `0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest` | `/etc/ciss/keys/<pinned-FPR>.gpg`; `/run/ciss-rootfs-attestation/filesystem.squashfs.sha512sum.txt`; `/run/ciss-rootfs-attestation/filesystem.squashfs.sha512sum.txt.sig`; `/dev/mapper/crypt_liveiso`        | Creates transient `/run/ciss-rootfs-attestation.sha512sum` for `sha512sum -c`; does not create trusted evidence                                                                                                                                                                                                    | Boot continues only after signature, FPR, and exact payload bytes all verify |
+
+`0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest` resolves artifacts in this order:
+
+1. The explicit manifest/signature paths exported through `/run/ciss-rootdev`.
+2. The default runtime cache under `/run/ciss-rootfs-attestation/`.
+3. Compatibility fallback mountpoints: `${CDLB_MNT_MEDIUM}`, `/run/live/medium`, `/lib/live/mount/medium`, and `/cdrom`.
+
+The fallback mountpoints are diagnostic and compatibility paths. The intended normal path for current CISS ISOs is the runtime cache copied by `0024-ciss-crypt-squash`.
 
 **Core calls (initramfs):**
 
 ```sh
 # 1) Signature and FPR pin (no agent)
-/usr/bin/gpgv --no-default-keyring --keyring "$KEYFILE" --status-fd 1 --verify "$SIG" "$DATA"
+DATA="/run/ciss-rootfs-attestation/filesystem.squashfs.sha512sum.txt"
+SIG="${DATA}.sig"
+KEYFILE="/etc/ciss/keys/<pinned-FPR>.gpg"
+/usr/bin/gpgv --keyring "${KEYFILE}" --status-fd 1 "${SIG}" "${DATA}"
 
-# 2) Required selected-payload verification
+# 2) Mandatory content hash verification
-( cd / && /usr/bin/sha512sum -c --strict --quiet "$DATA" )
+dd if="${CDLB_MAPPER_DEV}" ... | /usr/bin/sha512sum -c /run/ciss-rootfs-attestation.sha512sum
 ```
 
-The signed manifest alone is not sufficient: boot continues only after the selected decrypted mapper content matches it.
-This boundary does not individually attest the mounted file tree, OverlayFS upper layer, runtime mutations, or secrets after
-unlock.
-
 # 10. Failure Policy (fail-closed, deterministic)
 
-* **ISO-edge abort:** no supported manifest, no supported verification tool, failed checksum, failed requested signature, or
+* **Abort** on: missing checksum manifest, unsupported checksum manifest/tool state, failed checksum, empty checksum manifest, missing rootfs attestation artifacts on the real ISO medium during `0024`, failed preservation of the runtime attestation cache, missing cached rootfs manifest/signature during `0042`, missing `VALIDSIG`, FPR mismatch, missing key/signature, malformed rootfs attestation manifest, or rootfs payload hash mismatch.
-  unknown verification state.
+* A signed rootfs manifest alone is not sufficient. Boot continues only after the manifest signature/FPR, and the decrypted SquashFS payload bytes both verify successfully.
-* **Rootfs-attestation abort:** missing or malformed manifest/signature/key, missing `VALIDSIG`, FPR mismatch, manifest target
+* `dm-integrity` protects the opened LUKS mapping against sector corruption or tampering under the LUKS key, but it is not treated as origin authenticity. Origin authenticity is provided by the signed rootfs attestation manifest and pinned signer fingerprint.
-  mismatch, unreadable or non-block selected mapper, or mapper checksum mismatch.
 
 # 11. CISS hardened and built dropbear
 
@@ -258,63 +322,77 @@ unlock.
   * [9990-main.sh](../config/includes.chroot/usr/lib/live/boot/9990-main.sh),
   * [9990-networking.sh](../config/includes.chroot/usr/lib/live/boot/9990-networking.sh),
   * [9990-overlay.sh](../config/includes.chroot/usr/lib/live/boot/9990-overlay.sh).
-* **Hooks (boot view):** 
+* **Hooks (initramfs boot view):**
-  * `/scripts/live-premount/0022-ciss-overlay-tmpfs`, 
+  * `/usr/lib/live/boot/0022-ciss-overlay-tmpfs`,
-  * `/scripts/live-premount/0024-ciss-crypt-squash`,
+  * `/usr/lib/live/boot/0024-ciss-crypt-squash`,
-  * `/scripts/live-premount/0026-ciss-early-sysctl`,
+  * `/usr/lib/live/boot/0026-ciss-early-sysctl`,
-  * `/scripts/live-bottom/0030-ciss-verify-checksums`,
+  * `/usr/lib/live/boot/0030-ciss-verify-checksums`,
-  * `/scripts/live-bottom/0042-ciss-post-decrypt-attest`
+  * `/usr/lib/live/boot/0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest`,
+  * `/usr/lib/live/boot/9990-main.sh`,
+  * `/usr/lib/live/boot/9990-overlay.sh`
 * **Key files:**
-  * ISO edge (for 0030): embedded public key blob (project-specific FPR)
+  * Mounted live medium (for 0030): embedded public key blob (project-specific FPR)
   * Root FS (for 0042): `/etc/ciss/keys/<FPR>.gpg`
-* **Mounts (typical):** `/run/live/rootfs`, `/run/live/overlay`
+* **Rootfs attestation artifacts:**
+  * ISO payload paths: `/live/filesystem.squashfs.sha512sum.txt`, `/live/filesystem.squashfs.sha512sum.txt.sig`
+  * Runtime cache paths: `/run/ciss-rootfs-attestation/filesystem.squashfs.sha512sum.txt`, `/run/ciss-rootfs-attestation/filesystem.squashfs.sha512sum.txt.sig`
+  * Transient checksum file for exact mapper-byte verification: `/run/ciss-rootfs-attestation.sha512sum`
+* **Runtime handoff state:** `/run/ciss-rootdev`
+* **Mounts (typical):** `/run/live/medium`, `/run/live/rootfs`, `/run/live/overlay`
 
 # 13. Diagram: CISS Live ISO Build, Boot, and Run Time Trust Chain & Verification Paths
 ```mermaid
 flowchart TD
 
   subgraph ISO Build Time
-    A["Embed and pin GPG FPR (into ISO & RootFS as needed)"] e00@--> B["Generate ISO-edge sha512sum.txt and .sig"];
+    A["Embed and pin GPG FPR (into ISO & RootFS as needed)"] e00@--> B["Generate mounted-medium sha512sum.txt and .sig"];
-    B e01@--> C["Build filesystem.squashfs and wrap it into ciss_rootfs.crypt"];
+    B e01@--> C["Build filesystem.squashfs"];
-    C e01a@--> C2["Hash complete decrypted mapper and sign rootfs manifest"];
+    C e01b@--> C2["Generate rootfs attestation manifest and detached signature in binary/live"];
+    C2 e01c@--> C3["Copy filesystem.squashfs into ciss_rootfs.crypt and remove plaintext filesystem.squashfs"];
     e00@{ animation: fast }
     e01@{ animation: fast }
-    e01a@{ animation: fast }
+    e01b@{ animation: fast }
+    e01c@{ animation: fast }
   end
 
   subgraph ISO Boot Time
-    C2 e02@--> D["0024 LUKS2, dm-integrity HMAC-SHA512"];
+    C3 e02@--> D["0024 mounts real ISO medium and expects ciss_rootfs.crypt plus rootfs attestation files under /live"];
-    D e03@-->|SUCCESSFUL| E["ciss_rootfs.crypt opened"];
+    D e02b@--> DCACHE["0024 copies rootfs attestation files to /run/ciss-rootfs-attestation"];
-    E e04@--> F["Mounting RootFS"];
+    DCACHE e03@--> E["0024 opens ciss_rootfs.crypt with LUKS2/dm-integrity and exposes /dev/mapper/crypt_liveiso"];
-    F e05@--> G["0030 verification of authenticity and integrity via embedded and pinned GPG of ISO edge"];
+    E e04@--> F["0030 verifies mounted live-medium manifest, signature, FPR, and checksums"];
-    G e06@-->|SUCCESSFUL| H["ISO edge verified"];
+    F e05@-->|SUCCESSFUL| G["Mounted live medium verified"];
-    H e07@--> I["0042 verifies signed manifest and selected decrypted mapper"];
+    G e06@--> H["9990-overlay mounts SquashFS / OverlayFS"];
-    I e08@-->|SUCCESSFUL| J["RootFS attestation successful"];
+    H e07@--> I["0042 verifies cached rootfs attestation manifest and FPR"];
+    I e08@--> J["0042 verifies exact SquashFS bytes from /dev/mapper/crypt_liveiso"];
+    J e09@-->|SUCCESSFUL| K["RootFS SquashFS payload attestation successful"];
     e02@{ animation: fast }
+    e02b@{ animation: fast }
     e03@{ animation: fast }
     e04@{ animation: fast }
     e05@{ animation: fast }
     e06@{ animation: fast }
     e07@{ animation: fast }
     e08@{ animation: fast }
-  end
-
-  subgraph ISO Run Time
-    J e09@--> K{{"CISS.debian.live.builder ISO running"}};
-    X{{"CISS.debian.live.builder Boot process halted"}};
     e09@{ animation: fast }
   end
 
+  subgraph ISO Run Time
+    K e10@--> L{{"CISS.debian.live.builder ISO running"}};
+    X{{"CISS.debian.live.builder Boot process halted"}};
+    e10@{ animation: fast }
+  end
+
 D -- FAIL --> X;
-G -- FAIL --> X;
+DCACHE -- FAIL --> X;
+E -- FAIL --> X;
+F -- FAIL --> X;
 I -- FAIL --> X;
+J -- FAIL --> X;
 ```
 
 # 14. Closing Remarks
 
-The verification path is fail-closed and binds the selected decrypted rootfs mapper to the pinned signing key. `dm-integrity`
+This achieves a portable, self-contained trust chain without a Microsoft-db, providing strong protection at the mounted-medium and decrypted-rootfs-payload boundaries. The dual-verification phases make the state transparent and deterministic without treating `dm-integrity`, LUKS, or private infrastructure as substitutes for origin authenticity.
-adds a separate sector-integrity property where enabled. The implemented attestation does not cover runtime OverlayFS changes,
-post-unlock secrets, or an individually enumerated mounted file tree.
 
 ---
 **[no tracking | no logging | no advertising | no profiling | no bullshit](https://coresecret.eu/)**

docs/MAN_SSH_Host_Key_Policy.md

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ include_toc: true
 **Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard**<br>
 *Debian Live Build Generator for hardened live environment and CISS Debian Installer*<br>
 **Master Version**: 9.14<br>
-**Build**: V9.14.022.2026.06.10<br>
+**Build**: V9.14.028.2026.06.18<br>
 
 # 2. SSH Host Key Policy – CISS.debian.live.builder / CISS.debian.installer
 

docs/REFERENCES.md

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ include_toc: true
 **Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard**<br>
 *Debian Live Build Generator for hardened live environment and CISS Debian Installer*<br>
 **Master Version**: 9.14<br>
-**Build**: V9.14.022.2026.06.10<br>
+**Build**: V9.14.028.2026.06.18<br>
 
 # 2. Resources
 

docs/documentation/30-ciss-hardening.conf.md

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ include_toc: true
 **Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard**<br>
 *Debian Live Build Generator for hardened live environment and CISS Debian Installer*<br>
 **Master Version**: 9.14<br>
-**Build**: V9.14.022.2026.06.10<br>
+**Build**: V9.14.028.2026.06.18<br>
 
 # 2. ``30-ciss-hardening.conf``
 

docs/documentation/90-ciss-local.hardened.md

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ include_toc: true
 **Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard**<br>
 *Debian Live Build Generator for hardened live environment and CISS Debian Installer*<br>
 **Master Version**: 9.14<br>
-**Build**: V9.14.022.2026.06.10<br>
+**Build**: V9.14.028.2026.06.18<br>
 
 # 2. ``90-ciss-local.hardened``
 

docs/documentation/ciss_live_builder.sh.md

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ include_toc: true
 **Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard**<br>
 *Debian Live Build Generator for hardened live environment and CISS Debian Installer*<br>
 **Master Version**: 9.14<br>
-**Build**: V9.14.022.2026.06.10<br>
+**Build**: V9.14.028.2026.06.18<br>
 
 # 2. ``ciss_live_builder.sh``
 

lib/lib_arg_parser.sh

@@ -57,7 +57,6 @@ guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SRCE}"
 #   None
 # Returns:
 #   ERR_ARG_MSMTCH: on failure
-#   ERR_ARG_MSMTCH: on failure
 #   ERR_CONTROL_CT: on failure
 #   ERR_DROPBEAR_V: on failure
 #   ERR_MISS_PWD_F: on failure
@@ -76,7 +75,6 @@ guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SRCE}"
 #   ERR__SSH__PORT: on failure
 #######################################
 arg_parser() {
-  declare primordial_key_regex='^[A-Za-z0-9._@%+=:,~-]+$'
   declare primordial_url_regex='^https://[A-Za-z0-9.-]+/[A-Za-z0-9._~/%+=:@,-]+\.git$'
 
   while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
@@ -109,6 +107,16 @@ arg_parser() {
           shift 1
           ;;
 
+        -l | --logo)
+          if [[ -n "${2-}" && "${2}" != -* ]]; then
+            if ! ${VAR_HANDLER_AUTOBUILD}; then boot_screen_cleaner; fi
+            printf "\e[91m❌ Error: --logo MUST NOT be followed by an argument.\e[0m\n" >&2
+            read -p -r $'\e[92m✅ Press \'ENTER\' to exit the script ... \e[0m'
+            exit "${ERR_ARG_MSMTCH}"
+          fi
+          shift 1
+          ;;
+
         -v | --version)
           if [[ -n "${2-}" && "${2}" != -* ]]; then
             if ! ${VAR_HANDLER_AUTOBUILD}; then boot_screen_cleaner; fi
@@ -134,10 +142,9 @@ arg_parser() {
           ;;
 
         --build-directory)
-          declare -gx VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR="${2}"
+          declare -gx VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR="${2-}"
-          if [[ ! "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}" =~ ^/ ]]; then
+          if ! validate_build_dir_argument "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}"; then
             if ! ${VAR_HANDLER_AUTOBUILD}; then boot_screen_cleaner; fi
-            printf "\e[91m❌ Error: --build-directory MUST be an absolute path. Got: '%s'\n" "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}" >&2
             exit "${ERR_NOTABSPATH}"
           fi
           declare -gx VAR_BUILD_LOG="${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}/cdlb_${VAR_ISO8601}_build.log"
@@ -156,7 +163,7 @@ arg_parser() {
           shift 1
           ;;
 
-        --change-splash )
+        --change-splash)
           if [[ "${2}" == "club" || "${2}" == "hexagon" ]]; then
             # shellcheck disable=SC2034
             declare -g VAR_HANDLER_SPLASH="${2}"
@@ -266,18 +273,28 @@ arg_parser() {
           ;;
 
         --key_age=*)
+          declare key_age="${1#*=}"
+          if ! validate_secret_filename "--key_age" "${key_age}"; then
+            if ! ${VAR_HANDLER_AUTOBUILD}; then boot_screen_cleaner; fi
+            exit "${ERR_ARG_MSMTCH}"
+          fi
           # shellcheck disable=SC2034
           declare -gx VAR_AGE="true"
           # shellcheck disable=SC2034
-          declare -gx VAR_AGE_KEY="${1#*=}"
+          declare -gx VAR_AGE_KEY="${key_age}"
           shift 1
           ;;
 
         --key_luks=*)
+          declare key_luks="${1#*=}"
+          if ! validate_secret_filename "--key_luks" "${key_luks}"; then
+            if ! ${VAR_HANDLER_AUTOBUILD}; then boot_screen_cleaner; fi
+            exit "${ERR_ARG_MSMTCH}"
+          fi
           # shellcheck disable=SC2034
           declare -gx VAR_LUKS="true"
           # shellcheck disable=SC2034
-          declare -gx VAR_LUKS_KEY="${1#*=}"
+          declare -gx VAR_LUKS_KEY="${key_luks}"
           shift 1
           ;;
 
@@ -296,7 +313,7 @@ arg_parser() {
         --primordial-key)
           declare primordial_key="${2-}"
 
-          if [[ -n "${primordial_key}" && "${primordial_key}" != -* && "${primordial_key}" != "." && "${primordial_key}" != ".." && "${primordial_key}" != */* && "${primordial_key}" =~ ${primordial_key_regex} ]]; then
+          if validate_secret_filename "--primordial-key" "${primordial_key}"; then
 
             # shellcheck disable=SC2034
             declare -gx VAR_PRIMORDIAL_KEY="${primordial_key}"
@@ -315,7 +332,7 @@ arg_parser() {
         --primordial-key=*)
           declare primordial_key="${1#*=}"
 
-          if [[ -n "${primordial_key}" && "${primordial_key}" != "." && "${primordial_key}" != ".." && "${primordial_key}" != */* && "${primordial_key}" =~ ${primordial_key_regex} ]]; then
+          if validate_secret_filename "--primordial-key" "${primordial_key}"; then
 
             # shellcheck disable=SC2034
             declare -gx VAR_PRIMORDIAL_KEY="${primordial_key}"
@@ -461,7 +478,7 @@ arg_parser() {
           ;;
 
         --root-password-file)
-          declare pw_file="${2}"
+          declare pw_file="${2-}"
 
           if [[ -z "${pw_file}" ]]; then
 
@@ -473,10 +490,9 @@ arg_parser() {
 
           fi
 
-          if [[ ! -f "${pw_file}" ]]; then
+          if ! validate_secret_absolute_file_basics "--root-password-file" "${pw_file}"; then
 
             if ! ${VAR_HANDLER_AUTOBUILD}; then boot_screen_cleaner; fi
-            printf "\e[91m❌ Error: --root-password-file password file '%s' does not exist.\e[0m\n" "${pw_file}" >&2
             # shellcheck disable=SC2162
             read -p  $'\e[92m✅ Press \'ENTER\' to exit the script ... \e[0m'
             exit "${ERR_MISS_PWD_F}"
@@ -507,6 +523,13 @@ arg_parser() {
             }
           fi
 
+          validate_secret_file_path "--root-password-file" "${pw_file}" || {
+            if ! ${VAR_HANDLER_AUTOBUILD}; then boot_screen_cleaner; fi
+            # shellcheck disable=SC2162
+            read -p  $'\e[92m✅ Press \'ENTER\' to exit the script ... \e[0m'
+            exit "${ERR_RGHT_PWD_F}"
+          }
+
           declare plaintext_pw
           ### No tracing for security reasons ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
           [[ "${VAR_EARLY_DEBUG}" == "true" ]] && set +x
@@ -606,16 +629,26 @@ arg_parser() {
           ;;
 
         --signing_ca=*)
+          declare signing_ca="${1#*=}"
+          if ! validate_secret_filename "--signing_ca" "${signing_ca}"; then
+            if ! ${VAR_HANDLER_AUTOBUILD}; then boot_screen_cleaner; fi
+            exit "${ERR_ARG_MSMTCH}"
+          fi
           # shellcheck disable=SC2034
-          declare -gx VAR_SIGNING_CA="${1#*=}"
+          declare -gx VAR_SIGNING_CA="${signing_ca}"
           shift 1
           ;;
 
         --signing_key=*)
+          declare signing_key="${1#*=}"
+          if ! validate_secret_filename "--signing_key" "${signing_key}"; then
+            if ! ${VAR_HANDLER_AUTOBUILD}; then boot_screen_cleaner; fi
+            exit "${ERR_ARG_MSMTCH}"
+          fi
           # shellcheck disable=SC2034
           declare -gx VAR_SIGNER="true"
           # shellcheck disable=SC2034
-          declare -gx VAR_SIGNING_KEY="${1#*=}"
+          declare -gx VAR_SIGNING_KEY="${signing_key}"
           shift 1
           ;;
 
@@ -626,8 +659,13 @@ arg_parser() {
           ;;
 
         --signing_key_pass=*)
+          declare signing_key_pass="${1#*=}"
+          if ! validate_secret_filename "--signing_key_pass" "${signing_key_pass}"; then
+            if ! ${VAR_HANDLER_AUTOBUILD}; then boot_screen_cleaner; fi
+            exit "${ERR_ARG_MSMTCH}"
+          fi
           # shellcheck disable=SC2034
-          declare -gx VAR_SIGNING_KEY_PASS="${1#*=}"
+          declare -gx VAR_SIGNING_KEY_PASS="${signing_key_pass}"
           shift 1
           ;;
 
@@ -694,8 +732,13 @@ arg_parser() {
           ;;
 
         --ssh-pubkey)
+          declare ssh_pubkey="${2-}"
+          if ! validate_ssh_pubkey_directory "${ssh_pubkey}"; then
+            if ! ${VAR_HANDLER_AUTOBUILD}; then boot_screen_cleaner; fi
+            exit "${ERR_ARG_MSMTCH}"
+          fi
           # shellcheck disable=SC2034
-          declare -gx VAR_SSHPUBKEY="${2}"
+          declare -gx VAR_SSHPUBKEY="${ssh_pubkey}"
           shift 2
           ;;
 

lib/lib_build_dir_safety.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,318 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# SPDX-Version: 3.0
+# SPDX-CreationInfo: 2026-06-11; WEIDNER, Marc S.; <msw@coresecret.dev>
+# SPDX-ExternalRef: GIT https://git.coresecret.dev/msw/CISS.debian.live.builder.git
+# SPDX-FileContributor: WEIDNER, Marc S.; Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency
+# SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2024-2026; WEIDNER, Marc S.; <msw@coresecret.dev>
+# SPDX-FileType: SOURCE
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: LicenseRef-CNCL-1.1 OR LicenseRef-CCLA-1.1
+# SPDX-LicenseComment: This file is part of the CISS.debian.installer.secure framework.
+# SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.live.builder
+# SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
+# shellcheck disable=SC2154
+
+# Module overview:
+# This module centralizes build-directory safety checks for path validation, builder-ownership markers, and destructive cleanup
+# helpers. It keeps cleanup operations limited to canonical, explicitly validated build-directory paths.
+#
+# Function behavior:
+#   build_dir_safety_error(): writes a scoped build-directory safety error message to stderr.
+#   reject_broad_build_dir_path(): rejects the filesystem root and common top-level system directories as build targets.
+#   validate_build_dir_argument(): validates a non-empty absolute build-directory argument before the path is created.
+#   validate_existing_build_dir(): validates the argument and confirms that it resolves to an existing directory.
+#   require_builder_owned_build_dir(): requires a validated directory with a safe root-owned builder marker.
+#   ensure_builder_owned_build_dir(): creates the marker for a safe empty build directory or verifies an existing marker.
+#   require_builder_owned_subpath(): confirms that a target exists strictly below a verified builder-owned directory.
+#   safe_clean_build_dir_contents(): removes direct build-directory contents while preserving the builder marker.
+#   safe_remove_builder_subpath(): removes one verified subpath below a builder-owned build directory.
+
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SRCE}"
+
+#######################################
+# Print a cleanup/path safety error.
+# Globals:
+#   None
+# Arguments:
+#   1: Error detail.
+# Returns:
+#   0: on success
+#######################################
+build_dir_safety_error() {
+  declare detail="${1}"
+
+  printf "\e[91m❌ build directory safety: %s \e[0m\n" "${detail}" >&2
+
+  return 0
+}
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f build_dir_safety_error
+
+#######################################
+# Reject broad parent directories as build-directory targets.
+# Globals:
+#   ERR_INVLD_CHAR
+# Arguments:
+#   1: Canonical path.
+# Returns:
+#   0: on success
+#   ERR_INVLD_CHAR: on failure
+#######################################
+reject_broad_build_dir_path() {
+  declare canonical_path="${1}"
+
+  case "${canonical_path}" in
+    "" | "/" | "/bin" | "/boot" | "/dev" | "/etc" | "/home" | "/lib" | "/lib64" | "/opt" | "/proc" | "/root" | "/run" | "/sbin" | "/sys" | "/tmp" | "/usr" | "/var")
+      build_dir_safety_error "refusing broad path."
+      return "${ERR_INVLD_CHAR}"
+      ;;
+    *)
+      ;;
+  esac
+
+  return 0
+}
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f reject_broad_build_dir_path
+
+#######################################
+# Validate a build-directory argument before it is created.
+# Globals:
+#   ERR_INVLD_CHAR
+# Arguments:
+#   1: Build directory path.
+# Returns:
+#   0: on success
+#   ERR_INVLD_CHAR: on failure
+#######################################
+validate_build_dir_argument() {
+  declare build_dir="${1}" canonical_path=""
+
+  if [[ -z "${build_dir}" ]]; then
+    build_dir_safety_error "path MUST NOT be empty."
+    return "${ERR_INVLD_CHAR}"
+  fi
+
+  if [[ "${build_dir}" != /* ]]; then
+    build_dir_safety_error "path MUST be absolute."
+    return "${ERR_INVLD_CHAR}"
+  fi
+
+  if [[ -L "${build_dir}" ]]; then
+    build_dir_safety_error "path MUST NOT be a symlink."
+    return "${ERR_INVLD_CHAR}"
+  fi
+
+  canonical_path="$(realpath -m -- "${build_dir}")"
+  reject_broad_build_dir_path "${canonical_path}" || return "${?}"
+
+  return 0
+}
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f validate_build_dir_argument
+
+#######################################
+# Canonicalize and validate an existing build directory.
+# Globals:
+#   ERR_INVLD_CHAR
+# Arguments:
+#   1: Build directory path.
+# Returns:
+#   0: on success
+#   ERR_INVLD_CHAR: on failure
+#######################################
+validate_existing_build_dir() {
+  declare build_dir="${1}" canonical_path=""
+
+  validate_build_dir_argument "${build_dir}" || return "${?}"
+
+  if [[ ! -d "${build_dir}" ]]; then
+    build_dir_safety_error "path MUST be an existing directory."
+    return "${ERR_INVLD_CHAR}"
+  fi
+
+  canonical_path="$(realpath -e -- "${build_dir}")"
+  reject_broad_build_dir_path "${canonical_path}" || return "$?"
+
+  return 0
+}
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f validate_existing_build_dir
+
+#######################################
+# Validate the builder-owned marker in a build directory.
+# Globals:
+#   CISS_BUILD_DIR_MARKER
+#   ERR_INVLD_CHAR
+# Arguments:
+#   1: Build directory path.
+# Returns:
+#   0: on success
+#   ERR_INVLD_CHAR: on failure
+#######################################
+require_builder_owned_build_dir() {
+  declare build_dir="${1}" canonical_path="" marker_path="" marker_owner="" marker_mode="" marker_mode_octal=""
+
+  validate_existing_build_dir "${build_dir}" || return "$?"
+
+  canonical_path="$(realpath -e -- "${build_dir}")"
+  marker_path="${canonical_path}/${CISS_BUILD_DIR_MARKER}"
+
+  if [[ -L "${marker_path}" || ! -f "${marker_path}" ]]; then
+    build_dir_safety_error "builder-owned marker is missing or unsafe."
+    return "${ERR_INVLD_CHAR}"
+  fi
+
+  marker_owner="$(stat -c '%u:%g' -- "${marker_path}")"
+  if [[ "${marker_owner}" != "0:0" ]]; then
+    build_dir_safety_error "builder-owned marker MUST be owned by root:root."
+    return "${ERR_INVLD_CHAR}"
+  fi
+
+  marker_mode="$(stat -c '%a' -- "${marker_path}")"
+  marker_mode_octal=$((8#${marker_mode}))
+  if (( (marker_mode_octal & 022) != 0 )); then
+    build_dir_safety_error "builder-owned marker MUST NOT be group- or world-writable."
+    return "${ERR_INVLD_CHAR}"
+  fi
+
+  return 0
+}
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f require_builder_owned_build_dir
+
+#######################################
+# Create or preserve the builder-owned marker.
+# Globals:
+#   CISS_BUILD_DIR_MARKER
+#   ERR_INVLD_CHAR
+# Arguments:
+#   1: Build directory path.
+# Returns:
+#   0: on success
+#   ERR_INVLD_CHAR: on failure
+#######################################
+ensure_builder_owned_build_dir() {
+  declare build_dir="${1}" canonical_path="" marker_path=""
+
+  validate_existing_build_dir "${build_dir}" || return "${?}"
+
+  canonical_path="$(realpath -e -- "${build_dir}")"
+  marker_path="${canonical_path}/${CISS_BUILD_DIR_MARKER}"
+
+  if [[ -e "${marker_path}" || -L "${marker_path}" ]]; then
+    require_builder_owned_build_dir "${canonical_path}" || return "${?}"
+    return 0
+  fi
+
+  if [[ -d "${canonical_path}/.build" ]]; then
+    build_dir_safety_error "existing live-build state lacks the builder-owned marker."
+    return "${ERR_INVLD_CHAR}"
+  fi
+
+  install -m 0600 -o root -g root /dev/null "${marker_path}"
+
+  return 0
+}
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f ensure_builder_owned_build_dir
+
+#######################################
+# Validate that a target path is strictly below a builder-owned build directory.
+# Globals:
+#   ERR_INVLD_CHAR
+# Arguments:
+#   1: Build directory path.
+#   2: Target-path below the build directory.
+# Returns:
+#   0: on success
+#   ERR_INVLD_CHAR: on failure
+#######################################
+require_builder_owned_subpath() {
+  declare build_dir="${1}" target_path="${2}" build_real="" target_real=""
+
+  require_builder_owned_build_dir "${build_dir}" || return "$?"
+
+  if [[ -z "${target_path}" || -L "${target_path}" || ! -e "${target_path}" ]]; then
+    build_dir_safety_error "target subpath is empty, missing, or a symlink."
+    return "${ERR_INVLD_CHAR}"
+  fi
+
+  build_real="$(realpath -e -- "${build_dir}")"
+  target_real="$(realpath -e -- "${target_path}")"
+
+  if [[ "${target_real}" == "${build_real}" ]]; then
+    build_dir_safety_error "target subpath MUST NOT be the build directory itself."
+    return "${ERR_INVLD_CHAR}"
+  fi
+
+  case "${target_real}" in
+    "${build_real}"/*)
+      ;;
+    *)
+      build_dir_safety_error "target subpath MUST stay below the build directory."
+      return "${ERR_INVLD_CHAR}"
+      ;;
+  esac
+
+  return 0
+}
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f require_builder_owned_subpath
+
+#######################################
+# Remove all contents of the exact builder-owned build directory.
+# Globals:
+#   CISS_BUILD_DIR_MARKER
+# Arguments:
+#   1: Build directory path.
+# Returns:
+#   0: on success
+#   Non-zero: on failure
+#######################################
+safe_clean_build_dir_contents() {
+  declare build_dir="${1}" build_real=""
+
+  require_builder_owned_build_dir "${build_dir}" || return "${?}"
+
+  build_real="$(realpath -e -- "${build_dir}")"
+
+  find "${build_real}" -mindepth 1 -maxdepth 1 -xdev ! -name "${CISS_BUILD_DIR_MARKER}" -exec rm -rf --one-file-system -- {} +
+
+  return 0
+}
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f safe_clean_build_dir_contents
+
+#######################################
+# Remove one exact builder-owned subpath.
+# Globals:
+#   None
+# Arguments:
+#   1: Build-directory-path.
+#   2: Target-path below build-directory.
+# Returns:
+#   0: on success
+#   Non-zero: on failure
+#######################################
+safe_remove_builder_subpath() {
+  declare build_dir="${1}" target_path="${2}" target_real=""
+
+  require_builder_owned_subpath "${build_dir}" "${target_path}" || return "${?}"
+
+  target_real="$(realpath -e -- "${target_path}")"
+  rm -rf --one-file-system -- "${target_real}"
+
+  return 0
+}
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f safe_remove_builder_subpath
+# vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

lib/lib_check_secrets.sh

@@ -33,12 +33,16 @@ x_remove() {
 
   shopt -s nullglob dotglob
 
+  ### Collect exact currently available secret values before removing their source files.
+  ### Log rewriting is intentionally deferred to the final trap after xtrace has been stopped.
+  collect_debug_secret_values || true
+
   if [[ "${VAR_SIGNER}" == "true" ]]; then
 
     # shellcheck disable=SC2312
     find "${VAR_TMP_SECRET}" -xdev -type f \
-      ! -path "${VAR_TMP_SECRET}/signing_key_pass.txt" \
+      ! -path "${VAR_TMP_SECRET}/${VAR_SIGNING_KEY_PASS:-signing_key_pass.txt}" \
-      ! -path "${VAR_TMP_SECRET}/luks.txt" \
+      ! -path "${VAR_TMP_SECRET}/${VAR_LUKS_KEY:-luks.txt}" \
       -print0 \
       | xargs -0 --no-run-if-empty shred -fzu -n 5 --
 

lib/lib_ciss_upgrades_boot.sh

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 #!/bin/bash
+# shellcheck disable=SC2154
 # SPDX-Version: 3.0
 # SPDX-CreationInfo: 2025-11-12; WEIDNER, Marc S.; <msw@coresecret.dev>
 # SPDX-ExternalRef: GIT https://git.coresecret.dev/msw/CISS.debian.live.builder.git
@@ -9,14 +10,15 @@
 # SPDX-LicenseComment: This file is part of the CISS.debian.installer.secure framework.
 # SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.live.builder
 # SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
-# shellcheck disable=SC2154
 
 guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SRCE}"
 
 #######################################
 # Integrates and generates sha512sum and GPG signatures on CISS specific LIVE boot artifacts:
+#  - /root/.ciss/attestation/VAR_SIGNING_KEY_FPR.* legacy-signed public-key copy, not rootfs content attestation
 #  - /etc/initramfs-tools/files/unlock_wrapper.sh
 #  - /usr/lib/live/boot/0030-ciss-verify-checksums
+# Rootfs content attestation for the final SquashFS payload is generated by zzzz_ciss_crypt_squash.hook.binary.
 # Globals:
 #   BASH_SOURCE
 #   VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR
@@ -31,7 +33,10 @@ guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SRCE}"
 ciss_upgrades_boot() {
   printf "\e[95m🧪 %s starting ... \e[0m\n" "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}"
 
+  gpg --batch --yes --export "${VAR_SIGNING_KEY_FPR}" >| "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}/config/includes.chroot/root/.ciss/attestation/${VAR_SIGNING_KEY_FPR}.gpg"
+
   declare -ar _ary_target=(
+    "/root/.ciss/attestation/${VAR_SIGNING_KEY_FPR}.gpg"
     "/etc/initramfs-tools/files/unlock_wrapper.sh"
     "/usr/lib/live/boot/0030-ciss-verify-checksums"
   )

lib/lib_clean_up.sh

@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SRCE}"
 #######################################
 clean_up() {
   declare clean_exit_code="$1" fs_type="" _old_nullglob="" _old_dotglob="" _old_failglob=""
+  declare build_dir_valid="false" includes_chroot=""
 
   ### Enable nullglob/dotglob, disable failglob for safe globbing.
   _old_nullglob="$(shopt -p nullglob || true)"
@@ -52,10 +53,10 @@ clean_up() {
   rm -f -- "${VAR_NOTES}"
 
   ### Release advisory lock on FD 127.
-  flock -u 127
+  flock -u 127 2>/dev/null || true
 
   ### Close file descriptor 127.
-  exec 127>&-
+  exec 127>&- 2>/dev/null || true
 
   ### Remove the lockfile artifact.
   rm -f /run/lock/ciss_live_builder.lock
@@ -100,32 +101,46 @@ clean_up() {
   ### No tracing for security reasons ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   [[ "${VAR_EARLY_DEBUG}" == "true" ]] && set +x
 
-  ### Removes secrets securely.
+  ### Stop xtrace before destructive cleanup and collect still-available exact secret values.
-  # shellcheck disable=SC2312
+  ### The final log rewrite runs later from the trap after no further debug/error log writes are expected.
-  find "${VAR_TMP_SECRET}" -xdev -type f -print0 | xargs -0 --no-run-if-empty shred -fzu -n 5 --
+  finalize_debug_xtrace_logging || true
-  find "${VAR_TMP_SECRET}" -xdev -depth -type d -empty -delete
+  collect_debug_secret_values || true
 
-  ### Securely shred all regular files below ./includes.chroot, then remove empty dirs.
+  ### Removes secrets securely.
-  if [[ -d "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}/config/includes.chroot" ]]; then
+  if [[ -n "${VAR_TMP_SECRET:-}" && -d "${VAR_TMP_SECRET}" && ! -L "${VAR_TMP_SECRET}" ]]; then
 
     # shellcheck disable=SC2312
-    find "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}/config/includes.chroot" -xdev -type f -print0 | xargs -0 --no-run-if-empty shred -fzu -n 5 --
+    find "${VAR_TMP_SECRET}" -xdev -type f -print0 | xargs -0 --no-run-if-empty shred -fzu -n 5 -- || true
+    find "${VAR_TMP_SECRET}" -xdev -depth -type d -empty -delete || true
+
+  fi
+
+  if [[ -n "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR:-}" && -d "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}" ]]; then
+    if require_builder_owned_build_dir "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}"; then
+      build_dir_valid="true"
+    fi
+  fi
+
+  ### Securely shred all regular files below ./includes.chroot, then remove empty dirs.
+  includes_chroot="${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR:-}/config/includes.chroot"
+  if [[ "${build_dir_valid}" == "true" && -d "${includes_chroot}" ]] \
+    && require_builder_owned_subpath "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}" "${includes_chroot}"; then
+
+    # shellcheck disable=SC2312
+    find "${includes_chroot}" -xdev -type f -print0 | xargs -0 --no-run-if-empty shred -fzu -n 5 -- || true
 
     ### Remove empty directories (bottom-up).
-    find "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}/config/includes.chroot" -depth -xdev -type d -empty -delete
+    find "${includes_chroot}" -depth -xdev -type d -empty -delete || true
 
   fi
 
   ### Delete all files and directories below ./chroot.
-  if [[ -d "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}/chroot" ]]; then
+  if [[ "${build_dir_valid}" == "true" && -d "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}/chroot" ]]; then
 
-    rm -rf "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}/chroot"
+    safe_remove_builder_subpath "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}" "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}/chroot" || true
 
   fi
 
-  ### Turn on tracing again ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-  [[ "${VAR_EARLY_DEBUG}" == "true" ]] && set -x
-
   eval "${_old_nullglob}" 2>/dev/null || true
   eval "${_old_dotglob}"  2>/dev/null || true
   eval "${_old_failglob}" 2>/dev/null || true

lib/lib_debug_sanitize.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,297 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# SPDX-Version: 3.0
+# SPDX-CreationInfo: 2026-06-11; WEIDNER, Marc S.; <msw@coresecret.dev>
+# SPDX-ExternalRef: GIT https://git.coresecret.dev/msw/CISS.debian.live.builder.git
+# SPDX-FileContributor: WEIDNER, Marc S.; Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency
+# SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2024-2026; WEIDNER, Marc S.; <msw@coresecret.dev>
+# SPDX-FileType: SOURCE
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: LicenseRef-CNCL-1.1 OR LicenseRef-CCLA-1.1
+# SPDX-LicenseComment: This file is part of the CISS.debian.installer.secure framework.
+# SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.live.builder
+# SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
+# shellcheck disable=SC2154
+
+# Function behavior:
+#   debug_sanitize_escape_glob(): Escape Bash glob metacharacters so exact values can be used safely in parameter-substitution matches.
+#   debug_sanitize_read_file(): Read a text file into a named variable while preserving trailing newline bytes.
+#   debug_sanitize_add_secret(): Add one non-empty exact secret value to the in-memory redaction list, avoiding duplicates.
+#   debug_sanitize_add_secret_file(): Add the exact content of a regular, non-symlink secret file to the redaction list.
+#   debug_sanitize_collect_secrets(): Add controlled secret variables and secret-file contents to the redaction list.
+#   collect_debug_secret_values(): Collect exact secret values while xtrace is temporarily disabled.
+#   finalize_debug_xtrace_logging(): Permanently disable xtrace and close the xtrace log FD before rewriting logs.
+#   debug_sanitize_log_file(): Redact collected exact secret values from one log file and restrict its permissions.
+#   sanitize_debug_logs(): Run the final exact-value sanitization pass across closed debug, variable, and error logs.
+
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SRCE}"
+
+declare -ga _ARY_DEBUG_SECRET_VALUES=()
+declare -g  _VAR_DEBUG_XTRACE_FINALIZED="false"
+
+#######################################
+# Escape Bash glob metacharacters for exact parameter-substitution matching.
+# Globals:
+#   None
+# Arguments:
+#   1: Raw value.
+# Returns:
+#   0: on success
+#######################################
+debug_sanitize_escape_glob() {
+  declare value="${1}"
+
+  value="${value//\\/\\\\}"
+  value="${value//\*/\\*}"
+  value="${value//\?/\\?}"
+  value="${value//\[/\\[}"
+  value="${value//\]/\\]}"
+
+  printf '%s' "${value}"
+
+  return 0
+}
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f debug_sanitize_escape_glob
+
+#######################################
+# Read a text file into a variable, preserving trailing newlines.
+# Globals:
+#   None
+# Arguments:
+#   1: File path.
+#   2: Output variable name.
+# Returns:
+#   0: on success
+#######################################
+debug_sanitize_read_file() {
+  declare file_path="${1}" output_var="${2}" content=""
+
+  IFS= read -r -d '' content < "${file_path}" || true
+  printf -v "${output_var}" '%s' "${content}"
+
+  return 0
+}
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f debug_sanitize_read_file
+
+#######################################
+# Add one exact secret value to the redaction list.
+# Globals:
+#   _ARY_DEBUG_SECRET_VALUES
+# Arguments:
+#   1: Secret value.
+# Returns:
+#   0: on success
+#######################################
+debug_sanitize_add_secret() {
+  declare secret_value="${1}" known_value=""
+
+  [[ -n "${secret_value}" ]] || return 0
+
+  for known_value in "${_ARY_DEBUG_SECRET_VALUES[@]:-}"; do
+    [[ "${known_value}" == "${secret_value}" ]] && return 0
+  done
+
+  _ARY_DEBUG_SECRET_VALUES+=("${secret_value}")
+
+  return 0
+}
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f debug_sanitize_add_secret
+
+#######################################
+# Add a secret file's exact content to the redaction list.
+# Globals:
+#   _ARY_DEBUG_SECRET_VALUES
+# Arguments:
+#   1: File path.
+# Returns:
+#   0: on success
+#######################################
+debug_sanitize_add_secret_file() {
+  declare file_path="${1}" secret_value=""
+
+  [[ -n "${file_path}" && -f "${file_path}" && ! -L "${file_path}" ]] || return 0
+  [[ -s "${file_path}" ]] || return 0
+
+  debug_sanitize_read_file "${file_path}" secret_value
+  debug_sanitize_add_secret "${secret_value}"
+
+  return 0
+}
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f debug_sanitize_add_secret_file
+
+#######################################
+# Gather exact values from controlled secret variables and files.
+# Globals:
+#   _ARY_DEBUG_SECRET_VALUES
+#   VAR_HASHED_PWD
+#   VAR_SIGNING_KEY_PASSFILE
+#   VAR_TMP_SECRET
+# Arguments:
+#   None
+# Returns:
+#   0: on success
+#######################################
+debug_sanitize_collect_secrets() {
+  declare secret_file=""
+
+  if [[ -n "${VAR_HASHED_PWD:-}" ]]; then
+    debug_sanitize_add_secret "${VAR_HASHED_PWD}"
+  fi
+
+  if [[ -n "${VAR_SIGNING_KEY_PASSFILE:-}" ]]; then
+    debug_sanitize_add_secret_file "${VAR_SIGNING_KEY_PASSFILE}"
+  fi
+
+  if [[ -n "${VAR_TMP_SECRET:-}" && -d "${VAR_TMP_SECRET}" && ! -L "${VAR_TMP_SECRET}" ]]; then
+    while IFS= read -r -d '' secret_file; do
+      debug_sanitize_add_secret_file "${secret_file}"
+    done < <(find "${VAR_TMP_SECRET}" -xdev -type f -print0 2>/dev/null || true)
+  fi
+
+  return 0
+}
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f debug_sanitize_collect_secrets
+
+#######################################
+# Collect exact secret values without tracing secret-bearing operations.
+# Globals:
+#   _VAR_DEBUG_XTRACE_FINALIZED
+# Arguments:
+#   None
+# Returns:
+#   0: on success
+#######################################
+collect_debug_secret_values() {
+  declare tracing_was_enabled="false"
+
+  case "$-" in
+    *x*)
+      tracing_was_enabled="true"
+      set +x
+      ;;
+    *)
+      ;;
+  esac
+
+  debug_sanitize_collect_secrets || true
+
+  if [[ "${tracing_was_enabled}" == "true" && "${_VAR_DEBUG_XTRACE_FINALIZED}" != "true" ]]; then
+    set -x
+  fi
+
+  return 0
+}
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f collect_debug_secret_values
+
+#######################################
+# Permanently stop xtrace logging before the final log rewrite.
+# Globals:
+#   BASH_XTRACEFD
+#   _VAR_DEBUG_XTRACE_FINALIZED
+# Arguments:
+#   None
+# Returns:
+#   0: on success
+#######################################
+finalize_debug_xtrace_logging() {
+  declare xtrace_fd=""
+
+  set +x
+
+  if [[ "${BASH_XTRACEFD:-}" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]]; then
+    xtrace_fd="${BASH_XTRACEFD}"
+    unset BASH_XTRACEFD
+
+    if (( xtrace_fd > 2 )); then
+      exec {xtrace_fd}>&- 2>/dev/null || true
+    fi
+  fi
+
+  _VAR_DEBUG_XTRACE_FINALIZED="true"
+
+  return 0
+}
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f finalize_debug_xtrace_logging
+
+#######################################
+# Redact exact secret values from one log file.
+# Globals:
+#   _ARY_DEBUG_SECRET_VALUES
+# Arguments:
+#   1: Log file path.
+# Returns:
+#   0: on success
+#######################################
+debug_sanitize_log_file() {
+  declare log_file="${1}" log_content="" secret_value="" secret_pattern="" redaction=""
+  declare -i secret_len=0
+
+  [[ -n "${log_file}" && -f "${log_file}" && ! -L "${log_file}" ]] || return 0
+
+  debug_sanitize_read_file "${log_file}" log_content
+
+  for secret_value in "${_ARY_DEBUG_SECRET_VALUES[@]:-}"; do
+
+    [[ -n "${secret_value}" ]] || continue
+
+    secret_pattern="$(debug_sanitize_escape_glob "${secret_value}")"
+    secret_len="${#secret_value}"
+    printf -v redaction '%*s' "${secret_len}" ''
+    redaction="${redaction// /*}"
+    log_content="${log_content//${secret_pattern}/${redaction}}"
+
+  done
+
+  printf '%s' "${log_content}" >| "${log_file}"
+  chmod 0600 "${log_file}" 2>/dev/null || true
+
+  return 0
+}
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f debug_sanitize_log_file
+
+#######################################
+# Final exact-value debug log sanitization pass.
+# Globals:
+#   LOG_DEBUG
+#   LOG_ERROR
+#   LOG_VAR
+# Arguments:
+#   None
+# Returns:
+#   0: on success
+#######################################
+sanitize_debug_logs() {
+  declare old_lc_all="${LC_ALL:-}" log_file=""
+
+  finalize_debug_xtrace_logging || true
+
+  LC_ALL=C
+
+  debug_sanitize_collect_secrets || true
+
+  for log_file in "${LOG_DEBUG:-}" "${LOG_VAR:-}" "${LOG_ERROR:-}"; do
+    debug_sanitize_log_file "${log_file}" || true
+  done
+
+  LC_ALL="${old_lc_all}"
+
+  return 0
+}
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f sanitize_debug_logs
+# vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

lib/lib_gnupg.sh

@@ -72,9 +72,15 @@ EOF
 
     fi
 
-    ### Use pubring as verification keyring reference.
+    ### Use pubring as a verification keyring reference.
     declare -grx VAR_VERIFY_KEYRING="${GNUPGHOME}/pubring.kbx"
 
+    validate_secret_file_in_root "--signing_key" "${VAR_SIGNING_KEY}" || return "${?}"
+    validate_secret_file_in_root "--signing_key_pass" "${VAR_SIGNING_KEY_PASS}" || return "${?}"
+    if [[ -n "${VAR_SIGNING_CA}" ]]; then
+      validate_secret_file_in_root "--signing_ca" "${VAR_SIGNING_CA}" || return "${?}"
+    fi
+
     declare -grx VAR_SIGNING_KEY_PASSFILE="${VAR_TMP_SECRET}/${VAR_SIGNING_KEY_PASS}"
 
     ### No tracing for security reasons ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

lib/lib_hardening_ultra.sh

@@ -182,6 +182,7 @@ hardening_ultra() {
   printf "\e[95m🧪 Updating SSH Keys, Ports ... \e[0m\n"
 
   ### ./config/includes.chroot/root/.ssh ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  validate_ssh_pubkey_directory "${VAR_SSHPUBKEY}" || return "${?}"
   install -d -m 0700 "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}/config/includes.chroot/root/.ssh"
   install -m 0600 -o root -g root "${VAR_SSHPUBKEY}/authorized_keys" "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}/config/includes.chroot/root/.ssh/"
 

lib/lib_lb_config_start.sh

@@ -30,12 +30,14 @@ lb_config_start() {
     mkdir -p "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}"
     # shellcheck disable=SC2164
     cd "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}"
+    ensure_builder_owned_build_dir "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}"
     printf "\e[92m✅ '%s' created. \e[0m\n" "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}"
 
   else
 
     # shellcheck disable=SC2164
     cd "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}"
+    ensure_builder_owned_build_dir "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}"
 
   fi
 
@@ -48,11 +50,7 @@ lb_config_start() {
 
     lb clean --binary --cache --purge --source
 
-    if [[ "${PWD}" == "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}" && "${PWD}" != "/" && -n "${PWD}" ]]; then
+    safe_clean_build_dir_contents "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}"
-
-      rm -rf -- ./* ./.??*
-
-    fi
 
     printf "\e[92m✅ Deleting former config, binary and cache done.\e[0m\n"
 

lib/lib_primordial.sh

@@ -84,6 +84,8 @@ init_primordial() {
   ### Check for SOPS AGE key integration ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   if [[ "${VAR_AGE,,}" == "true" ]]; then
 
+    validate_secret_file_in_root "--key_age" "${VAR_AGE_KEY}" || return "$?"
+
     install -d -m 0700                                 "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}/config/includes.chroot/root/.config/sops/age"
     install -m 0400 "${VAR_TMP_SECRET}/${VAR_AGE_KEY}" "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}/config/includes.chroot/root/.config/sops/age/keys.txt"
     shred -fzu -n 5 -- "${VAR_TMP_SECRET}/${VAR_AGE_KEY}" 2>/dev/null || rm -f "${VAR_TMP_SECRET}/${VAR_AGE_KEY}"
@@ -93,6 +95,18 @@ init_primordial() {
   ### Check for SSH CISS and PhysNet Primordial-Workflow™ integration -------------------------------------------------------
   if [[ "${VAR_SSHFP,,}" == "true" ]]; then
 
+    # shellcheck disable=SC2312
+    if find "${VAR_TMP_SECRET}" -xdev \( -name 'id*' -o -name 'ssh_host_*' \) -type l -print -quit | grep -q .; then
+      printf "\e[91m❌ ERROR: SSH identity and host key inputs MUST NOT be symlinks. \e[0m\n" >&2
+      return "${ERR_INVLD_CHAR}"
+    fi
+
+    # shellcheck disable=SC2312
+    if find "${VAR_TMP_SECRET}" -xdev \( -name 'id*' -o -name 'ssh_host_*' \) ! -type f -print -quit | grep -q .; then
+      printf "\e[91m❌ ERROR: SSH identity and host key inputs MUST be regular files. \e[0m\n" >&2
+      return "${ERR_INVLD_CHAR}"
+    fi
+
     install -d -m 0700                      "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}/config/includes.chroot/root/.ssh"
     install -m 0600 "${VAR_TMP_SECRET}/id"* "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}/config/includes.chroot/root/.ssh/"
     normalize_ssh_keys_in_dir               "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}/config/includes.chroot/root/.ssh"

lib/lib_secret_validation.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,406 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# SPDX-Version: 3.0
+# SPDX-CreationInfo: 2026-06-11; WEIDNER, Marc S.; <msw@coresecret.dev>
+# SPDX-ExternalRef: GIT https://git.coresecret.dev/msw/CISS.debian.live.builder.git
+# SPDX-FileContributor: WEIDNER, Marc S.; Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency
+# SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2024-2026; WEIDNER, Marc S.; <msw@coresecret.dev>
+# SPDX-FileType: SOURCE
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: LicenseRef-CNCL-1.1 OR LicenseRef-CCLA-1.1
+# SPDX-LicenseComment: This file is part of the CISS.debian.installer.secure framework.
+# SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.live.builder
+# SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
+# shellcheck disable=SC2154
+
+guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SRCE}"
+
+#######################################
+# Print a validation error without echoing secret values.
+# Globals:
+#   None
+# Arguments:
+#   1: Validation label.
+#   2: Error detail.
+# Returns:
+#   0: on success
+#######################################
+secret_validation_error() {
+  declare label="$1" detail="$2"
+
+  printf "\e[91mERROR: %s: %s\e[0m\n" "${label}" "${detail}" >&2
+
+  return 0
+}
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f secret_validation_error
+
+#######################################
+# Validate a filename-only secret argument.
+# Globals:
+#   ERR_ARG_MSMTCH
+# Arguments:
+#   1: Validation label.
+#   2: Filename.
+# Returns:
+#   0: on success
+#   ERR_ARG_MSMTCH: on failure
+#######################################
+validate_secret_filename() {
+  declare label="$1" filename="$2"
+  declare filename_regex='^[A-Za-z0-9._@%+=:,~-]+$'
+
+  if [[ -z "${filename}" ]]; then
+    secret_validation_error "${label}" "filename MUST NOT be empty."
+    return "${ERR_ARG_MSMTCH}"
+  fi
+
+  if [[ "${filename}" == "." || "${filename}" == ".." ]]; then
+    secret_validation_error "${label}" "filename MUST NOT be '.' or '..'."
+    return "${ERR_ARG_MSMTCH}"
+  fi
+
+  if [[ "${filename}" == -* ]]; then
+    secret_validation_error "${label}" "filename MUST NOT start with '-'."
+    return "${ERR_ARG_MSMTCH}"
+  fi
+
+  if [[ "${filename}" == */* || "${filename}" == *\\* ]]; then
+    secret_validation_error "${label}" "filename MUST NOT contain path separators."
+    return "${ERR_ARG_MSMTCH}"
+  fi
+
+  if [[ ! "${filename}" =~ ${filename_regex} ]]; then
+    secret_validation_error "${label}" "filename contains unsupported characters."
+    return "${ERR_ARG_MSMTCH}"
+  fi
+
+  return 0
+}
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f validate_secret_filename
+
+#######################################
+# Validate the fixed tmpfs secret root.
+# Globals:
+#   ERR_INVLD_CHAR
+# Arguments:
+#   1: Secret root path.
+# Returns:
+#   0: on success
+#   ERR_INVLD_CHAR: on failure
+#######################################
+validate_secret_root() {
+  declare secret_root="$1" root_owner="" root_mode="" root_mode_octal="" root_fs=""
+
+  if [[ -z "${secret_root}" ]]; then
+    secret_validation_error "secret root" "path MUST NOT be empty."
+    return "${ERR_INVLD_CHAR}"
+  fi
+
+  if [[ -L "${secret_root}" ]]; then
+    secret_validation_error "secret root" "path MUST NOT be a symlink."
+    return "${ERR_INVLD_CHAR}"
+  fi
+
+  if [[ ! -d "${secret_root}" ]]; then
+    secret_validation_error "secret root" "path MUST be an existing directory."
+    return "${ERR_INVLD_CHAR}"
+  fi
+
+  root_owner="$(stat -c '%u:%g' -- "${secret_root}")"
+  if [[ "${root_owner}" != "0:0" ]]; then
+    secret_validation_error "secret root" "directory MUST be owned by root:root."
+    return "${ERR_INVLD_CHAR}"
+  fi
+
+  root_mode="$(stat -c '%a' -- "${secret_root}")"
+  root_mode_octal=$((8#${root_mode}))
+  if (( (root_mode_octal & 077) != 0 || (root_mode_octal & 0700) != 0700 )); then
+    secret_validation_error "secret root" "directory mode MUST be 0700 or stricter."
+    return "${ERR_INVLD_CHAR}"
+  fi
+
+  root_fs="$(stat -f -c '%T' -- "${secret_root}")"
+  if [[ "${root_fs}" != "tmpfs" && "${root_fs}" != "ramfs" ]]; then
+    secret_validation_error "secret root" "directory MUST be backed by tmpfs or ramfs."
+    return "${ERR_INVLD_CHAR}"
+  fi
+
+  # shellcheck disable=SC2312
+  if find "${secret_root}" -xdev -type l -print -quit | grep -q .; then
+    secret_validation_error "secret root" "secret tree MUST NOT contain symlinks."
+    return "${ERR_INVLD_CHAR}"
+  fi
+
+  # shellcheck disable=SC2312
+  if find "${secret_root}" -xdev \( -type b -o -type c -o -type p -o -type s \) -print -quit | grep -q .; then
+    secret_validation_error "secret root" "secret tree MUST NOT contain special files."
+    return "${ERR_INVLD_CHAR}"
+  fi
+
+  return 0
+}
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f validate_secret_root
+
+#######################################
+# Normalize ownership and mode of regular files in the secret root.
+# Globals:
+#   ERR_INVLD_CHAR
+# Arguments:
+#   1: Secret root path.
+# Returns:
+#   0: on success
+#   ERR_INVLD_CHAR: on failure
+#######################################
+harden_secret_root_files() {
+  declare secret_root="$1"
+
+  validate_secret_root "${secret_root}" || return "$?"
+
+  find "${secret_root}" -xdev -type f -exec chown root:root -- {} +
+  find "${secret_root}" -xdev -type f -exec chmod 0400 -- {} +
+
+  return 0
+}
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f harden_secret_root_files
+
+#######################################
+# Validate that an existing absolute path is a regular non-symlink file.
+# Globals:
+#   ERR_INVLD_CHAR
+# Arguments:
+#   1: Validation label.
+#   2: File path.
+# Returns:
+#   0: on success
+#   ERR_INVLD_CHAR: on failure
+#######################################
+validate_secret_absolute_file_basics() {
+  declare label="$1" file_path="$2"
+
+  if [[ -z "${file_path}" ]]; then
+    secret_validation_error "${label}" "file path MUST NOT be empty."
+    return "${ERR_INVLD_CHAR}"
+  fi
+
+  if [[ "${file_path}" != /* ]]; then
+    secret_validation_error "${label}" "file path MUST be absolute."
+    return "${ERR_INVLD_CHAR}"
+  fi
+
+  if [[ -L "${file_path}" ]]; then
+    secret_validation_error "${label}" "file MUST NOT be a symlink."
+    return "${ERR_INVLD_CHAR}"
+  fi
+
+  if [[ ! -f "${file_path}" ]]; then
+    secret_validation_error "${label}" "file MUST be an existing regular file."
+    return "${ERR_INVLD_CHAR}"
+  fi
+
+  return 0
+}
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f validate_secret_absolute_file_basics
+
+#######################################
+# Validate a strict secret file.
+# Globals:
+#   ERR_INVLD_CHAR
+# Arguments:
+#   1: Validation label.
+#   2: File path.
+# Returns:
+#   0: on success
+#   ERR_INVLD_CHAR: on failure
+#######################################
+validate_secret_file_path() {
+  declare label="$1" file_path="$2" file_owner="" file_mode="" file_mode_octal=""
+
+  validate_secret_absolute_file_basics "${label}" "${file_path}" || return "$?"
+
+  file_owner="$(stat -c '%u:%g' -- "${file_path}")"
+  if [[ "${file_owner}" != "0:0" ]]; then
+    secret_validation_error "${label}" "file MUST be owned by root:root."
+    return "${ERR_INVLD_CHAR}"
+  fi
+
+  file_mode="$(stat -c '%a' -- "${file_path}")"
+  file_mode_octal=$((8#${file_mode}))
+  if (( (file_mode_octal & 077) != 0 || (file_mode_octal & 0400) != 0400 )); then
+    secret_validation_error "${label}" "file mode MUST allow root read and no group/other access."
+    return "${ERR_INVLD_CHAR}"
+  fi
+
+  return 0
+}
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f validate_secret_file_path
+
+#######################################
+# Validate a filename-only secret stored below the fixed secret root.
+# Globals:
+#   VAR_TMP_SECRET
+# Arguments:
+#   1: Validation label.
+#   2: Filename.
+# Returns:
+#   0: on success
+#   Non-zero: on failure
+#######################################
+validate_secret_file_in_root() {
+  declare label="$1" filename="$2"
+
+  validate_secret_filename "${label}" "${filename}" || return "$?"
+  validate_secret_file_path "${label}" "${VAR_TMP_SECRET}/${filename}" || return "$?"
+
+  return 0
+}
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f validate_secret_file_in_root
+
+#######################################
+# Validate a public input file copied into the ISO.
+# Globals:
+#   ERR_INVLD_CHAR
+# Arguments:
+#   1: Validation label.
+#   2: File path.
+# Returns:
+#   0: on success
+#   ERR_INVLD_CHAR: on failure
+#######################################
+validate_public_input_file() {
+  declare label="$1" file_path="$2" file_owner="" file_mode="" file_mode_octal=""
+
+  validate_secret_absolute_file_basics "${label}" "${file_path}" || return "$?"
+
+  file_owner="$(stat -c '%u:%g' -- "${file_path}")"
+  if [[ "${file_owner}" != "0:0" ]]; then
+    secret_validation_error "${label}" "file MUST be owned by root:root."
+    return "${ERR_INVLD_CHAR}"
+  fi
+
+  file_mode="$(stat -c '%a' -- "${file_path}")"
+  file_mode_octal=$((8#${file_mode}))
+  if (( (file_mode_octal & 022) != 0 )); then
+    secret_validation_error "${label}" "file MUST NOT be group- or world-writable."
+    return "${ERR_INVLD_CHAR}"
+  fi
+
+  return 0
+}
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f validate_public_input_file
+
+#######################################
+# Validate the authorized_keys directory.
+# Globals:
+#   ERR_INVLD_CHAR
+# Arguments:
+#   1: Directory path.
+# Returns:
+#   0: on success
+#   ERR_INVLD_CHAR: on failure
+#######################################
+validate_ssh_pubkey_directory() {
+  declare key_dir="$1" key_file="" dir_owner="" dir_mode="" dir_mode_octal=""
+
+  if [[ -z "${key_dir}" ]]; then
+    secret_validation_error "--ssh-pubkey" "directory path MUST NOT be empty."
+    return "${ERR_INVLD_CHAR}"
+  fi
+
+  if [[ "${key_dir}" != /* ]]; then
+    secret_validation_error "--ssh-pubkey" "directory path MUST be absolute."
+    return "${ERR_INVLD_CHAR}"
+  fi
+
+  if [[ -L "${key_dir}" ]]; then
+    secret_validation_error "--ssh-pubkey" "directory MUST NOT be a symlink."
+    return "${ERR_INVLD_CHAR}"
+  fi
+
+  if [[ ! -d "${key_dir}" ]]; then
+    secret_validation_error "--ssh-pubkey" "directory MUST exist."
+    return "${ERR_INVLD_CHAR}"
+  fi
+
+  dir_owner="$(stat -c '%u:%g' -- "${key_dir}")"
+  if [[ "${dir_owner}" != "0:0" ]]; then
+    secret_validation_error "--ssh-pubkey" "directory MUST be owned by root:root."
+    return "${ERR_INVLD_CHAR}"
+  fi
+
+  dir_mode="$(stat -c '%a' -- "${key_dir}")"
+  dir_mode_octal=$((8#${dir_mode}))
+  if (( (dir_mode_octal & 022) != 0 )); then
+    secret_validation_error "--ssh-pubkey" "directory MUST NOT be group- or world-writable."
+    return "${ERR_INVLD_CHAR}"
+  fi
+
+  key_file="${key_dir}/authorized_keys"
+  validate_public_input_file "--ssh-pubkey authorized_keys" "${key_file}" || return "$?"
+
+  return 0
+}
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f validate_ssh_pubkey_directory
+
+#######################################
+# Validate all selected secret inputs after argument parsing.
+# Globals:
+#   VAR_AGE
+#   VAR_AGE_KEY
+#   VAR_LUKS
+#   VAR_LUKS_KEY
+#   VAR_SIGNER
+#   VAR_SIGNING_CA
+#   VAR_SIGNING_KEY
+#   VAR_SIGNING_KEY_PASS
+#   VAR_SSHPUBKEY
+#   VAR_TMP_SECRET
+# Arguments:
+#   None
+# Returns:
+#   0: on success
+#   Non-zero: on failure
+#######################################
+validate_selected_secret_inputs() {
+  if [[ "${VAR_AGE,,}" == "true" ]]; then
+    validate_secret_file_in_root "--key_age" "${VAR_AGE_KEY}" || return "$?"
+  fi
+
+  if [[ "${VAR_LUKS,,}" == "true" ]]; then
+    validate_secret_file_in_root "--key_luks" "${VAR_LUKS_KEY}" || return "$?"
+  fi
+
+  if [[ "${VAR_SIGNER,,}" == "true" ]]; then
+    validate_secret_file_in_root "--signing_key" "${VAR_SIGNING_KEY}" || return "$?"
+    validate_secret_file_in_root "--signing_key_pass" "${VAR_SIGNING_KEY_PASS}" || return "$?"
+  fi
+
+  if [[ -n "${VAR_SIGNING_CA:-}" ]]; then
+    validate_secret_file_in_root "--signing_ca" "${VAR_SIGNING_CA}" || return "$?"
+  fi
+
+  if [[ -n "${VAR_SSHPUBKEY:-}" ]]; then
+    validate_ssh_pubkey_directory "${VAR_SSHPUBKEY}" || return "$?"
+  fi
+
+  return 0
+}
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f validate_selected_secret_inputs
+# vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

lib/lib_trap_on_exit.sh

@@ -49,6 +49,8 @@ trap_on_exit() {
 
     print_scr_exit "${errcode}"
 
+    sanitize_debug_logs || true
+
     exit "${errcode}"
 
   else
@@ -63,6 +65,8 @@ trap_on_exit() {
 
     fi
 
+    sanitize_debug_logs || true
+
     exit "${errcode}"
 
   fi

lib/lib_usage.sh

@@ -39,13 +39,13 @@ usage() {
   # shellcheck disable=SC2155
   declare var_header=$(center "CDLB(1)                        CISS.debian.live.builder                        CDLB(1)" "${var_cols}")
   # shellcheck disable=SC2155
-  declare var_footer=$(center "V9.14.022.2026.06.10                        2026-06-10                         CDLB(1)" "${var_cols}")
+  declare var_footer=$(center "${VAR_VERSION}                        2026-06-11                         CDLB(1)" "${var_cols}")
 
   {
     echo -e "\e[1;97m${var_header}\e[0m"
     echo
     echo -e "\e[92mCISS.debian.live.builder from https://git.coresecret.dev/msw \e[0m"
-    echo -e "\e[92mMaster V9.14.022.2026.06.10\e[0m"
+    echo -e "\e[92mMaster ${VAR_VERSION}\e[0m"
     echo -e "\e[92mA lightweight Shell Wrapper for building a hardened Debian Live ISO Image.\e[0m"
     echo
     echo -e "\e[97m(c) Marc S. Weidner, 2018 - 2026 \e[0m"
@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ usage() {
     echo
     echo -e "\e[97m  --build-directory </path/to/build_directory> \e[0m"
     echo "    Where the Debian Live Build Image should be generated. RECOMMENDED path: </opt/cdlb>"
+    echo "    Cleanup is destructive inside the exact builder-owned path and requires '.ciss-live-builder-owned'."
     echo "    MUST be provided."
     echo
     echo -e "\e[97m  --change-splash <STRING> one of <club | hexagon> \e[0m"
@@ -77,6 +78,9 @@ usage() {
     echo "    This option creates a boot menu entry that starts the forthcoming 'CISS.debian.installer', which is executed"
     echo "    once the system has successfully booted up."
     echo
+    echo -e "\e[97m  --cicd \e[0m"
+    echo "    Only for CISS internal Gitea Action Runners"
+    echo
     echo -e "\e[97m  --contact, -c \e[0m"
     echo "    Show author contact information."
     echo
@@ -87,6 +91,7 @@ usage() {
     echo -e "\e[97m  --debug, -d \e[0m"
     echo "    Enables debug logging for the main program routine. Detailed logging information are written to:"
     echo "    </tmp/ciss_live_builder_$$.log>"
+    echo "    After xtrace is stopped and its debug FD is closed, a final exact-value redaction pass sanitizes logs."
     echo
     echo -e "\e[97m  --dhcp-centurion \e[0m"
     echo "    If a DHCP lease is provided, the provider's name server will be overridden and the hardened, privacy-focused "
@@ -108,14 +113,17 @@ usage() {
     echo
     echo -e "\e[97m  --key_age=* \e[0m"
     echo "    The SOPS AGE private keyring for decryption operations. Change '*' to your desired SOPS AGE key file."
-    echo "    File MUST be placed in:"
+    echo "    This MUST be a filename only and MUST be placed in the root-owned tmpfs secret root:"
     echo "    </dev/shm/cdlb_secrets>"
     echo
     echo -e "\e[97m  --key_luks=* \e[0m"
     echo "    The LUKS encryption / decryption passphrase for '/'-fs-encryption. Change '*' to your desired passphrase file."
-    echo "    File MUST be placed in:"
+    echo "    This MUST be a filename only and MUST be placed in the root-owned tmpfs secret root:"
     echo "    </dev/shm/cdlb_secrets>"
     echo
+    echo -e "\e[97m  --logo, -l \e[0m"
+    echo "    Shows the Centurion Head."
+    echo
     echo -e "\e[97m  --log-statistics-only \e[0m"
     echo "    Provides statistic only after successful building a CISS.debian.live-ISO. While enabling '--log-statistics-only'"
     echo "    the argument '--build-directory' MUST be provided."
@@ -123,10 +131,6 @@ usage() {
     echo -e "\e[97m  --primordial-key <ssh-identity-filename> \e[0m"
     echo "    SSH identity filename for the Primordial overlay clone. This MUST be a filename only; the runtime path is"
     echo "    derived as '/root/.ssh/<ssh-identity-filename>'."
-    echo "    Example fragment:"
-    echo "      ./ciss_live_builder.sh --primordial-url https://git.coresecret.dev/ahz/PhysNet.primordial.git \\"
-    echo "        --primordial-key id--git.coresecret.dev--PhysNet.primordial_deploy--ed25519--newton--2025-10 \\"
-    echo "        --primordial-ssh 42842"
     echo
     echo -e "\e[97m  --primordial-ssh <INTEGER> \e[0m"
     echo "    Adds one outgoing UFW TCP exception for a bootstrap SSH port."
@@ -162,7 +166,8 @@ usage() {
     echo -e "\e[97m  --root-password-file </dev/shm/cdlb_secrets/password.txt>> \e[0m"
     echo "    Password file for 'root', if given, MUST be a string of 42 to 64 characters."
     echo "    If the argument is omitted, no further login authentication is required for the local console."
-    echo "    MUST be placed in:"
+    echo "    The path MUST be absolute, regular, non-symlink, root-owned, and mode 0400 after normalization."
+    echo "    RECOMMENDED path:"
     echo "    </dev/shm/cdlb_secrets/password.txt>"
     echo
     echo -e "\e[97m  --secure-boot-profile <STRING> one of <debian-shim | ciss-uki> \e[0m"
@@ -178,7 +183,7 @@ usage() {
     echo "    specified via '--signing_key=*'. If the keyring is protected, then provide the passphrase in its own file."
     echo "    Specify the fingerprint of the key to use via '--signing_key_fpr=*'."
     echo "    Optionally import an offline GPG CA signing public key via: '--signing_ca=*'."
-    echo "    Change '*' to your desired files / fingerprint. Files MUST be placed in:"
+    echo "    Change '*' to your desired filename-only files / fingerprint. Files MUST be placed in:"
     echo "    </dev/shm/cdlb_secrets>"
     echo
     echo -e "\e[97m  --sops-version <STRING> \e[0m"
@@ -201,6 +206,7 @@ usage() {
     echo
     echo -e "\e[97m  --ssh-pubkey </dev/shm/cdlb_secrets/> \e[0m"
     echo "    Imports the SSH Public Key from the file 'authorized_keys' into the Live ISO."
+    echo "    Directory MUST be absolute, regular, non-symlink, root-owned, and not group/world-writable."
     echo "    Key file MUST be placed in:"
     echo "    </dev/shm/cdlb_secrets/authorized_keys>"
     echo

scripts/usr/local/sbin/9999_cdi_starter.sh

@@ -601,7 +601,7 @@ main() {
   var_log="/root/.ciss/cdi/log/9999-cdi-starter_$(date +"%Y-%m-%d_%H-%M-%S").log"
   touch "${var_log}"
 
-  printf "CISS.debian.live.builder V9.14.022.2026.06.10 calling CISS.debian.installer ... \n" >> "${var_log}"
+  printf "CISS.debian.live.builder V9.14.028.2026.06.18 calling CISS.debian.installer ... \n" >> "${var_log}"
 
   ### Sleep a moment to settle boot artifacts.
   sleep 8
@@ -696,7 +696,7 @@ main() {
 
   ### Timeout reached without acceptable semaphore.
   logger -t cdi-watcher "No valid semaphore ${VAR_SEMAPHORE} (mode 0600) within ${VAR_TIMEOUT}s; exiting idle."
-  printf "CISS.debian.live.builder V9.14.022.2026.06.10: No valid semaphore [%s] within [%s]s.\n" "${VAR_SEMAPHORE}" "${VAR_TIMEOUT}" >> "${var_log}"
+  printf "CISS.debian.live.builder V9.14.028.2026.06.18: No valid semaphore [%s] within [%s]s.\n" "${VAR_SEMAPHORE}" "${VAR_TIMEOUT}" >> "${var_log}"
 
   exit 0
 }

tests/test_boot_attestation.sh

@@ -1,228 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-# SPDX-Version: 3.0
-# SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026; WEIDNER, Marc S.; <msw@coresecret.dev>
-# SPDX-FileType: SOURCE
-# SPDX-License-Identifier: LicenseRef-CNCL-1.1 OR LicenseRef-CCLA-1.1
-# SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.live.builder
-
-set -Ceuo pipefail
-
-declare ROOT_DIR=""
-declare SHA512SUM=""
-declare SHASUM=""
-declare TMP_BASE=""
-declare TMP_ROOT=""
-
-ROOT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd)"
-SHA512SUM="$(command -v sha512sum)"
-SHASUM="$(command -v shasum || true)"
-TMP_BASE="${TMPDIR:-/tmp}"
-TMP_BASE="${TMP_BASE%/}"
-TMP_ROOT="$(mktemp -d "${TMP_BASE}/ciss-boot-attestation.XXXXXXXX")"
-
-cleanup() {
-  case "${TMP_ROOT}" in
-    "${TMP_BASE}/ciss-boot-attestation."*)
-      rm -rf -- "${TMP_ROOT}"
-      ;;
-    *)
-      printf 'Refusing to clean unexpected test path: %s\n' "${TMP_ROOT}" >&2
-      return 1
-      ;;
-  esac
-}
-trap cleanup EXIT
-
-fail() {
-  printf 'FAIL: %s\n' "${1}" >&2
-  exit 1
-}
-
-prepare_checksum_hook() {
-  declare source_hook="${1}"
-  declare target_hook="${2}"
-  declare fault_mode="${3}"
-  declare test_bin="${4}"
-  declare test_tty="${5}"
-  declare test_runtime=""
-
-  test_runtime="$(dirname "${test_tty}")"
-  sed \
-    -e "s|/usr/bin/|${test_bin}/|g" \
-    -e "s|/run/ciss-|${test_runtime}/ciss-|g" \
-    -e "s|_TTY=\"/dev/tty8\"|_TTY=\"${test_tty}\"|" \
-    "${source_hook}" > "${target_hook}"
-
-  if [[ "${fault_mode}" == "unknown-state" ]]; then
-    sed \
-      -e 's/_RETURN_PGP="na"/_RETURN_PGP="unknown"/' \
-      -e 's/_RETURN_SHA="${?}"/_RETURN_SHA="unknown"/g' \
-      "${target_hook}" > "${target_hook}.new"
-    mv "${target_hook}.new" "${target_hook}"
-  fi
-}
-
-install_test_sha512sum() {
-  declare test_bin="${1}"
-
-  if printf '' | "${SHA512SUM}" -c >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-    ln -s "${SHA512SUM}" "${test_bin}/sha512sum"
-  elif [[ -n "${SHASUM}" ]]; then
-    printf '#!/bin/sh\nexec "%s" -a 512 "$@"\n' "${SHASUM}" > "${test_bin}/sha512sum"
-    chmod 0755 "${test_bin}/sha512sum"
-  else
-    fail "No SHA-512 tool with checksum verification support is available."
-  fi
-}
-
-run_checksum_case() {
-  declare source_hook="${1}"
-  declare case_name="${2}"
-  declare expected_status="${3}"
-  declare expected_message="${4}"
-  declare case_dir=""
-  declare hook_copy=""
-  declare output_file=""
-  declare test_bin=""
-  declare test_tty=""
-  declare source_id=""
-  declare fault_mode=""
-  declare panic_returns="false"
-  declare status=0
-
-  source_id="$(printf '%s' "${source_hook#"${ROOT_DIR}"/}" | tr '/' '_')"
-  case_dir="${TMP_ROOT}/${source_id}-${case_name}"
-  hook_copy="${case_dir}/0030-ciss-verify-checksums"
-  output_file="${case_dir}/output.log"
-  test_bin="${case_dir}/bin"
-  test_tty="${case_dir}/tty.log"
-
-  mkdir -p "${case_dir}" "${test_bin}"
-  : >| "${test_tty}"
-
-  case "${case_name}" in
-    valid)
-      install_test_sha512sum "${test_bin}"
-      printf 'trusted rootfs payload\n' > "${case_dir}/payload"
-      (cd "${case_dir}" && "${test_bin}/sha512sum" payload > sha512sum.txt)
-      ;;
-    missing-manifest)
-      install_test_sha512sum "${test_bin}"
-      ;;
-    unsupported-manifest)
-      install_test_sha512sum "${test_bin}"
-      printf 'unsupported\n' > "${case_dir}/md5sum.txt"
-      ;;
-    failed-checksum)
-      install_test_sha512sum "${test_bin}"
-      printf 'trusted rootfs payload\n' > "${case_dir}/payload"
-      (cd "${case_dir}" && "${test_bin}/sha512sum" payload > sha512sum.txt)
-      printf 'tampered rootfs payload\n' >| "${case_dir}/payload"
-      ;;
-    missing-tool)
-      install_test_sha512sum "${test_bin}"
-      printf 'trusted rootfs payload\n' > "${case_dir}/payload"
-      (cd "${case_dir}" && "${test_bin}/sha512sum" payload > sha512sum.txt)
-      rm -f "${test_bin}/sha512sum"
-      ;;
-    unknown-state)
-      fault_mode="unknown-state"
-      panic_returns="true"
-      install_test_sha512sum "${test_bin}"
-      printf 'trusted rootfs payload\n' > "${case_dir}/payload"
-      (cd "${case_dir}" && "${test_bin}/sha512sum" payload > sha512sum.txt)
-      ;;
-    *)
-      fail "Unknown checksum test case: ${case_name}"
-      ;;
-  esac
-
-  prepare_checksum_hook "${source_hook}" "${hook_copy}" "${fault_mode}" "${test_bin}" "${test_tty}"
-
-  set +e
-  # shellcheck disable=SC2034,SC2329
-  (
-    set +C
-    CDLB_SCRIPT_FULL="${hook_copy}"
-    LIVE_BOOT_CMDLINE="verify-checksums=sha512"
-    LIVE_VERIFY_CHECKSUMS=""
-
-    log_begin_msg() { :; }
-    log_end_msg() { :; }
-    log_success_msg() { :; }
-    panic() {
-      printf 'PANIC: %s\n' "${1}" >&2
-      if [[ "${panic_returns}" == "true" ]]; then
-        return 0
-      fi
-      exit 97
-    }
-    sleep() { :; }
-
-    # shellcheck source=/dev/null
-    . "${hook_copy}"
-    Verify_checksums "${case_dir}"
-  ) > "${output_file}" 2>&1
-  status="${?}"
-  set -e
-
-  [[ "${status}" -eq "${expected_status}" ]] || {
-    cat "${output_file}" >&2
-    fail "${source_hook} ${case_name}: expected status ${expected_status}, got ${status}"
-  }
-
-  grep -Fq "${expected_message}" "${output_file}" || {
-    cat "${output_file}" >&2
-    fail "${source_hook} ${case_name}: missing expected message '${expected_message}'"
-  }
-}
-
-test_rootfs_payload_tamper() {
-  declare case_dir="${TMP_ROOT}/rootfs-payload-tamper"
-  declare test_bin="${case_dir}/bin"
-  declare payload="${case_dir}/crypt_liveiso"
-  declare manifest="${case_dir}/ciss_rootfs.crypt.decrypted.sha512sum.txt"
-  declare build_hook="${ROOT_DIR}/config/hooks/live/zzzz_ciss_crypt_squash.hook.binary"
-  declare boot_hook="${ROOT_DIR}/config/includes.chroot/usr/lib/live/boot/0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest"
-
-  mkdir -p "${case_dir}" "${test_bin}"
-  install_test_sha512sum "${test_bin}"
-
-  printf 'trusted selected rootfs mapper payload\n' > "${payload}"
-  "${test_bin}/sha512sum" "${payload}" > "${manifest}"
-  "${test_bin}/sha512sum" -c --strict --quiet "${manifest}"
-
-  printf 'tampered selected rootfs mapper payload\n' >> "${payload}"
-  if "${test_bin}/sha512sum" -c --strict --quiet "${manifest}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-    fail "Modified selected rootfs payload unexpectedly passed checksum verification."
-  fi
-
-  # shellcheck disable=SC2016
-  grep -Fq 'sha512sum "${MAPPER_DEV}" >| "${ROOTFS_ATTESTATION}"' "${build_hook}" || \
-    fail "Build hook does not generate the attestation from the decrypted mapper."
-  # shellcheck disable=SC2016
-  grep -Fq '/usr/bin/sha512sum -c --strict --quiet "${HASH_FILE}"' "${boot_hook}" || \
-    fail "Boot hook does not verify the selected rootfs payload with sha512sum -c."
-  # shellcheck disable=SC2016
-  grep -Fq '[ "${_ATTESTED_PAYLOAD}" != "${CDLB_MAPPER_DEV}" ]' "${boot_hook}" || \
-    fail "Boot hook does not require the manifest to target the selected rootfs payload."
-}
-
-declare -a CHECKSUM_HOOKS=(
-  "${ROOT_DIR}/config/includes.chroot/usr/lib/live/boot/0030-ciss-verify-checksums"
-  "${ROOT_DIR}/scripts/usr/lib/live/boot/0030-ciss-verify-checksums"
-)
-declare checksum_hook=""
-
-for checksum_hook in "${CHECKSUM_HOOKS[@]}"; do
-  run_checksum_case "${checksum_hook}" "valid"                0  "Verification of [sha checksum] file successful"
-  run_checksum_case "${checksum_hook}" "missing-manifest"     97 "No supported checksum manifest found."
-  run_checksum_case "${checksum_hook}" "unsupported-manifest" 97 "No supported checksum manifest found."
-  run_checksum_case "${checksum_hook}" "failed-checksum"       97 "No supported checksum manifest was verified successfully."
-  run_checksum_case "${checksum_hook}" "missing-tool"          97 "No supported checksum verification tool was available."
-  run_checksum_case "${checksum_hook}" "unknown-state"          1 "Checksum verification ended in an unsupported state."
-done
-
-test_rootfs_payload_tamper
-
-printf 'PASS: checksum verification fails closed and modified rootfs payloads fail attestation.\n'

var/early.var.sh

@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ declare -grx VAR_GIT_HEAD_FULL="$(git rev-parse HEAD)"
 declare -grx VAR_HOST="$(uname -n)"
 declare -grx VAR_ISO8601="$(date -u -d "@${VAR_DATE_EPOCH}" '+%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ')"
 declare -grx VAR_SYSTEM="$(uname -mnosv)"
-declare -grx VAR_VERSION="Master V9.14.022.2026.06.10"
+declare -grx VAR_VERSION="Master V9.14.028.2026.06.18"
 declare -grx VAR_VER_BASH="$(bash --version | head -n1 | awk '{
   # Print $4 and $5; include $6 only if it exists
   out = $4

var/global.var.sh

@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ declare -g  VAR_SSHFP="false"
 declare -g  VAR_SSHPORT=""
 declare -g  VAR_SSHPUBKEY=""
 declare -g  VAR_SUITE="trixie"
+declare -ga ARY_DEBUG_SECRET_VALUES=()
 declare -ga ARY_HANDLER_JUMPHOST_UNIQUE=()
 declare -ga ARY_HANDLER_JUMPHOST=()
 declare -ga ARY_HANDLER_NETCUP_IPV6=()
@@ -51,10 +52,12 @@ declare -gi VAR_HANDLER_PRIORITY=0
 declare -gi VAR_HANDLER_STA=0
 declare -gi VAR_REIONICE_CLASS=2
 declare -gi VAR_REIONICE_PRIORITY=4
+declare -gr CISS_BUILD_DIR_MARKER=".ciss_debian_live_builder_owned"
 declare -gr VAR_CHROOT_DIR="chroot"
 declare -gr VAR_PACKAGES_FILE="chroot.packages.live"
 declare -gx VAR_AGE_KEY=""
 declare -gx VAR_AGE="false"
+declare -gx VAR_ARG_SANITIZED=""
 declare -gx VAR_CDLB_INSIDE_RUNNER="${VAR_CDLB_INSIDE_RUNNER:-false}"
 declare -gx VAR_CISS_SECUREBOOT_PROFILE="debian-shim"
 declare -gx VAR_LUKS_KEY=""