V9.14.008.2026.06.04
🛡️ Retrieve DNSSEC status of coresecret.dev. / 🛡️ Retrieve DNSSEC status of coresecret.dev. (push) Has been cancelled
🛡️ Shell Script Linting / 🛡️ Shell Script Linting (push) Has been cancelled
💙 Generating a PUBLIC Live ISO. / 💙 Generating a PUBLIC Live ISO. (push) Has been cancelled
🔐 Generating a Private Live ISO TRIXIE. / 🔐 Generating a Private Live ISO TRIXIE. (push) Has been cancelled

Signed-off-by: Marc S. Weidner <msw@coresecret.dev>
This commit is contained in:
2026-06-04 18:19:09 +01:00
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**Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard**<br>
*Debian Live Build Generator for hardened live environment and CISS Debian Installer*<br>
**Master Version**: 9.14<br>
**Build**: V9.14.004.2026.05.17<br>
**Build**: V9.14.008.2026.06.04<br>
# 2. CISS.debian.live.builder Boot & Trust Chain (Technical Documentation)
**Status:** 2025-11-12<br>
**Audience:** CICA CISO, CISS staff, technically proficient administrators<br>
**Summary:** The **CISS.debian.live.builder** Live-ISO establishes a two-stage verification chain without Microsoft-db: an early ISO-edge check (signature and FPR pin) *before* LUKS unlock, and a late root-FS attestation *after* unlock, reinforced by `dm-crypt (AES-XTS)` and `dm-integrity (HMAC-SHA-512)`.<br>
**Summary:** The **CISS.debian.live.builder** Live-ISO establishes a two-stage verification chain around the live root: an early ISO-edge check (signature and FPR pin) *before* LUKS unlock, and a late root-FS attestation *after* unlock, reinforced by `dm-crypt (AES-XTS)` and `dm-integrity (HMAC-SHA-512)`. UEFI Secure Boot can use either the default Microsoft/Debian shim chain, or a CISS-signed UKI chain for systems that trust the CISS Secure Boot key material.<br>
# 3. Overview
@@ -27,6 +27,26 @@ include_toc: true
* **Storage-level AEAD (functional):** `dm-crypt` (AES-XTS-512) and `dm-integrity` (HMAC-SHA-512, 4 KiB).
* **Remotely unlock:** CISS hardened and build dropbear, modern primitives only, no passwords, no agent/forwarding.
# 3.1. Secure Boot Profiles
The builder supports two built-time Secure Boot profiles:
* `debian-shim` (default): keeps the broadly portable live-build path. The ISO is built as `iso-hybrid` with BIOS and UEFI
bootloaders, and UEFI Secure Boot loads the Microsoft-signed Debian shim before Debian-signed GRUB.
* `ciss-uki`: intended for amd64 systems whose firmware trusts the CISS Secure Boot public key through db, or a custom
PK/KEK/db model. A late binary hook builds and signs a UKI from the final `binary/live/vmlinuz-*` and
`binary/live/initrd.img-*` artifacts, then installs it as `EFI/BOOT/BOOTX64.EFI` inside `binary/boot/grub/efi.img` and
mirrors it into the ISO EFI tree when live-build created one.
The `ciss-uki` path is:
```text
UEFI firmware -> EFI/BOOT/BOOTX64.EFI (CISS-signed UKI) -> Linux
```
The private EFI signing key remains outside `binary/`, `chroot/` and `config/includes.*`; the binary hooks fail if the CISS
private Secure Boot key names are detected in those paths before live-build checksum generation.
# 4. Primitives & Parameters
| Component | Primitive / Parameter | Purpose |
@@ -52,12 +72,16 @@ flowchart TD
end
subgraph Trusted Secure Boot
0030 e03@--> |SUCCESSFUL| 0040["Secure Boot: load & verify \\EFI\\BOOT\\BOOTX64.EFI (shim)"];
0040 e04@--> |SUCCESSFUL| 0050["shim: load & verify \\EFI\\BOOT\\GRUBX64.EFI"];
0030 e03@--> |debian-shim| 0040["Secure Boot: load & verify \EFI\BOOT\BOOTX64.EFI (shim)"];
0040 e04@--> |SUCCESSFUL| 0050["shim: load & verify \EFI\BOOT\GRUBX64.EFI"];
0050 e05@--> 0060["GRUB: load vmlinuz + initrd.img, set cmdline"];
0030 e06a@--> |ciss-uki| 0045["Secure Boot: load & verify \EFI\BOOT\BOOTX64.EFI (CISS UKI)"];
0045 e06b@--> 0060;
e03@{ animation: fast }
e04@{ animation: fast }
e05@{ animation: fast }
e06a@{ animation: fast }
e06b@{ animation: fast }
end