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V9.14.024.2026.06.11

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Signed-off-by: Marc S. Weidner <msw@coresecret.dev>
This commit is contained in:
Marc S. Weidner
2026-06-11 17:11:22 +01:00
parent 9ef535554a
commit 97596fbcba
63 changed files with 767 additions and 200 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
scripts/usr/lib/live/boot/0030-ciss-verify-checksums → .archive/0030-ciss-verify-checksums
+80 -1
View File
@@ -46,11 +46,26 @@ Verify_checksums() {
LIVE_VERIFY_CHECKSUMS_SIGNATURES="false"
_CHECKSUM_LOG_DIR="${LIVE_VERIFY_CHECKSUMS_LOG_DIR:-/run}"
_KEYFILE=""
_MP=""
_MANIFEST_FOUND="false"
_TOOL_FOUND="false"
_VERIFICATION_EXECUTED="false"
_VERIFICATION_SUCCEEDED="false"
_RETURN_PGP=""
_RETURN_SHA=""
### Parse commandline arguments ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# shellcheck disable=SC2154
for _PARAMETER in ${LIVE_BOOT_CMDLINE}; do
case "${_PARAMETER}" in
@@ -107,6 +122,14 @@ Verify_checksums() {
done
if [ "${LIVE_VERIFY_CHECKSUMS_SIGNATURES}" = "true" ] && [ -z "${_KEYFILE}" ]; then
printf "\e[91m[FATAL] No pinned GPG key file found while checksum signature verification is enabled. \n\e[0m"
sleep 8
panic "No pinned GPG key file found while checksum signature verification is enabled."
fi
# shellcheck disable=SC2164
cd "${_MOUNTPOINT}"
@@ -203,10 +226,14 @@ Verify_checksums() {
if [ -e "${_CHECKSUM}" ]; then
_MANIFEST_FOUND="true"
printf "\e[95m[INFO] Found: [%s] ... \n\e[0m" "${_CHECKSUM}"
if [ -e "/usr/bin/${_DIGEST}sum" ]; then
_TOOL_FOUND="true"
printf "\e[95m[INFO] Found: [%s] ... \n\e[0m" "/usr/bin/${_DIGEST}sum"
if [ "${LIVE_VERIFY_CHECKSUMS_SIGNATURES}" = "true" ]; then
@@ -234,18 +261,34 @@ Verify_checksums() {
fi
# shellcheck disable=SC2312
if grep -v '^#' "${_CHECKSUM}" | /usr/bin/"${_DIGEST}"sum -c > "${_TTY}"; then
_VERIFICATION_EXECUTED="true"
_CHECKSUM_LOG="${_CHECKSUM_LOG_DIR}/ciss-${_DIGEST}sum-check.log"
if ! grep -v '^#' "${_CHECKSUM}" | grep -q '[^[:space:]]'; then
_RETURN_SHA="254"
: > "${_CHECKSUM_LOG}"
printf "\e[91m[FATAL] Checksum manifest has no checksum entries: [%s] \n\e[0m" "${_CHECKSUM}"
elif grep -v '^#' "${_CHECKSUM}" | /usr/bin/"${_DIGEST}"sum -c > "${_CHECKSUM_LOG}" 2>&1; then
_RETURN_SHA="${?}"
cat "${_CHECKSUM_LOG}" > "${_TTY}"
printf "\e[92m[INFO] Found: [%s] successful verified: [%s] \n\e[0m" "/usr/bin/${_DIGEST}sum" "${_CHECKSUM}"
else
_RETURN_SHA="${?}"
cat "${_CHECKSUM_LOG}" > "${_TTY}"
printf "\e[91m[FATAL] Found: [%s] unsuccessful verified: [%s] \n\e[0m" "/usr/bin/${_DIGEST}sum" "${_CHECKSUM}"
fi
if { [ "${_RETURN_PGP}" = "0" ] || [ "${_RETURN_PGP}" = "na" ]; } && [ "${_RETURN_SHA}" = "0" ]; then
_VERIFICATION_SUCCEEDED="true"
fi
# Stop after the first verification.
break 2
@@ -265,6 +308,36 @@ Verify_checksums() {
log_end_msg
printf "\n"
if [ "${_MANIFEST_FOUND}" != "true" ]; then
printf "\e[91m[FATAL] No supported checksum manifest found. Checksum verification is fail-closed. \n\e[0m"
sleep 8
panic "No supported checksum manifest found. Checksum verification is fail-closed."
fi
if [ "${_TOOL_FOUND}" != "true" ]; then
printf "\e[91m[FATAL] Checksum manifest found, but no supported checksum tool is available. Checksum verification is fail-closed. \n\e[0m"
sleep 8
panic "Checksum manifest found, but no supported checksum tool is available. Checksum verification is fail-closed."
fi
if [ "${_VERIFICATION_EXECUTED}" != "true" ]; then
printf "\e[91m[FATAL] Checksum verification was not executed. Checksum verification is fail-closed. \n\e[0m"
sleep 8
panic "Checksum verification was not executed. Checksum verification is fail-closed."
fi
if [ "${_VERIFICATION_SUCCEEDED}" != "true" ]; then
printf "\e[91m[FATAL] Checksum verification did not complete successfully. Evaluating fail-closed failure state. \n\e[0m"
fi
case "${_RETURN_PGP},${_RETURN_SHA}" in
"0,0")
@@ -304,6 +377,12 @@ Verify_checksums() {
panic "Verification of checksum file failed."
;;
*)
printf "\e[91m[FATAL] Unknown checksum verification state: [%s,%s]. \n\e[0m" "${_RETURN_PGP:-unset}" "${_RETURN_SHA:-unset}"
sleep 8
panic "Unknown checksum verification state. Checksum verification is fail-closed."
;;
esac
}
# vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh
.archive/generate_PRIVATE_trixie_0.yaml
+1 -1
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@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
# SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.live.builder
# SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
# Version Master V9.14.022.2026.06.10
# Version Master V9.14.024.2026.06.11
name: 🔐 Generating a Private Live ISO TRIXIE.
.archive/generate_PRIVATE_trixie_1.yaml
+1 -1
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
# SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.live.builder
# SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
# Version Master V9.14.022.2026.06.10
# Version Master V9.14.024.2026.06.11
name: 🔐 Generating a Private Live ISO TRIXIE.
.archive/generate_PUBLIC_iso.yaml
+1 -1
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
# SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.live.builder
# SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
# Version Master V9.14.022.2026.06.10
# Version Master V9.14.024.2026.06.11
name: 💙 Generating a PUBLIC Live ISO.
.gitea/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/ISSUE_TEMPLATE.yaml
+1 -1
View File
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ body:
attributes:
label: "Version"
description: "Which version are you running? Use `./ciss_live_builder.sh -v`."
placeholder: "e.g., Master V9.14.022.2026.06.10"
placeholder: "e.g., Master V9.14.024.2026.06.11"
validations:
required: true
.gitea/TODO/dockerfile
+1 -1
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@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
# SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.live.builder
# SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
# Version Master V9.14.022.2026.06.10
# Version Master V9.14.024.2026.06.11
FROM debian:bookworm
.gitea/TODO/render-md-to-html.yaml
+1 -1
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@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
# SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.live.builder
# SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
# Version Master V9.14.022.2026.06.10
# Version Master V9.14.024.2026.06.11
name: 🔁 Render README.md to README.html.
.gitea/trigger/t_generate_PRIVATE_trixie_0.yaml
+1 -1
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@@ -11,5 +11,5 @@
build:
counter: 1023
version: V9.14.022.2026.06.10
version: V9.14.024.2026.06.11
# vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=yaml
.gitea/trigger/t_generate_PUBLIC.yaml
+1 -1
View File
@@ -11,5 +11,5 @@
build:
counter: 1023
version: V9.14.022.2026.06.10
version: V9.14.024.2026.06.11
# vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=yaml
.gitea/trigger/t_generate_dns.yaml
+1 -1
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@@ -11,5 +11,5 @@
build:
counter: 1023
version: V9.14.022.2026.06.10
version: V9.14.024.2026.06.11
# vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=yaml
.gitea/workflows/generate_PRIVATE_trixie_0.yaml
+1 -1
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@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
# SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.live.builder
# SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
# Version Master V9.14.022.2026.06.10
# Version Master V9.14.024.2026.06.11
name: 🔐 Generating a Private Live ISO TRIXIE.
.gitea/workflows/generate_PRIVATE_trixie_1.yaml
+1 -1
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
# SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.live.builder
# SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
# Version Master V9.14.022.2026.06.10
# Version Master V9.14.024.2026.06.11
name: 🔐 Generating a Private Live ISO TRIXIE.
.gitea/workflows/generate_PUBLIC_iso.yaml
+1 -1
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@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
# SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.live.builder
# SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
# Version Master V9.14.022.2026.06.10
# Version Master V9.14.024.2026.06.11
name: 💙 Generating a PUBLIC Live ISO.
.gitea/workflows/linter_char_scripts.yaml
+1 -1
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@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
# SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.live.builder
# SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
# Version Master V9.14.022.2026.06.10
# Version Master V9.14.024.2026.06.11
# Gitea Workflow: Shell-Script Linting
#
.gitea/workflows/render-dnssec-status.yaml
+1 -1
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@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
# SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.live.builder
# SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
# Version Master V9.14.022.2026.06.10
# Version Master V9.14.024.2026.06.11
name: 🛡️ Retrieve DNSSEC status of coresecret.dev.
.gitea/workflows/render-dot-to-png.yaml
+1 -1
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@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
# SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.live.builder
# SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
# Version Master V9.14.022.2026.06.10
# Version Master V9.14.024.2026.06.11
name: 🔁 Render Graphviz Diagrams.
.version.properties
+1 -1
View File
@@ -15,5 +15,5 @@ properties_SPDX-License-Identifier="LicenseRef-CNCL-1.1 OR LicenseRef-CCLA-1.1 "
properties_SPDX-LicenseComment="This file is part of the CISS.debian.installer.secure framework."
properties_SPDX-PackageName="CISS.debian.live.builder"
properties_SPDX-Security-Contact="security@coresecret.eu"
properties_version="V9.14.022.2026.06.10"
properties_version="V9.14.024.2026.06.11"
# vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=conf
CISS.debian.live.builder.spdx
+1 -1
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ Creator: Person: Marc S. Weidner (Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency)
Created: 2025-05-07T12:00:00Z
Package: CISS.debian.live.builder
PackageName: CISS.debian.live.builder
PackageVersion: Master V9.14.022.2026.06.10
PackageVersion: Master V9.14.024.2026.06.11
PackageSupplier: Organization: Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency
PackageDownloadLocation: https://git.coresecret.dev/msw/CISS.debian.live.builder
PackageHomePage: https://git.coresecret.dev/msw/CISS.debian.live.builder
README.md
+38 -26
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
gitea: none
include_toc: true
---
[![Static Badge](https://badges.coresecret.dev/badge/Release-V9.14.022.2026.06.10-white?style=plastic&logo=linux&logoColor=white&logoSize=auto&label=Release&color=%23FCC624)](https://git.coresecret.dev/msw/CISS.debian.live.builder)
[![Static Badge](https://badges.coresecret.dev/badge/Release-V9.14.024.2026.06.11-white?style=plastic&logo=linux&logoColor=white&logoSize=auto&label=Release&color=%23FCC624)](https://git.coresecret.dev/msw/CISS.debian.live.builder)
&nbsp;
[![Static Badge](https://badges.coresecret.dev/badge/Licence-EUPL1.2-white?style=plastic&logo=europeanunion&logoColor=white&logoSize=auto&label=Licence&color=%23003399)](https://eupl.eu/1.2/en/) &nbsp;
[![Static Badge](https://badges.coresecret.dev/badge/opensourceinitiative-Compliant-white?style=plastic&logo=opensourceinitiative&logoColor=white&logoSize=auto&label=OSI&color=%233DA639)](https://opensource.org/license/eupl-1-2) &nbsp;
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ include_toc: true
**Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard**<br>
*Debian Live Build Generator for hardened live environment and CISS Debian Installer*<br>
**Master Version**: 9.14<br>
**Build**: V9.14.022.2026.06.10<br>
**Build**: V9.14.024.2026.06.11<br>
**CISS.debian.live.builder — First of its own.**<br>
**World-class CIA: Designed, handcrafted, and powered by Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency.**
@@ -46,9 +46,10 @@ Beyond a conventional live system, **CISS.debian.live.builder** assembles a **fu
in a single, deterministic build step: a LUKS2 container backed by `dm-integrity` hosting the SquashFS root filesystem, combined
with a hardened initramfs chain including a dedicated Dropbear build pipeline for remote LUKS unlock. The resulting ISO ships
with a hardened kernel configuration, strict sysctl and network tuning, pre-configured SSH hardening and fail2ban, and a
customised `verify-checksums` path providing both ISO-edge verification and runtime attestation of the live root. All components
are aligned with the `CISS.debian.installer` baseline, ensuring a unified cryptographic and security posture from first boot to
an installed system. For an overview of the entire build process, see:
customised `verify-checksums` path providing fail-closed ISO-edge verification and runtime attestation of the exact final
SquashFS payload bytes selected for the encrypted live root. All components are aligned with the `CISS.debian.installer`
baseline, ensuring a unified cryptographic and security posture from first boot to an installed system. For an overview of the
entire build process, see:
**[MAN_CISS_ISO_BOOT_CHAIN.md](docs/MAN_CISS_ISO_BOOT_CHAIN.md)**
When built with the ``--dhcp-centurion`` profile, the live system ships with a strict network and resolver policy:
@@ -60,12 +61,17 @@ and spoofing surfaces.
Internally, the builder employs a dedicated secret-handling pipeline backed by a tmpfs-only secrets directory
(`/dev/shm/cdlb_secrets`). Sensitive material such as root passwords, SSH keys, and signing keys never appears on the command
line, is guarded by strict `0400 root:root` permissions, and any symlink inside the secret path is treated as a hard failure
that aborts the run. Critical code paths temporarily disable Bash xtrace so that credentials never leak into debug logs, and
transient secret files are shredded (`shred -fzu`) as soon as they are no longer needed. GNUPG homes used for signing are
wiped, unencrypted chroot artifacts and includes are removed after `lb build`, and the final artifact is reduced to the
encrypted SquashFS inside the LUKS2 container. At runtime, LUKS passphrases in the live ISO and installer are transported via
named pipes inside the initramfs instead of process arguments, further minimizing exposure in process listings.
line. The secret root must be an existing `root:root` tmpfs or ramfs directory with `0700` permissions and no symlinks or
special files below it. Filename-only secret arguments are rejected when they contain path separators, traversal names, shell
metacharacters, or unsafe leading dashes. Critical code paths temporarily disable Bash xtrace so that credentials never leak
into debug logs; the final exact-value sanitization pass runs only after xtrace has been stopped and its debug file descriptor
has been closed, then redacts still-known secret values from debug, variable, and error logs as defense in depth. Transient
secret files are shredded (`shred -fzu`) as soon as they are no longer needed; this is best-effort on SSD/NVMe media, so the
architecture relies primarily on tmpfs for secret staging. GNUPG homes used for signing are wiped,
unencrypted chroot artifacts and includes are removed after `lb build`, and cleanup is intentionally destructive only inside
the exact build directory carrying the `.ciss-live-builder-owned` marker. At runtime, LUKS passphrases in the live ISO and
installer are transported via named pipes inside the initramfs instead of process arguments, further minimizing exposure in
process listings.
Check out more leading world-class services powered by Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency:
* [CenturionDNS Resolver](https://eddns.eu/)
@@ -123,7 +129,7 @@ lockstep avoids those mismatches and gives me predictable artifacts across build
The live ISO acts as a sealed, immutable execution environment. All relevant configuration, all installation logic, and all
security decisions are rendered into the image at build time and treated as read-only at runtime. On top of that logical
immutability, I now layer cryptographic protection of the live root file system itself. The live image contains a LUKS2 container
immutability, I now layer cryptographic protection of the live root file system itself. The live image contains a LUKS2 container
file with dm-integrity that wraps the SquashFS payload. The initramfs knows how to locate this container, unlock it, verify its
integrity, and then present the decrypted SquashFS as the root component of an OverlayFS stack. The detailed boot and
verification chain is documented separately in **[CISS ISO Boot Chain](docs/MAN_CISS_ISO_BOOT_CHAIN.md)**<br>
@@ -131,7 +137,7 @@ verification chain is documented separately in **[CISS ISO Boot Chain](docs/MAN_
In compact form, my expectations for the system are:<br>
* Every bit that matters for boot and provisioning is covered by checksums that I control and that are signed with keys under my solely authoritative HSM.
* The live root runs out of a LUKS2 dm-integrity container so that a tampered or bit-rotted SquashFS never becomes a trusted root.
* The live root runs out of a LUKS2 dm-integrity container, and the final SquashFS byte stream copied into the decrypted mapper is verified against a signed rootfs attestation manifest, so a tampered or bit-rotted SquashFS never becomes a trusted root.
* Verification steps are not advisory. Any anomaly causes a hard abort during boot.
* After the live environment has reached a stable, verified state, it can hand off to ``CISS.debian.installer``. The installer operates from the same image, does not pull random payloads from the internet, and keeps the target system behind a hardened firewall until the entire provisioning process has completed.
* For unattended, headless scenarios I also support builds where the target system is installed without ever exposing a shell over the console. After installation and reboot, the machine waits for a decryption passphrase via an embedded Dropbear SSH instance in the initramfs, limited to public key authentication and guarded by strict cryptographic policies. In such variants even ``/boot`` can be encrypted, with GRUB taking care of unlocking the boot partition.
@@ -175,7 +181,7 @@ installer toolchain.
This project adheres strictly to a structured versioning scheme following the pattern x.y.z-Date.
Example: `V9.14.022.2026.06.10`
Example: `V9.14.024.2026.06.11`
`x.y.z` represents major (x), minor (y), and patch (z) version increments.
@@ -369,7 +375,7 @@ For further details see: **[90-ciss-local.hardened.md](docs/documentation/90-cis
`--primordial-ssh <port>` configure the CDI Primordial overlay clone. `--primordial-ssh` also adds an outgoing-only UFW TCP
exception for a bootstrap/recovery SSH port when the live system's UFW outgoing policy is `deny`. It adds no incoming firewall
rule and does not replace `--ssh-port`. If the requested port already matches an existing outgoing SSH exception, the current
hook still emits the requested labelled rule because this repository has no separate UFW rule deduplication layer.
hook still emits the requested labeled rule because this repository has no separate UFW rule deduplication layer.
* **Rationale**: Implements a default-deny firewall, reducing lateral movement and data exfiltration risks immediately after
deployment.
@@ -493,10 +499,13 @@ To use **``CISS.debian.live.builder``** as intended, the following baseline is e
2. Preparation:
1. Ensure you are root.
2. Create the build directory `mkdir /opt/cdlb` and the tmpfs secrets directory `mkdir /dev/shm/cdlb_secrets`.
2. Create the build directory `install -d -m 0755 -o root -g root /opt/cdlb` and the tmpfs secrets directory
`install -d -m 0700 -o root -g root /dev/shm/cdlb_secrets`.
3. Place your desired SSH public key in the `authorized_keys` file, for example, in the `/dev/shm/cdlb_secrets` directory.
4. Place your desired Password in the `password.txt` file, for example, in the `/dev/shm/cdlb_secrets` directory.
5. Make any other changes you need to.
5. Keep files below `/dev/shm/cdlb_secrets` as regular, non-symlink files owned by `root:root`; the builder normalizes them
to `0400` before use.
6. Make any other changes you need to.
3. Run the config builder script `./ciss_live_builder.sh` and the integrated `lb build` command (example):
@@ -505,7 +514,7 @@ To use **``CISS.debian.live.builder``** as intended, the following baseline is e
timestamp=$(date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S%z)
./ciss_live_builder.sh \
--architecture amd64 \
--autobuild=6.16.3+deb13-amd64 \
--autobuild=7.0.10+deb13-amd64 \
--build-directory /opt/cdlb \
--cdi \
--change-splash hexagon \
@@ -525,9 +534,9 @@ To use **``CISS.debian.live.builder``** as intended, the following baseline is e
--signing_key_pass=signing_key_pass.txt \
--signing_key=signing_key.asc \
--ssh-port 4242 \
--primordial-url https://git.coresecret.dev/ahz/PhysNet.primordial.git \
--primordial-key id--git.coresecret.dev--PhysNet.primordial_deploy--ed25519--newton--2025-10 \
--primordial-ssh 42842 \
--primordial-key SSH-key-filename-for-Primordial-overlay-clone \
--primordial-ssh SSH-port-for-Primordial-overlay-clone \
--primordial-url URL-to-Primordial-overlay-clone \
--ssh-pubkey /dev/shm/cdlb_secrets \
--sshfp \
--trixie
@@ -559,10 +568,13 @@ preview it or run it.
2. Preparation:
1. Ensure you are root.
2. Create the build directory `mkdir /opt/cdlb` and the tmpfs secrets directory `mkdir /dev/shm/cdlb_secrets`.
2. Create the build directory `install -d -m 0755 -o root -g root /opt/cdlb` and the tmpfs secrets directory
`install -d -m 0700 -o root -g root /dev/shm/cdlb_secrets`.
3. Place your desired SSH public key in the `authorized_keys` file, for example, in the `/dev/shm/cdlb_secrets` directory.
4. Place your desired Password in the `password.txt` file, for example, in the `/dev/shm/cdlb_secrets` directory.
5. Copy and edit the sample and set your options (no spaces around commas in lists):
5. Keep files below `/dev/shm/cdlb_secrets` as regular, non-symlink files owned by `root:root`; the builder normalizes them
to `0400` before use.
6. Copy and edit the sample and set your options (no spaces around commas in lists):
````bash
cp config.mk.sample config.mk
@@ -577,9 +589,9 @@ preview it or run it.
SSH_PUBKEY=/dev/shm/cdlb_secrets
# Optional
PRIMORDIAL_URL=https://git.coresecret.dev/ahz/PhysNet.primordial.git
PRIMORDIAL_KEY=id--git.coresecret.dev--PhysNet.primordial_deploy--ed25519--newton--2025-10
PRIMORDIAL_SSH_PORT=42842
PRIMORDIAL_KEY=SSH-key-filename-for-Primordial-overlay-clone
PRIMORDIAL_SSH_PORT=SSH-port-for-Primordial-overlay-clone
PRIMORDIAL_URL=URL-to-Primordial-overlay-clone
PROVIDER_NETCUP_IPV6=2001:cdb::1
# comma-separated; IPv6 in [] is fine
JUMP_HOSTS=[2001:db8::1],[2001:db8::2]
REPOSITORY.md
+2 -2
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@@ -8,13 +8,13 @@ include_toc: true
**Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard**<br>
*Debian Live Build Generator for hardened live environment and CISS Debian Installer*<br>
**Master Version**: 9.14<br>
**Build**: V9.14.022.2026.06.10<br>
**Build**: V9.14.024.2026.06.11<br>
# 2. Repository Structure
**Project:** Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard (CISS) — Debian Live Builder
**Branch:** `master`
**Repository State:** Master Version **9.14**, Build **V9.14.022.2026.06.10** (as of 2025-10-11)
**Repository State:** Master Version **9.14**, Build **V9.14.024.2026.06.11** (as of 2025-10-11)
## 3.1. Top-Level Layout
ciss.secureboot/private/README.md
+1 -1
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@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ include_toc: true
**Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard**<br>
*Debian Live Build Generator for hardened live environment and CISS Debian Installer*<br>
**Master Version**: 9.14<br>
**Build**: V9.14.022.2026.06.10<br>
**Build**: V9.14.024.2026.06.11<br>
# 2. CISS Secure Boot Private Material
ciss.secureboot/public/README.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ include_toc: true
**Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard**<br>
*Debian Live Build Generator for hardened live environment and CISS Debian Installer*<br>
**Master Version**: 9.14<br>
**Build**: V9.14.022.2026.06.10<br>
**Build**: V9.14.024.2026.06.11<br>
# 2. CISS Secure Boot Public Material
ciss_live_builder.sh
+33 -20
View File
@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ declare -grx VAR_SETUP_PATH="$(cd "$(dirname "${0}")" && pwd)" # '/roo
declare -grx VAR_TMP_SECRET="/dev/shm/cdlb_secrets" # Fixed tmpfs path to store securely build artifacts.
declare -grx VAR_WORKDIR="$(dirname "${VAR_SETUP_FULL}")" # '/root/git/CISS.debian.live.builder'
clear
### PRELIMINARY CHECKS.
### No ash, dash, ksh, sh.
# shellcheck disable=SC2292
@@ -116,7 +118,6 @@ for arg in "$@"; do case "${arg,,}" in -v|--version) . ./lib/lib_version.sh ;
for arg in "$@"; do case "${arg,,}" in -d|--debug) . ./meta_sources_debug.sh; debugger "${@}";; esac; done
### ALL CHECKS DONE. READY TO START THE SCRIPT.
clear
printf '\033[95m'
cat bootscreen.txt
printf '\033[0m\n'
@@ -143,6 +144,7 @@ find "${VAR_TMP_SECRET}" -type f -exec chown root:root {} +
[[ "${VAR_SETUP}" == true ]] && {
source_guard "./lib/lib_arg_parser.sh"
source_guard "./lib/lib_arg_priority_check.sh"
source_guard "./lib/lib_build_dir_safety.sh"
source_guard "./lib/lib_boot_screen.sh"
source_guard "./lib/lib_cdi.sh"
source_guard "./lib/lib_change_splash.sh"
@@ -160,6 +162,7 @@ find "${VAR_TMP_SECRET}" -type f -exec chown root:root {} +
source_guard "./lib/lib_clean_screen.sh"
source_guard "./lib/lib_clean_up.sh"
source_guard "./lib/lib_copy_integrity.sh"
source_guard "./lib/lib_debug_sanitize.sh"
source_guard "./lib/lib_gnupg.sh"
source_guard "./lib/lib_hardening_root_pw.sh"
source_guard "./lib/lib_hardening_ssh_tcp.sh"
@@ -173,6 +176,7 @@ find "${VAR_TMP_SECRET}" -type f -exec chown root:root {} +
source_guard "./lib/lib_provider_netcup.sh"
source_guard "./lib/lib_run_analysis.sh"
source_guard "./lib/lib_sanitizer.sh"
source_guard "./lib/lib_secret_validation.sh"
source_guard "./lib/lib_secureboot_profile.sh"
source_guard "./lib/lib_trap_on_err.sh"
source_guard "./lib/lib_trap_on_exit.sh"
@@ -180,22 +184,6 @@ find "${VAR_TMP_SECRET}" -type f -exec chown root:root {} +
source_guard "./lib/lib_usage.sh"
}
### PRE-SCAN SECURE BOOT PROFILE FOR BUILD-HOST PACKAGE CHECKS.
### Formal validation still happens in arg_parser().
for ((idx=0; idx<${#ARY_PARAM_ARRAY[@]}; idx++)); do
case "${ARY_PARAM_ARRAY[idx],,}" in
--secure-boot-profile=*)
declare -gx VAR_CISS_SECUREBOOT_PROFILE="${ARY_PARAM_ARRAY[idx]#*=}"
;;
--secure-boot-profile)
if [[ -n "${ARY_PARAM_ARRAY[idx + 1]:-}" ]]; then
declare -gx VAR_CISS_SECUREBOOT_PROFILE="${ARY_PARAM_ARRAY[idx + 1]}"
fi
;;
esac
done
unset idx
### CHECKING REQUIRED PACKAGES.
check_pkgs
@@ -221,9 +209,30 @@ if ! ${VAR_HANDLER_AUTOBUILD}; then boot_screen; fi
if ! ${VAR_HANDLER_AUTOBUILD}; then printf "XXX\nInitialization done ... \nXXX\n15\n" >&3; fi
### Updating Status of Dialog Gauge Bar.
if ! ${VAR_HANDLER_AUTOBUILD}; then printf "XXX\nActivate traps ... \nXXX\n50\n" >&3; fi
if ! ${VAR_HANDLER_AUTOBUILD}; then printf "XXX\nValidating secrets artifacts ... \nXXX\n20\n" >&3; fi
validate_secret_root "${VAR_TMP_SECRET}"
harden_secret_root_files "${VAR_TMP_SECRET}"
### Following the CISS Bash naming and ordering scheme:
### Updating Status of Dialog Gauge Bar.
if ! ${VAR_HANDLER_AUTOBUILD}; then printf "XXX\nPre-Scan Secure-Boot ... \nXXX\n30\n" >&3; fi
### PRE-SCAN SECURE BOOT PROFILE FOR BUILD-HOST PACKAGE CHECKS.
### Formal validation still happens in arg_parser().
for ((idx=0; idx<${#ARY_PARAM_ARRAY[@]}; idx++)); do
case "${ARY_PARAM_ARRAY[idx],,}" in
--secure-boot-profile=*)
declare -gx VAR_CISS_SECUREBOOT_PROFILE="${ARY_PARAM_ARRAY[idx]#*=}"
;;
--secure-boot-profile)
if [[ -n "${ARY_PARAM_ARRAY[idx + 1]:-}" ]]; then
declare -gx VAR_CISS_SECUREBOOT_PROFILE="${ARY_PARAM_ARRAY[idx + 1]}"
fi
;;
esac
done
unset idx
### Updating Status of Dialog Gauge Bar.
if ! ${VAR_HANDLER_AUTOBUILD}; then printf "XXX\nTraps active ... \nXXX\n50\n" >&3; fi
trap 'trap_on_exit "$?" "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}" "${LINENO}" "${FUNCNAME[0]:-main}" "${BASH_COMMAND}"' EXIT
trap 'trap_on_err "$?" "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}" "${LINENO}" "${FUNCNAME[0]:-main}" "${BASH_COMMAND}"' ERR
@@ -234,9 +243,13 @@ declare -ar ARY_ARG_SANITIZED=("$@")
declare -grx VAR_ARG_SANITIZED="${ARY_ARG_SANITIZED[*]}"
### Updating Status of Dialog Gauge Bar.
if ! ${VAR_HANDLER_AUTOBUILD}; then printf "XXX\nParsing Arguments ... \nXXX\n90\n" >&3; fi
if ! ${VAR_HANDLER_AUTOBUILD}; then printf "XXX\nParsing Arguments ... \nXXX\n80\n" >&3; fi
arg_parser "$@"
### Updating Status of Dialog Gauge Bar.
if ! ${VAR_HANDLER_AUTOBUILD}; then printf "XXX\nValidate secret Arguments ... \nXXX\n95\n" >&3; fi
validate_selected_secret_inputs
### Updating Status of Dialog Gauge Bar.
if ! ${VAR_HANDLER_AUTOBUILD}; then printf "XXX\nFinal checks ... \nXXX\n95\n" >&3; fi
clean_ip
config/hooks/live/zzzz_ciss_crypt_squash.hook.binary
+126 -15
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
#!/bin/bash
# shellcheck disable=SC2154
# SPDX-Version: 3.0
# SPDX-CreationInfo: 2025-10-11; WEIDNER, Marc S.; <msw@coresecret.dev>
# SPDX-ExternalRef: GIT https://git.coresecret.dev/msw/CISS.debian.live.builder.git
@@ -11,9 +12,10 @@
# SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
set -Ceuo pipefail
# Final live-build binary hook for encrypted root filesystem packaging. Preallocate a LUKS2 container, formats it with the
# generated build secret, copies the generated filesystem.squashfs into the opened encrypted mapping, then closes the container,
# shreds the temporary LUKS secret, and removes the plaintext SquashFS from the ISO payload.
# Final live-build binary hook for encrypted root filesystem packaging. It creates and signs a deterministic attestation
# manifest for the final filesystem.squashfs byte stream, preallocates a LUKS2 container, formats it with the generated build
# secret, copies the generated filesystem.squashfs into the opened encrypted mapping, then closes the container, shreds the
# temporary LUKS secret, and removes the plaintext SquashFS from the ISO payload.
printf "\e[95m🧪 '%s' starting ... \e[0m\n" "${0}"
@@ -63,12 +65,120 @@ preallocate() {
# shellcheck disable=SC2034
readonly -f preallocate
declare ROOTFS="${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}/binary/live/filesystem.squashfs"
declare LUKSFS="${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}/binary/live/ciss_rootfs.crypt"
declare KEYFD=""
#######################################
# Create and sign the rootfs attestation manifest for the exact SquashFS payload copied into the LUKS mapper.
# Globals:
# VAR_SIGNING_KEY_FPR
# VAR_SIGNING_KEY_PASSFILE
# VAR_VERIFY_KEYRING
# Arguments:
# 1: Final SquashFS payload file
# 2: Manifest path below binary/live
# Returns:
# 0: on success
# 42: on failure
#######################################
create_attestation() {
declare rootfs_file="$1"
declare rootfs_attestation="$2"
declare rootfs_hash=""
declare rootfs_size=""
rootfs_size="$(stat -c%s -- "${rootfs_file}")"
rootfs_hash="$(sha512sum "${rootfs_file}")"
rootfs_hash="${rootfs_hash%% *}"
# The attested boundary is the final SquashFS byte stream before LUKS wrapping. The boot verifier reads exactly this many
# bytes from the decrypted mapper and intentionally excludes the LUKS allocation slack after the SquashFS payload.
cat << EOF >| "${rootfs_attestation}"
# CISS rootfs attestation manifest v1
# boundary: final filesystem.squashfs byte stream copied into /dev/mapper/crypt_liveiso
# rootfs-size-bytes: ${rootfs_size}
${rootfs_hash} ciss-rootfs.squashfs
EOF
chmod 0444 "${rootfs_attestation}"
gpg --batch --yes --pinentry-mode loopback --passphrase-file "${VAR_SIGNING_KEY_PASSFILE}" --local-user "${VAR_SIGNING_KEY_FPR}" \
--detach-sign --output "${rootfs_attestation}.sig" "${rootfs_attestation}"
chmod 0444 "${rootfs_attestation}.sig"
gpgv --keyring "${VAR_VERIFY_KEYRING}" "${rootfs_attestation}.sig" "${rootfs_attestation}"
printf "\e[92m[INFO] Rootfs attestation manifest created and verified: [%s]. \e[0m\n" "${rootfs_attestation}"
return 0
}
### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
# shellcheck disable=SC2034
readonly -f create_attestation
declare LUKSFS="${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}/binary/live/ciss_rootfs.crypt"
declare ROOTFS="${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}/binary/live/filesystem.squashfs"
declare ROOTFS_ATTESTATION="${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}/binary/live/filesystem.squashfs.sha512sum.txt"
declare DM_LAB="crypt_liveiso"
declare DEVMAP="/dev/mapper/${DM_LAB}"
declare LUKS_KEY_FILE="${VAR_TMP_SECRET}/${VAR_LUKS_KEY:-luks.txt}"
declare KEYFD=""
# shellcheck disable=SC2155
declare -i VAR_ROOTFS_SIZE=$(stat -c%s -- "${ROOTFS}")
declare -i VAR_ROOTFS_SIZE="$(stat -c%s -- "${ROOTFS}")"
# shellcheck disable=SC2155
declare VAR_ROOTFS_HASH="$(LC_ALL=C sha512sum "${ROOTFS}")"
declare VAR_ROOTFS_HASH="${VAR_ROOTFS_HASH%% *}"
### Attestation Boundary
# - The attested boundary is the final SquashFS byte stream before LUKS wrapping.
# - The boot verifier reads exactly this many bytes from the decrypted mapper and intentionally excludes the LUKS allocation
# slack after the SquashFS payload.
printf "\e[95m🧪 Attestation of filesystem.squashfs ... \e[0m\n"
cat << EOF >| "${ROOTFS_ATTESTATION}"
# CISS.debian.live.builder Master ${VAR_VERSION}
# Attestation file for filesystem.squashfs Version 1.0.0
# Boundary : Final filesystem.squashfs byte stream copied into /dev/mapper/crypt_liveiso
# Bytes : Final filesystem.squashfs ${VAR_ROOTFS_SIZE}
${VAR_ROOTFS_HASH} filesystem.squashfs
EOF
chmod 0444 "${ROOTFS_ATTESTATION}"
if gpg --batch --yes --pinentry-mode loopback --passphrase-file "${VAR_SIGNING_KEY_PASSFILE}" --local-user "${VAR_SIGNING_KEY_FPR}" \
--detach-sign --output "${ROOTFS_ATTESTATION}.sig" "${ROOTFS_ATTESTATION}"; then
printf "\e[92m✅ [gpg of %s] successful. \e[0m\n" "${ROOTFS_ATTESTATION}"
else
printf "\e[91m❌ [gpg of %s] NOT successful. \e[0m\n" "${ROOTFS_ATTESTATION}"
return 42
fi
chmod 0444 "${ROOTFS_ATTESTATION}.sig"
if gpgv --keyring "${VAR_VERIFY_KEYRING}" "${ROOTFS_ATTESTATION}.sig" "${ROOTFS_ATTESTATION}"; then
printf "\e[92m✅ [gpgv of %s] successful. \e[0m\n" "${ROOTFS_ATTESTATION}.sig"
else
printf "\e[91m❌ [gpgv of %s] NOT successful. \e[0m\n" "${ROOTFS_ATTESTATION}.sig"
return 42
fi
if LC_ALL=C sha512sum -c --strict --quiet "${ROOTFS_ATTESTATION}"; then
printf "\e[92m✅ [LC_ALL=C sha512sum -c --strict --quiet of %s] successful. \e[0m\n" "${ROOTFS_ATTESTATION}"
else
printf "\e[91m❌ [LC_ALL=C sha512sum -c --strict --quiet of %s] NOT successful. \e[0m\n" "${ROOTFS_ATTESTATION}"
return 42
fi
printf "\e[92m✅ Attestation of filesystem.squashfs successful. \e[0m\n"
### Safety margin:
# - LUKS2-Header and Metadata
@@ -82,7 +192,7 @@ declare -i VAR_LUKSFS_SIZE=$(( ( (BASE_SIZE + ALIGN_BYTES - 1) / ALIGN_BYTES ) *
preallocate "${LUKSFS}" "${VAR_LUKSFS_SIZE}"
exec {KEYFD}<"${VAR_TMP_SECRET}/luks.txt"
exec {KEYFD}<"${LUKS_KEY_FILE}"
if [[ "${VAR_CDLB_INSIDE_RUNNER}" == "false" ]]; then
@@ -93,7 +203,7 @@ if [[ "${VAR_CDLB_INSIDE_RUNNER}" == "false" ]]; then
--iter-time 1000 \
--key-file "/proc/$$/fd/${KEYFD}" \
--key-size 512 \
--label crypt_liveiso \
--label "${DM_LAB}" \
--luks2-keyslots-size 16777216 \
--luks2-metadata-size 4194304 \
--pbkdf argon2id \
@@ -108,10 +218,11 @@ elif [[ "${VAR_CDLB_INSIDE_RUNNER}" == "true" ]]; then
cryptsetup luksFormat \
--batch-mode \
--cipher aes-xts-plain64 \
--integrity hmac-sha512 \
--iter-time 1000 \
--key-file "/proc/$$/fd/${KEYFD}" \
--key-size 512 \
--label crypt_liveiso \
--label "${DM_LAB}" \
--luks2-keyslots-size 16777216 \
--luks2-metadata-size 4194304 \
--pbkdf argon2id \
@@ -123,10 +234,10 @@ elif [[ "${VAR_CDLB_INSIDE_RUNNER}" == "true" ]]; then
fi
cryptsetup open --key-file "/proc/$$/fd/${KEYFD}" "${LUKSFS}" crypt_liveiso
cryptsetup open --key-file "/proc/$$/fd/${KEYFD}" "${LUKSFS}" "${DM_LAB}"
# shellcheck disable=SC2155
declare -i LUKS_FREE=$(blockdev --getsize64 /dev/mapper/crypt_liveiso)
declare -i LUKS_FREE=$(blockdev --getsize64 "${DEVMAP}")
declare -i SQUASH_FS="${VAR_ROOTFS_SIZE}"
if (( LUKS_FREE >= SQUASH_FS )); then
@@ -140,13 +251,13 @@ else
fi
dd if="${ROOTFS}" of=/dev/mapper/crypt_liveiso bs=8M status=progress conv=fsync
dd if="${ROOTFS}" of="${DEVMAP}" bs=8M status=progress conv=fsync
sync
cryptsetup close crypt_liveiso
cryptsetup close "${DM_LAB}"
exec {KEYFD}<&-
shred -fzu -n 5 -- "${VAR_TMP_SECRET}/luks.txt"
shred -fzu -n 5 -- "${LUKS_KEY_FILE}"
rm -f -- "${ROOTFS}"
config/includes.chroot/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
+1 -1
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
# SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.live.builder
# SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
# Version Master V9.14.022.2026.06.10
# Version Master V9.14.024.2026.06.11
[git.coresecret.dev]:42842 ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIGQA107AVmg1D/jnyXiqbPf38zQRl8s3c+PM1zbfpeQl
[git.coresecret.dev]:42842 ssh-rsa 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
config/includes.chroot/etc/ssh/sshd_config
+1 -1
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
# SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.live.builder
# SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
# Version Master V9.14.022.2026.06.10
# Version Master V9.14.024.2026.06.11
### https://www.ssh-audit.com/
### ssh -Q cipher | cipher-auth | compression | kex | kex-gss | key | key-cert | key-plain | key-sig | mac | protocol-version | sig
config/includes.chroot/etc/sysctl.d/90-ciss-local.hardened
+1 -1
View File
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
# SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.live.builder
# SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
# Version Master V9.14.022.2026.06.10
# Version Master V9.14.024.2026.06.11
### https://docs.kernel.org/
### https://github.com/a13xp0p0v/kernel-hardening-checker/
config/includes.chroot/preseed/.iso/preseed_hash_generator.sh
+1 -1
View File
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
# SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.live.builder
# SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
declare -gr VERSION="Master V9.14.022.2026.06.10"
declare -gr VERSION="Master V9.14.024.2026.06.11"
### VERY EARLY CHECK FOR DEBUGGING
if [[ $* == *" --debug "* ]]; then
config/includes.chroot/preseed/preseed.cfg
+1 -1
View File
@@ -112,4 +112,4 @@ d-i preseed/late_command string sh /preseed/.ash/3_di_preseed_late_command.sh
# Please consider donating to my work at: https://coresecret.eu/spenden/
###########################################################################################
# Written by: ./preseed_hash_generator.sh Version: Master V9.14.022.2026.06.10 at: 10:18:37.9542
# Written by: ./preseed_hash_generator.sh Version: Master V9.14.024.2026.06.11 at: 10:18:37.9542
config/includes.chroot/usr/lib/live/boot/0030-ciss-verify-checksums
+86 -8
View File
@@ -15,12 +15,14 @@
# SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
# Module summary:
# This live-boot component implements the verify-checksums mode for the mounted live medium.
# It reads the live-boot command line to decide whether checksum verification is enabled and which digests to accept.
# It locates the pinned CISS GPG key material on the live medium, optionally verifies this script's signed hash,
# optionally verifies signed checksum files, and checks the first matching checksum manifest with the matching digest tool. It
# writes detailed checksum output to the verification TTY. It panics instead of continuing boot when integrity or
# authenticity verification fails.
# This live-boot component implements verify-checksums mode for the mounted live medium.
# It reads the live-boot command line to decide whether checksum verification is enabled, which digests to accept, and
# whether checksum signature verification is required. When signature verification is enabled, it requires to be pinned CISS GPG
# key material from the live medium, verifies this script's signed SHA-512 hash, and verifies the selected checksum manifest
# signature before accepting checksum results. It checks the first supported checksum manifest with an available matching digest
# tool and writes detailed checksum command output to the verification TTY when checksum execution runs. It fails closed by
# panicking on missing manifests, missing digest tools, empty manifests, failed signatures, failed checksums, or unknown
# verification states.
### Modified Version of the original file:
### https://salsa.debian.org/live-team/live-boot 'components/0030-ciss-verify-checksums'
@@ -87,11 +89,26 @@ Verify_checksums() {
_CHECKSUM_LOG=""
_CHECKSUM_LOG_DIR="${LIVE_VERIFY_CHECKSUMS_LOG_DIR:-/run}"
_KEYFILE=""
_MANIFEST_FOUND="false"
_MP=""
_RETURN_PGP=""
_RETURN_SHA=""
_TOOL_FOUND="false"
_VERIFICATION_EXECUTED="false"
_VERIFICATION_SUCCEEDED="false"
### Parse commandline arguments ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# shellcheck disable=SC2154
for _PARAMETER in ${LIVE_BOOT_CMDLINE}; do
case "${_PARAMETER}" in
@@ -148,6 +165,14 @@ Verify_checksums() {
done
if [ "${LIVE_VERIFY_CHECKSUMS_SIGNATURES}" = "true" ] && [ -z "${_KEYFILE}" ]; then
log_er "No pinned GPG key file found while checksum signature verification is enabled."
sleep 8
panic "[FATAL] No pinned GPG key file found while checksum signature verification is enabled."
fi
# shellcheck disable=SC2164
cd "${_MOUNTPOINT}"
@@ -244,10 +269,14 @@ Verify_checksums() {
if [ -e "${_CHECKSUM}" ]; then
_MANIFEST_FOUND="true"
log_in "Found: [${_CHECKSUM}] ..."
if [ -e "/usr/bin/${_DIGEST}sum" ]; then
_TOOL_FOUND="true"
log_in "Found: [/usr/bin/${_DIGEST}sum] ..."
if [ "${LIVE_VERIFY_CHECKSUMS_SIGNATURES}" = "true" ]; then
@@ -275,8 +304,15 @@ Verify_checksums() {
fi
# shellcheck disable=SC2312
_CHECKSUM_LOG="/run/ciss-${_DIGEST}sum-check.log"
if grep -v '^#' "${_CHECKSUM}" | LC_ALL=C /usr/bin/"${_DIGEST}"sum -c > "${_CHECKSUM_LOG}" 2>&1; then
_CHECKSUM_LOG="${_CHECKSUM_LOG_DIR}/ciss-${_DIGEST}sum-check.log"
_VERIFICATION_EXECUTED="true"
if ! grep -v '^#' "${_CHECKSUM}" | grep -q '[^[:space:]]'; then
_RETURN_SHA="254"
: > "${_CHECKSUM_LOG}"
log_er "Checksum manifest has no checksum entries: [${_CHECKSUM}]"
elif grep -v '^#' "${_CHECKSUM}" | LC_ALL=C /usr/bin/"${_DIGEST}"sum -c > "${_CHECKSUM_LOG}" 2>&1; then
_RETURN_SHA="${?}"
cat "${_CHECKSUM_LOG}" > "${_TTY}"
@@ -294,6 +330,12 @@ Verify_checksums() {
fi
if { [ "${_RETURN_PGP}" = "0" ] || [ "${_RETURN_PGP}" = "na" ]; } && [ "${_RETURN_SHA}" = "0" ]; then
_VERIFICATION_SUCCEEDED="true"
fi
# Stop after the first verification.
break 2
@@ -313,6 +355,36 @@ Verify_checksums() {
log_end_msg
printf "\n"
if [ "${_MANIFEST_FOUND}" != "true" ]; then
log_er "No supported checksum manifest found. Checksum verification is fail-closed."
sleep 8
panic "[FATAL] No supported checksum manifest found. Checksum verification is fail-closed."
fi
if [ "${_TOOL_FOUND}" != "true" ]; then
log_er "Checksum manifest found, but no supported checksum tool is available. Checksum verification is fail-closed."
sleep 8
panic "[FATAL] Checksum manifest found, but no supported checksum tool is available. Checksum verification is fail-closed."
fi
if [ "${_VERIFICATION_EXECUTED}" != "true" ]; then
log_er "Checksum verification was not executed. Checksum verification is fail-closed."
sleep 8
panic "[FATAL] Checksum verification was not executed. Checksum verification is fail-closed."
fi
if [ "${_VERIFICATION_SUCCEEDED}" != "true" ]; then
log_er "[FATAL] Checksum verification did not complete successfully. Evaluating fail-closed failure state."
fi
case "${_RETURN_PGP},${_RETURN_SHA}" in
"0,0")
@@ -345,6 +417,12 @@ Verify_checksums() {
panic "Verification of [sha checksum] file failed."
;;
*)
log_er "Unknown checksum verification state: [${_RETURN_PGP:-unset},${_RETURN_SHA:-unset}]."
sleep 8
panic "[FATAL] Unknown checksum verification state. Checksum verification is fail-closed."
;;
esac
}
# vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh
config/includes.chroot/usr/lib/live/boot/0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest
+176 -17
View File
@@ -16,18 +16,27 @@
# Module summary:
# - Runs after the encrypted live root filesystem has been decrypted.
# - Requires the pinned public key, attestation hash file, and detached signature to exist as readable, non-empty regular files
# inside the decrypted rootfs.
# - Verifies the attestation signature with gpgv against the pinned key material.
# - Confirms that the signature fingerprint matches the build-time expected rootfs fingerprint and panics on missing, malformed,
# or mismatched evidence.
_SAVED_SET_OPTS="$(set +o)"
# - Requires the pinned public key, external rootfs attestation manifest, and detached signature to exist as readable,
# non-empty regular files.
# - Verifies the attestation signature with gpgv against the pinned key material and expected signer fingerprint.
# - Verifies the exact final SquashFS byte stream copied into the decrypted LUKS mapper. The signed manifest provides both the
# SHA-512 digest and the exact byte length; allocation slack after that SquashFS payload is intentionally out of scope.
# - Panics on missing, malformed, unauthentic, or mismatched evidence.
set -eu
printf "\e[95m[INFO] Starting : [/usr/lib/live/boot/0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest] \n\e[0m"
### Check panic command availability -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
if ! command -v panic >/dev/null 2>&1; then
panic() {
printf '\e[91m[FATAL] %s \n\e[0m' "${*}" >&2
exit 1
}
fi
### Declare variables ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
### Will be replaced at build time:
@@ -36,10 +45,13 @@ export CDLB_EXP_CA_FPR="@EXP_CA_FPR@"
### Name of the top-level dm-crypt mapping (e.g., cryptsetup --label): zzzz_ciss_crypt_squash.hook.binary ----------------------
export CDLB_MAPPER_NAME="${CDLB_MAPPER_NAME:-crypt_liveiso}"
export CDLB_MAPPER_DEV="${CDLB_MAPPER_DEV:-/dev/mapper/${CDLB_MAPPER_NAME}}"
export CDLB_MNT_MEDIUM="${CDLB_MNT_MEDIUM:-/run/live/medium}"
### Attestation file locations inside decrypted rootfs. ------------------------------------------------------------------------
CDLB_ATTEST_FPR_SHA="${CDLB_ATTEST_FPR_SHA:-/root/root/.ciss/attestation/${CDLB_EXP_FPR}.gpg.sha512sum.txt}"
CDLB_ATTEST_FPR_SIG="${CDLB_ATTEST_FPR_SIG:-/root/root/.ciss/attestation/${CDLB_EXP_FPR}.gpg.sha512sum.txt.sig}"
### Locations of the attestation file of filesystem.squashfs on the verified live medium. --------------------------------------
CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_MANIFEST="${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_MANIFEST:-${CDLB_MNT_MEDIUM}/live/filesystem.squashfs.sha512sum.txt}"
CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_SIGNATURE="${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_SIGNATURE:-${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_MANIFEST}.sig}"
CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_CHECK="${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_CHECK:-/run/ciss-rootfs-attestation.sha512sum}"
CDLB_KEY_DIR="${CDLB_KEY_DIR:-/etc/ciss/keys}"
### Declare functions ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -123,15 +135,162 @@ require_attestation_file() {
return 0
}
HASH_FILE="${CDLB_ATTEST_FPR_SHA}"
SIGN_FILE="${CDLB_ATTEST_FPR_SIG}"
#######################################
# Validate the decrypted rootfs payload device.
# Globals:
# None
# Arguments:
# 1: Absolute payload device path
# Returns:
# 0: on success
#######################################
require_rootfs_payload_device() {
artifact_path="${1}"
if [ ! -e "${artifact_path}" ]; then
log_er "0042() : Rootfs payload device missing: [${artifact_path}]"
panic "0042() : Rootfs payload device missing: [${artifact_path}]"
fi
if [ -L "${artifact_path}" ] || { [ ! -b "${artifact_path}" ] && [ ! -f "${artifact_path}" ]; }; then
log_er "0042() : Rootfs payload must be a block device or regular test fixture: [${artifact_path}]"
panic "0042() : Rootfs payload must be a block device or regular test fixture: [${artifact_path}]"
fi
if [ ! -r "${artifact_path}" ]; then
log_er "0042() : Rootfs payload is not readable: [${artifact_path}]"
panic "0042() : Rootfs payload is not readable: [${artifact_path}]"
fi
return 0
}
#######################################
# Stream exactly the attested SquashFS payload bytes from the decrypted mapper.
# Globals:
# None
# Arguments:
# 1: Payload device or regular test fixture
# 2: Exact payload byte count
# Returns:
# 0: on success
#######################################
stream_rootfs_payload() {
payload_device="${1}"
payload_size="${2}"
block_size=1048576
full_blocks=$((payload_size / block_size))
remainder=$((payload_size % block_size))
remainder_offset=$((full_blocks * block_size))
if [ "${full_blocks}" -gt 0 ]; then
dd if="${payload_device}" bs="${block_size}" count="${full_blocks}" 2>/dev/null || return 1
fi
if [ "${remainder}" -gt 0 ]; then
dd if="${payload_device}" bs=1 skip="${remainder_offset}" count="${remainder}" 2>/dev/null || return 1
fi
return 0
}
#######################################
# Verify the attested SquashFS payload hash against the decrypted mapper bytes.
# Globals:
# CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_CHECK
# Arguments:
# 1: Manifest path
# 2: Payload device path
# Returns:
# 0: on success
#######################################
verify_rootfs_payload() {
manifest_path="${1}"
payload_device="${2}"
payload_size=""
payload_hash=""
payload_size="$(awk -F': ' '/^# rootfs-size-bytes: /{print $2; exit}' "${manifest_path}")"
payload_hash="$(awk '($0 !~ /^#/ && NF >= 2){print $1; exit}' "${manifest_path}")"
case "${payload_size}" in
""|*[!0-9]*)
log_er "0042() : Rootfs attestation manifest has invalid payload size."
panic "0042() : Rootfs attestation manifest has invalid payload size."
;;
esac
if [ "${payload_size}" -le 0 ]; then
log_er "0042() : Rootfs attestation manifest has empty payload size."
panic "0042() : Rootfs attestation manifest has empty payload size."
fi
case "${payload_hash}" in
""|*[!0123456789abcdefABCDEF]*)
log_er "0042() : Rootfs attestation manifest has invalid SHA-512 payload hash."
panic "0042() : Rootfs attestation manifest has invalid SHA-512 payload hash."
;;
esac
if [ "${#payload_hash}" -ne 128 ]; then
log_er "0042() : Rootfs attestation manifest SHA-512 payload hash has invalid length."
panic "0042() : Rootfs attestation manifest SHA-512 payload hash has invalid length."
fi
if ! printf '%s -\n' "${payload_hash}" > "${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_CHECK}"; then
log_er "0042() : Failed to prepare transient rootfs payload checksum file."
panic "0042() : Failed to prepare transient rootfs payload checksum file."
fi
chmod 0600 "${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_CHECK}" 2>/dev/null || :
log_in "0042() : Verifying exact SquashFS payload bytes from: [${payload_device}]"
# stream_rootfs_payload may be evaluated in a pipeline here; sha512sum -c is the fail-closed authority for truncated or
# tampered payload bytes.
# shellcheck disable=SC2310
if ! stream_rootfs_payload "${payload_device}" "${payload_size}" | /usr/bin/sha512sum -c "${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_CHECK}"; then
log_er "0042() : Rootfs payload SHA-512 verification failed."
panic "0042() : Rootfs payload SHA-512 verification failed."
fi
log_ok "0042() : Rootfs payload SHA-512 verification successful."
return 0
}
HASH_FILE="${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_MANIFEST}"
SIGN_FILE="${CDLB_ROOTFS_ATTEST_SIGNATURE}"
KEYFILE="${CDLB_KEY_DIR}/${CDLB_EXP_FPR}.gpg"
require_attestation_file "Public key" "${KEYFILE}"
require_attestation_file "Attestation data" "${HASH_FILE}"
require_attestation_file "Attestation signature" "${SIGN_FILE}"
require_attestation_file "Public key" "${KEYFILE}"
require_attestation_file "Rootfs attestation manifest" "${HASH_FILE}"
require_attestation_file "Rootfs attestation signature" "${SIGN_FILE}"
require_rootfs_payload_device "${CDLB_MAPPER_DEV}"
log_in "0042() : Verifying rootfs attestation with 'gpgv' and inside LUKS encrypted rootfs pinned GPG FPR."
log_in "0042() : Verifying rootfs attestation manifest with 'gpgv' and pinned GPG FPR."
if ! _STATUS="$(/usr/bin/gpgv --keyring "${KEYFILE}" --status-fd 1 "${SIGN_FILE}" "${HASH_FILE}" 2>&1)"; then
@@ -163,7 +322,7 @@ else
fi
eval "${_SAVED_SET_OPTS}"
verify_rootfs_payload "${HASH_FILE}" "${CDLB_MAPPER_DEV}"
printf "\e[92m[INFO] Successfully applied : [/usr/lib/live/boot/0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest] \n\e[0m"
docs/AUDIT_DNSSEC.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ include_toc: true
**Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard**<br>
*Debian Live Build Generator for hardened live environment and CISS Debian Installer*<br>
**Master Version**: 9.14<br>
**Build**: V9.14.022.2026.06.10<br>
**Build**: V9.14.024.2026.06.11<br>
# 2. DNSSEC Status
docs/AUDIT_HAVEGED.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ include_toc: true
**Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard**<br>
*Debian Live Build Generator for hardened live environment and CISS Debian Installer*<br>
**Master Version**: 9.14<br>
**Build**: V9.14.022.2026.06.10<br>
**Build**: V9.14.024.2026.06.11<br>
# 2. Haveged Audit on Netcup RS 2000 G11
docs/AUDIT_LYNIS.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ include_toc: true
**Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard**<br>
*Debian Live Build Generator for hardened live environment and CISS Debian Installer*<br>
**Master Version**: 9.14<br>
**Build**: V9.14.022.2026.06.10<br>
**Build**: V9.14.024.2026.06.11<br>
# 2. Lynis Audit:
docs/AUDIT_SSH.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ include_toc: true
**Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard**<br>
*Debian Live Build Generator for hardened live environment and CISS Debian Installer*<br>
**Master Version**: 9.14<br>
**Build**: V9.14.022.2026.06.10<br>
**Build**: V9.14.024.2026.06.11<br>
# 2. SSH Audit by ssh-audit.com
docs/AUDIT_TLS.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ include_toc: true
**Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard**<br>
*Debian Live Build Generator for hardened live environment and CISS Debian Installer*<br>
**Master Version**: 9.14<br>
**Build**: V9.14.022.2026.06.10<br>
**Build**: V9.14.024.2026.06.11<br>
# 2. TLS Audit:
````text
docs/BOOTPARAMS.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ include_toc: true
**Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard**<br>
*Debian Live Build Generator for hardened live environment and CISS Debian Installer*<br>
**Master Version**: 9.14<br>
**Build**: V9.14.022.2026.06.10<br>
**Build**: V9.14.024.2026.06.11<br>
# 2. Hardened Kernel Boot Parameters
docs/CHANGELOG.md
+14 -2
View File
@@ -8,10 +8,22 @@ include_toc: true
**Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard**<br>
*Debian Live Build Generator for hardened live environment and CISS Debian Installer*<br>
**Master Version**: 9.14<br>
**Build**: V9.14.022.2026.06.10<br>
**Build**: V9.14.024.2026.06.11<br>
# 2. Changelog
## V9.14.024.2026.06.11
* **Added**: [lib_build_dir_safety.sh](../lib/lib_build_dir_safety.sh) Integrated Security Audit Finding A12
* **Added**: [lib_debug_sanitize.sh](../lib/lib_debug_sanitize.sh) Integrated Security Audit Finding A11
* **Added**: [lib_secret_validation.sh](../lib/lib_secret_validation.sh) Integrated Security Audit Finding A10
* **Changed**: [zzzz_ciss_crypt_squash.hook.binary](../config/hooks/live/zzzz_ciss_crypt_squash.hook.binary) Integrated Security Audit Finding A01 + A10
* **Changed**: [0030-ciss-verify-checksums](../config/includes.chroot/usr/lib/live/boot/0030-ciss-verify-checksums) Integrated Security Audit Finding A02
* **Changed**: [0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest](../config/includes.chroot/usr/lib/live/boot/0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest) Integrated Security Audit Finding A01
* **Changed**: [lib_ciss_upgrades_boot.sh](../lib/lib_ciss_upgrades_boot.sh) Integrated Security Audit Finding A01
* **Changed**: [lib_lb_config_start.sh](../lib/lib_lb_config_start.sh) Integrated Security Audit Finding A12
* **Changed**: [README.md](../README.md) Integrated Security Audit Finding A01 + A02
* **Changed**: [lib_usage.sh](../lib/lib_usage.sh) Integrated Security Audit Finding A10
## V9.14.022.2026.06.10
* **Added**: [lib_logo.sh](../lib/lib_logo.sh)
* **Added**: [9999_cdi_starter.sh](../scripts/usr/local/sbin/9999_cdi_starter.sh) Retrieve rdns for Primordial-Workflow™
@@ -196,7 +208,7 @@ include_toc: true
* **Added**: [lib_ciss_upgrades_build.sh](../lib/lib_ciss_upgrades_build.sh) Updates for CISS and PhysNet Primordial-Workflow™.
* **Added**: [lib_gnupg.sh](../lib/lib_gnupg.sh) Updates for CISS and PhysNet Primordial-Workflow™.
* **Added**: [lib_primordial.sh](../lib/lib_primordial.sh) Updates for CISS and PhysNet Primordial-Workflow™.
* **Added**: [0030-ciss-verify-checksums](../scripts/usr/lib/live/boot/0030-ciss-verify-checksums) Unified handling via includes.chroot.
* **Added**: [0030-ciss-verify-checksums](../.archive/0030-ciss-verify-checksums) Unified handling via includes.chroot.
* **Bugfixes**: [linter_char_scripts.yaml](../.gitea/workflows/linter_char_scripts.yaml) - WORKFLOW_ID="${GITHUB_WORKFLOW:-linter_char_scripts.yaml}"
* **Bugfixes**: [render-dnssec-status.yaml](../.gitea/workflows/render-dnssec-status.yaml) - WORKFLOW_ID="${GITHUB_WORKFLOW:-render-dnssec-status.yaml}"
* **Bugfixes**: [render-dot-to-png.yaml](../.gitea/workflows/render-dot-to-png.yaml) - WORKFLOW_ID="${GITHUB_WORKFLOW:-render-dot-to-png.yaml}"
docs/CNET.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ include_toc: true
**Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard**<br>
*Debian Live Build Generator for hardened live environment and CISS Debian Installer*<br>
**Master Version**: 9.14<br>
**Build**: V9.14.022.2026.06.10<br>
**Build**: V9.14.024.2026.06.11<br>
# 2. Centurion Net - Developer Branch Overview
docs/CODING_CONVENTION.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ include_toc: true
**Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard**<br>
*Debian Live Build Generator for hardened live environment and CISS Debian Installer*<br>
**Master Version**: 9.14<br>
**Build**: V9.14.022.2026.06.10<br>
**Build**: V9.14.024.2026.06.11<br>
# 2. Purpose
docs/CONTRIBUTING.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ include_toc: true
**Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard**<br>
*Debian Live Build Generator for hardened live environment and CISS Debian Installer*<br>
**Master Version**: 9.14<br>
**Build**: V9.14.022.2026.06.10<br>
**Build**: V9.14.024.2026.06.11<br>
# 2. Contributing / participating
docs/CREDITS.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ include_toc: true
**Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard**<br>
*Debian Live Build Generator for hardened live environment and CISS Debian Installer*<br>
**Master Version**: 9.14<br>
**Build**: V9.14.022.2026.06.10<br>
**Build**: V9.14.024.2026.06.11<br>
# 2. Credits
docs/DL_PUB_ISO.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ include_toc: true
**Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard**<br>
*Debian Live Build Generator for hardened live environment and CISS Debian Installer*<br>
**Master Version**: 9.14<br>
**Build**: V9.14.022.2026.06.10<br>
**Build**: V9.14.024.2026.06.11<br>
# 2. Download the latest PUBLIC CISS.debian.live.ISO
docs/DOCUMENTATION.md
+11 -7
View File
@@ -8,14 +8,14 @@ include_toc: true
**Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard**<br>
*Debian Live Build Generator for hardened live environment and CISS Debian Installer*<br>
**Master Version**: 9.14<br>
**Build**: V9.14.022.2026.06.10<br>
**Build**: V9.14.024.2026.06.11<br>
# 2.1. Usage
````text
CDLB(1) CISS.debian.live.builder CDLB(1)
CISS.debian.live.builder from https://git.coresecret.dev/msw
Master V9.14.022.2026.06.10
Master V9.14.024.2026.06.11
A lightweight Shell Wrapper for building a hardened Debian Live ISO Image.
(c) Marc S. Weidner, 2018 - 2026
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ A lightweight Shell Wrapper for building a hardened Debian Live ISO Image.
--build-directory </path/to/build_directory>
Where the Debian Live Build Image should be generated. RECOMMENDED path: </opt/cdlb>
Cleanup is destructive inside the exact builder-owned path and requires '.ciss-live-builder-owned'.
MUST be provided.
--change-splash <STRING> one of <club | hexagon>
@@ -57,6 +58,7 @@ A lightweight Shell Wrapper for building a hardened Debian Live ISO Image.
--debug, -d
Enables debug logging for the main program routine. Detailed logging information are written to:
</tmp/ciss_live_builder_1801049.log>
After xtrace is stopped and its debug FD is closed, a final exact-value redaction pass sanitizes logs.
--dhcp-centurion
If a DHCP lease is provided, the provider's name server will be overridden and the hardened, privacy-focused
@@ -86,12 +88,12 @@ A lightweight Shell Wrapper for building a hardened Debian Live ISO Image.
--key_age=*
The SOPS AGE private keyring for decryption operations. Change '*' to your desired SOPS AGE key file.
File MUST be placed in:
This MUST be a filename only and MUST be placed in the root-owned tmpfs secret root:
</dev/shm/cdlb_secrets>
--key_luks=*
The LUKS encryption / decryption passphrase for '/'-fs-encryption. Change '*' to your desired passphrase file.
File MUST be placed in:
This MUST be a filename only and MUST be placed in the root-owned tmpfs secret root:
</dev/shm/cdlb_secrets>
--log-statistics-only
@@ -140,7 +142,8 @@ A lightweight Shell Wrapper for building a hardened Debian Live ISO Image.
--root-password-file </dev/shm/cdlb_secrets/password.txt>>
Password file for 'root', if given, MUST be a string of 42 to 64 characters.
If the argument is omitted, no further login authentication is required for the local console.
MUST be placed in:
The path MUST be absolute, regular, non-symlink, root-owned, and mode 0400 after normalization.
RECOMMENDED path:
</dev/shm/cdlb_secrets/password.txt>
--secure-boot-profile <STRING> one of <debian-shim | ciss-uki>
@@ -156,7 +159,7 @@ A lightweight Shell Wrapper for building a hardened Debian Live ISO Image.
specified via '--signing_key=*'. If the keyring is protected, then provide the passphrase in its own file.
Specify the fingerprint of the key to use via '--signing_key_fpr=*'.
Optionally import an offline GPG CA signing public key via: '--signing_ca=*'.
Change '*' to your desired files / fingerprint. Files MUST be placed in:
Change '*' to your desired filename-only files / fingerprint. Files MUST be placed in:
</dev/shm/cdlb_secrets>
--sshfp
@@ -171,6 +174,7 @@ A lightweight Shell Wrapper for building a hardened Debian Live ISO Image.
--ssh-pubkey </dev/shm/cdlb_secrets/>
Imports the SSH Public Key from the file 'authorized_keys' into the Live ISO.
Directory MUST be absolute, regular, non-symlink, root-owned, and not group/world-writable.
Key file MUST be placed in:
</dev/shm/cdlb_secrets/authorized_keys>
@@ -186,7 +190,7 @@ A lightweight Shell Wrapper for building a hardened Debian Live ISO Image.
💷 Please consider donating to my work at:
🌐 https://coresecret.eu/spenden/
V9.14.022.2026.06.10 2026-05-17 CDLB(1)
V9.14.024.2026.06.11 2026-05-17 CDLB(1)
````
# 3. Booting
docs/MAN_CISS_ISO_BOOT_CHAIN.md
+18 -14
View File
@@ -8,13 +8,13 @@ include_toc: true
**Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard**<br>
*Debian Live Build Generator for hardened live environment and CISS Debian Installer*<br>
**Master Version**: 9.14<br>
**Build**: V9.14.022.2026.06.10<br>
**Build**: V9.14.024.2026.06.11<br>
# 2. CISS.debian.live.builder – Boot & Trust Chain (Technical Documentation)
**Status:** 2025-11-12<br>
**Status:** 2026-06-10<br>
**Audience:** CICA CISO, CISS staff, technically proficient administrators<br>
**Summary:** The **CISS.debian.live.builder** Live-ISO establishes a two-stage verification chain around the live root: an early ISO-edge check (signature and FPR pin) *before* LUKS unlock, and a late root-FS attestation *after* unlock, reinforced by `dm-crypt (AES-XTS)` and `dm-integrity (HMAC-SHA-512)`. UEFI Secure Boot can use either the default Microsoft/Debian shim chain, or a CISS-signed UKI chain for systems that trust the CISS Secure Boot key material.<br>
**Summary:** The **CISS.debian.live.builder** Live-ISO establishes a two-stage verification chain around the live root: an early ISO-edge check (signature and FPR pin) *before* LUKS unlock, and a late root-FS attestation *after* unlock that verifies the exact final SquashFS payload bytes copied into the decrypted LUKS mapper, reinforced by `dm-crypt (AES-XTS)` and `dm-integrity (HMAC-SHA-512)`. UEFI Secure Boot can use either the default Microsoft/Debian shim chain, or a CISS-signed UKI chain for systems that trust the CISS Secure Boot key material.<br>
# 3. Overview
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ include_toc: true
* **Integrity & authenticity verification:**
1. **Early:** Verify `sha512sum.txt` at the ISO edge using `gpgv` and FPR pin.
2. **Late:** Verify an attestation hash list inside the decrypted root FS using `gpgv` and FPR pin.
2. **Late:** Verify the external rootfs attestation manifest using `gpgv` and FPR pin, then verify the exact SquashFS payload bytes from the decrypted mapper with `sha512sum -c`.
* **Storage-level AEAD (functional):** `dm-crypt` (AES-XTS-512) and `dm-integrity` (HMAC-SHA-512, 4 KiB).
* **Remotely unlock:** CISS hardened and build dropbear, modern primitives only, no passwords, no agent/forwarding.
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ flowchart TD
LUKS e14@--> ROOT["Assemble RootFS OverlayFS"];
ROOT e15@--> 0126["Executing 0026-ciss: Hardening early sysctls"];
0126 e16@--> 0130["Executing 0030-ciss: Verification of authenticity and integrity via embedded and pinned GPG of ISO edge"];
0130 e17@--> |SUCCESSFUL| 0142["Executing 0042-ciss: Attestation of RootFS"];
0130 e17@--> |SUCCESSFUL| 0142["Executing 0042-ciss: Attestation of RootFS SquashFS payload"];
0142 e18@--> 0145["init-bottom: stop CISS.hardened dropbear, tear down initramfs net"];
0145 e19@--> 9050["Switching root (run-init / pivot_root)"];
9050 e20@--> 9010["Starting /sbin/init -> systemd"];
@@ -185,30 +185,34 @@ cryptsetup luksFormat \
**Core call (initramfs):**
```sh
/usr/bin/gpgv --no-default-keyring --keyring "$KEYFILE" --status-fd 1 --verify sha512sum.txt.sig sha512sum.txt
/usr/bin/gpgv --keyring "$KEYFILE" --status-fd 1 sha512sum.txt.sig sha512sum.txt
# parse [GNUPG:] VALIDSIG ... <FPR> ...
```
# 9. Late Root-FS Attestation and dmsetup Health (CISS hook 0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest, called by 9990-overlay.sh)
**Goal:** After LUKS unlock, validate the **decrypted** contents and the **actual** mapping topology.
**Goal:** After LUKS unlocked, validate the **decrypted** rootfs payload selected at build time and the **actual** mapping topology.
* **Attestation files:** `/root/.ciss/attestation/<FPR>.sha512sum.txt[.sig]`
* **Attested boundary:** the final `binary/live/filesystem.squashfs` byte stream, immediately before it is copied into `/dev/mapper/crypt_liveiso` by `zzzz_ciss_crypt_squash.hook.binary`.
* **Runtime verification boundary:** the first `rootfs-size-bytes` bytes read from the decrypted mapper. Any LUKS allocation slack after the SquashFS payload is intentionally excluded.
* **Attestation files:** `/run/live/medium/live/ciss_rootfs.sha512sum.txt[.sig]`
* **Key source:** `/etc/ciss/keys/*.gpg` (accepted only if FPR == build-pin)
**Core calls (initramfs):**
```sh
# 1) Signature and FPR pin (no agent)
/usr/bin/gpgv --no-default-keyring --keyring "$KEYFILE" --status-fd 1 --verify "$SIG" "$DATA"
/usr/bin/gpgv --keyring "${KEYFILE}" --status-fd 1 "${SIG}" "${DATA}"
# 2) Optional: Content hash verification
( cd "$ROOTMP" && /usr/bin/sha512sum -c --strict --quiet "$DATA" )
# 2) Mandatory content hash verification
dd if="${CDLB_MAPPER_DEV}" ... | /usr/bin/sha512sum -c /run/ciss-rootfs-attestation.sha512sum
```
# 10. Failure Policy (fail-closed, deterministic)
* **Abort** on: missing `VALIDSIG`, FPR mismatch, missing key / signature.
* **Abort** on: missing checksum manifest, unsupported checksum manifest/tool state, failed checksum, empty checksum manifest, missing `VALIDSIG`, FPR mismatch, missing key/signature, malformed rootfs attestation manifest, or rootfs payload hash mismatch.
* A signed rootfs manifest alone is not sufficient. Boot continues only after the manifest signature/FPR, and the decrypted SquashFS payload bytes both verify successfully.
* `dm-integrity` protects the opened LUKS mapping against sector corruption or tampering under the LUKS key, but it is not treated as origin authenticity. Origin authenticity is provided by the signed rootfs attestation manifest and pinned signer fingerprint.
# 11. CISS hardened and built dropbear
@@ -261,8 +265,8 @@ flowchart TD
E e04@--> F["Mounting RootFS"];
F e05@--> G["0030 verification of authenticity and integrity via embedded and pinned GPG of ISO edge"];
G e06@-->|SUCCESSFUL| H["ISO edge verified"];
H e07@--> I["0042 post-decrypt-attestation of RootFS"];
I e08@-->|SUCCESSFUL| J["RootFS attestation successful"];
H e07@--> I["0042 post-decrypt-attestation of RootFS SquashFS payload"];
I e08@-->|SUCCESSFUL| J["RootFS SquashFS payload attestation successful"];
e02@{ animation: fast }
e03@{ animation: fast }
e04@{ animation: fast }
docs/MAN_SSH_Host_Key_Policy.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ include_toc: true
**Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard**<br>
*Debian Live Build Generator for hardened live environment and CISS Debian Installer*<br>
**Master Version**: 9.14<br>
**Build**: V9.14.022.2026.06.10<br>
**Build**: V9.14.024.2026.06.11<br>
# 2. SSH Host Key Policy – CISS.debian.live.builder / CISS.debian.installer
docs/REFERENCES.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ include_toc: true
**Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard**<br>
*Debian Live Build Generator for hardened live environment and CISS Debian Installer*<br>
**Master Version**: 9.14<br>
**Build**: V9.14.022.2026.06.10<br>
**Build**: V9.14.024.2026.06.11<br>
# 2. Resources
docs/documentation/30-ciss-hardening.conf.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ include_toc: true
**Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard**<br>
*Debian Live Build Generator for hardened live environment and CISS Debian Installer*<br>
**Master Version**: 9.14<br>
**Build**: V9.14.022.2026.06.10<br>
**Build**: V9.14.024.2026.06.11<br>
# 2. ``30-ciss-hardening.conf``
docs/documentation/90-ciss-local.hardened.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ include_toc: true
**Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard**<br>
*Debian Live Build Generator for hardened live environment and CISS Debian Installer*<br>
**Master Version**: 9.14<br>
**Build**: V9.14.022.2026.06.10<br>
**Build**: V9.14.024.2026.06.11<br>
# 2. ``90-ciss-local.hardened``
docs/documentation/ciss_live_builder.sh.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ include_toc: true
**Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency Information Security Standard**<br>
*Debian Live Build Generator for hardened live environment and CISS Debian Installer*<br>
**Master Version**: 9.14<br>
**Build**: V9.14.022.2026.06.10<br>
**Build**: V9.14.024.2026.06.11<br>
# 2. ``ciss_live_builder.sh``
lib/lib_arg_parser.sh
+59 -15
View File
@@ -76,7 +76,6 @@ guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SRCE}"
# ERR__SSH__PORT: on failure
#######################################
arg_parser() {
declare primordial_key_regex='^[A-Za-z0-9._@%+=:,~-]+$'
declare primordial_url_regex='^https://[A-Za-z0-9.-]+/[A-Za-z0-9._~/%+=:@,-]+\.git$'
while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
@@ -109,6 +108,16 @@ arg_parser() {
shift 1
;;
-l | --logo)
if [[ -n "${2-}" && "${2}" != -* ]]; then
if ! ${VAR_HANDLER_AUTOBUILD}; then boot_screen_cleaner; fi
printf "\e[91m❌ Error: --logo MUST NOT be followed by an argument.\e[0m\n" >&2
read -p -r $'\e[92m✅ Press \'ENTER\' to exit the script ... \e[0m'
exit "${ERR_ARG_MSMTCH}"
fi
shift 1
;;
-v | --version)
if [[ -n "${2-}" && "${2}" != -* ]]; then
if ! ${VAR_HANDLER_AUTOBUILD}; then boot_screen_cleaner; fi
@@ -134,10 +143,9 @@ arg_parser() {
;;
--build-directory)
declare -gx VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR="${2}"
if [[ ! "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}" =~ ^/ ]]; then
declare -gx VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR="${2-}"
if ! validate_build_dir_argument "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}"; then
if ! ${VAR_HANDLER_AUTOBUILD}; then boot_screen_cleaner; fi
printf "\e[91m❌ Error: --build-directory MUST be an absolute path. Got: '%s'\n" "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}" >&2
exit "${ERR_NOTABSPATH}"
fi
declare -gx VAR_BUILD_LOG="${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}/cdlb_${VAR_ISO8601}_build.log"
@@ -266,18 +274,28 @@ arg_parser() {
;;
--key_age=*)
declare key_age="${1#*=}"
if ! validate_secret_filename "--key_age" "${key_age}"; then
if ! ${VAR_HANDLER_AUTOBUILD}; then boot_screen_cleaner; fi
exit "${ERR_ARG_MSMTCH}"
fi
# shellcheck disable=SC2034
declare -gx VAR_AGE="true"
# shellcheck disable=SC2034
declare -gx VAR_AGE_KEY="${1#*=}"
declare -gx VAR_AGE_KEY="${key_age}"
shift 1
;;
--key_luks=*)
declare key_luks="${1#*=}"
if ! validate_secret_filename "--key_luks" "${key_luks}"; then
if ! ${VAR_HANDLER_AUTOBUILD}; then boot_screen_cleaner; fi
exit "${ERR_ARG_MSMTCH}"
fi
# shellcheck disable=SC2034
declare -gx VAR_LUKS="true"
# shellcheck disable=SC2034
declare -gx VAR_LUKS_KEY="${1#*=}"
declare -gx VAR_LUKS_KEY="${key_luks}"
shift 1
;;
@@ -296,7 +314,7 @@ arg_parser() {
--primordial-key)
declare primordial_key="${2-}"
if [[ -n "${primordial_key}" && "${primordial_key}" != -* && "${primordial_key}" != "." && "${primordial_key}" != ".." && "${primordial_key}" != */* && "${primordial_key}" =~ ${primordial_key_regex} ]]; then
if validate_secret_filename "--primordial-key" "${primordial_key}"; then
# shellcheck disable=SC2034
declare -gx VAR_PRIMORDIAL_KEY="${primordial_key}"
@@ -315,7 +333,7 @@ arg_parser() {
--primordial-key=*)
declare primordial_key="${1#*=}"
if [[ -n "${primordial_key}" && "${primordial_key}" != "." && "${primordial_key}" != ".." && "${primordial_key}" != */* && "${primordial_key}" =~ ${primordial_key_regex} ]]; then
if validate_secret_filename "--primordial-key" "${primordial_key}"; then
# shellcheck disable=SC2034
declare -gx VAR_PRIMORDIAL_KEY="${primordial_key}"
@@ -461,7 +479,7 @@ arg_parser() {
;;
--root-password-file)
declare pw_file="${2}"
declare pw_file="${2-}"
if [[ -z "${pw_file}" ]]; then
@@ -473,10 +491,9 @@ arg_parser() {
fi
if [[ ! -f "${pw_file}" ]]; then
if ! validate_secret_absolute_file_basics "--root-password-file" "${pw_file}"; then
if ! ${VAR_HANDLER_AUTOBUILD}; then boot_screen_cleaner; fi
printf "\e[91m❌ Error: --root-password-file password file '%s' does not exist.\e[0m\n" "${pw_file}" >&2
# shellcheck disable=SC2162
read -p $'\e[92m✅ Press \'ENTER\' to exit the script ... \e[0m'
exit "${ERR_MISS_PWD_F}"
@@ -507,6 +524,13 @@ arg_parser() {
}
fi
validate_secret_file_path "--root-password-file" "${pw_file}" || {
if ! ${VAR_HANDLER_AUTOBUILD}; then boot_screen_cleaner; fi
# shellcheck disable=SC2162
read -p $'\e[92m✅ Press \'ENTER\' to exit the script ... \e[0m'
exit "${ERR_RGHT_PWD_F}"
}
declare plaintext_pw
### No tracing for security reasons ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[ "${VAR_EARLY_DEBUG}" == "true" ]] && set +x
@@ -606,16 +630,26 @@ arg_parser() {
;;
--signing_ca=*)
declare signing_ca="${1#*=}"
if ! validate_secret_filename "--signing_ca" "${signing_ca}"; then
if ! ${VAR_HANDLER_AUTOBUILD}; then boot_screen_cleaner; fi
exit "${ERR_ARG_MSMTCH}"
fi
# shellcheck disable=SC2034
declare -gx VAR_SIGNING_CA="${1#*=}"
declare -gx VAR_SIGNING_CA="${signing_ca}"
shift 1
;;
--signing_key=*)
declare signing_key="${1#*=}"
if ! validate_secret_filename "--signing_key" "${signing_key}"; then
if ! ${VAR_HANDLER_AUTOBUILD}; then boot_screen_cleaner; fi
exit "${ERR_ARG_MSMTCH}"
fi
# shellcheck disable=SC2034
declare -gx VAR_SIGNER="true"
# shellcheck disable=SC2034
declare -gx VAR_SIGNING_KEY="${1#*=}"
declare -gx VAR_SIGNING_KEY="${signing_key}"
shift 1
;;
@@ -626,8 +660,13 @@ arg_parser() {
;;
--signing_key_pass=*)
declare signing_key_pass="${1#*=}"
if ! validate_secret_filename "--signing_key_pass" "${signing_key_pass}"; then
if ! ${VAR_HANDLER_AUTOBUILD}; then boot_screen_cleaner; fi
exit "${ERR_ARG_MSMTCH}"
fi
# shellcheck disable=SC2034
declare -gx VAR_SIGNING_KEY_PASS="${1#*=}"
declare -gx VAR_SIGNING_KEY_PASS="${signing_key_pass}"
shift 1
;;
@@ -694,8 +733,13 @@ arg_parser() {
;;
--ssh-pubkey)
declare ssh_pubkey="${2-}"
if ! validate_ssh_pubkey_directory "${ssh_pubkey}"; then
if ! ${VAR_HANDLER_AUTOBUILD}; then boot_screen_cleaner; fi
exit "${ERR_ARG_MSMTCH}"
fi
# shellcheck disable=SC2034
declare -gx VAR_SSHPUBKEY="${2}"
declare -gx VAR_SSHPUBKEY="${ssh_pubkey}"
shift 2
;;
lib/lib_check_secrets.sh
+6 -2
View File
@@ -33,12 +33,16 @@ x_remove() {
shopt -s nullglob dotglob
### Collect exact currently available secret values before removing their source files.
### Log rewriting is intentionally deferred to the final trap after xtrace has been stopped.
collect_debug_secret_values || true
if [[ "${VAR_SIGNER}" == "true" ]]; then
# shellcheck disable=SC2312
find "${VAR_TMP_SECRET}" -xdev -type f \
! -path "${VAR_TMP_SECRET}/signing_key_pass.txt" \
! -path "${VAR_TMP_SECRET}/luks.txt" \
! -path "${VAR_TMP_SECRET}/${VAR_SIGNING_KEY_PASS:-signing_key_pass.txt}" \
! -path "${VAR_TMP_SECRET}/${VAR_LUKS_KEY:-luks.txt}" \
-print0 \
| xargs -0 --no-run-if-empty shred -fzu -n 5 --
lib/lib_ciss_upgrades_boot.sh
+3 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
#!/bin/bash
# shellcheck disable=SC2154
# SPDX-Version: 3.0
# SPDX-CreationInfo: 2025-11-12; WEIDNER, Marc S.; <msw@coresecret.dev>
# SPDX-ExternalRef: GIT https://git.coresecret.dev/msw/CISS.debian.live.builder.git
@@ -14,9 +15,10 @@ guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SRCE}"
#######################################
# Integrates and generates sha512sum and GPG signatures on CISS specific LIVE boot artifacts:
# - /root/.ciss/attestation/VAR_SIGNING_KEY_FPR.*
# - /root/.ciss/attestation/VAR_SIGNING_KEY_FPR.* legacy-signed public-key copy, not rootfs content attestation
# - /etc/initramfs-tools/files/unlock_wrapper.sh
# - /usr/lib/live/boot/0030-ciss-verify-checksums
# Rootfs content attestation for the final SquashFS payload is generated by zzzz_ciss_crypt_squash.hook.binary.
# Globals:
# BASH_SOURCE
# VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR
lib/lib_clean_up.sh
+30 -15
View File
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ guard_sourcing || return "${ERR_GUARD_SRCE}"
#######################################
clean_up() {
declare clean_exit_code="$1" fs_type="" _old_nullglob="" _old_dotglob="" _old_failglob=""
declare build_dir_valid="false" includes_chroot=""
### Enable nullglob/dotglob, disable failglob for safe globbing.
_old_nullglob="$(shopt -p nullglob || true)"
@@ -52,10 +53,10 @@ clean_up() {
rm -f -- "${VAR_NOTES}"
### Release advisory lock on FD 127.
flock -u 127
flock -u 127 2>/dev/null || true
### Close file descriptor 127.
exec 127>&-
exec 127>&- 2>/dev/null || true
### Remove the lockfile artifact.
rm -f /run/lock/ciss_live_builder.lock
@@ -100,32 +101,46 @@ clean_up() {
### No tracing for security reasons ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[ "${VAR_EARLY_DEBUG}" == "true" ]] && set +x
### Removes secrets securely.
# shellcheck disable=SC2312
find "${VAR_TMP_SECRET}" -xdev -type f -print0 | xargs -0 --no-run-if-empty shred -fzu -n 5 --
find "${VAR_TMP_SECRET}" -xdev -depth -type d -empty -delete
### Stop xtrace before destructive cleanup and collect still-available exact secret values.
### The final log rewrite runs later from the trap after no further debug/error log writes are expected.
finalize_debug_xtrace_logging || true
collect_debug_secret_values || true
### Securely shred all regular files below ./includes.chroot, then remove empty dirs.
if [[ -d "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}/config/includes.chroot" ]]; then
### Removes secrets securely.
if [[ -n "${VAR_TMP_SECRET:-}" && -d "${VAR_TMP_SECRET}" && ! -L "${VAR_TMP_SECRET}" ]]; then
# shellcheck disable=SC2312
find "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}/config/includes.chroot" -xdev -type f -print0 | xargs -0 --no-run-if-empty shred -fzu -n 5 --
find "${VAR_TMP_SECRET}" -xdev -type f -print0 | xargs -0 --no-run-if-empty shred -fzu -n 5 -- || true
find "${VAR_TMP_SECRET}" -xdev -depth -type d -empty -delete || true
fi
if [[ -n "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR:-}" && -d "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}" ]]; then
if require_builder_owned_build_dir "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}"; then
build_dir_valid="true"
fi
fi
### Securely shred all regular files below ./includes.chroot, then remove empty dirs.
includes_chroot="${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR:-}/config/includes.chroot"
if [[ "${build_dir_valid}" == "true" && -d "${includes_chroot}" ]] \
&& require_builder_owned_subpath "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}" "${includes_chroot}"; then
# shellcheck disable=SC2312
find "${includes_chroot}" -xdev -type f -print0 | xargs -0 --no-run-if-empty shred -fzu -n 5 -- || true
### Remove empty directories (bottom-up).
find "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}/config/includes.chroot" -depth -xdev -type d -empty -delete
find "${includes_chroot}" -depth -xdev -type d -empty -delete || true
fi
### Delete all files and directories below ./chroot.
if [[ -d "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}/chroot" ]]; then
if [[ "${build_dir_valid}" == "true" && -d "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}/chroot" ]]; then
rm -rf "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}/chroot"
safe_remove_builder_subpath "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}" "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}/chroot" || true
fi
### Turn on tracing again ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[ "${VAR_EARLY_DEBUG}" == "true" ]] && set -x
eval "${_old_nullglob}" 2>/dev/null || true
eval "${_old_dotglob}" 2>/dev/null || true
eval "${_old_failglob}" 2>/dev/null || true
lib/lib_gnupg.sh
+7 -1
View File
@@ -72,9 +72,15 @@ EOF
fi
### Use pubring as verification keyring reference.
### Use pubring as a verification keyring reference.
declare -grx VAR_VERIFY_KEYRING="${GNUPGHOME}/pubring.kbx"
validate_secret_file_in_root "--signing_key" "${VAR_SIGNING_KEY}" || return "${?}"
validate_secret_file_in_root "--signing_key_pass" "${VAR_SIGNING_KEY_PASS}" || return "${?}"
if [[ -n "${VAR_SIGNING_CA}" ]]; then
validate_secret_file_in_root "--signing_ca" "${VAR_SIGNING_CA}" || return "${?}"
fi
declare -grx VAR_SIGNING_KEY_PASSFILE="${VAR_TMP_SECRET}/${VAR_SIGNING_KEY_PASS}"
### No tracing for security reasons ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
lib/lib_hardening_ultra.sh
+1
View File
@@ -182,6 +182,7 @@ hardening_ultra() {
printf "\e[95m🧪 Updating SSH Keys, Ports ... \e[0m\n"
### ./config/includes.chroot/root/.ssh ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
validate_ssh_pubkey_directory "${VAR_SSHPUBKEY}" || return "${?}"
install -d -m 0700 "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}/config/includes.chroot/root/.ssh"
install -m 0600 -o root -g root "${VAR_SSHPUBKEY}/authorized_keys" "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}/config/includes.chroot/root/.ssh/"
lib/lib_lb_config_start.sh
+3 -5
View File
@@ -30,12 +30,14 @@ lb_config_start() {
mkdir -p "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}"
# shellcheck disable=SC2164
cd "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}"
ensure_builder_owned_build_dir "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}"
printf "\e[92m✅ '%s' created. \e[0m\n" "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}"
else
# shellcheck disable=SC2164
cd "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}"
ensure_builder_owned_build_dir "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}"
fi
@@ -48,11 +50,7 @@ lb_config_start() {
lb clean --binary --cache --purge --source
if [[ "${PWD}" == "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}" && "${PWD}" != "/" && -n "${PWD}" ]]; then
rm -rf -- ./* ./.??*
fi
safe_clean_build_dir_contents "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}"
printf "\e[92m✅ Deleting former config, binary and cache done.\e[0m\n"
lib/lib_primordial.sh
+14
View File
@@ -84,6 +84,8 @@ init_primordial() {
### Check for SOPS AGE key integration ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
if [[ "${VAR_AGE,,}" == "true" ]]; then
validate_secret_file_in_root "--key_age" "${VAR_AGE_KEY}" || return "$?"
install -d -m 0700 "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}/config/includes.chroot/root/.config/sops/age"
install -m 0400 "${VAR_TMP_SECRET}/${VAR_AGE_KEY}" "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}/config/includes.chroot/root/.config/sops/age/keys.txt"
shred -fzu -n 5 -- "${VAR_TMP_SECRET}/${VAR_AGE_KEY}" 2>/dev/null || rm -f "${VAR_TMP_SECRET}/${VAR_AGE_KEY}"
@@ -93,6 +95,18 @@ init_primordial() {
### Check for SSH CISS and PhysNet Primordial-Workflow™ integration -------------------------------------------------------
if [[ "${VAR_SSHFP,,}" == "true" ]]; then
# shellcheck disable=SC2312
if find "${VAR_TMP_SECRET}" -xdev \( -name 'id*' -o -name 'ssh_host_*' \) -type l -print -quit | grep -q .; then
printf "\e[91m❌ ERROR: SSH identity and host key inputs MUST NOT be symlinks. \e[0m\n" >&2
return "${ERR_INVLD_CHAR}"
fi
# shellcheck disable=SC2312
if find "${VAR_TMP_SECRET}" -xdev \( -name 'id*' -o -name 'ssh_host_*' \) ! -type f -print -quit | grep -q .; then
printf "\e[91m❌ ERROR: SSH identity and host key inputs MUST be regular files. \e[0m\n" >&2
return "${ERR_INVLD_CHAR}"
fi
install -d -m 0700 "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}/config/includes.chroot/root/.ssh"
install -m 0600 "${VAR_TMP_SECRET}/id"* "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}/config/includes.chroot/root/.ssh/"
normalize_ssh_keys_in_dir "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}/config/includes.chroot/root/.ssh"
lib/lib_trap_on_exit.sh
+4
View File
@@ -49,6 +49,8 @@ trap_on_exit() {
print_scr_exit "${errcode}"
sanitize_debug_logs || true
exit "${errcode}"
else
@@ -61,6 +63,8 @@ trap_on_exit() {
print_scr_exit_non_zero "${errcode}" "${errscrt}" "${errline}" "${errfunc}" "${errcmmd}"
sanitize_debug_logs || true
fi
exit "${errcode}"
lib/lib_usage.sh
+10 -6
View File
@@ -39,13 +39,13 @@ usage() {
# shellcheck disable=SC2155
declare var_header=$(center "CDLB(1) CISS.debian.live.builder CDLB(1)" "${var_cols}")
# shellcheck disable=SC2155
declare var_footer=$(center "V9.14.022.2026.06.10 2026-06-10 CDLB(1)" "${var_cols}")
declare var_footer=$(center "${VAR_VERSION} 2026-06-11 CDLB(1)" "${var_cols}")
{
echo -e "\e[1;97m${var_header}\e[0m"
echo
echo -e "\e[92mCISS.debian.live.builder from https://git.coresecret.dev/msw \e[0m"
echo -e "\e[92mMaster V9.14.022.2026.06.10\e[0m"
echo -e "\e[92mMaster ${VAR_VERSION}\e[0m"
echo -e "\e[92mA lightweight Shell Wrapper for building a hardened Debian Live ISO Image.\e[0m"
echo
echo -e "\e[97m(c) Marc S. Weidner, 2018 - 2026 \e[0m"
@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ usage() {
echo
echo -e "\e[97m --build-directory </path/to/build_directory> \e[0m"
echo " Where the Debian Live Build Image should be generated. RECOMMENDED path: </opt/cdlb>"
echo " Cleanup is destructive inside the exact builder-owned path and requires '.ciss-live-builder-owned'."
echo " MUST be provided."
echo
echo -e "\e[97m --change-splash <STRING> one of <club | hexagon> \e[0m"
@@ -87,6 +88,7 @@ usage() {
echo -e "\e[97m --debug, -d \e[0m"
echo " Enables debug logging for the main program routine. Detailed logging information are written to:"
echo " </tmp/ciss_live_builder_$$.log>"
echo " After xtrace is stopped and its debug FD is closed, a final exact-value redaction pass sanitizes logs."
echo
echo -e "\e[97m --dhcp-centurion \e[0m"
echo " If a DHCP lease is provided, the provider's name server will be overridden and the hardened, privacy-focused "
@@ -108,12 +110,12 @@ usage() {
echo
echo -e "\e[97m --key_age=* \e[0m"
echo " The SOPS AGE private keyring for decryption operations. Change '*' to your desired SOPS AGE key file."
echo " File MUST be placed in:"
echo " This MUST be a filename only and MUST be placed in the root-owned tmpfs secret root:"
echo " </dev/shm/cdlb_secrets>"
echo
echo -e "\e[97m --key_luks=* \e[0m"
echo " The LUKS encryption / decryption passphrase for '/'-fs-encryption. Change '*' to your desired passphrase file."
echo " File MUST be placed in:"
echo " This MUST be a filename only and MUST be placed in the root-owned tmpfs secret root:"
echo " </dev/shm/cdlb_secrets>"
echo
echo -e "\e[97m --log-statistics-only \e[0m"
@@ -162,7 +164,8 @@ usage() {
echo -e "\e[97m --root-password-file </dev/shm/cdlb_secrets/password.txt>> \e[0m"
echo " Password file for 'root', if given, MUST be a string of 42 to 64 characters."
echo " If the argument is omitted, no further login authentication is required for the local console."
echo " MUST be placed in:"
echo " The path MUST be absolute, regular, non-symlink, root-owned, and mode 0400 after normalization."
echo " RECOMMENDED path:"
echo " </dev/shm/cdlb_secrets/password.txt>"
echo
echo -e "\e[97m --secure-boot-profile <STRING> one of <debian-shim | ciss-uki> \e[0m"
@@ -178,7 +181,7 @@ usage() {
echo " specified via '--signing_key=*'. If the keyring is protected, then provide the passphrase in its own file."
echo " Specify the fingerprint of the key to use via '--signing_key_fpr=*'."
echo " Optionally import an offline GPG CA signing public key via: '--signing_ca=*'."
echo " Change '*' to your desired files / fingerprint. Files MUST be placed in:"
echo " Change '*' to your desired filename-only files / fingerprint. Files MUST be placed in:"
echo " </dev/shm/cdlb_secrets>"
echo
echo -e "\e[97m --sops-version <STRING> \e[0m"
@@ -201,6 +204,7 @@ usage() {
echo
echo -e "\e[97m --ssh-pubkey </dev/shm/cdlb_secrets/> \e[0m"
echo " Imports the SSH Public Key from the file 'authorized_keys' into the Live ISO."
echo " Directory MUST be absolute, regular, non-symlink, root-owned, and not group/world-writable."
echo " Key file MUST be placed in:"
echo " </dev/shm/cdlb_secrets/authorized_keys>"
echo
scripts/usr/local/sbin/9999_cdi_starter.sh
+2 -2
View File
@@ -601,7 +601,7 @@ main() {
var_log="/root/.ciss/cdi/log/9999-cdi-starter_$(date +"%Y-%m-%d_%H-%M-%S").log"
touch "${var_log}"
printf "CISS.debian.live.builder V9.14.022.2026.06.10 calling CISS.debian.installer ... \n" >> "${var_log}"
printf "CISS.debian.live.builder V9.14.024.2026.06.11 calling CISS.debian.installer ... \n" >> "${var_log}"
### Sleep a moment to settle boot artifacts.
sleep 8
@@ -696,7 +696,7 @@ main() {
### Timeout reached without acceptable semaphore.
logger -t cdi-watcher "No valid semaphore ${VAR_SEMAPHORE} (mode 0600) within ${VAR_TIMEOUT}s; exiting idle."
printf "CISS.debian.live.builder V9.14.022.2026.06.10: No valid semaphore [%s] within [%s]s.\n" "${VAR_SEMAPHORE}" "${VAR_TIMEOUT}" >> "${var_log}"
printf "CISS.debian.live.builder V9.14.024.2026.06.11: No valid semaphore [%s] within [%s]s.\n" "${VAR_SEMAPHORE}" "${VAR_TIMEOUT}" >> "${var_log}"
exit 0
}
var/early.var.sh
+1 -1
View File
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ declare -grx VAR_GIT_HEAD_FULL="$(git rev-parse HEAD)"
declare -grx VAR_HOST="$(uname -n)"
declare -grx VAR_ISO8601="$(date -u -d "@${VAR_DATE_EPOCH}" '+%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ')"
declare -grx VAR_SYSTEM="$(uname -mnosv)"
declare -grx VAR_VERSION="Master V9.14.022.2026.06.10"
declare -grx VAR_VERSION="Master V9.14.024.2026.06.11"
declare -grx VAR_VER_BASH="$(bash --version | head -n1 | awk '{
# Print $4 and $5; include $6 only if it exists
out = $4
var/global.var.sh
+3
View File
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ declare -g VAR_SSHFP="false"
declare -g VAR_SSHPORT=""
declare -g VAR_SSHPUBKEY=""
declare -g VAR_SUITE="trixie"
declare -ga ARY_DEBUG_SECRET_VALUES=()
declare -ga ARY_HANDLER_JUMPHOST_UNIQUE=()
declare -ga ARY_HANDLER_JUMPHOST=()
declare -ga ARY_HANDLER_NETCUP_IPV6=()
@@ -51,10 +52,12 @@ declare -gi VAR_HANDLER_PRIORITY=0
declare -gi VAR_HANDLER_STA=0
declare -gi VAR_REIONICE_CLASS=2
declare -gi VAR_REIONICE_PRIORITY=4
declare -gr CISS_BUILD_DIR_MARKER=".ciss_debian_live_builder_owned"
declare -gr VAR_CHROOT_DIR="chroot"
declare -gr VAR_PACKAGES_FILE="chroot.packages.live"
declare -gx VAR_AGE_KEY=""
declare -gx VAR_AGE="false"
declare -gx VAR_ARG_SANITIZED=""
declare -gx VAR_CDLB_INSIDE_RUNNER="${VAR_CDLB_INSIDE_RUNNER:-false}"
declare -gx VAR_CISS_SECUREBOOT_PROFILE="debian-shim"
declare -gx VAR_LUKS_KEY=""