V8.13.528.2025.12.03

Signed-off-by: Marc S. Weidner <msw@coresecret.dev>
2025-12-03 19:15:00 +01:00
parent c113d985e7
commit 205678c415
7 changed files with 484 additions and 83 deletions
--- a/config/hooks/live/0900_ufw_setup.chroot
+++ b/config/hooks/live/0900_ufw_setup.chroot
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ if [[ ${UFW_OUT_POLICY,,} == "deny"  ]]; then
  ufw allow out  443/tcp comment 'Outgoing HTTPS'
  ufw allow out  465/tcp comment 'Outgoing SMTPS'
  ufw allow out  587/tcp comment 'Outgoing SMTPS'
+  ufw allow out  853/tcp comment 'Outgoing DoT'
  ufw allow out  993/tcp comment 'Outgoing IMAPS'
  ufw allow out 4460/tcp comment 'Outgoing NTS'
  ufw allow out "${SSHPORT}"/tcp comment 'Outgoing SSH (Custom-Port)'
--- a/config/hooks/live/9935_hardening_ssl.chroot
+++ b/config/hooks/live/9935_hardening_ssl.chroot
@@ -0,0 +1,454 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# SPDX-Version: 3.0
+# SPDX-CreationInfo: 2025-12-03; WEIDNER, Marc S.; <msw@coresecret.dev>
+# SPDX-ExternalRef: GIT https://git.coresecret.dev/msw/CISS.debian.live.builder.git
+# SPDX-FileContributor: WEIDNER, Marc S.; Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency
+# SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2024-2025; WEIDNER, Marc S.; <msw@coresecret.dev>
+# SPDX-FileType: SOURCE
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: LicenseRef-CNCL-1.1 OR LicenseRef-CCLA-1.1
+# SPDX-LicenseComment: This file is part of the CISS.debian.installer.secure framework.
+# SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.live.builder
+# SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
+set -Ceuo pipefail
+
+printf "\e[95m++++ ++++ ++++ ++++ ++++ ++++ ++ 🧪 '%s' starting ... \e[0m\n" "${0}"
+
+mkdir -p /root/.ciss/cdlb/backup/etc/ssl
+
+mv /etc/ssl/openssl.cnf /root/.ciss/cdlb/backup/etc/ssl/openssl.cnf.bak
+
+cat << 'EOF' >| /etc/ssl/openssl.cnf
+#
+# OpenSSL example configuration file.
+# See doc/man5/config.pod for more information.
+#
+# This is mostly being used for generation of certificate requests,
+# but may be used for autoloading of providers
+
+# Note that you can include other files from the main configuration
+# file using the .include directive.
+#.include filename
+
+openssl_conf = default_conf
+
+# This definition stops the following lines choking if HOME isn't
+# defined.
+HOME			= .
+
+# Use this to automatically load providers.
+openssl_conf = openssl_init
+
+# Comment out the next line to ignore configuration errors
+config_diagnostics = 1
+
+# Extra OBJECT IDENTIFIER information:
+# oid_file       = $ENV::HOME/.oid
+oid_section = new_oids
+
+# To use this configuration file with the "-extfile" option of the
+# "openssl x509" utility, name here the section containing the
+# X.509v3 extensions to use:
+# extensions		=
+# (Alternatively, use a configuration file that has only
+# X.509v3 extensions in its main [= default] section.)
+
+[ new_oids ]
+# We can add new OIDs in here for use by 'ca,' 'req,' and 'ts.'
+# Add a simple OID like this:
+# testoid1=1.2.3.4
+# Or use config file substitution like this:
+# testoid2=${testoid1}.5.6
+
+# Policies used by the TSA examples.
+tsa_policy1 = 1.2.3.4.1
+tsa_policy2 = 1.2.3.4.5.6
+tsa_policy3 = 1.2.3.4.5.7
+
+# For FIPS
+# Optionally include a file that is generated by the OpenSSL fipsinstall
+# application. This file contains configuration data required by the OpenSSL
+# fips provider. It contains a named section e.g., [fips_sect] which is
+# referenced from the [provider_sect] below.
+# Refer to the OpenSSL security policy for more information.
+# .include fipsmodule.cnf
+
+[openssl_init]
+providers = provider_sect
+
+# List of providers to load
+[provider_sect]
+default = default_sect
+# The fips section name should match the section name inside the
+# included fipsmodule.cnf.
+# fips = fips_sect
+
+# If no providers are activated explicitly, the default one is activated implicitly.
+# See man 7 OSSL_PROVIDER-default for more details.
+#
+# If you add a section explicitly activating any other provider(s), you most
+# probably need to explicitly activate the default provider, otherwise it
+# becomes unavailable in openssl.  As a consequence, applications depending on
+# OpenSSL may not work correctly, which could lead to significant system
+# problems including inability to remotely access the system.
+[default_sect]
+# activate = 1
+
+
+####################################################################
+[ ca ]
+default_ca	= CA_default		# The default ca section
+
+####################################################################
+[ CA_default ]
+
+dir		= ./demoCA		# Where everything is kept
+certs		= $dir/certs		# Where the issued certs are kept
+crl_dir		= $dir/crl		# Where the issued crl are kept
+database	= $dir/index.txt	# database index file.
+#unique_subject	= no			# Set to 'no' to allow creation of several certs with the same subject.
+new_certs_dir	= $dir/newcerts		# default place for new certs.
+
+certificate	= $dir/cacert.pem 	# The CA certificate
+serial		= $dir/serial 		# The current serial number
+crlnumber	= $dir/crlnumber	# the current crl number
+					# must be commented out to leave a V1 CRL
+crl		= $dir/crl.pem 		# The current CRL
+private_key	= $dir/private/cakey.pem # The private key
+
+x509_extensions	= usr_cert		# The extensions to add to the cert
+
+# Comment out the following two lines for the "traditional"
+# (and highly broken) format.
+name_opt 	= ca_default		# Subject Name options
+cert_opt 	= ca_default		# Certificate field options
+
+# Extension copying option: use with caution.
+# copy_extensions = copy
+
+# Extensions to add to a CRL. Note: Netscape communicator chokes on V2 CRLs
+# so this is commented out by default to leave a V1 CRL.
+# crlnumber must also be commented out to leave a V1 CRL.
+# crl_extensions	= crl_ext
+
+default_days	= 365			# how long to certify for
+default_crl_days= 30			# how long before next CRL
+default_md	= default		# use public key default MD
+preserve	= no			# keep passed DN ordering
+
+# A few different ways of specifying how similar the request should look
+# For type CA, the listed attributes must be the same, and the optional
+# and supplied fields are just that.
+policy		= policy_match
+
+# For the CA policy
+[ policy_match ]
+countryName		= match
+stateOrProvinceName	= match
+organizationName	= match
+organizationalUnitName	= optional
+commonName		= supplied
+emailAddress		= optional
+
+# For the 'anything' policy
+# At this point in time, you must list all acceptable 'object'
+# types.
+[ policy_anything ]
+countryName		= optional
+stateOrProvinceName	= optional
+localityName		= optional
+organizationName	= optional
+organizationalUnitName	= optional
+commonName		= supplied
+emailAddress		= optional
+
+####################################################################
+[ req ]
+default_bits		= 4096
+default_keyfile 	= privkey.pem
+distinguished_name	= req_distinguished_name
+attributes		= req_attributes
+x509_extensions	= v3_ca	# The extensions to add to the self-signed cert
+
+# Passwords for private keys if not present, they will be prompted for
+# input_password = secret
+# output_password = secret
+
+# This sets a mask for permitted string types. There are several options.
+# default: PrintableString, T61String, BMPString.
+# pkix	 : PrintableString, BMPString (PKIX recommendation before 2004)
+# utf8only: only UTF8Strings (PKIX recommendation after 2004).
+# nombstr : PrintableString, T61String (no BMPStrings or UTF8Strings).
+# MASK:XXXX a literal mask value.
+# WARNING: ancient versions of Netscape crash on BMPStrings or UTF8Strings.
+string_mask = utf8only
+
+# req_extensions = v3_req # The extensions to add to a certificate request
+
+[ req_distinguished_name ]
+countryName			= Country Name (2-letter code)
+countryName_default		= AU
+countryName_min			= 2
+countryName_max			= 2
+
+stateOrProvinceName		= State or Province Name (full name)
+stateOrProvinceName_default	= Some-State
+
+localityName			= Locality Name (e.g., city)
+
+0.organizationName		= Organization Name (e.g., company)
+0.organizationName_default	= Internet Widgits Pty Ltd
+
+# we can do this, but it is unnecessary normally
+#1.organizationName		= Second Organization Name (e.g., company)
+#1.organizationName_default	= World Wide Web Pty Ltd
+
+organizationalUnitName		= Organizational Unit Name (e.g., section)
+#organizationalUnitName_default	=
+
+commonName			= Common Name (e.g., server FQDN or YOUR name)
+commonName_max			= 64
+
+emailAddress			= Email Address
+emailAddress_max		= 64
+
+# SET-ex3			= SET extension number 3
+
+[ req_attributes ]
+challengePassword		= A challenge password
+challengePassword_min		= 4
+challengePassword_max		= 20
+
+unstructuredName		= An optional company name
+
+[ usr_cert ]
+
+# These extensions are added when 'ca' signs a request.
+
+# This goes against PKIX guidelines, but some CAs do it, and some software
+# requires this to avoid interpreting an end user certificate as a CA.
+
+basicConstraints=CA:FALSE
+
+# This is typical in keyUsage for a client certificate.
+# keyUsage = nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment
+
+# PKIX recommendations harmless if included in all certificates.
+subjectKeyIdentifier=hash
+authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid,issuer
+
+# This stuff is for subjectAltName and issuerAltname.
+# Import the email address.
+# subjectAltName=email:copy
+# An alternative to produce certificates that aren't
+# deprecated, according to PKIX.
+# subjectAltName=email:move
+
+# Copy subject details
+# issuerAltName=issuer:copy
+
+# This is required for TSA certificates.
+# extendedKeyUsage = critical,timeStamping
+
+[ v3_req ]
+
+# Extensions to add to a certificate request
+
+basicConstraints = CA:FALSE
+keyUsage = nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment
+
+[ v3_ca ]
+
+
+# Extensions for a typical CA
+
+
+# PKIX recommendation.
+
+subjectKeyIdentifier=hash
+
+authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid:always,issuer
+
+basicConstraints = critical,CA:true
+
+# Key usage: this is typical for a CA certificate. However, since it will
+# prevent it being used as a test self-signed certificate, it is best
+# left out by default.
+# keyUsage = cRLSign, keyCertSign
+
+# Include email address in subject alt name: another PKIX recommendation
+# subjectAltName=email:copy
+# Copy issuer details
+# issuerAltName=issuer:copy
+
+# DER hex encoding of an extension: beware experts only!
+# obj=DER:02:03
+# Where 'obj' is a standard or added object
+# You can even override a supported extension:
+# basicConstraints= critical, DER:30:03:01:01:FF
+
+[ crl_ext ]
+
+# CRL extensions.
+# Only issuerAltName and authorityKeyIdentifier make any sense in a CRL.
+
+# issuerAltName=issuer:copy
+authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid:always
+
+[ proxy_cert_ext ]
+# These extensions should be added when creating a proxy certificate
+
+# This goes against PKIX guidelines, but some CAs do it, and some software
+# requires this to avoid interpreting an end user certificate as a CA.
+
+basicConstraints=CA:FALSE
+
+# This is typical in keyUsage for a client certificate.
+# keyUsage = nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment
+
+# PKIX recommendations harmless if included in all certificates.
+subjectKeyIdentifier=hash
+authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid,issuer
+
+# This stuff is for subjectAltName and issuerAltname.
+# Import the email address.
+# subjectAltName=email:copy
+# An alternative to produce certificates that aren't
+# deprecated, according to PKIX.
+# subjectAltName=email:move
+
+# Copy subject details
+# issuerAltName=issuer:copy
+
+# This really needs to be in place for it to be a proxy certificate.
+proxyCertInfo=critical,language:id-ppl-anyLanguage,pathlen:3,policy:foo
+
+####################################################################
+[ tsa ]
+
+default_tsa = tsa_config1	# the default TSA section
+
+[ tsa_config1 ]
+
+# These are used by the TSA reply generation only.
+dir		= ./demoCA		# TSA root directory
+serial		= $dir/tsaserial	# The current serial number (mandatory)
+crypto_device	= builtin		# OpenSSL engine to use for signing
+signer_cert	= $dir/tsacert.pem 	# The TSA signing certificate
+					# (optional)
+certs		= $dir/cacert.pem	# Certificate chain to include in reply
+					# (optional)
+signer_key	= $dir/private/tsakey.pem # The TSA private key (optional)
+signer_digest  = sha256			# Signing digest to use. (Optional)
+default_policy	= tsa_policy1		# Policy if request did not specify it
+					# (optional)
+other_policies	= tsa_policy2, tsa_policy3	# acceptable policies (optional)
+digests     = sha1, sha256, sha384, sha512  # Acceptable message digests (mandatory)
+accuracy	= secs:1, millisecs:500, microsecs:100	# (optional)
+clock_precision_digits  = 0	# number of digits after dot. (optional)
+ordering		= yes	# Is ordering defined for timestamps?
+				# (optional, default: no)
+tsa_name		= yes	# Must the TSA name be included in the reply?
+				# (optional, default: no)
+ess_cert_id_chain	= no	# Must the ESS cert id chain be included?
+				# (optional, default: no)
+ess_cert_id_alg		= sha256	# algorithm to compute certificate
+				# identifier (optional, default: sha256)
+
+[insta] # CMP using Insta Demo CA
+# Message transfer
+server = pki.certificate.fi:8700
+# proxy = # set this as far as needed, e.g., http://192.168.1.1:8080
+# tls_use = 0
+path = pkix/
+
+# Server authentication
+recipient = "/C=FI/O=Insta Demo/CN=Insta Demo CA" # or set srvcert or issuer
+ignore_keyusage = 1 # quirk needed to accept Insta CA cert not including digitalsignature
+unprotected_errors = 1 # quirk needed to accept negative responses possibly not protected
+extracertsout = insta.extracerts.pem
+
+# Client authentication
+ref = 3078 # user identification
+secret = pass:insta # can be used for both client and server side
+
+# Generic message options
+cmd = ir # default operation, can be overridden on cmd line with, e.g., kur
+
+# Certificate enrollment
+subject = "/CN=openssl-cmp-test"
+newkey = insta.priv.pem
+out_trusted = apps/insta.ca.crt # does not include keyUsage digitalSignature
+certout = insta.cert.pem
+
+[pbm] # Password-based protection for Insta CA
+# Server and client authentication
+ref = $insta::ref # 3078
+secret = $insta::secret # pass:insta
+
+[signature] # Signature-based protection for Insta CA
+# Server authentication
+trusted = $insta::out_trusted # apps/insta.ca.crt
+
+# Client authentication
+secret = # disable the PBM
+key = $insta::newkey # insta.priv.pem
+cert = $insta::certout # insta.cert.pem
+
+[ir]
+cmd = ir
+
+[cr]
+cmd = cr
+
+[kur]
+# Certificate update
+cmd = kur
+oldcert = $insta::certout # insta.cert.pem
+
+[rr]
+# Certificate revocation
+cmd = rr
+oldcert = $insta::certout # insta.cert.pem
+
+##### Added by CISS.debian.live.builder #####
+[default_conf]
+ssl_conf = ssl_sect
+
+[ssl_sect]
+system_default = system_default_sect
+
+[system_default_sect]
+# Protocol floor / ceiling:
+# - only TLS 1.2 and 1.3.
+# - TLS 1.3 is FS by design;
+# - TLS 1.2 FS enforced via the cipher list.
+MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
+MaxProtocol = TLSv1.3
+
+# TLS 1.2 cipher policy:
+# - Forward secrecy only: ECDHE or DHE (no static RSA kx);
+# - AES-256 *GCM* only (no DHE (dheatattack), no AES-128, no CBC);
+# - Keep distro default SECLEVEL=2 explicitly.
+CipherString = ECDHE+AES256-GCM:ECDHE+CHACHA20:ECDHE+ARIA256-GCM:ECDHE+CAMELLIA256-GCM:!kRSA:!PSK:!SRP:!aNULL:!eNULL:@SECLEVEL=2
+
+# TLS 1.3 cipher policy: AES-256 and ChaCha20-Poly1305 only:
+Ciphersuites = TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
+
+# Prefer strong, widely supported ECDHE groups (first = most preferred):
+Groups = X448:P-521:P-384
+
+SignatureAlgorithms = rsa_pss_rsae_sha512:rsa_pss_rsae_sha384:rsa_pss_rsae_sha256
+
+# Operational flags:
+# -SessionTicket   ⇒ disable TLS session tickets (TLS 1.2 + 1.3)
+# ServerPreference ⇒ honor server cipher order (TLS 1.2)
+# NoRenegotiation  ⇒ disallow TLS 1.2 renegotiation
+Options = -SessionTicket,ServerPreference,NoRenegotiation
+
+# vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=conf
+EOF
+
+printf "\e[92m++++ ++++ ++++ ++++ ++++ ++++ ++ ✅ '%s' applied successfully. \e[0m\n" "${0}"
+
+exit 0
+# vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh
--- a/config/includes.chroot/usr/lib/live/boot/0030-ciss-verify-checksums
+++ b/config/includes.chroot/usr/lib/live/boot/0030-ciss-verify-checksums
@@ -299,16 +299,14 @@ Verify_checksums() {
  case "${_RETURN_PGP},${_RETURN_SHA}" in

    "0,0")
-      log_ok "Verification of [GPG signature] and [sha checksum] file successful; continuing booting in 8 seconds."
-      log_success_msg "Verification of [GPG signature] and [sha checksum] file successful; continuing booting in 8 seconds."
-      sleep 8
+      log_ok "Verification of [GPG signature] and [sha checksum] file successful; continuing booting."
+      log_success_msg "Verification of [GPG signature] and [sha checksum] file successful; continuing booting."
      return 0
      ;;

    "na,0")
-      log_ok "Verification of [sha checksum] file successful; continuing booting in 8 seconds."
-      log_success_msg "Verification of [sha checksum] file successful; continuing booting in 8 seconds."
-      sleep 8
+      log_ok "Verification of [sha checksum] file successful; continuing booting."
+      log_success_msg "Verification of [sha checksum] file successful; continuing booting."
      return 0
      ;;

--- a/config/includes.chroot/usr/lib/live/boot/0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest
+++ b/config/includes.chroot/usr/lib/live/boot/0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest
@@ -17,8 +17,6 @@
 # Purpose: Late rootfs attestation and dmsetup health checking.
 # Phase  : executed by live-boot inside the 9990-main.sh.

-# TODO: Remove Debug Mode
-
 _SAVED_SET_OPTS="$(set +o)"

 set -eu
@@ -72,10 +70,26 @@ HASH_FILE="${CDLB_ATTEST_FPR_SHA}"
 SIGN_FILE="${CDLB_ATTEST_FPR_SIG}"
 KEYFILE="${CDLB_KEY_DIR}/${CDLB_EXP_FPR}.gpg"

-[ -s "${KEYFILE}" ]   || { log_er "0042()              : No public key found under: [${CDLB_KEY_DIR}/${CDLB_EXP_FPR}.gpg]"; exit 42; }
-[ -s "${HASH_FILE}" ] || { log_er "0042()              : Attestation data missing: [${HASH_FILE}]"; exit 42; }
-[ -s "${SIGN_FILE}" ] || { log_er "0042()              : Attestation signature missing: [${SIGN_FILE}]"; exit 42; }
+if [ -s "${KEYFILE}" ]; then

+  log_er "0042()              : No public key found under: [${CDLB_KEY_DIR}/${CDLB_EXP_FPR}.gpg]"
+  panic  "0042()              : No public key found under: [${CDLB_KEY_DIR}/${CDLB_EXP_FPR}.gpg]"
+
+fi
+
+if [ -s "${HASH_FILE}" ]; then
+
+  log_er "0042()              : Attestation data missing: [${HASH_FILE}]"
+  panic  "0042()              : Attestation data missing: [${HASH_FILE}]"
+
+fi
+
+if [ -s "${SIGN_FILE}" ]; then
+
+  log_er "0042()              : Attestation signature missing: [${SIGN_FILE}]"
+  panic  "0042()              : Attestation signature missing: [${SIGN_FILE}]"
+
+fi

 log_in "0042()               : Verifying rootfs attestation with 'gpgv' and inside LUKS encrypted rootfs pinned GPG FPR."
 _STATUS="$(/usr/bin/gpgv --keyring "${KEYFILE}" --status-fd 1 "${SIGN_FILE}" "${HASH_FILE}")"
@@ -89,71 +103,8 @@ if [ "${_CDLB_SIG_FILE_FPR}" = "${CDLB_EXP_FPR}" ]; then
 else

  log_er "0042()              : Signature FPR mismatch: got: [${_CDLB_SIG_FILE_FPR}] expected: [${CDLB_EXP_FPR}]"
-  #sleep 8
-  #panic "[FATAL] Signature FPR mismatch: got: [${_CDLB_SIG_FILE_FPR}] expected: [${CDLB_EXP_FPR}]."
-
-fi
-
-### 'dmsetup' health check -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-MAP_DEV="/dev/mapper/${CDLB_MAPPER_NAME}"
-if [ -b "${MAP_DEV}" ]; then
-
-  log_in "0042()               : Checking dmsetup table for ${MAP_DEV}"
-
-  TOP_LINE="$(/usr/sbin/dmsetup table --showkeys "${MAP_DEV}" 2>/dev/null | awk 'NR==1{print; exit}')"
-  if printf '%s\n' "${TOP_LINE}" | grep -q ' crypt '; then
-
-    log_ok "0042()               : Top layer is 'crypt'."
-
-  else
-
-    log_er "0042()              : Top layer is NOT 'crypt'."
-    #sleep 8
-    #panic "[FATAL] Top layer is NOT 'crypt'."
-
-  fi
-
-  if printf '%s\n' "${TOP_LINE}" | grep -Eq ' xts|aes-xts'; then
-
-    log_ok "0042()               : Cipher looks like AES-XTS."
-
-  else
-
-    log_er "0042()              : Cipher does not look like AES-XTS."
-    #sleep 8
-    #panic "[FATAL] Cipher does not look like AES-XTS."
-
-  fi
-
-  ### Extract child device token (the second last field is 'device', the last is 'offset.') --------------------------------------
-  CHILD_TOK="$(printf '%s\n' "${TOP_LINE}" | awk '{print $(NF-1)}')"
-  CHILD_NAME="${CHILD_TOK}"
-
-  case "${CHILD_TOK}" in
-
-    *:* )
-      if [ -e "/sys/dev/block/${CHILD_TOK}/dm/name" ]; then
-        CHILD_NAME="$(cat "/sys/dev/block/${CHILD_TOK}/dm/name" 2>/dev/null || true)"
-        [ -n "${CHILD_NAME}" ] || CHILD_NAME="${CHILD_TOK}"
-      fi
-      ;;
-
-    /dev/* )
-      CHILD_NAME="$(basename -- "${CHILD_TOK}")"
-      ;;
-
-  esac
-
-  #### Child layer must be 'integrity' with hmac and sha512 and 4096-byte sectors (best-effort greps). ---------------------------
-  log_in "Checking underlying integrity target: ${CHILD_NAME}"
-
-  CHILD_TAB="$(/usr/sbin/dmsetup table --showkeys "${CHILD_NAME}" 2>/dev/null || true)"
-  printf '%s\n' "${CHILD_TAB}" | grep -q ' integrity ' || { log_er "0042()              : Underlying layer is not 'integrity'"; }
-  printf '%s\n' "${CHILD_TAB}" | grep -qi 'hmac'       || { log_er "0042()              : Integrity target not using keyed MAC (hmac)"; }
-  printf '%s\n' "${CHILD_TAB}" | grep -qi 'sha512'     || { log_er "0042()              : Integrity algo not sha512"; }
-  printf '%s\n' "${CHILD_TAB}" | grep -Eq '\b4096\b'   || { log_er "0042()              : Expected 4096-byte sector size not found"; }
-
-  log_ok "0042()               : dm-crypt and dm-integrity(HMAC-SHA512, 4096B) chain looks healthy."
+  sleep 8
+  panic "[FATAL] Signature FPR mismatch: got: [${_CDLB_SIG_FILE_FPR}] expected: [${CDLB_EXP_FPR}]."

 fi

--- a/config/includes.chroot/usr/lib/live/boot/9990-overlay.sh
+++ b/config/includes.chroot/usr/lib/live/boot/9990-overlay.sh
@@ -488,13 +488,10 @@ setup_unionfs ()
    done
  fi

-  # TODO: Remove Debug
  ### CISS override for /usr/lib/live/boot/0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest -------------------------------------------------------
-  printf "\e[92m[INFO] Calling              : [/usr/lib/live/boot/0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest] ... \n\e[0m"
+  printf "\e[95m[INFO] Calling              : [/usr/lib/live/boot/0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest] ... \n\e[0m"
  [ -x /usr/lib/live/boot/0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest ] && /usr/lib/live/boot/0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest
  printf "\e[92m[INFO] Calling              : [/usr/lib/live/boot/0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest] done. \n\e[0m"
-
-  sleep 16
  ### CISS override for /usr/lib/live/boot/0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest -------------------------------------------------------

  printf "\e[92m[INFO] Successfully applied : [/usr/lib/live/boot/9990-overlay.sh] \n\e[0m"
--- a/lib/lib_provider_netcup.sh
+++ b/lib/lib_provider_netcup.sh
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ DNS=138.199.237.109
 DNS=2a01:4f9:c012:a813:135:181:207:105
 DNS=2a0a:4cc0:1:e6:89:58:62:53
 DNS=2a01:4f8:c013:8011:138:199:237:109
-DNSOverTLS=opportunistic
+DNSOverTLS=yes
 DNSSEC=yes
 IPv6AcceptRA=no
 LinkLocalAddressing=ipv6
--- a/scripts/0010_dhcp_supersede.sh
+++ b/scripts/0010_dhcp_supersede.sh
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ fi

 cat << 'EOF' >| "${VAR_HANDLER_BUILD_DIR}"/config/includes.chroot/etc/systemd/network/90-ciss-ethernet.network
 # SPDX-Version: 3.0
-# SPDX-CreationInfo: 2025-11-26; WEIDNER, Marc S.; <msw@coresecret.dev>
+# SPDX-CreationInfo: 2025-12-03; WEIDNER, Marc S.; <msw@coresecret.dev>
 # SPDX-ExternalRef: GIT https://git.coresecret.dev/msw/CISS.debian.live.builder.git
 # SPDX-FileContributor: WEIDNER, Marc S.; Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency
 # SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2024-2025; WEIDNER, Marc S.; <msw@coresecret.dev>
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ DNS=138.199.237.109
 DNS=2a01:4f9:c012:a813:135:181:207:105
 DNS=2a0a:4cc0:1:e6:89:58:62:53
 DNS=2a01:4f8:c013:8011:138:199:237:109
-DNSOverTLS=opportunistic
+DNSOverTLS=yes
 DNSSEC=yes
 IPv6AcceptRA=yes
 LinkLocalAddressing=ipv6