V8.13.528.2025.12.03
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Signed-off-by: Marc S. Weidner <msw@coresecret.dev>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ if [[ ${UFW_OUT_POLICY,,} == "deny" ]]; then
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ufw allow out 443/tcp comment 'Outgoing HTTPS'
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ufw allow out 465/tcp comment 'Outgoing SMTPS'
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ufw allow out 587/tcp comment 'Outgoing SMTPS'
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ufw allow out 853/tcp comment 'Outgoing DoT'
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ufw allow out 993/tcp comment 'Outgoing IMAPS'
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ufw allow out 4460/tcp comment 'Outgoing NTS'
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ufw allow out "${SSHPORT}"/tcp comment 'Outgoing SSH (Custom-Port)'
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454
config/hooks/live/9935_hardening_ssl.chroot
Normal file
454
config/hooks/live/9935_hardening_ssl.chroot
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,454 @@
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#!/bin/bash
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# SPDX-Version: 3.0
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# SPDX-CreationInfo: 2025-12-03; WEIDNER, Marc S.; <msw@coresecret.dev>
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# SPDX-ExternalRef: GIT https://git.coresecret.dev/msw/CISS.debian.live.builder.git
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# SPDX-FileContributor: WEIDNER, Marc S.; Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency
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# SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2024-2025; WEIDNER, Marc S.; <msw@coresecret.dev>
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# SPDX-FileType: SOURCE
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# SPDX-License-Identifier: LicenseRef-CNCL-1.1 OR LicenseRef-CCLA-1.1
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# SPDX-LicenseComment: This file is part of the CISS.debian.installer.secure framework.
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# SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.live.builder
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# SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
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set -Ceuo pipefail
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printf "\e[95m++++ ++++ ++++ ++++ ++++ ++++ ++ 🧪 '%s' starting ... \e[0m\n" "${0}"
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mkdir -p /root/.ciss/cdlb/backup/etc/ssl
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mv /etc/ssl/openssl.cnf /root/.ciss/cdlb/backup/etc/ssl/openssl.cnf.bak
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cat << 'EOF' >| /etc/ssl/openssl.cnf
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#
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# OpenSSL example configuration file.
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# See doc/man5/config.pod for more information.
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#
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# This is mostly being used for generation of certificate requests,
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# but may be used for autoloading of providers
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# Note that you can include other files from the main configuration
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# file using the .include directive.
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#.include filename
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openssl_conf = default_conf
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# This definition stops the following lines choking if HOME isn't
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# defined.
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HOME = .
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# Use this to automatically load providers.
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openssl_conf = openssl_init
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# Comment out the next line to ignore configuration errors
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config_diagnostics = 1
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# Extra OBJECT IDENTIFIER information:
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# oid_file = $ENV::HOME/.oid
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oid_section = new_oids
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# To use this configuration file with the "-extfile" option of the
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# "openssl x509" utility, name here the section containing the
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# X.509v3 extensions to use:
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# extensions =
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# (Alternatively, use a configuration file that has only
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# X.509v3 extensions in its main [= default] section.)
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[ new_oids ]
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# We can add new OIDs in here for use by 'ca,' 'req,' and 'ts.'
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# Add a simple OID like this:
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# testoid1=1.2.3.4
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# Or use config file substitution like this:
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# testoid2=${testoid1}.5.6
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# Policies used by the TSA examples.
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tsa_policy1 = 1.2.3.4.1
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tsa_policy2 = 1.2.3.4.5.6
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tsa_policy3 = 1.2.3.4.5.7
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# For FIPS
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# Optionally include a file that is generated by the OpenSSL fipsinstall
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# application. This file contains configuration data required by the OpenSSL
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# fips provider. It contains a named section e.g., [fips_sect] which is
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# referenced from the [provider_sect] below.
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# Refer to the OpenSSL security policy for more information.
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# .include fipsmodule.cnf
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[openssl_init]
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providers = provider_sect
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# List of providers to load
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[provider_sect]
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default = default_sect
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# The fips section name should match the section name inside the
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# included fipsmodule.cnf.
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# fips = fips_sect
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# If no providers are activated explicitly, the default one is activated implicitly.
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# See man 7 OSSL_PROVIDER-default for more details.
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#
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# If you add a section explicitly activating any other provider(s), you most
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# probably need to explicitly activate the default provider, otherwise it
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# becomes unavailable in openssl. As a consequence, applications depending on
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# OpenSSL may not work correctly, which could lead to significant system
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# problems including inability to remotely access the system.
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[default_sect]
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# activate = 1
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####################################################################
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[ ca ]
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default_ca = CA_default # The default ca section
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####################################################################
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[ CA_default ]
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dir = ./demoCA # Where everything is kept
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certs = $dir/certs # Where the issued certs are kept
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crl_dir = $dir/crl # Where the issued crl are kept
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database = $dir/index.txt # database index file.
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#unique_subject = no # Set to 'no' to allow creation of several certs with the same subject.
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new_certs_dir = $dir/newcerts # default place for new certs.
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certificate = $dir/cacert.pem # The CA certificate
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serial = $dir/serial # The current serial number
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crlnumber = $dir/crlnumber # the current crl number
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# must be commented out to leave a V1 CRL
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crl = $dir/crl.pem # The current CRL
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private_key = $dir/private/cakey.pem # The private key
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x509_extensions = usr_cert # The extensions to add to the cert
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# Comment out the following two lines for the "traditional"
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# (and highly broken) format.
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name_opt = ca_default # Subject Name options
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cert_opt = ca_default # Certificate field options
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# Extension copying option: use with caution.
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# copy_extensions = copy
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# Extensions to add to a CRL. Note: Netscape communicator chokes on V2 CRLs
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# so this is commented out by default to leave a V1 CRL.
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# crlnumber must also be commented out to leave a V1 CRL.
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# crl_extensions = crl_ext
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default_days = 365 # how long to certify for
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default_crl_days= 30 # how long before next CRL
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default_md = default # use public key default MD
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preserve = no # keep passed DN ordering
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# A few different ways of specifying how similar the request should look
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# For type CA, the listed attributes must be the same, and the optional
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# and supplied fields are just that.
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policy = policy_match
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# For the CA policy
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[ policy_match ]
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countryName = match
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stateOrProvinceName = match
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organizationName = match
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organizationalUnitName = optional
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commonName = supplied
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emailAddress = optional
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# For the 'anything' policy
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# At this point in time, you must list all acceptable 'object'
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# types.
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[ policy_anything ]
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countryName = optional
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stateOrProvinceName = optional
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localityName = optional
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organizationName = optional
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organizationalUnitName = optional
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commonName = supplied
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emailAddress = optional
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####################################################################
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[ req ]
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default_bits = 4096
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default_keyfile = privkey.pem
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distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name
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attributes = req_attributes
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x509_extensions = v3_ca # The extensions to add to the self-signed cert
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# Passwords for private keys if not present, they will be prompted for
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# input_password = secret
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# output_password = secret
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# This sets a mask for permitted string types. There are several options.
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# default: PrintableString, T61String, BMPString.
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# pkix : PrintableString, BMPString (PKIX recommendation before 2004)
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# utf8only: only UTF8Strings (PKIX recommendation after 2004).
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# nombstr : PrintableString, T61String (no BMPStrings or UTF8Strings).
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# MASK:XXXX a literal mask value.
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# WARNING: ancient versions of Netscape crash on BMPStrings or UTF8Strings.
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string_mask = utf8only
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# req_extensions = v3_req # The extensions to add to a certificate request
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[ req_distinguished_name ]
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countryName = Country Name (2-letter code)
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countryName_default = AU
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countryName_min = 2
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countryName_max = 2
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stateOrProvinceName = State or Province Name (full name)
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stateOrProvinceName_default = Some-State
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localityName = Locality Name (e.g., city)
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0.organizationName = Organization Name (e.g., company)
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0.organizationName_default = Internet Widgits Pty Ltd
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# we can do this, but it is unnecessary normally
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#1.organizationName = Second Organization Name (e.g., company)
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#1.organizationName_default = World Wide Web Pty Ltd
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organizationalUnitName = Organizational Unit Name (e.g., section)
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#organizationalUnitName_default =
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commonName = Common Name (e.g., server FQDN or YOUR name)
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commonName_max = 64
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emailAddress = Email Address
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emailAddress_max = 64
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# SET-ex3 = SET extension number 3
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[ req_attributes ]
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challengePassword = A challenge password
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challengePassword_min = 4
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challengePassword_max = 20
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unstructuredName = An optional company name
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[ usr_cert ]
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# These extensions are added when 'ca' signs a request.
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# This goes against PKIX guidelines, but some CAs do it, and some software
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# requires this to avoid interpreting an end user certificate as a CA.
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basicConstraints=CA:FALSE
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# This is typical in keyUsage for a client certificate.
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# keyUsage = nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment
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# PKIX recommendations harmless if included in all certificates.
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subjectKeyIdentifier=hash
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authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid,issuer
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# This stuff is for subjectAltName and issuerAltname.
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# Import the email address.
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# subjectAltName=email:copy
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# An alternative to produce certificates that aren't
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# deprecated, according to PKIX.
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# subjectAltName=email:move
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# Copy subject details
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# issuerAltName=issuer:copy
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# This is required for TSA certificates.
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# extendedKeyUsage = critical,timeStamping
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[ v3_req ]
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# Extensions to add to a certificate request
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basicConstraints = CA:FALSE
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keyUsage = nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment
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[ v3_ca ]
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# Extensions for a typical CA
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# PKIX recommendation.
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subjectKeyIdentifier=hash
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authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid:always,issuer
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basicConstraints = critical,CA:true
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# Key usage: this is typical for a CA certificate. However, since it will
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# prevent it being used as a test self-signed certificate, it is best
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# left out by default.
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# keyUsage = cRLSign, keyCertSign
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# Include email address in subject alt name: another PKIX recommendation
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# subjectAltName=email:copy
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# Copy issuer details
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# issuerAltName=issuer:copy
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# DER hex encoding of an extension: beware experts only!
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# obj=DER:02:03
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# Where 'obj' is a standard or added object
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# You can even override a supported extension:
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# basicConstraints= critical, DER:30:03:01:01:FF
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[ crl_ext ]
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# CRL extensions.
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# Only issuerAltName and authorityKeyIdentifier make any sense in a CRL.
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# issuerAltName=issuer:copy
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authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid:always
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[ proxy_cert_ext ]
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# These extensions should be added when creating a proxy certificate
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# This goes against PKIX guidelines, but some CAs do it, and some software
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# requires this to avoid interpreting an end user certificate as a CA.
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|
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basicConstraints=CA:FALSE
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# This is typical in keyUsage for a client certificate.
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# keyUsage = nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment
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# PKIX recommendations harmless if included in all certificates.
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subjectKeyIdentifier=hash
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authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid,issuer
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# This stuff is for subjectAltName and issuerAltname.
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# Import the email address.
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||||
# subjectAltName=email:copy
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# An alternative to produce certificates that aren't
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||||
# deprecated, according to PKIX.
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||||
# subjectAltName=email:move
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# Copy subject details
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||||
# issuerAltName=issuer:copy
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# This really needs to be in place for it to be a proxy certificate.
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proxyCertInfo=critical,language:id-ppl-anyLanguage,pathlen:3,policy:foo
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####################################################################
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[ tsa ]
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default_tsa = tsa_config1 # the default TSA section
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[ tsa_config1 ]
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||||
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# These are used by the TSA reply generation only.
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dir = ./demoCA # TSA root directory
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serial = $dir/tsaserial # The current serial number (mandatory)
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crypto_device = builtin # OpenSSL engine to use for signing
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signer_cert = $dir/tsacert.pem # The TSA signing certificate
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# (optional)
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certs = $dir/cacert.pem # Certificate chain to include in reply
|
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# (optional)
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signer_key = $dir/private/tsakey.pem # The TSA private key (optional)
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signer_digest = sha256 # Signing digest to use. (Optional)
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default_policy = tsa_policy1 # Policy if request did not specify it
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||||
# (optional)
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other_policies = tsa_policy2, tsa_policy3 # acceptable policies (optional)
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digests = sha1, sha256, sha384, sha512 # Acceptable message digests (mandatory)
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accuracy = secs:1, millisecs:500, microsecs:100 # (optional)
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clock_precision_digits = 0 # number of digits after dot. (optional)
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ordering = yes # Is ordering defined for timestamps?
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# (optional, default: no)
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tsa_name = yes # Must the TSA name be included in the reply?
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||||
# (optional, default: no)
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ess_cert_id_chain = no # Must the ESS cert id chain be included?
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||||
# (optional, default: no)
|
||||
ess_cert_id_alg = sha256 # algorithm to compute certificate
|
||||
# identifier (optional, default: sha256)
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||||
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[insta] # CMP using Insta Demo CA
|
||||
# Message transfer
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||||
server = pki.certificate.fi:8700
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||||
# proxy = # set this as far as needed, e.g., http://192.168.1.1:8080
|
||||
# tls_use = 0
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||||
path = pkix/
|
||||
|
||||
# Server authentication
|
||||
recipient = "/C=FI/O=Insta Demo/CN=Insta Demo CA" # or set srvcert or issuer
|
||||
ignore_keyusage = 1 # quirk needed to accept Insta CA cert not including digitalsignature
|
||||
unprotected_errors = 1 # quirk needed to accept negative responses possibly not protected
|
||||
extracertsout = insta.extracerts.pem
|
||||
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||||
# Client authentication
|
||||
ref = 3078 # user identification
|
||||
secret = pass:insta # can be used for both client and server side
|
||||
|
||||
# Generic message options
|
||||
cmd = ir # default operation, can be overridden on cmd line with, e.g., kur
|
||||
|
||||
# Certificate enrollment
|
||||
subject = "/CN=openssl-cmp-test"
|
||||
newkey = insta.priv.pem
|
||||
out_trusted = apps/insta.ca.crt # does not include keyUsage digitalSignature
|
||||
certout = insta.cert.pem
|
||||
|
||||
[pbm] # Password-based protection for Insta CA
|
||||
# Server and client authentication
|
||||
ref = $insta::ref # 3078
|
||||
secret = $insta::secret # pass:insta
|
||||
|
||||
[signature] # Signature-based protection for Insta CA
|
||||
# Server authentication
|
||||
trusted = $insta::out_trusted # apps/insta.ca.crt
|
||||
|
||||
# Client authentication
|
||||
secret = # disable the PBM
|
||||
key = $insta::newkey # insta.priv.pem
|
||||
cert = $insta::certout # insta.cert.pem
|
||||
|
||||
[ir]
|
||||
cmd = ir
|
||||
|
||||
[cr]
|
||||
cmd = cr
|
||||
|
||||
[kur]
|
||||
# Certificate update
|
||||
cmd = kur
|
||||
oldcert = $insta::certout # insta.cert.pem
|
||||
|
||||
[rr]
|
||||
# Certificate revocation
|
||||
cmd = rr
|
||||
oldcert = $insta::certout # insta.cert.pem
|
||||
|
||||
##### Added by CISS.debian.live.builder #####
|
||||
[default_conf]
|
||||
ssl_conf = ssl_sect
|
||||
|
||||
[ssl_sect]
|
||||
system_default = system_default_sect
|
||||
|
||||
[system_default_sect]
|
||||
# Protocol floor / ceiling:
|
||||
# - only TLS 1.2 and 1.3.
|
||||
# - TLS 1.3 is FS by design;
|
||||
# - TLS 1.2 FS enforced via the cipher list.
|
||||
MinProtocol = TLSv1.2
|
||||
MaxProtocol = TLSv1.3
|
||||
|
||||
# TLS 1.2 cipher policy:
|
||||
# - Forward secrecy only: ECDHE or DHE (no static RSA kx);
|
||||
# - AES-256 *GCM* only (no DHE (dheatattack), no AES-128, no CBC);
|
||||
# - Keep distro default SECLEVEL=2 explicitly.
|
||||
CipherString = ECDHE+AES256-GCM:ECDHE+CHACHA20:ECDHE+ARIA256-GCM:ECDHE+CAMELLIA256-GCM:!kRSA:!PSK:!SRP:!aNULL:!eNULL:@SECLEVEL=2
|
||||
|
||||
# TLS 1.3 cipher policy: AES-256 and ChaCha20-Poly1305 only:
|
||||
Ciphersuites = TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
|
||||
|
||||
# Prefer strong, widely supported ECDHE groups (first = most preferred):
|
||||
Groups = X448:P-521:P-384
|
||||
|
||||
SignatureAlgorithms = rsa_pss_rsae_sha512:rsa_pss_rsae_sha384:rsa_pss_rsae_sha256
|
||||
|
||||
# Operational flags:
|
||||
# -SessionTicket ⇒ disable TLS session tickets (TLS 1.2 + 1.3)
|
||||
# ServerPreference ⇒ honor server cipher order (TLS 1.2)
|
||||
# NoRenegotiation ⇒ disallow TLS 1.2 renegotiation
|
||||
Options = -SessionTicket,ServerPreference,NoRenegotiation
|
||||
|
||||
# vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=conf
|
||||
EOF
|
||||
|
||||
printf "\e[92m++++ ++++ ++++ ++++ ++++ ++++ ++ ✅ '%s' applied successfully. \e[0m\n" "${0}"
|
||||
|
||||
exit 0
|
||||
# vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh
|
||||
@@ -299,16 +299,14 @@ Verify_checksums() {
|
||||
case "${_RETURN_PGP},${_RETURN_SHA}" in
|
||||
|
||||
"0,0")
|
||||
log_ok "Verification of [GPG signature] and [sha checksum] file successful; continuing booting in 8 seconds."
|
||||
log_success_msg "Verification of [GPG signature] and [sha checksum] file successful; continuing booting in 8 seconds."
|
||||
sleep 8
|
||||
log_ok "Verification of [GPG signature] and [sha checksum] file successful; continuing booting."
|
||||
log_success_msg "Verification of [GPG signature] and [sha checksum] file successful; continuing booting."
|
||||
return 0
|
||||
;;
|
||||
|
||||
"na,0")
|
||||
log_ok "Verification of [sha checksum] file successful; continuing booting in 8 seconds."
|
||||
log_success_msg "Verification of [sha checksum] file successful; continuing booting in 8 seconds."
|
||||
sleep 8
|
||||
log_ok "Verification of [sha checksum] file successful; continuing booting."
|
||||
log_success_msg "Verification of [sha checksum] file successful; continuing booting."
|
||||
return 0
|
||||
;;
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -17,8 +17,6 @@
|
||||
# Purpose: Late rootfs attestation and dmsetup health checking.
|
||||
# Phase : executed by live-boot inside the 9990-main.sh.
|
||||
|
||||
# TODO: Remove Debug Mode
|
||||
|
||||
_SAVED_SET_OPTS="$(set +o)"
|
||||
|
||||
set -eu
|
||||
@@ -72,10 +70,26 @@ HASH_FILE="${CDLB_ATTEST_FPR_SHA}"
|
||||
SIGN_FILE="${CDLB_ATTEST_FPR_SIG}"
|
||||
KEYFILE="${CDLB_KEY_DIR}/${CDLB_EXP_FPR}.gpg"
|
||||
|
||||
[ -s "${KEYFILE}" ] || { log_er "0042() : No public key found under: [${CDLB_KEY_DIR}/${CDLB_EXP_FPR}.gpg]"; exit 42; }
|
||||
[ -s "${HASH_FILE}" ] || { log_er "0042() : Attestation data missing: [${HASH_FILE}]"; exit 42; }
|
||||
[ -s "${SIGN_FILE}" ] || { log_er "0042() : Attestation signature missing: [${SIGN_FILE}]"; exit 42; }
|
||||
if [ -s "${KEYFILE}" ]; then
|
||||
|
||||
log_er "0042() : No public key found under: [${CDLB_KEY_DIR}/${CDLB_EXP_FPR}.gpg]"
|
||||
panic "0042() : No public key found under: [${CDLB_KEY_DIR}/${CDLB_EXP_FPR}.gpg]"
|
||||
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
if [ -s "${HASH_FILE}" ]; then
|
||||
|
||||
log_er "0042() : Attestation data missing: [${HASH_FILE}]"
|
||||
panic "0042() : Attestation data missing: [${HASH_FILE}]"
|
||||
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
if [ -s "${SIGN_FILE}" ]; then
|
||||
|
||||
log_er "0042() : Attestation signature missing: [${SIGN_FILE}]"
|
||||
panic "0042() : Attestation signature missing: [${SIGN_FILE}]"
|
||||
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
log_in "0042() : Verifying rootfs attestation with 'gpgv' and inside LUKS encrypted rootfs pinned GPG FPR."
|
||||
_STATUS="$(/usr/bin/gpgv --keyring "${KEYFILE}" --status-fd 1 "${SIGN_FILE}" "${HASH_FILE}")"
|
||||
@@ -89,71 +103,8 @@ if [ "${_CDLB_SIG_FILE_FPR}" = "${CDLB_EXP_FPR}" ]; then
|
||||
else
|
||||
|
||||
log_er "0042() : Signature FPR mismatch: got: [${_CDLB_SIG_FILE_FPR}] expected: [${CDLB_EXP_FPR}]"
|
||||
#sleep 8
|
||||
#panic "[FATAL] Signature FPR mismatch: got: [${_CDLB_SIG_FILE_FPR}] expected: [${CDLB_EXP_FPR}]."
|
||||
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
### 'dmsetup' health check -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
MAP_DEV="/dev/mapper/${CDLB_MAPPER_NAME}"
|
||||
if [ -b "${MAP_DEV}" ]; then
|
||||
|
||||
log_in "0042() : Checking dmsetup table for ${MAP_DEV}"
|
||||
|
||||
TOP_LINE="$(/usr/sbin/dmsetup table --showkeys "${MAP_DEV}" 2>/dev/null | awk 'NR==1{print; exit}')"
|
||||
if printf '%s\n' "${TOP_LINE}" | grep -q ' crypt '; then
|
||||
|
||||
log_ok "0042() : Top layer is 'crypt'."
|
||||
|
||||
else
|
||||
|
||||
log_er "0042() : Top layer is NOT 'crypt'."
|
||||
#sleep 8
|
||||
#panic "[FATAL] Top layer is NOT 'crypt'."
|
||||
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
if printf '%s\n' "${TOP_LINE}" | grep -Eq ' xts|aes-xts'; then
|
||||
|
||||
log_ok "0042() : Cipher looks like AES-XTS."
|
||||
|
||||
else
|
||||
|
||||
log_er "0042() : Cipher does not look like AES-XTS."
|
||||
#sleep 8
|
||||
#panic "[FATAL] Cipher does not look like AES-XTS."
|
||||
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
### Extract child device token (the second last field is 'device', the last is 'offset.') --------------------------------------
|
||||
CHILD_TOK="$(printf '%s\n' "${TOP_LINE}" | awk '{print $(NF-1)}')"
|
||||
CHILD_NAME="${CHILD_TOK}"
|
||||
|
||||
case "${CHILD_TOK}" in
|
||||
|
||||
*:* )
|
||||
if [ -e "/sys/dev/block/${CHILD_TOK}/dm/name" ]; then
|
||||
CHILD_NAME="$(cat "/sys/dev/block/${CHILD_TOK}/dm/name" 2>/dev/null || true)"
|
||||
[ -n "${CHILD_NAME}" ] || CHILD_NAME="${CHILD_TOK}"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
;;
|
||||
|
||||
/dev/* )
|
||||
CHILD_NAME="$(basename -- "${CHILD_TOK}")"
|
||||
;;
|
||||
|
||||
esac
|
||||
|
||||
#### Child layer must be 'integrity' with hmac and sha512 and 4096-byte sectors (best-effort greps). ---------------------------
|
||||
log_in "Checking underlying integrity target: ${CHILD_NAME}"
|
||||
|
||||
CHILD_TAB="$(/usr/sbin/dmsetup table --showkeys "${CHILD_NAME}" 2>/dev/null || true)"
|
||||
printf '%s\n' "${CHILD_TAB}" | grep -q ' integrity ' || { log_er "0042() : Underlying layer is not 'integrity'"; }
|
||||
printf '%s\n' "${CHILD_TAB}" | grep -qi 'hmac' || { log_er "0042() : Integrity target not using keyed MAC (hmac)"; }
|
||||
printf '%s\n' "${CHILD_TAB}" | grep -qi 'sha512' || { log_er "0042() : Integrity algo not sha512"; }
|
||||
printf '%s\n' "${CHILD_TAB}" | grep -Eq '\b4096\b' || { log_er "0042() : Expected 4096-byte sector size not found"; }
|
||||
|
||||
log_ok "0042() : dm-crypt and dm-integrity(HMAC-SHA512, 4096B) chain looks healthy."
|
||||
sleep 8
|
||||
panic "[FATAL] Signature FPR mismatch: got: [${_CDLB_SIG_FILE_FPR}] expected: [${CDLB_EXP_FPR}]."
|
||||
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -488,13 +488,10 @@ setup_unionfs ()
|
||||
done
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# TODO: Remove Debug
|
||||
### CISS override for /usr/lib/live/boot/0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest -------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
printf "\e[92m[INFO] Calling : [/usr/lib/live/boot/0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest] ... \n\e[0m"
|
||||
printf "\e[95m[INFO] Calling : [/usr/lib/live/boot/0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest] ... \n\e[0m"
|
||||
[ -x /usr/lib/live/boot/0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest ] && /usr/lib/live/boot/0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest
|
||||
printf "\e[92m[INFO] Calling : [/usr/lib/live/boot/0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest] done. \n\e[0m"
|
||||
|
||||
sleep 16
|
||||
### CISS override for /usr/lib/live/boot/0042_ciss_post_decrypt_attest -------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
printf "\e[92m[INFO] Successfully applied : [/usr/lib/live/boot/9990-overlay.sh] \n\e[0m"
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user