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CISS.debian.installer/func/cdi_4000_debootstrap/4010_prepare_mounts.sh
Marc S. Weidner 95eb751172
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V8.00.000.2025.06.17
Signed-off-by: Marc S. Weidner <msw@coresecret.dev>
2025-10-08 18:16:45 +01:00

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#!/bin/bash
# SPDX-Version: 3.0
# SPDX-CreationInfo: 2025-06-17; WEIDNER, Marc S.; <msw@coresecret.dev>
# SPDX-ExternalRef: GIT https://git.coresecret.dev/msw/CISS.debian.installer.git
# SPDX-FileContributor: WEIDNER, Marc S.; Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency
# SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2024-2025; WEIDNER, Marc S.; <msw@coresecret.dev>
# SPDX-FileType: SOURCE
# SPDX-License-Identifier: EUPL-1.2 OR LicenseRef-CCLA-1.0
# SPDX-LicenseComment: This file is part of the CISS.debian.installer.secure framework.
# SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
# SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
guard_sourcing
#######################################
# Configure the target system for chroot.
# Globals:
# TARGET
# VAR_CHROOT_ACTIVATED
# VAR_CHROOT_SYS_MASK_HELPER
# VAR_NEED_RUN_IN_TARGET
# Arguments:
# None
# Returns:
# 0: on success
# ERR_CHRT_MOUNTS: on failure
#######################################
prepare_mounts() {
### Notes
# This function mounts all necessary pseudo filesystems into the target root environment to enable chroot operations.
# --rbind: recursive binding.
# --make-rslave: In this case, the mount point is marked as 'slave'.
# This means changes to the source mount (e.g., /proc) are propagated to the target mount (e.g., "${TARGET}/proc").
# Conversely, changes to the target mount are not propagated back to the source mount.
# This mode is necessary to avoid problems with double or erroneous propagation effects in chroot or container environments.
#
# Some subdirectories (such as /dev/pts, /dev/shm, /sys/fs/cgroup) are remounted with more restrictive options
# like 'noexec', 'nosuid', and 'nodev' to enhance security. This ensures they override the inherited bind-mounts and
# enforce proper runtime behavior in the chroot.
### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
declare -A HMP_SPECIAL_MOUNTS=(
["/dev"]="devtmpfs devtmpfs mode=0755,nosuid" # Base device node FS
["/dev/pts"]="devpts devpts noexec,nosuid" # Pseudoterminals
["/dev/shm"]="tmpfs tmpfs rw,nosuid,nodev" # Shared memory
["/dev/mqueue"]="mqueue mqueue rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec" # POSIX message queues
["/dev/hugepages"]="hugetlbfs hugetlbfs rw,nosuid,nodev" # Huge pages
["/proc"]="proc proc nosuid,noexec,nodev" # procfs
["/sys"]="sysfs sysfs nosuid,noexec,nodev" # sysfs
["/sys/fs/cgroup"]="cgroup2 cgroup2 rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime" # Unified cgroup2
)
declare var_path="" var_fs="" var_src="" var_opts=""
# shellcheck disable=SC2034
declare -g VAR_CHROOT_SYS_MASK_HELPER=""
# shellcheck disable=SC2034
VAR_CHROOT_SYS_MASK_HELPER=$(cat <<'EOF'
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Helpers: mount detection and conditional umount (idempotent).
# Detect if PATH is an exact mountpoint (not just covered by a parent mount).
cdi_is_mountpoint() {
declare path="${1:?target path required}"
if command -v mountpoint >/dev/null 2>&1; then
mountpoint -q -- "${path}"
return $?
fi
if command -v findmnt >/dev/null 2>&1; then
# Exact mountpoint check (not -T which matches enclosing mounts).
findmnt -rn --mountpoint "${path}" >/dev/null 2>&1 && return 0 || return 1
fi
# Fallback: parse /proc/self/mountinfo (field 5 = mountpoint, no spaces here).
awk -v p="${path}" '$5==p {found=1; exit} END{exit (found?0:1)}' /proc/self/mountinfo 2>/dev/null
}
cdi_umount_if_mountpoint() {
declare path="${1:?target path required}"
if cdi_is_mountpoint "${path}"; then
umount -l -- "${path}" || { printf 'ERROR: cannot umount %s\n' "${path}" >&2; return 128; }
fi
return 0
}
cdi_sys_mask_enter() {
declare state="/run/.ciss_sysmask"
mkdir -p /run
# Record only true mountpoints.
declare had_sys="0"
declare had_cg="0"
cdi_is_mountpoint /sys && had_sys="1"
cdi_is_mountpoint /sys/fs/cgroup && had_cg="1"
printf 'HAD_SYS=%s\nHAD_CG=%s\n' "${had_sys}" "${had_cg}" >| "${state}"
# Unmount only if exact mountpoints exist.
cdi_umount_if_mountpoint /sys/fs/cgroup || return 129
cdi_umount_if_mountpoint /sys || return 130
mkdir -p /sys
mount -t tmpfs -o ro,nosuid,nodev,noexec,mode=0555,size=1M tmpfs /sys \
|| { printf 'ERROR: cannot mount tmpfs on /sys\n' >&2; return 131; }
return 0
}
cdi_sys_mask_leave() {
declare state="/run/.ciss_sysmask"
declare had_sys="0"
declare had_cg="0"
if [[ -f "${state}" ]]; then
# shellcheck disable=SC2155
declare had_sys="$(grep -Eo '^HAD_SYS=[01]' "${state}" 2>/dev/null | cut -d= -f2 || printf '0')"
# shellcheck disable=SC2155
declare had_cg="$(grep -Eo '^HAD_CG=[01]' "${state}" 2>/dev/null | cut -d= -f2 || printf '0')"
fi
# Drop the mask if present (it is an exact mountpoint).
cdi_umount_if_mountpoint /sys || return 132
if [[ "${had_sys}" == "1" ]]; then
mount -t sysfs -o nosuid,nodev,noexec sysfs /sys \
|| { printf 'ERROR: cannot mount sysfs on /sys\n' >&2; return 133; }
fi
if [[ "${had_cg}" == "1" ]]; then
mkdir -p /sys/fs/cgroup
mount -t cgroup2 -o rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime cgroup2 /sys/fs/cgroup \
|| { printf 'ERROR: cannot mount cgroup2 on /sys/fs/cgroup\n' >&2; return 134; }
fi
rm -f -- "${state}"
return 0
}
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
EOF
)
for var_path in "${!HMP_SPECIAL_MOUNTS[@]}"; do
mkdir -p "${TARGET}${var_path}"
done
for var_path in "${!HMP_SPECIAL_MOUNTS[@]}"; do
IFS=" " read -r var_fs var_src var_opts <<< "${HMP_SPECIAL_MOUNTS[${var_path}]}"
if mountpoint -q "${TARGET}${var_path}"; then
do_log "info" "file_only" "4010() Skipped: '${TARGET}${var_path}' is already a mountpoint."
continue
fi
if ! mount -t "${var_fs}" "${var_src}" "${TARGET}${var_path}" -o "${var_opts}"; then
do_log "emergency" "file_only" "4010() Command: [mount -t ${var_fs} ${var_src} ${TARGET}${var_path} -o ${var_opts}] failed."
return "${ERR_CHRT_MOUNTS}"
fi
do_log "info" "file_only" "4010() Command: [mount -t ${var_fs} ${var_src} ${TARGET}${var_path} -o ${var_opts}] successful."
done
if [[ "${VAR_NEED_RUN_IN_TARGET:-false}" == "true" ]]; then
mkdir -p "${TARGET}/run"
if ! mount --make-rslave --rbind /run "${TARGET}/run"; then
do_log "emergency" "file_only" "4010() Command: [mount --make-rslave --rbind /run ${TARGET}/run] failed."
return "${ERR_CHRT_MOUNTS}"
fi
do_log "info" "file_only" "4010() Command: [mount --make-rslave --rbind /run ${TARGET}/run] successful."
fi
if ! chroot_exec "${TARGET}" mkdir -p /etc/systemd/system/multi-user.target.wants; then
do_log "emergency" "file_only" "4010() Command: [chroot_exec ${TARGET} mkdir -p /etc/systemd/system/multi-user.target.wants] failed."
return "${ERR_CHRT_MOUNTS}"
fi
do_log "info" "file_only" "4010() Command: [chroot_exec ${TARGET} mkdir -p /etc/systemd/system/multi-user.target.wants] successful."
mkdir -p "${TARGET}/media/cdrom0"
# shellcheck disable=SC2034
declare -gx VAR_CHROOT_ACTIVATED="system"
do_log "info" "file_only" "4010() Command: [declare -gx VAR_CHROOT_ACTIVATED=system]"
guard_dir && return 0
}
### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
# shellcheck disable=SC2034
readonly -f prepare_mounts
# vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh