V8.00.000.2025.06.17

Signed-off-by: Marc S. Weidner <msw@coresecret.dev>
This commit is contained in:
2025-10-15 07:08:52 +01:00
parent 0bb6cb6a64
commit f0bbc6094d
6 changed files with 69 additions and 55 deletions

View File

@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ guard_sourcing
# VAR_DROPBEAR
# VAR_GRUB_PASSWORD
# VAR_LUKS_BACKUP
# VAR_LUKS_PGP
# VAR_LUKS_URL
# VAR_NEED_RUN_IN_TARGET
# VAR_NUKE
@@ -57,7 +58,7 @@ guard_sourcing
# None
# Returns:
# 0: on success
# ERR_NO_VALID_RECIPE
# ERR_NO_VALID_RECIPE: on failure
#######################################
yaml_reader() {
### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
@@ -67,12 +68,12 @@ yaml_reader() {
VAR_RECIPE_TABLE="" VAR_NEED_RUN_IN_TARGET="false" VAR_CODENAME="" VAR_DROPBEAR="" VAR_RECOVERY="" \
VAR_GRUB_PASSWORD="false" VAR_SSH_PORT="22" VAR_DEB822="true" VAR_PROVIDER="" VAR_SSH_CA="" VAR_UFW_OUT="deny" \
VAR_CHROOT_DEBUG="false" VAR_SEC_FW="selinux" VAR_APT_FULL_UPGRADE="true" VAR_LUKS_BACKUP="false" \
VAR_LUKS_URL=""
VAR_LUKS_URL="" VAR_LUKS_PGP=""
### Declare and substitute input files.
declare -r var_if="${VAR_PRESEED}"
declare var_line="" var_middle_part="" var_highest_dev="" var_device="" var_fields="" var_partition="" \
recipe_firmware_var="" recipe_nuke_var="" recipe_nuke_rounds_var="" recipe_table_var="" recipe_recovery_var="" \
recipe_luks_var="" recipe_luks_url=""
recipe_luks_var="" recipe_luks_url="" recipe_luks_pgp=""
### Read "${var_if}" line by line.
while IFS= read -r var_line; do
@@ -209,12 +210,17 @@ END { print max }
VAR_RECIPE_FIRMWARE="${!recipe_firmware_var,,}"
### Extract the chosen LUKS Backup strategy.
recipe_luks_var="recipe_${VAR_RECIPE_STRING}_control_luks_backup"
# shellcheck disable=SC2034
VAR_LUKS_BACKUP="${!recipe_luks_var,,}"
recipe_luks_url="recipe_${VAR_RECIPE_STRING}_control_luks_backup_url"
# shellcheck disable=SC2034
VAR_LUKS_URL="${!recipe_luks_url,,}"
recipe_luks_var="recipe_${VAR_RECIPE_STRING}_control_luks_backup"
# shellcheck disable=SC2034
VAR_LUKS_BACKUP="${!recipe_luks_var,,}"
recipe_luks_pgp="recipe_${VAR_RECIPE_STRING}_control_luks_backup_pgp"
# shellcheck disable=SC2034
VAR_LUKS_PGP="${!recipe_luks_url,,}"
recipe_luks_url="recipe_${VAR_RECIPE_STRING}_control_luks_backup_url"
# shellcheck disable=SC2034
VAR_LUKS_URL="${!recipe_luks_url,,}"
### Extract the chosen Nuke mechanism.
recipe_nuke_var="recipe_${VAR_RECIPE_STRING}_control_nuke"

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@@ -174,20 +174,50 @@ partition_encryption() {
fi
### Opening the encrypted container.
if [[ "${var_encryption_path,,}" == "/boot" ]]; then
cryptsetup luksOpen "/dev/${var_dev}" \
--key-file="${DIR_CNF}/password_luks_boot.txt" \
"${var_encryption_label}"
else
cryptsetup luksOpen "/dev/${var_dev}" \
--key-file="${DIR_CNF}/password_luks_common.txt" \
"${var_encryption_label}"
fi
do_log "info" "file_only" "3220() Partition: '/dev/${var_dev}' opened as '/dev/mapper/${var_encryption_label}'."
### Create luksDump log entry.
cryptsetup luksDump "/dev/${var_dev}" >> "${DIR_LOG}/3220_cryptsetup_luksdump_${var_dev}.log"
### Store UUID of the LUKS container.
var_uuid=$(blkid -s UUID -o value "/dev/${var_dev}")
[[ "${var_encryption_path}" == "/" ]] && declare -grx VAR_CRYPT_ROOT="${var_uuid}"
[[ "${var_encryption_path}" == "/boot" ]] && declare -grx VAR_CRYPT_BOOT="${var_uuid}"
[[ "${var_encryption_path}" == "/recovery" ]] && declare -grx VAR_CRYPT_RECOVERY="${var_uuid}"
HMP_PATH_LUKSUUID["${var_encryption_path}"]="${var_uuid}"
HMP_PATH_ENCLABEL["${var_encryption_path}"]="${var_encryption_label}"
do_log "debug" "file_only" "3220() [HMP_PATH_LUKSUUID]: '${var_encryption_path}' -> '${HMP_PATH_LUKSUUID["${var_encryption_path}"]}'"
do_log "debug" "file_only" "3220() [HMP_PATH_ENCLABEL]: '${var_encryption_path}' -> '${HMP_PATH_ENCLABEL["${var_encryption_path}"]}'"
### Backup the LUKS Header.
if [[ "${VAR_LUKS_BACKUP}" == "true" ]]; then
case "${user_root_specific}" in
ciss) var_pgp_publickey="${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/.pubkey/marc_s_weidner_msw@coresecret.dev_0xE62E84F8_public.asc" ;;
physnet) var_pgp_publickey="${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/.pubkey/zimnol_andre_h_git.cs@physnet.eu_0x8A659CC7B4D63AE6_public.asc" ;;
*) do_log "error" "file_only" "3220() No valid PGP public key for LUKS Header encryption provided."; return "${ERR_LUKS_HEADER_ENC}" ;;
esac
var_luks_backup_file="${DIR_BAK}/luks_header_${var_dev}.bak"
var_luks_backup_name="${VAR_FINAL_FQDN}_luks_header_${var_dev}.bak.pgp"
var_luks_backup_pgp="${DIR_BAK}/luks_header_${var_dev}.bak.pgp"
case "${VAR_LUKS_PGP}" in
ciss) var_pgp_publickey="${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/.pubkey/marc_s_weidner_msw@coresecret.dev_0xE62E84F8_public.asc" ;;
physnet) var_pgp_publickey="${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/.pubkey/zimnol_andre_h_git.cs@physnet.eu_0x8A659CC7B4D63AE6_public.asc" ;;
none) do_log "error" "file_only" "3220() No PGP public key for LUKS Header encryption provided."; continue ;;
*) do_log "fatal" "file_only" "3220() No valid PGP public key for LUKS Header encryption provided."; return "${ERR_LUKS_HEADER_ENC}" ;;
esac
if cryptsetup luksHeaderBackup --header-backup-file="${var_luks_backup_file}" "/dev/${var_dev}"; then
do_log "info" "file_only" "3220() Partition: '/dev/${var_dev}' LUKS Header saved: '${var_luks_backup_file}'."
@@ -207,11 +237,11 @@ partition_encryption() {
if command -v shred >/dev/null 2>&1; then
shred -u -- "${var_luks_backup_file}" || rm -f -- "${var_luks_backup_file}"
shred -vfzu -n 5 "${var_luks_backup_file}" || rm -f "${var_luks_backup_file}"
else
rm -f -- "${var_luks_backup_file}"
rm -f "${var_luks_backup_file}"
fi
@@ -245,34 +275,6 @@ partition_encryption() {
fi
### Opening the encrypted container.
if [[ "${var_encryption_path,,}" == "/boot" ]]; then
cryptsetup luksOpen "/dev/${var_dev}" \
--key-file="${DIR_CNF}/password_luks_boot.txt" \
"${var_encryption_label}"
else
cryptsetup luksOpen "/dev/${var_dev}" \
--key-file="${DIR_CNF}/password_luks_common.txt" \
"${var_encryption_label}"
fi
do_log "info" "file_only" "3220() Partition: '/dev/${var_dev}' opened as '/dev/mapper/${var_encryption_label}'."
### Create luksDump log entry.
cryptsetup luksDump "/dev/${var_dev}" >> "${DIR_LOG}/3220_cryptsetup_luksdump_${var_dev}.log"
### Store UUID of the LUKS container.
var_uuid=$(blkid -s UUID -o value "/dev/${var_dev}")
[[ "${var_encryption_path}" == "/" ]] && declare -grx VAR_CRYPT_ROOT="${var_uuid}"
[[ "${var_encryption_path}" == "/boot" ]] && declare -grx VAR_CRYPT_BOOT="${var_uuid}"
[[ "${var_encryption_path}" == "/recovery" ]] && declare -grx VAR_CRYPT_RECOVERY="${var_uuid}"
HMP_PATH_LUKSUUID["${var_encryption_path}"]="${var_uuid}"
HMP_PATH_ENCLABEL["${var_encryption_path}"]="${var_encryption_label}"
do_log "debug" "file_only" "3220() [HMP_PATH_LUKSUUID]: '${var_encryption_path}' -> '${HMP_PATH_LUKSUUID["${var_encryption_path}"]}'"
do_log "debug" "file_only" "3220() [HMP_PATH_ENCLABEL]: '${var_encryption_path}' -> '${HMP_PATH_ENCLABEL["${var_encryption_path}"]}'"
done
[[ -n "${VAR_LUKS_URL}" ]] && unset VAR_TEMP_PLAIN_NC_AUTH

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@@ -82,11 +82,11 @@ hardening_ufw() {
sed -i "/^# BEGIN custom MLD rules/,/^# END custom MLD rules/d" "${var_rules}"
sed -i "/^# BEGIN custom MLD OUTPUT rules/,/^# END custom MLD OUTPUT rules/d" "${var_rules}"
### Inbound MLD (INPUT chain) insert before the existing echo-request rule.
### Inbound MLD (INPUT chain), insert before the existing echo-request rule.
### Allows MLDv1 (130/131/132) and MLDv2 (143) to link-local multicast (ff02::/16)
sed -i "/-A ufw6-before-input .*--icmpv6-type echo-request -j ACCEPT/i # BEGIN custom MLD rules\n-A ufw6-before-input -i ${VAR_FINAL_NIC} -p icmpv6 --icmpv6-type 130 -d ff02::/16 -j ACCEPT\n-A ufw6-before-input -i ${VAR_FINAL_NIC} -p icmpv6 --icmpv6-type 131 -d ff02::/16 -j ACCEPT\n-A ufw6-before-input -i ${VAR_FINAL_NIC} -p icmpv6 --icmpv6-type 132 -d ff02::/16 -j ACCEPT\n-A ufw6-before-input -i ${VAR_FINAL_NIC} -p icmpv6 --icmpv6-type 143 -d ff02::/16 -j ACCEPT\n# END custom MLD rules" "${var_rules}"
### Outbound MLD (OUTPUT chain) insert before echo-request.
### Outbound MLD (OUTPUT chain), insert before echo-request.
### Useful if local daemons join multicast groups, and you want clean logs.
sed -i "/-A ufw6-before-output .*--icmpv6-type echo-request -j ACCEPT/i # BEGIN custom MLD OUTPUT rules\n-A ufw6-before-output -o ${VAR_FINAL_NIC} -p icmpv6 --icmpv6-type 131 -d ff02::/16 -j ACCEPT\n-A ufw6-before-output -o ${VAR_FINAL_NIC} -p icmpv6 --icmpv6-type 143 -d ff02::/16 -j ACCEPT\n# END custom MLD OUTPUT rules" "${var_rules}"

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@@ -1308,7 +1308,7 @@ session required pam_env.so readenv=1 envfile=/etc/default/locale
# If user is NOT listed -> succeed and SKIP next two lines (no TOTP prompt).
auth [success=2 default=ignore] pam_listfile.so item=user sense=deny file=/etc/ciss/2fa onerr=ignore
# Listed users: show a clear hint and then require GA. No 'nullok': missing secret fail.
# Listed users: show a clear hint and then require GA. No 'nullok': missing secret -> fail.
auth required pam_echo.so file=/etc/ciss/login_totp.prompt
auth required pam_google_authenticator.so