V9.14.000.2026.06.07

Signed-off-by: Marc S. Weidner <msw@coresecret.dev>
2026-06-07 18:24:29 +01:00
parent 261d770e42
commit 98c14bd008
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+# code_review.md
+
+Use this file for explicit review tasks and final self-review after implementation. Do not treat it as a mandate for an
+unlimited audit unless the user asks for one.
+
+## Review priorities
+
+Review findings in this order:
+
+1. Correctness
+2. Security regressions
+3. Data loss risk
+4. Boot-chain integrity
+5. Reproducibility and deterministic behavior
+6. Error handling and cleanup
+7. Test or validation coverage
+8. Maintainability
+9. Minimality of diff
+10. Style consistency
+
+## Finding classes
+
+- `BLOCKER`: proven correctness bug, security regression, installer break, boot break, or data loss risk that must be fixed
+  before merge.
+- `RISK`: plausible issue or security concern that is not fully proven from the available context.
+- `CLEANUP`: maintainability, readability, or consistency improvement that is not required for correctness.
+- `NOTE`: observation only; no change requested.
+
+## Review output format
+
+List findings first, ordered by severity.
+
+For each finding include:
+
+- class
+- file path and line number where possible
+- observation
+- concrete impact
+- smallest reasonable fix
+
+Then include:
+
+- missing checks or validation gaps
+- residual risks
+- concise final recommendation
+
+If there are no findings, say so explicitly and still mention relevant validation gaps.
+
+## Scope control
+
+- Review the requested change, touched files, and directly affected code paths.
+- Do not expand a small implementation task into a broad repository audit.
+- Do not nitpick formatting when automated tooling exists.
+- Do not invent requirements not present in the task, repository, or documentation.
+- Do not request a full installer run, debootstrap run, destructive disk test, or network-heavy validation unless the changed
+  path cannot be checked responsibly any other way.
+- Prefer a small actionable finding over a broad speculative warning.
+- Separate observation, inference, and recommendation when the evidence is incomplete.
+
+## Installer-specific security checklist
+
+Check whether the change affects:
+
+- destructive disk operations, disk selection, partition table wiping, or formatting
+- partition boundaries, GPT/MBR type codes, bootable flags, or firmware mode selection
+- cryptsetup/LUKS2 parameters, passphrases, key files, key slots, LUKS UUIDs, header backups, or nuke behavior
+- Btrfs filesystem creation, subvolumes, snapshots, labels, compression, or mount options
+- `/etc/fstab`, `/etc/crypttab`, UUIDs, PARTUUIDs, mapper names, or initramfs flags
+- initramfs-tools hooks, scripts, included binaries, early boot paths, or update-initramfs behavior
+- Dropbear initramfs remote unlock, forced commands, host keys, firewalling, unlock-wrapper signatures, or hashes
+- GRUB package selection, GRUB modules, encrypted `/boot`, UEFI fallback paths, BIOS install paths, or NVRAM behavior
+- chroot command construction, `env -i` sanitization, target mount handling, or host/target path separation
+- APT source generation, package authentication, Debian suite selection, signature verification, or hash verification
+- remote downloads, TLS settings, bundled source archives, provenance, or checksum files
+- key material, SSH keys, PGP keys, SOPS/AGE values, passphrase files, or secret cleanup
+- logging, debug traces, trap output, and accidental disclosure of sensitive values
+- file permissions, ownership, sudo policy, PAM, SSH policy, UFW, fail2ban, sysctl, modprobe, or hardening files
+- recovery target behavior and consistency with the primary target
+- reproducibility, deterministic ordering, and generated file stability
+- direct or indirect data loss risk
+
+---
+**[no tracking | no logging | no advertising | no profiling | no bullshit](https://coresecret.eu/)**
+<!-- vim: set number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=markdown -->