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V8.00.000.2025.06.17

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Signed-off-by: Marc S. Weidner <msw@coresecret.dev>
This commit is contained in:
Marc S. Weidner
2025-07-18 20:31:00 +02:00
parent c7930b9f28
commit 34193a5a02
8 changed files with 411 additions and 405 deletions
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336
func/4160_grub_bootparameter.sh
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@@ -18,340 +18,34 @@ guard_sourcing
#######################################
# Hardening Grub boot parameter.
# Globals:
# ARY_BOOTPARAM
# TARGET
# VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX
# VAR_SETUP_PATH
# VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT
# Arguments:
# None
# None
# Returns:
# 0: on success
#######################################
setup_grub_bootparameter() {
### Install Kernel Hardening-Presets
cp "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/etc/sysctl.d/99_local.hardened.ini" "${TARGET}/etc/sysctl.d/99_local.hardened"
chmod 0644 "${TARGET}/etc/sysctl.d/99_local.hardened"
### Entropy collection improvements
mkdir -p "${TARGET}/usr/lib/modules-load.d"
cat << EOF >| "${TARGET}/usr/lib/modules-load.d/30_security-misc.conf"
## https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Dev/Entropy
## https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=927972
## https://forums.whonix.org/t/jitterentropy-rngd/7204
jitterentropy_rng
EOF
chmod 0644 "${TARGET}/usr/lib/modules-load.d/30_security-misc.conf"
declare var_param
grub_extract_current_string
###########################################################################################
# Audit events need to be captured on processes that start up prior to auditd, #
# so that potential malicious activity cannot go undetected. During boot if audit=1, then #
# the backlog will hold 64 records. If more than 64 records are created during boot, #
# auditd records will be lost and potential malicious activity could go undetected #
###########################################################################################
VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="${VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT} audit=1 audit_backlog_limit=8192"
for var_param in "${ARY_BOOTPARAM[@]}"; do
###########################################################################################
# Distrusts CPU bootloader for initial entropy at boot. #
# Distrusts the CPU for initial entropy at boot, as it is not possible to audit, #
# may contain weaknesses or a backdoor. #
###########################################################################################
# https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RDRAND#Reception #
# https://twitter.com/pid_eins/status/1149649806056280069 #
# https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/09/05/us/documents-reveal-nsa-campaign-against-encryption.html
# https://forums.whonix.org/t/entropy-config-random-trust-cpu-yes-or-no-rng-core-default-quality/8566
# https://lkml.org/lkml/2022/6/5/271 #
###########################################################################################
VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="${VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT} random.trust_cpu=off"
if [[ -z "${var_param}" ]]; then
do_log "warn" "true" "Empty GRUB parameter detected and skipped."
continue
fi
###########################################################################################
# Distrusts the bootloader for initial entropy at boot. #
# https://lkml.org/lkml/2022/6/5/271 #
###########################################################################################
VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="${VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT} random.trust_bootloader=off"
if grep -q --word-regexp "${var_param%%=*}" <<< "${VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT}"; then
do_log "info" "true" "Skipping duplicate kernel parameter: '${var_param}'."
continue
fi
###########################################################################################
# ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization) causes central areas of memory to be assigned #
# random addresses each time a program is started. These include: Stack, Heap, Shared #
# libraries (e.g., libc), mmap regions, VDSO/VSyscall. The executable itself (only with #
# PIE binaries). The aim is to make it more difficult for attackers to predict memory #
# addresses, thereby preventing classic exploits that rely on known addresses from #
# succeeding. #
# 0: disabled Fixed memory addresses – insecure, testable. #
# 1: Partial ASLR Heap, mmap are randomized, stack only partially randomized. #
# 2: Full ASLR (default) Stack, mmap, heap, VDSO, shared libraries all randomized. #
###########################################################################################
VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="${VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT} randomize_va_space=2"
VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT+=" ${var_param}"
###########################################################################################
# Enables IOMMU to prevent DMA attacks. #
# intel_iommu=on amd_iommu=force_isolation iommu=force #
# Multiple IOMMU switches are redundant; iommu=force is usually sufficient. #
# Forces an IOMMU to be initialized and used completely, even if the BIOS or ACPI wanted #
# to disable it. It activates the basic DMA remapping function. However, it does not say #
# anything about how restrictive the mapping strategy is, passthrough, strict, see below #
###########################################################################################
VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="${VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT} iommu=force"
###########################################################################################
# Enables strict enforcement of IOMMU TLB invalidation, so devices will never be able to #
# access stale data contents. #
# iommu.passthrough=0 #
# Prevents devices from operating in identity-mapped passthrough mode. Without this #
# parameter (or with =1), devices could be passed through without being monitored by the #
# IOMMU in a truly restrictive manner. From a security standpoint, iommu.passthrough=0 is #
# an important step toward DMA isolation for all devices, especially for untrusted PCI(e) #
# devices. #
# iommu.strict=1 #
# Enables Strict Mode for dma-iommu.c (i.e., all DMA transactions are validated #
# synchronously). Without this parameter, the kernel often runs in lazy mode, where #
# mapping caches are used. #
# Performance vs. security: strict=1= more secure, but potentially slower, especially #
# with many small DMA transfers. #
# https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/master/drivers/iommu/Kconfig#L97 #
# Page 11 of https://lenovopress.lenovo.com/lp1467.pdf #
###########################################################################################
VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="${VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT} iommu.passthrough=0 iommu.strict=1"
###########################################################################################
# Disable the busmaster bit on all PCI bridges during very early boot to avoid holes in #
# IOMMU. #
# https://mjg59.dreamwidth.org/54433.html #
# https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=4444f8541dad16fefd9b8807ad1451e806ef1d94
###########################################################################################
VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="${VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT} efi=disable_early_pci_dma"
###########################################################################################
# Disables the merging of slabs of similar sizes. #
# Sometimes a slab can be used vulnerably, which an attacker can exploit. #
###########################################################################################
VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="${VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT} slab_nomerge"
###########################################################################################
# Zero memory at allocation and free time. #
###########################################################################################
VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="${VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT} init_on_alloc=1 init_on_free=1"
###########################################################################################
# This option randomizes page allocator freelists, improving security by making page #
# allocations less predictable. This also improves performance. #
###########################################################################################
VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="${VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT} page_alloc.shuffle=1"
###########################################################################################
# When releasing (i.e., free_pages()), all bytes with a marker value (e.g., 0xAA) are #
# overwritten. If later code (accidentally or maliciously) accesses this page, it will #
# most likely crash or produce recognizable artifacts. Only supported if the kernel was #
# built with CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING=y (default on Debian: enabled since Bookworm). #
###########################################################################################
VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="${VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT} page_poison=1"
###########################################################################################
# Enables Kernel Page Table Isolation, which mitigates Meltdown, improves KASLR. #
###########################################################################################
VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="${VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT} pti=on"
###########################################################################################
# The setting 'vsyscall' is obsolete, are at fixed addresses and are a target for ROP. #
###########################################################################################
VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="${VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT} vsyscall=none"
###########################################################################################
# The kernel adds a small random padding offset to the stack pointer with every system #
# call or kernel entry. The starting point for local variables is at a different position #
# within the stack with every call. This makes ROP chains (return-oriented programming) #
# or stack pivoting attacks significantly more difficult. #
###########################################################################################
VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="${VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT} randomize_kstack_offset=on"
###########################################################################################
# Prevents the debugfsfile system from being made available at boot time. This is a #
# useful hardening measure because debugfs reveals a lot of potentially security-relevant #
# kernel information by default, which can be misused by normal users (and by exploits). #
###########################################################################################
VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="${VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT} debugfs=off"
###########################################################################################
# Force the kernel to panic on "oopses" (which may be due to false positives). #
# panic=N (e.g., panic=60): Wait N seconds and then reboot. #
# panic=0 No automatic action (System remains stuck in panic state). #
# panic=-1 Also explicitly prevents any automatic reboot. #
###########################################################################################
VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="${VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT} oops=panic panic=-1"
###########################################################################################
# Enable a subset of known mitigations for CPU vulnerabilities and disable SMT. #
# mitigations=auto Enables all available CPU-specific security measures based on the #
# detected CPU, microcode version, and kernel build configuration, if applicable. #
# 'nosmt' Disables Simultaneous Multithreading (SMT) (e.g., Hyper-Threading on Intel) #
# system-wide to prevent shared cache attacks (SMoTHER, MDS, L1TF, TAA, Snoop-assisted). #
# Why is 'mitigations=auto,nosmt' better than setting everything manually? #
# Automatically adjusted: Depending on CPU family, stepping, microcode. #
# Consistency guaranteed: No contradictions between flags possible #
# (e.g., spec_store_bypass_disable=on vs. nospec_store_bypass_disable=off). #
# Future-proof: Even new kernel features (e.g., bhi=flush or srbds) are automatically #
# activated without having to know about them. #
###########################################################################################
VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="${VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT} mitigations=auto,nosmt"
###########################################################################################
# If mitigations=auto,nosmt is set, see before, then these flags should not be set #
# individually because they are redundant. Enable mitigations for both Spectre Variant 2 #
# (indirect branch speculation) and Intel branch history injection (BHI) vulnerabilities. #
# https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.html #
###########################################################################################
# VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="${VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT} spectre_v2=on spectre_v2_user=on spectre_bhi=on"
###########################################################################################
# If mitigations=auto,nosmt is set, see before, then these flags should not be set #
# individually because they are redundant. #
# Disable Speculative Store Bypass (Spectre Variant 4). #
# https://www.suse.com/support/kb/doc/?id=000019189 #
###########################################################################################
# VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="${VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT} spec_store_bypass_disable=on nospec_store_bypass_disable=off"
###########################################################################################
# If mitigations=auto,nosmt is set, see before, then these flags should not be set #
# individually because they are redundant. #
# Enable mitigations for the L1TF vulnerability through disabling SMT and L1D flush #
# runtime control. #
# https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.html #
###########################################################################################
# VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="${VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT} l1tf=full,force"
###########################################################################################
# If mitigations=auto,nosmt is set, see before, then these flags should not be set #
# individually because they are redundant. #
# Enable mitigations for the MDS vulnerability through clearing buffer cache #
# and disabling SMT. #
# https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.html #
###########################################################################################
# VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="${VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT} mds=full,nosmt"
###########################################################################################
# If mitigations=auto,nosmt is set, see before, then these flags should not be set #
# individually because they are redundant. #
# Patches the TAA vulnerability by disabling TSX and enables mitigations using TSX Async #
# Abort along with disabling SMT. #
# https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.html #
###########################################################################################
# VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="${VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT} tsx=off tsx_async_abort=full,nosmt"
###########################################################################################
# Mark all huge pages in the EPT as non-executable to mitigate iTLB multihit. #
# https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/multihit.html #
###########################################################################################
VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="${VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT} kvm.nx_huge_pages=force"
###########################################################################################
# Force disable SMT as it has caused numerous CPU vulnerabilities. #
# The only full mitigation of cross-HT attacks is to disable SMT. #
# https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.html #
###########################################################################################
VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="${VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT} nosmt=force"
###########################################################################################
# Enables the prctl interface to prevent leaks from L1D on context switches. #
# https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1d_flush.html #
###########################################################################################
VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="${VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT} l1d_flush=on"
###########################################################################################
# Mitigates numerous MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities and disables SMT. #
# mmio_stale_data=off No mitigation (unsafe) #
# mmio_stale_data=full All known measures active #
# mmio_stale_data=full,nosmt Full mitigation + SMT disabling #
# mmio_stale_data=auto Activated depending on CPU/microcode #
# mmio_stale_data=full,force Forces mitigation even on CPUs that are supposedly not #
# affected #
# https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.html
###########################################################################################
VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="${VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT} mmio_stale_data=full,force"
###########################################################################################
# Enable mitigations for RETBleed (Arbitrary Speculative Code Execution with #
# Return Instructions) vulnerability and disable SMT. #
# If 'mitigations=auto,nosmt' is set, the kernel already activates all retbleed-relevant #
# mitigations, provided the CPU is affected; 'retbleed=auto,nosmt' explicitly overrides #
# the internal assessment and forces full protection. If maximum hardening is required, #
# and one does not want to rely on "auto-detection" then it is recommended to additionally#
# set 'retbleed=auto,nosmt' otherwise, 'mitigations=auto,nosmt' is sufficient. #
# https://www.suse.com/support/kb/doc/?id=000020693 #
###########################################################################################
VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="${VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT} retbleed=auto"
###########################################################################################
# Enables kernel lockdown mode with a focus on confidentiality. The kernel is #
# configured in such a way that even privileged users (such as root) have limited access #
# to kernel data and debug mechanisms. 'confidentiality': Maximum restriction to ensure #
# the security and integrity of the system. This prevents direct access to hardware and #
# debug interfaces, for example. Useful for highly secure environments as it reduces the #
# attack surface to kernel data. However, some applications that require debugging or #
# hardware access may have problems. #
# https://blog.cloudflare.com/de-de/linux-kernel-hardening/ #
# https://www.linux-magazine.com/Issues/2020/239/Lockdown-Mode #
###########################################################################################
VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="${VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT} lockdown=confidentiality"
###########################################################################################
# Enables 'Read-Only Data Protection', which implements read-only memory areas #
# for kernel data structures. This protects the kernel from certain types of exploit #
# (e.g., buffer overflows). 'on': Forces the corresponding areas to remain read-only. #
# https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v6.10/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.html #
###########################################################################################
VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="${VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT} rodata=on"
###########################################################################################
# Kernel Electric-Fence (KFENCE) is a low-overhead sampling-based memory safety #
# error detector. KFENCE detects heap out-of-bounds access, use-after-free, and #
# invalid-free errors. KFENCE is designed to be enabled in production kernels, and has #
# near zero performance overhead. Compared to KASAN, KFENCE trades performance for #
# precision. The main motivation behind KFENCE’s design is that with enough total uptime #
# KFENCE will detect bugs in code paths not typically exercised by non-production test #
# workloads. One way to quickly achieve a large enough total uptime is when the tool is #
# deployed across a large fleet of machines. #
# https://docs.kernel.org/dev-tools/kfence.html #
###########################################################################################
VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="${VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT} kfence.sample_interval=100"
###########################################################################################
# CFI Ensures that only controlled, predefined transitions are possible in the #
# programs' control flow. kcfi (Kernel Control Flow Integrity): Specific implementation of#
# CFI for the Linux kernel that is particularly robust and provides accurate control flow #
# validation. kcfi relies on compiler-based technologies (e.g., LLVM) that insert special #
# checks and instrumentation into the kernel code. #
# https://kspp.github.io/Recommended_Settings#kernel-command-line-options #
###########################################################################################
VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="${VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT} cfi=kcfi"
###########################################################################################
# Remove additional (32-bit) attack surface, unless you really need them. #
# https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v6.10/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.html #
# https://kspp.github.io/Recommended_Settings#kernel-command-line-options #
###########################################################################################
VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="${VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT} ia32_emulation=0"
###########################################################################################
# Removes mapping for 32-bit VDSO (for ia32binaries). On 32-bit processes that rely on #
# VDSO, this causes a fallback to classic syscalls (slower) or errors. On a system #
# without CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION or with ia32_emulation=0, vdso32=0 is effective but #
# redundant. #
###########################################################################################
VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="${VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT} vdso32=0"
###########################################################################################
# Checks every copy_to_user() / copy_from_user()operation. Prevents kernels from #
# accidentally copying unallocated memory to userspace. Stop exploits that trigger #
# buffer overflows or use-after-free via copy_*_user(), for example. Effect: Detects #
# heap/SLOB abuse, overwrites. Leads to BUG() & stack trace if suspicious access is #
# detected. #
###########################################################################################
VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="${VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT} hardened_usercopy=1"
###########################################################################################
# Sets the minimum log output of the kernel at boot time to level 0 (= KERN_EMERG). #
###########################################################################################
VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="${VAR_GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT} loglevel=0"
done
grub_finalize_string