V8.00.000.2025.06.17

Signed-off-by: Marc S. Weidner <msw@coresecret.dev>

.preseed/preseed.yaml

@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ debootstrap:                   # Provide a mirror for downloading the Debian pac
                                # list of official Debian packages.
   mirror: "https://deb.debian.org/debian"
                                # The following packages MUST be included in the debootstrap.
-  includes: "busybox,ca-certificates,git,locales,openssl,python3,python3-apt,systemd-cryptsetup,zstd"
+  includes: "busybox,ca-certificates,git,libpam-systemd,locales,openssl,python3,python3-apt,systemd-cryptsetup,zstd"
 distribution: "trixie"         # MUST be "trixie".
 debian_suite: "stable"         # MUST be "stable". Not supported yet: "testing", "experimental".
 exit:
@@ -855,7 +855,7 @@ user:
         tty: true              # Allow TTY (local console) login.
       password: true           # Allow password login. SSH password login is always disabled.
       2fa:
-        ssh: false             # Require 2FA for SSH access. MUST be either 'true' or 'false' for both ssh and tty.
+        ssh: false             # Require 2FA for SSH access.
         tty: false             # Require 2FA for TTY (local console) login.
     privileges:
       description: "Root user with full system access and administrative privileges."
@@ -872,7 +872,7 @@ user:
   user0:
     ensure: present            # Must always be 'present'. (Not in use in this version of the installer.)
     protected: true            # Prevent unintentional edits or deletions. (Not in use in this version of the installer.)
-    name: "msw"                # The name of the user account.
+    name: "msw"                # The name of the user account. No ":" allowed.
     fullname: "msw"            # The full name of the user account holder.
     uid: 1000                  # Ensures that the same user has the same UID on all systems.
     gid: 1000                  # Ensures that the same user has the same GID on all systems.
@@ -885,7 +885,7 @@ user:
         tty: true              # Allow TTY (local console) login.
       password: true           # Allow password login. SSH password login is always disabled.
       2fa:
-        ssh: false             # Require 2FA for SSH access. MUST be either 'true' or 'false' for both ssh and tty.
+        ssh: false             # Require 2FA for SSH access.
         tty: false             # Require 2FA for TTY (local console) login.
     privileges:
       description: "Primary admin user with full sudo access and interactive login."
@@ -902,7 +902,7 @@ user:
   user1:
     ensure: present            # "present" = create user; "absent" = remove user
     protected: true            # Prevent unintentional edits or deletions.
-    name: "ansible"            # The name of the user account.
+    name: "ansible"            # The name of the user account. No ":" allowed.
     fullname: "ansible"        # The full name of the user account holder.
     uid: 137                   # Ensures that the same user has the same UID on all systems.
     gid: 137                   # Ensures that the same user has the same GID on all systems.
@@ -915,7 +915,7 @@ user:
         tty: false             # Allow TTY (local console) login.
       password: false          # Allow password login. SSH password login is always disabled.
       2fa:
-        ssh: false             # Require 2FA for SSH access. MUST be either 'true' or 'false' for both ssh and tty.
+        ssh: false             # Require 2FA for SSH access.
         tty: false             # Require 2FA for TTY (local console) login.
     privileges:
       description: "Ansible automation user with sudo, key-only SSH, no TTY."

ciss_debian_installer.sh

@@ -435,6 +435,9 @@ auditing_packages
 info_echo "4900_final_command.sh [${TARGET}]"
 final_commands
 
+info_echo "4950_final_logrotate.sh [${TARGET}]"
+final_logrotate
+
 info_echo "4999_exiting_chroot_system.sh [${TARGET}]"
 exiting_chroot_system
 

func/cdi_4400_hardening/4420_hardening_fail2ban.sh

@@ -17,12 +17,14 @@ guard_sourcing
 # Globals:
 #   ARY_ALLOW_IPV4
 #   ARY_ALLOW_IPV6
+#   RECOVERY
 #   TARGET
 #   VAR_FINAL_FQDN
 #   VAR_FINAL_IPV4
 #   VAR_FINAL_IPV6
 #   VAR_LINK_IPV6
 #   VAR_PROVIDER
+#   VAR_RUN_RECOVERY
 #   VAR_SSH_PORT
 # Arguments:
 #   None
@@ -32,29 +34,33 @@ guard_sourcing
 hardening_fail2ban() {
   ### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
   declare -r  var_logfile="/root/.ciss/cdi/log/4420_hardening_fail2ban.log"
+  declare     var_target="${TARGET}"
 
-  chroot_logger "${TARGET}${var_logfile}"
+  ### Check for TARGET / RECOVERY.
+  [[ "${VAR_RUN_RECOVERY}" == "true" ]] && var_target="${RECOVERY}"
 
-  mkdir -p "${TARGET}/root/.ciss/cdi/backup/etc/fail2ban/jail.d"
+  chroot_logger "${var_target}${var_logfile}"
-  cp "${TARGET}/etc/fail2ban/fail2ban.conf" "${TARGET}/root/.ciss/cdi/backup/etc/fail2ban/fail2ban.conf.bak"
+
-  mv "${TARGET}/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/defaults-debian.conf" "${TARGET}/root/.ciss/cdi/backup/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/defaults-debian.conf.bak"
+  mkdir -p "${var_target}/root/.ciss/cdi/backup/etc/fail2ban/jail.d"
+  cp "${var_target}/etc/fail2ban/fail2ban.conf" "${var_target}/root/.ciss/cdi/backup/etc/fail2ban/fail2ban.conf.bak"
+  mv "${var_target}/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/defaults-debian.conf" "${var_target}/root/.ciss/cdi/backup/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/defaults-debian.conf.bak"
 
   # https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=1024305
-  insert_header   "${TARGET}/etc/fail2ban/fail2ban.local"
+  insert_header   "${var_target}/etc/fail2ban/fail2ban.local"
-  insert_comments "${TARGET}/etc/fail2ban/fail2ban.local"
+  insert_comments "${var_target}/etc/fail2ban/fail2ban.local"
-  cat << 'EOF' >> "${TARGET}/etc/fail2ban/fail2ban.local"
+  cat << 'EOF' >> "${var_target}/etc/fail2ban/fail2ban.local"
 [DEFAULT]
 allowipv6 = auto
 
 EOF
 
-  insert_header   "${TARGET}/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/ciss-default.conf"
+  insert_header   "${var_target}/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/ciss-default.conf"
-  insert_comments "${TARGET}/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/ciss-default.conf"
+  insert_comments "${var_target}/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/ciss-default.conf"
 
   if [[ "${#ARY_ALLOW_IPV4[@]}" -gt 0 ]]; then
 
     ### fail2ban ufw aggressive mode, one attempt for jumphost configuration.
-    cat << EOF >> "${TARGET}/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/ciss-default.conf"
+    cat << EOF >> "${var_target}/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/ciss-default.conf"
 [DEFAULT]
 usedns    = yes
 ignoreip  = 127.0.0.0/8 ::1
@@ -64,28 +70,37 @@ EOF
 
     if [[ "${VAR_LINK_IPV6}" == "true" ]]; then
 
-      cat << EOF >> "${TARGET}/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/ciss-default.conf"
+      cat << EOF >> "${var_target}/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/ciss-default.conf"
   ${VAR_FINAL_IPV6}/64
 EOF
     fi
 
-    cat << EOF >> "${TARGET}/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/ciss-default.conf"
+    cat << EOF >> "${var_target}/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/ciss-default.conf"
 # Jumphost
   ${ARY_ALLOW_IPV4[*]}
 EOF
 
     if [[ "${VAR_LINK_IPV6}" == "true" ]]; then
 
-      cat << EOF >> "${TARGET}/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/ciss-default.conf"
+      cat << EOF >> "${var_target}/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/ciss-default.conf"
   ${ARY_ALLOW_IPV6[*]}
 EOF
     fi
 
-    cat << EOF >> "${TARGET}/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/ciss-default.conf"
+    cat << EOF >> "${var_target}/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/ciss-default.conf"
 maxretry  = 8
 findtime  = 24h
 bantime   = 24h
 
+[recidive]
+enabled   = true
+filter    = recidive
+logpath   = /var/log/fail2ban/fail2ban.log*
+banaction = iptables-allports
+bantime   = 32d
+findtime  = 384d
+maxretry  = 4
+
 [sshd]
 enabled   = true
 backend   = systemd
@@ -112,7 +127,6 @@ logpath   = /var/log/ufw.log
 maxretry  = 1
 findtime  = 24h
 bantime   = 24h
-protocol  = tcp,udp
 
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=conf
 EOF
@@ -120,7 +134,7 @@ EOF
   else
 
     ### fail2ban ufw aggressive mode, 32 attempts for NO jumphost configuration.
-    cat << EOF >> "${TARGET}/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/ciss-default.conf"
+    cat << EOF >> "${var_target}/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/ciss-default.conf"
 [DEFAULT]
 usedns    = yes
 ignoreip  = 127.0.0.0/8 ::1
@@ -130,16 +144,25 @@ EOF
 
     if [[ "${VAR_LINK_IPV6}" == "true" ]]; then
 
-      cat << EOF >> "${TARGET}/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/ciss-default.conf"
+      cat << EOF >> "${var_target}/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/ciss-default.conf"
   ${VAR_FINAL_IPV6}/64
 EOF
     fi
 
-    cat << EOF >> "${TARGET}/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/ciss-default.conf"
+    cat << EOF >> "${var_target}/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/ciss-default.conf"
 maxretry  = 8
 findtime  = 24h
 bantime   = 24h
 
+[recidive]
+enabled   = true
+filter    = recidive
+logpath   = /var/log/fail2ban/fail2ban.log*
+banaction = iptables-allports
+bantime   = 32d
+findtime  = 384d
+maxretry  = 4
+
 [sshd]
 enabled   = true
 backend   = systemd
@@ -166,7 +189,6 @@ logpath   = /var/log/ufw.log
 maxretry  = 8
 findtime  = 24h
 bantime   = 24h
-protocol  = tcp,udp
 
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=conf
 EOF
@@ -176,16 +198,19 @@ EOF
   ### Provider Hetzner needs special ignoreip rules.
   if [[ "${VAR_PROVIDER}" == "hetzner" ]]; then
 
-    sed -i '0,/^maxretry/{s/^maxretry/# Hetzner Intern\n  172.31.1.1\/16\n&/}' "${TARGET}/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/ciss-default.conf"
+    sed -i '0,/^maxretry/{s/^maxretry/# Hetzner Intern\n  172.31.1.1\/16\n&/}' "${var_target}/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/ciss-default.conf"
 
   fi
 
-  insert_header   "${TARGET}/etc/fail2ban/filter.d/ciss.ufw.conf"
+  insert_header   "${var_target}/etc/fail2ban/filter.d/ciss.ufw.conf"
-  insert_comments "${TARGET}/etc/fail2ban/filter.d/ciss.ufw.conf"
+  insert_comments "${var_target}/etc/fail2ban/filter.d/ciss.ufw.conf"
-  cat << EOF >>   "${TARGET}/etc/fail2ban/filter.d/ciss.ufw.conf"
+  cat << EOF >>   "${var_target}/etc/fail2ban/filter.d/ciss.ufw.conf"
+
 [Definition]
-failregex = ^.*UFW BLOCK.* SRC=<HOST> .*DPT=\d+ .*
+failregex = \[UFW BLOCK\].+SRC=<HOST> DST
 ignoreregex =
+
+# vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=conf
 EOF
 
   # Hardening of fail2ban systemd: https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/fail2ban#Service_hardening
@@ -193,12 +218,12 @@ EOF
   # file. "CAP_NET_ADMIN" and "CAP_NET_RAW" allow fail2ban to operate on any firewall that has a command-line shell interface.
   # By using 'ProtectSystem=strict' the filesystem hierarchy will only be read-only; 'ReadWritePaths' allows Fail2ban to have
   # write access on required paths.
-  mkdir -p "${TARGET}/etc/systemd/system/fail2ban.service.d"
+  mkdir -p "${var_target}/etc/systemd/system/fail2ban.service.d"
-  mkdir -p "${TARGET}/var/log/fail2ban"
+  mkdir -p "${var_target}/var/log/fail2ban"
 
-  insert_header   "${TARGET}/etc/systemd/system/fail2ban.service.d/override.conf"
+  insert_header   "${var_target}/etc/systemd/system/fail2ban.service.d/override.conf"
-  insert_comments "${TARGET}/etc/systemd/system/fail2ban.service.d/override.conf"
+  insert_comments "${var_target}/etc/systemd/system/fail2ban.service.d/override.conf"
-  cat << EOF >>   "${TARGET}/etc/systemd/system/fail2ban.service.d/override.conf"
+  cat << EOF >>   "${var_target}/etc/systemd/system/fail2ban.service.d/override.conf"
 [Service]
 PrivateDevices=yes
 PrivateTmp=yes
@@ -214,29 +239,53 @@ ProtectClock=true
 ProtectHostname=true
 EOF
 
-  cat << 'EOF' >> "${TARGET}/etc/fail2ban/fail2ban.local"
+  cat << 'EOF' >> "${var_target}/etc/fail2ban/fail2ban.local"
 [Definition]
 logtarget = /var/log/fail2ban/fail2ban.log
 
+[Database]
+# Keep entries for at least 384 days to cover recidive findtime.
+dbpurgeage = 384d
+
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=conf
 EOF
 
   ### Logrotate must be updated too.
-  mkdir -p "${TARGET}/root/.ciss/cdi/backup/etc/logrotate.d"
+  mkdir -p "${var_target}/root/.ciss/cdi/backup/etc/logrotate.d"
-  cp "${TARGET}/etc/logrotate.d/fail2ban" "${TARGET}/root/.ciss/cdi/backup/etc/logrotate.d/fail2ban.bak"
+  cp "${var_target}/etc/logrotate.d/fail2ban" "${var_target}/root/.ciss/cdi/backup/etc/logrotate.d/fail2ban.bak"
-  sed -i 's/\/var\/log\/fail2ban.log/\/var\/log\/fail2ban\/fail2ban.log/1' "${TARGET}/etc/logrotate.d/fail2ban"
+  cat << EOF >| "${var_target}/etc/logrotate.d/fail2ban"
-  touch "${TARGET}/var/log/fail2ban/fail2ban.log"
+/var/log/fail2ban/fail2ban.log {
-  chmod 640 "${TARGET}/var/log/fail2ban/fail2ban.log"
 
-  if [[ ! -f "${TARGET}/var/log/ufw.log" ]]; then
+    daily
-    install -d -m 0755 "${TARGET}/var/log"
+    rotate 384
-    : >| "${TARGET}/var/log/ufw.log"
+    compress
-    chmod 0640 "${TARGET}/var/log/ufw.log"
+    # Do not rotate if empty
+    notifempty
+
+    delaycompress
+    missingok
+    postrotate
+        fail2ban-client flushlogs 1>/dev/null
+    endscript
+
+    # If fail2ban runs as non-root it still needs to have write access
+    # to logfiles.
+    # create 640 fail2ban adm
+    create 640 root adm
+}
+EOF
+  touch "${var_target}/var/log/fail2ban/fail2ban.log"
+  chmod 0640 "${var_target}/var/log/fail2ban/fail2ban.log"
+
+  if [[ ! -f "${var_target}/var/log/ufw.log" ]]; then
+    install -d -m 0755 "${var_target}/var/log"
+    : >| "${var_target}/var/log/ufw.log"
+    chmod 0640 "${var_target}/var/log/ufw.log"
   fi
 
   ### Merge / Dump-Parse via 'fail2ban-client -d'. All '*.conf', '*.local', and 'jail.*'-files are read, inherited, and merged.
   ### Syntax, path, and key errors result in a non-zero exit.
-  chroot_script "${TARGET}" "
+  chroot_script "${var_target}" "
     fail2ban-client -d >> ${var_logfile} && echo "OK: config parsed" >> ${var_logfile} || echo "ERROR: config invalid" >> ${var_logfile}
   "
 

func/cdi_4400_hardening/4430_hardening_files.sh

@@ -15,7 +15,10 @@ guard_sourcing
 #######################################
 # Hardening files and directories.
 # Globals:
-#   None
+#   RECOVERY
+#   TARGET
+#   VAR_RUN_RECOVERY
+#   VAR_SETUP_PATH
 # Arguments:
 #   None
 # Returns:
@@ -23,22 +26,29 @@ guard_sourcing
 #######################################
 hardening_files() {
   declare     var_bin="" var_binary=""
+  declare     var_target="${TARGET}"
 
-  chmod 0700 "${TARGET}/etc/cron.d" "${TARGET}/etc/cron.daily" "${TARGET}/etc/cron.hourly" "${TARGET}/etc/cron.monthly" \
+  ### Check for TARGET / RECOVERY.
-             "${TARGET}/etc/cron.weekly"
+  [[ "${VAR_RUN_RECOVERY}" == "true" ]] && var_target="${RECOVERY}"
-  chmod 0700 "${TARGET}/etc/sudoers.d"
-  chmod 0700 "${TARGET}/etc/crontab"
 
-  [[ -f "${TARGET}/etc/cron.deny" ]] && rm "${TARGET}/etc/cron.deny"
+  chmod 0700 "${var_target}/etc/cron.d" "${var_target}/etc/cron.daily" "${var_target}/etc/cron.hourly" "${var_target}/etc/cron.monthly" \
+             "${var_target}/etc/cron.weekly"
+  chmod 0700 "${var_target}/etc/sudoers.d"
+  chmod 0700 "${var_target}/etc/crontab"
 
-  rm -f "${TARGET}/etc/issue" "${TARGET}/etc/issue.net"
+  [[ -f "${var_target}/etc/cron.deny" ]] && rm "${var_target}/etc/cron.deny"
-  install -m 0644 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/etc/issue" "${TARGET}/etc/issue"
-  install -m 0644 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/etc/issue.net" "${TARGET}/etc/issue.net"
 
-  install -d -m 0700 -o root -g root "${TARGET}/root/.ansible"
+  ### /etc/issue ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  rm -f "${var_target}/etc/issue" "${var_target}/etc/issue.net"
+  install -m 0644 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/etc/issue" "${var_target}/etc/issue"
+  install -m 0644 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/etc/issue.net" "${var_target}/etc/issue.net"
 
+  ### /root/.ansible -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  install -d -m 0700 -o root -g root "${var_target}/root/.ansible"
+
+  ### /usr/bin/compiler --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   for var_bin in as gcc g++ cc clang; do
-    var_binary=$(readlink -f "${TARGET}/usr/bin/${var_bin}") || {
+    var_binary=$(readlink -f "${var_target}/usr/bin/${var_bin}") || {
       do_log "info" "file_only" "4430() Binary: '${var_bin}' not found, skipping."
       continue
     }
@@ -47,6 +57,16 @@ hardening_files() {
     }
   done
 
+  ### /etc/update-motd.d/10-uname ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  mkdir -p "${var_target}/root/.ciss/cdi/backup/etc/update-motd.d"
+  cp -af "${var_target}/etc/update-motd.d/10-uname" "${var_target}/root/.ciss/cdi/backup/etc/update-motd.d/10-uname"
+
+  cat << 'EOF' >| "${var_target}/etc/update-motd.d/10-uname"
+#!/bin/sh
+uname -snrm
+EOF
+  chmod 0755 /etc/update-motd.d/10-uname
+
   guard_dir && return 0
 }
 ### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.

func/cdi_4400_hardening/4445_hardening_logrotate.sh

@@ -13,9 +13,11 @@
 guard_sourcing
 
 #######################################
-# Hardening logrotate.
+# Hardening '/etc/logrotate'.
 # Globals:
+#   RECOVERY
 #   TARGET
+#   VAR_RUN_RECOVERY
 # Arguments:
 #   None
 # Returns:
@@ -23,8 +25,6 @@ guard_sourcing
 #######################################
 hardening_logrotate() {
   ### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
-  declare -ar ary_logrotate=( "alternatives" "apt" "btmp" "chrony" "dpkg" "fail2ban" "rkhunter" "ufw" "unattended-upgrades" "usbguard")
-  declare     var_file="" var_log=""
   declare     var_target="${TARGET}"
 
   ### Check for TARGET / RECOVERY.
@@ -39,8 +39,8 @@ hardening_logrotate() {
 # rotate log files daily
 daily
 
-# keep 128 daily worth of backlogs
+# keep 384 daily worth of backlogs
-rotate 128
+rotate 384
 
 # hard cap: delete rotated logs older than 384 days
 maxage 384
@@ -65,16 +65,6 @@ include /etc/logrotate.d
 # vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=conf
 EOF
 
-  for var_log in "${ary_logrotate[@]}"; do
-    var_file="${var_target}/etc/logrotate.d/${var_log}"
-    [[ -e "${var_file}" ]] || continue
-    ### Replace leading 'monthly'/'weekly' directives with 'daily', preserving indentation and trailing comments.
-    sed -E -i \
-      -e 's/^([[:space:]]*)(monthly|weekly)([[:space:]]*)(#.*)?$/\1daily\3\4/' \
-      -e 's/^([[:space:]]*)rotate([[:space:]]+[0-9]+)?([[:space:]]*)(#.*)?$/\1rotate 128\3\4/' \
-      "${var_file}"
-  done
-
   guard_dir && return 0
 }
 ### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.

func/cdi_4400_hardening/4470_hardening_ufw.sh

@@ -15,7 +15,10 @@ guard_sourcing
 #######################################
 # Hardening 'ufw'.
 # Globals:
+#   RECOVERY
 #   TARGET
+#   VAR_FINAL_NIC
+#   VAR_RUN_RECOVERY
 #   VAR_SSH_PORT
 #   VAR_UFW_OUT
 # Arguments:
@@ -26,16 +29,22 @@ guard_sourcing
 hardening_ufw() {
   ### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
   declare -r  var_logfile="/root/.ciss/cdi/log/4470_hardening_ufw.log"
-  declare -r  var_rules="${TARGET}/etc/ufw/before6.rules"
+  declare     var_target="${TARGET}"
 
-  chroot_logger "${TARGET}${var_logfile}"
+  ### Check for TARGET / RECOVERY.
+  [[ "${VAR_RUN_RECOVERY}" == "true" ]] && var_target="${RECOVERY}"
 
-  if [[ ! -f "${TARGET}/var/log/ufw.log" ]]; then
+  declare -r  var_rules="${var_target}/etc/ufw/before6.rules"
-    touch "${TARGET}/var/log/ufw.log"
+
-    chmod 0640 "${TARGET}/var/log/ufw.log"
+
+  chroot_logger "${var_target}${var_logfile}"
+
+  if [[ ! -f "${var_target}/var/log/ufw.log" ]]; then
+    touch "${var_target}/var/log/ufw.log"
+    chmod 0640 "${var_target}/var/log/ufw.log"
   fi
 
-  chroot_script "${TARGET}" "
+  chroot_script "${var_target}" "
     ufw --force reset
     ufw logging medium
     ufw default deny incoming
@@ -48,7 +57,7 @@ hardening_ufw() {
   ### Ensure that a standard set of the most commonly used ports are open if a default-'deny'-outbound policy is selected.
   if [[ "${VAR_UFW_OUT}" = "deny" ]]; then
 
-    chroot_script "${TARGET}" "
+    chroot_script "${var_target}" "
       ufw allow out   21/tcp comment 'Outgoing FTP'
       ufw allow out   22/tcp comment 'Outgoing SSH'
       ufw allow out   25/tcp comment 'Outgoing SMTP'
@@ -71,12 +80,11 @@ hardening_ufw() {
   fi
 
   ### Allowing ICMP IPv4 outgoing per default.
-  sed -i "/# ok icmp code for FORWARD/i \# ok icmp codes for OUTPUT" "${TARGET}/etc/ufw/before.rules"
+  sed -i "/# ok icmp code for FORWARD/i \# ok icmp codes for OUTPUT" "${var_target}/etc/ufw/before.rules"
-  sed -i "/# ok icmp code for FORWARD/i \-A ufw-before-output -p icmp --icmp-type destination-unreachable -j ACCEPT" "${TARGET}/etc/ufw/before.rules"
+  sed -i "/# ok icmp code for FORWARD/i \-A ufw-before-output -p icmp --icmp-type destination-unreachable -j ACCEPT" "${var_target}/etc/ufw/before.rules"
-  sed -i "/# ok icmp code for FORWARD/i \-A ufw-before-output -p icmp --icmp-type time-exceeded -j ACCEPT" "${TARGET}/etc/ufw/before.rules"
+  sed -i "/# ok icmp code for FORWARD/i \-A ufw-before-output -p icmp --icmp-type time-exceeded -j ACCEPT" "${var_target}/etc/ufw/before.rules"
-  sed -i "/# ok icmp code for FORWARD/i \-A ufw-before-output -p icmp --icmp-type parameter-problem -j ACCEPT" "${TARGET}/etc/ufw/before.rules"
+  sed -i "/# ok icmp code for FORWARD/i \-A ufw-before-output -p icmp --icmp-type parameter-problem -j ACCEPT" "${var_target}/etc/ufw/before.rules"
-  sed -i "/# ok icmp code for FORWARD/i \-A ufw-before-output -p icmp --icmp-type echo-request -j ACCEPT" "${TARGET}/etc/ufw/before.rules"
+  sed -i "/# ok icmp code for FORWARD/i \-A ufw-before-output -p icmp --icmp-type echo-request -j ACCEPT" "${var_target}/etc/ufw/before.rules"
-
 
   ### Remove previous custom blocks (idempotent).
   sed -i "/^# BEGIN custom MLD rules/,/^# END custom MLD rules/d" "${var_rules}"
@@ -90,10 +98,9 @@ hardening_ufw() {
   ### Useful if local daemons join multicast groups, and you want clean logs.
   sed -i "/-A ufw6-before-output .*--icmpv6-type echo-request -j ACCEPT/i # BEGIN custom MLD OUTPUT rules\n-A ufw6-before-output -o ${VAR_FINAL_NIC} -p icmpv6 --icmpv6-type 131 -d ff02::/16 -j ACCEPT\n-A ufw6-before-output -o ${VAR_FINAL_NIC} -p icmpv6 --icmpv6-type 143 -d ff02::/16 -j ACCEPT\n# END custom MLD OUTPUT rules" "${var_rules}"
 
+  chroot_script "${var_target}" "echo 'y' | ufw enable 2>&1"
 
-  chroot_script "${TARGET}" "echo 'y' | ufw enable 2>&1"
+  chroot_script "${var_target}" "ufw status verbose >> ${var_logfile}"
-
-  chroot_script "${TARGET}" "ufw status verbose >> ${var_logfile}"
 
   guard_dir && return 0
 }

func/cdi_4500_user/4520_accounts_setup.sh

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ guard_sourcing
 #   RECOVERY
 #   TARGET
 #   VAR_RUN_RECOVERY
+#   VAR_SETUP_PATH
 #   VAR_TEMP_PLAIN_MFA_SEED
 #   VAR_USER_MAX
 #   VAR_USER_ROOT_SPECIFIC
@@ -51,6 +52,10 @@ accounts_setup() {
 
   chroot_logger "${var_target}${var_logfile}"
 
+  ### Install CISS TOTP gate script.
+  install -m 0755 -o root -g root "${VAR_SETUP_PATH}/includes/target/usr/local/libexec/ciss_pam_2fa_gate.sh" \
+    "${var_target}/usr/local/libexec/"
+
   ### Update pam modules for 2fa.
   write_pam_login "${var_target}"
   write_pam_sshd  "${var_target}"
@@ -166,7 +171,10 @@ EOF
   if [[ "${user_root_authentication_2fa_ssh}" == "true" || "${user_root_authentication_2fa_tty}" == "true" ]]; then
 
     write_google_authenticator_file "root" "0" "0" "${var_target}"
-    printf '%s\n' "root" >> "${var_target}/etc/ciss/2fa.users"
+
+    [[ "${user_root_authentication_2fa_ssh}" == "true" ]] && write_ciss_2fa_user "root" "sshd" "on" "${var_target}"
+
+    [[ "${user_root_authentication_2fa_tty}" == "true" ]] && write_ciss_2fa_user "root" "login" "on" "${var_target}"
 
   fi
 
@@ -382,7 +390,10 @@ EOF
     if [[ "${var_2fa_ssh}" == "true" || "${var_2fa_tty}" == "true" ]]; then
 
       write_google_authenticator_file "${var_username}" "${var_uid}" "${var_gid}" "${var_target}"
-      printf '%s\n' "${var_username}" >> "${var_target}/etc/ciss/2fa.users"
+
+      [[ "${var_2fa_ssh}" == "true" ]] && write_ciss_2fa_user "${var_username}" "sshd" "on" "${var_target}"
+
+      [[ "${var_2fa_tty}" == "true" ]] && write_ciss_2fa_user "${var_username}" "login" "on" "${var_target}"
 
     fi
 
@@ -652,7 +663,7 @@ EOF
     cat << EOF >>   "${var_lr_conf}"
 /var/log/sudo.log {
     daily
-    rotate 128
+    rotate 384
     maxage 384
     compress
     delaycompress
@@ -666,18 +677,6 @@ EOF
 }
 EOF
 
-    ### Verify logrotate config in chroot.
-    if ! chroot_script "${var_target}" "logrotate -d /etc/logrotate.conf >> ${var_logfile}"; then
-
-      do_log "warn" "file_only" "4520() Command: [chroot_script ${var_target} logrotate -d /etc/logrotate.conf] failed."
-      return "${ERR_VERIFY_LOGROTATE}"
-
-    else
-
-      do_log "info" "file_only" "4520() Command: [chroot_script ${var_target} logrotate -d /etc/logrotate.conf] successful."
-
-    fi
-
   fi
 
   return 0
@@ -721,6 +720,131 @@ read_totp_seed(){
 # shellcheck disable=SC2034
 readonly -f read_totp_seed
 
+#######################################
+# Writes idempotently '/etc/ciss/2fa.map'.
+# Globals:
+#   None
+# Arguments:
+#   1: user
+#   2: module {login, sshd, su, sudo}
+#   3: status {on, off, 1, 0, yes, no, true, false}
+#   4: target
+# Returns:
+#   0: on success
+#######################################
+write_ciss_2fa_user() {
+  ### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
+  declare -r  var_u="${1}" var_m="${2,,}" var_s="${3}" var_target="${4}"
+  declare -r  var_ciss_2fa_map="${var_target}/etc/ciss/2fa.map" var_map_file="${var_ciss_2fa_map}" \
+              var_tmp_file="${var_map_file}.tmp.$$" var_umask=$(umask)
+  declare -i  col_idx="" found="0" status=""
+  declare     line=""
+
+  umask 0077
+
+  # shellcheck disable=SC2249
+  case "${var_s,,}" in
+    on|1|yes|true)  status="1" ;;
+    off|0|no|false) status="0" ;;
+  esac
+
+  # shellcheck disable=SC2249
+  case "${var_m}" in
+    login) col_idx=2 ;;
+    sshd)  col_idx=3 ;;
+    su)    col_idx=4 ;;
+    sudo)  col_idx=5 ;;
+  esac
+
+  ### Read the old map, rewrite with targeted change.
+  if [[ -r "${var_map_file}" ]]; then
+
+    ### Read line by line; preserve comments/blank lines; drop duplicate user lines beyond the first.
+    while IFS= read -r line || [[ -n "${line}" ]]; do
+
+      ### Preserve comments and blanks verbatim.
+      if [[ -z "${line}" || "${line:0:1}" == "#" ]]; then
+
+        printf '%s\n' "${line}" >> "${var_tmp_file}"
+        continue
+
+      fi
+
+      ### Parse colon-separated fields (the rest is ignored).
+      declare u="" f_login="" f_sshd="" f_su="" f_sudo="" rest=""
+      IFS=':' read -r u f_login f_sshd f_su f_sudo rest <<< "${line}"
+
+      ### Keep non-target users verbatim.
+      if [[ "${u}" != "${var_u}" ]]; then
+
+        printf '%s\n' "${line}" >> "${var_tmp_file}"
+        continue
+
+      fi
+
+      ### If we already updated this user once, skip any further duplicates.
+      if [[ "${found}" -eq 1 ]]; then
+        ### Drop duplicate occurrence to keep the file canonical.
+        continue
+      fi
+
+      ### Fill missing fields with defaults=1.
+      [[ -n "${f_login}" ]] || f_login=1
+      [[ -n "${f_sshd}"  ]] || f_sshd=1
+      [[ -n "${f_su}"    ]] || f_su=1
+      [[ -n "${f_sudo}"  ]] || f_sudo=1
+
+      ### Toggle the requested column only.
+      # shellcheck disable=SC2249
+      case "${col_idx}" in
+
+        2) f_login="${status}" ;;
+        3) f_sshd="${status}"  ;;
+        4) f_su="${status}"    ;;
+        5) f_sudo="${status}"  ;;
+
+      esac
+
+      printf '%s:%s:%s:%s:%s\n' "${u}" "${f_login}" "${f_sshd}" "${f_su}" "${f_sudo}" >> "${var_tmp_file}"
+      found=1
+
+    done < "${var_map_file}"
+
+  fi
+
+  ### If user not found: append a new default line (all 1), with the column set.
+  if [[ "${found}" -eq 0 ]]; then
+
+    declare -i d_login="1" d_sshd="1" d_su="1" d_sudo="1"
+
+    # shellcheck disable=SC2249
+    case "${col_idx}" in
+
+      2) d_login="${status}" ;;
+      3) d_sshd="${status}"  ;;
+      4) d_su="${status}"    ;;
+      5) d_sudo="${status}"  ;;
+
+    esac
+
+    printf '%s:%s:%s:%s:%s\n' "${var_u}" "${d_login}" "${d_sshd}" "${d_su}" "${d_sudo}" >> "${var_tmp_file}"
+
+  fi
+
+  if [[ -e "${var_tmp_file}" ]]; then
+
+    mv -f -- "${var_tmp_file}" "${var_map_file}" || rm -f -- "${var_tmp_file}"
+
+  fi
+
+  umask "${var_umask}"
+
+  return 0
+}
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f write_ciss_2fa_user
+
 #######################################
 # Writes '.google_authenticator'-file for the respective user.
 # Globals:
@@ -859,8 +983,8 @@ session  required   pam_env.so readenv=1 envfile=/etc/default/locale
 
 # ===== CISS 2FA block  ========
 
-# If user is NOT listed -> succeed and SKIP next two lines (no TOTP prompt).
+# If gate returns SUCCESS => skip next two lines (no TOTP).
-auth                [success=2 default=ignore] pam_listfile.so item=user sense=deny file=/etc/ciss/2fa.users onerr=ignore
+auth                [success=2 default=ignore] pam_exec.so quiet /usr/local/libexec/ciss_pam_2fa_gate.sh
 
 # For listed users: enforce that the secret file exists, else deny without prompting.
 # pam_google_authenticator will itself fail if the file is absent; we add a clear hint before it.
@@ -943,8 +1067,8 @@ write_pam_sshd() {
 
 # ===== CISS 2FA block  ========
 
-# If user is NOT listed -> succeed and SKIP next two lines (silent Keyboard-Interactive (KI) success).
+# If gate returns SUCCESS => skip next two lines (no TOTP).
-auth                [success=2 default=ignore] pam_listfile.so item=user sense=deny file=/etc/ciss/2fa.users onerr=ignore
+auth                [success=2 default=ignore] pam_exec.so quiet /usr/local/libexec/ciss_pam_2fa_gate.sh
 
 # For listed users: enforce that the secret file exists, else deny without prompting.
 # pam_google_authenticator will itself fail if the file is absent; we add a clear hint before it.
@@ -1064,8 +1188,8 @@ auth     sufficient pam_timestamp.so
 
 # ===== CISS 2FA block  ========
 
-# If user is NOT listed -> succeed and SKIP next two lines (no TOTP prompt).
+# If gate returns SUCCESS => skip next two lines (no TOTP).
-auth                [success=2 default=ignore] pam_listfile.so item=user sense=deny file=/etc/ciss/2fa.users onerr=ignore
+auth                [success=2 default=ignore] pam_exec.so quiet /usr/local/libexec/ciss_pam_2fa_gate.sh
 
 # For listed users: enforce that the secret file exists, else deny without prompting.
 # pam_google_authenticator will itself fail if the file is absent; we add a clear hint before it.
@@ -1129,8 +1253,8 @@ auth     sufficient pam_timestamp.so
 
 # ===== CISS 2FA block  ========
 
-# If user is NOT listed -> succeed and SKIP next two lines (no TOTP prompt).
+# If gate returns SUCCESS => skip next two lines (no TOTP).
-auth                [success=2 default=ignore] pam_listfile.so item=user sense=deny file=/etc/ciss/2fa.users onerr=ignore
+auth                [success=2 default=ignore] pam_exec.so quiet /usr/local/libexec/ciss_pam_2fa_gate.sh
 
 # For listed users: enforce that the secret file exists, else deny without prompting.
 # pam_google_authenticator will itself fail if the file is absent; we add a clear hint before it.

func/cdi_4900_xtended/4950_final_logrotate.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# SPDX-Version: 3.0
+# SPDX-CreationInfo: 2025-06-17; WEIDNER, Marc S.; <msw@coresecret.dev>
+# SPDX-ExternalRef: GIT https://git.coresecret.dev/msw/CISS.debian.installer.git
+# SPDX-FileContributor: WEIDNER, Marc S.; Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency
+# SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2024-2025; WEIDNER, Marc S.; <msw@coresecret.dev>
+# SPDX-FileType: SOURCE
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: EUPL-1.2 OR LicenseRef-CCLA-1.0
+# SPDX-LicenseComment: This file is part of the CISS.debian.installer.secure framework.
+# SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
+# SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
+
+guard_sourcing
+
+#######################################
+# Final update '/etc/logrotate.d/*'.
+# Globals:
+#   RECOVERY
+#   TARGET
+#   VAR_RUN_RECOVERY
+# Arguments:
+#   None
+# Returns:
+#   0: on success
+#######################################
+final_logrotate() {
+  ### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
+  declare -ar ary_logrotate=(
+    "alternatives"
+    "apt"
+    "btmp"
+    "chrony"
+    "clamav-daemon"
+    "clamav-freshclam"
+    "dpkg"
+    "fail2ban"
+    "rkhunter"
+    "rsnapshot"
+    "ufw"
+    "unattended-upgrades"
+    "usbguard"
+    "wtmp"
+  )
+  declare     var_file="" var_log=""
+  declare     var_target="${TARGET}"
+
+  ### Check for TARGET / RECOVERY.
+  [[ "${VAR_RUN_RECOVERY}" == "true" ]] && var_target="${RECOVERY}"
+
+  for var_log in "${ary_logrotate[@]}"; do
+    var_file="${var_target}/etc/logrotate.d/${var_log}"
+    [[ -e "${var_file}" ]] || continue
+    ### Replace leading 'monthly'/'weekly' directives with 'daily', preserving indentation and trailing comments.
+    sed -E -i \
+      -e 's/^([[:space:]]*)(monthly|weekly)([[:space:]]*)(#.*)?$/\1daily\3\4/' \
+      -e 's/^([[:space:]]*)rotate([[:space:]]+[0-9]+)?([[:space:]]*)(#.*)?$/\1rotate 128\3\4/' \
+      "${var_file}"
+  done
+
+  guard_dir && return 0
+}
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f final_logrotate
+# vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

includes/target/etc/skel/.ciss.bashrc

@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ export HISTSIZE="16384"
 export HISTTIMEFORMAT='%F %T %z  '
 
 # Optional, cautious filters (avoids trivial leaks, but not foolproof). Caution: HISTIGNORE is coarse-grained, don't overdo it.
-export HISTIGNORE='*PASS*:*pass*:*secret*:*token*:*API_KEY*:*'
+export HISTIGNORE='*PASS*:*pass*:*secret*:*token*:*API_KEY*'
 
 # With only histappend, entries can be lost or merge with each other in the event of a crash or multiple sessions.
 # "-a": Appends new entries from RAM to the file.

includes/target/etc/skel/.physnet.bashrc

@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ export HISTSIZE="16384"
 export HISTTIMEFORMAT='%F %T %z  '
 
 # Optional, cautious filters (avoids trivial leaks, but not foolproof). Caution: HISTIGNORE is coarse-grained, don't overdo it.
-export HISTIGNORE='*PASS*:*pass*:*secret*:*token*:*API_KEY*:*'
+export HISTIGNORE='*PASS*:*pass*:*secret*:*token*:*API_KEY*'
 
 # With only histappend, entries can be lost or merge with each other in the event of a crash or multiple sessions.
 # "-a": Appends new entries from RAM to the file.

includes/target/root/.ciss.bashrc

@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ export HISTSIZE="16384"
 export HISTTIMEFORMAT='%F %T %z  '
 
 # Optional, cautious filters (avoids trivial leaks, but not foolproof). Caution: HISTIGNORE is coarse-grained, don't overdo it.
-export HISTIGNORE='*PASS*:*pass*:*secret*:*token*:*API_KEY*:*'
+export HISTIGNORE='*PASS*:*pass*:*secret*:*token*:*API_KEY*'
 
 # With only histappend, entries can be lost or merge with each other in the event of a crash or multiple sessions.
 # "-a": Appends new entries from RAM to the file.

includes/target/root/.physnet.bashrc

@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ export HISTSIZE="16384"
 export HISTTIMEFORMAT='%F %T %z  '
 
 # Optional, cautious filters (avoids trivial leaks, but not foolproof). Caution: HISTIGNORE is coarse-grained, don't overdo it.
-export HISTIGNORE='*PASS*:*pass*:*secret*:*token*:*API_KEY*:*'
+export HISTIGNORE='*PASS*:*pass*:*secret*:*token*:*API_KEY*'
 
 # With only histappend, entries can be lost or merge with each other in the event of a crash or multiple sessions.
 # "-a": Appends new entries from RAM to the file.

includes/target/usr/local/libexec/ciss_pam_2fa_gate.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# SPDX-Version: 3.0
+# SPDX-CreationInfo: 2025-06-17; WEIDNER, Marc S.; <msw@coresecret.dev>
+# SPDX-ExternalRef: GIT https://git.coresecret.dev/msw/CISS.debian.installer.git
+# SPDX-FileContributor: WEIDNER, Marc S.; Centurion Intelligence Consulting Agency
+# SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2024-2025; WEIDNER, Marc S.; <msw@coresecret.dev>
+# SPDX-FileType: SOURCE
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: EUPL-1.2 OR LicenseRef-CCLA-1.0
+# SPDX-LicenseComment: This file is part of the CISS.debian.installer.secure framework.
+# SPDX-PackageName: CISS.debian.installer
+# SPDX-Security-Contact: security@coresecret.eu
+
+### Purpose: Unified CISS 2FA gate for PAM (auth phase), deciding per 'user' and 'service'.
+#            Exit 0 => PAM_SUCCESS (skip next N lines via the control flag).
+#            Exit 1 => non-success (fall through to GA lines).
+### Policy : "strict" by default: if service=1 and secret missing => GA will fail (no prompt).
+#            Set CISS_POLICY=permissive to skip GA when the secret is missing.
+
+set -Ceuo pipefail
+
+### Declare Arrays, HashMaps, and Variables.
+declare -g VAR_MAP_FILE="/etc/ciss/2fa.map"
+declare -g VAR_POLICY="${CISS_POLICY:-strict}"
+
+### PAM variables provided by pam_exec:
+declare -g VAR_U="${PAM_USER:-}"
+declare -g VAR_S="${PAM_SERVICE:-}"
+
+
+#######################################
+# Read flag for user and service (0/1), default: empty (not found).
+# Globals:
+#   VAR_MAP_FILE
+#   VAR_U
+# Arguments:
+#   1: PAM module / service {login, sshd, su, sudo}
+# Returns:
+#   0: on success
+#######################################
+read_flag() {
+  declare -r  var_col="${1}"
+  declare     line=""
+
+  while IFS= read -r line; do
+
+    ### Strip leading / trailing spaces.
+    line="${line#"${line%%[![:space:]]*}"}"
+    line="${line%"${line##*[![:space:]]}"}"
+    [[ -z "${line}" || "${line}" == \#* ]] && continue
+
+    declare user="" f_login="" f_sshd="" f_su="" f_sudo="" _rest=""
+    IFS=: read -r user f_login f_sshd f_su f_sudo _rest <<<"${line}"
+
+    [[ "${user}" != "${VAR_U}" ]] && continue
+
+    case "${var_col}" in
+
+      2) echo "${f_login}"; return 0 ;;
+      3) echo "${f_sshd}";  return 0 ;;
+      4) echo "${f_su}";    return 0 ;;
+      5) echo "${f_sudo}";  return 0 ;;
+      *) echo "";           return 0 ;;
+
+    esac
+
+  done < "${VAR_MAP_FILE}"
+
+  echo ""
+
+  return 0
+}
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f read_flag
+
+#######################################
+# Map PAM service to column index in the map (1-based after USER).
+# Globals:
+#   None
+# Arguments:
+#   1: PAM module / service {login, sshd, su, sudo}
+# Returns:
+#   0: on success
+#######################################
+map_service_to_col() {
+  declare -r  var_s="${1}"
+  case "${var_s}" in
+    login) echo 2 ;;
+    sshd)  echo 3 ;;
+    su)    echo 4 ;;
+    sudo)  echo 5 ;;
+    *)     echo 0 ;; # Unknown services => behave as "not enforced".
+  esac
+}
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f map_service_to_col
+
+#######################################
+# Main function wrapper.
+# Globals:
+#   VAR_MAP_FILE
+#   VAR_POLICY
+#   VAR_S
+#   VAR_U
+# Arguments:
+#   None
+# Returns:
+#   0: on success
+#   1: on failure
+#######################################
+main() {
+  ### On missing map, behave like "not listed" (skip GA), analogous to onerr=ignore.
+  if [[ ! -r "${VAR_MAP_FILE}" || -z "${VAR_U}" || -z "${VAR_S}" ]]; then
+    exit 0
+  fi
+
+  declare col; col="$(map_service_to_col "${VAR_S}")"
+  ### Treat unknown service as "not enforced".
+  [[ "${col}" -eq 0 ]] && exit 0
+
+  declare flag=""; flag="$(read_flag "${col}")"
+  ###  Not listed => skip GA.
+  [[ -z "${flag}" ]] && exit 0
+
+  ### Listed with explicit 0 => skip GA.
+  [[ "${flag}" == "0" ]] && exit 0
+
+  ### If the flag == "1" => enforces GA for this service.
+  ### Optional permissive mode: If the secret is missing, then skip GA instead of enforcing.
+  if [[ "${VAR_POLICY}" == "permissive" ]]; then
+
+    declare home=""
+    ### Resolve home via getent passwd (avoids $HOME spoofing).
+    home="$(getent passwd -- "${VAR_U}" | cut -d: -f6)"
+    if [[ -n "${home}" && ! -f "${home}/.google_authenticator" ]]; then
+
+      exit 0
+
+    fi
+
+  fi
+
+  # Enforce GA: return non-zero so PAM control falls through to GA lines.
+  exit 1
+}
+### Prevents accidental 'unset -f'.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+readonly -f main
+
+main "$@"
+
+# vim: number et ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 ai tw=128 ft=sh

meta_loader_func.sh

@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ source_guard "./func/cdi_4600_packages/4630_auditing_packages.sh"
 
 ### cdi_4900_xtended
 source_guard "./func/cdi_4900_xtended/4900_final_command.sh"
+source_guard "./func/cdi_4900_xtended/4950_final_logrotate.sh"
 source_guard "./func/cdi_4900_xtended/4999_exiting_chroot_system.sh"
 
 ### cdi_5000_recovery